

G L O T T A

Zeitschrift für griechische und lateinische Sprache

Herausgegeben von

Michael Meier-Brügger,
Gerhard Meiser und Heinz-Günther Nesselrath

LXXVII. Band
2001

Göttingen · Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2003

*Begründet von Paul Kretschmer und Franz Skutsch
Nach 1945 fortgesetzt von Paul Kretschmer und Bruno Snell*

Printed in Germany by Hubert & Co., Göttingen

Inhalt

I.-J. Adiego, Osco TRÍBUF PLÍFRIKS	1
G. Bonfante, <i>ě</i> > <i>ǎ</i> in báltico e in armeno	137
B. Fraser, Consider the lilies: prolepsis and the development of complementation	7
B. Fraser, The clause start in ancient Greek: focus and the second position	138
E.-C. Gerö, Negatives and Noun Phrases in Classical Greek: A Reconsideration	38
E.-C. Gerö, “Irrealis” and Past Tense in Ancient Greek	178
K. Järvinen, Modern Greek <i>τηφλόμυγα</i> , a Descendant of <i>χαλκή μυῖα</i> ?	56
D. Kölligan, Suppletion und Defektivität im griechischen Verbum: <i>εὔδειν</i> und <i>δραθεῖν</i>	198
K. Lennartz, Zwei versteckte Wörter	59
W. B. Lockwood, On the origin of Lat. <i>hirundo</i> and Gr. <i>χελιδών</i>	217
R. G. Mayer, “Not” again?	65
S. Mazzoldi, Accezione del greco <i>λείσσω</i> in alcuni passi tragici	75
B. Pastor, Lat. <i>Olphius</i> = ὈΛΒΙΟΣ	219
G.-J. Pinault, Le type latin <i>uorāgō</i> : un reflet d’un suffixe indo- européen	85
R. Renehan, Some Supplements to the Revised <i>LSJ</i> Supplement	221
H. Ros, Binding Theory and Valency Grammar in Latin	244
P. Sandin, A Greek Delocutive Noun? Some Notes on <i>ποιφύγμα</i> and its Alleged Cognates	110
M. L. West, Some Homeric Words	118
M. L. West, Atreus and Attarissiyas	262
Stichwörterverzeichnis	267

GLOTTA

Zeitschrift für
griechische und lateinische Sprache

Herausgegeben von
Michael Meier-Brügger,
Gerhard Meiser und
Heinz-Günther Nesselrath

LXXVII. Band · 1.–2. Heft · 2001

VANDENHOECK & RUPRECHT IN GÖTTINGEN

GLOTTA

Zeitschrift für griechische und lateinische Sprache
Begründet von Paul Kretschmer und Franz Skutsch
Nach 1945 fortgesetzt von Paul Kretschmer und Bruno Snell

INHALT

77. Band · 1.-2. Heft · 2001
(erschienen 2003)

I.-J. Adiego, Osco TRÍBUF PLÍFRIKS	1
B. Fraser, Consider the lilies: prolepsis and the development of complementation	7
E.-C. Gerö, Negatives and Noun Phrases in Classical Greek: A Reconsideration	38
K. Järvinen, Modern Greek τυφλόμυγα, a Descendant of χαλκή μυῖα?	56
K. Lennartz, Zwei versteckte Wörter	59
R. G. Mayer, "Not" again?	65
S. Mazzoldi, Accezione del greco λεύσσω in alcuni passi tragici	75
G.-J. Pinault, Le type latin <i>uorāgō</i> : un reflet d'un suffixe indo-européen	85
P. Sandin, A Greek Delocutive Noun? Some Notes on ποίφυγμα and its Alleged Cognates	110
M. L. West, Some Homeric Words	118

Manuskriptsendungen werden nur nach vorheriger Anfrage mit kurzer Zusammenfassung des Inhalts an folgende Anschriften erbeten: *Prof. Dr. Michael Meier-Brügger*, Freie Universität Berlin, Seminar für Vergleichende und Indogermanische Sprachwissenschaft, Fabeckstr. 7, D-14195 Berlin, E-mail: drmeier@zedat.fuberlin.de; *Prof. Dr. Gerhard Meiser*, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Institut für Indogermanistik, Allgemeine und Angewandte Sprachwissenschaft, Heinrich-und-Thomas-Mann-Str. 22, D-06108 Halle/Saale, E-mail: meiser@indogerm.uni-halle.de; *Prof. Dr. Heinz-Günther Nesselrath*, Georg-August-Universität, Seminar für Klassische Philologie, Humboldtallee 19, D-37073 Göttingen, E-mail: HeinzGuenther.Nesselrath@phil.uni-goettingen.de. Die Zusammenfassungen werden mit den Beiträgen veröffentlicht und sollten nicht mehr als etwa 75-100 Wörter umfassen. Manuskripte müssen die deutlich lesbare Privatadresse des Verfassers tragen.

Diese Zeitschrift und alle in ihr enthaltenen einzelnen Beiträge und Abbildungen sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes bedarf der Zustimmung des Verlages. Abbestellungen können nur berücksichtigt werden, wenn sie innerhalb 8 Wochen nach Ausgabe des Schlußheftes eines Bandes beim Verlag vorliegen.

Verlag: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, 37070 Göttingen.

Internet: www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht.de

E-mail: info@vandenhoeck-ruprecht.de (für Bestellungen und Abonnementsverwaltung)

Satz: Satzspiegel, 37176 Angerstein; Druck- u. Bindearbeit: Hubert & Co., 37079 Göttingen.

Verlag und Herausgeber bedauern die durch verschiedene ungünstige Umstände eingetretene Verzögerung im Erscheinen der Glotta. Sie werden alles daransetzen, daß die Zeitschrift künftig wieder in regelmäßigen Abständen erscheinen kann.

ISSN 0017-1298

Oscó TRÍBUF PLÍFRIKS¹

De IGNACIO-J. ADIEGO, Barcelona

Resumen: Una inscripción osca recientemente publicada presenta la fórmula TRÍBUF PLÍFRIKS, posible forma osca del título de magistrado romano *tribunus plebis*. En el presente artículo se analizan las dos palabras que componen la fórmula osca. En TRÍBUF se señalan las dificultades que plantea la presencia de *b* para **bʰ* originaria y se propone como alternativa considerar algún tipo de interferencia de la raíz **tréb-*. En el caso de PLÍFRIKS, además de confirmar un origen **pleh₁dʰ-* de latín *plebs*, se observa la importancia de que la forma osca presuponga una forma sufijada en *-ro-* frente a las formas sufijadas en *-u-* y *-os-* del griego (πληθός y πλῆθος), ya que recuerda claramente al llamado “sistema Caland-Wackernagel”.

Una inscripción osca recientemente descubierta en *Teanum Sidicinum* (Campania) ha sido publicada por Stefano De Caro en la revista de epigrafía itálica de *Studi Etruschi* (SE 63, 1999, 456–458):

[...] TRÍBUF: PLÍFRIKS: APPELLUNEÍ: BRATEÍS: DATAS:
DUNAT

La inscripción es traducida así por De Caro: [...] *tribunus plebicus, Appollini, gratia data, donat*.

Tal como puede verse en la traducción, el editor propone, siguiendo a Adriano La Regina, interpretar TRÍBUF PLÍFRIKS como equivalente a la fórmula latina *tribunus plebis* (atestiguada ya en osco, como el propio De Caro señala, en la Tabula Bantina, aunque de forma abreviada *tr[] pl[]*).

La identificación resulta sumamente atractiva, pero plantea problemas lingüísticos muy interesantes que la edición epigráfica, por razones obvias, no aborda, y que vale la pena analizar:

1. TRÍBUF: De Caro señala que se ha de tratar de un sustantivo de la 3ª declinación (-UF < **-ons* [sic]), y lo compara con el umbro *trifo*, TRIFU. El problema, no mencionado por De Caro, es, evidentemente, la presencia de B en lugar de F, si atendemos a la tradicional derivación de *tribunus* a partir de *tribus* y éste, a su vez, de un **tribʰus*

¹ Este artículo ha sido realizado en el marco del proyecto PB 96-0470 de la DGCYT. Agradezco al Prof. Jürgen Untermann (Köln) sus comentarios y observaciones que han permitido dar forma definitiva a este trabajo.

con aspirada (de hecho, un compuesto de *tri-* “3” y la raíz **b^hewH-*), tal como el umbro presupone (cf. los mencionados *trifo*, TRIFU). Evaluemos las diferentes posibilidades de interpretación que esta anomalía puede recibir y sus repercusiones:

1) Estamos ante un préstamo latino. Esta explicación solventa sin más el problema fonético. Tiene a su favor, además, los ejemplos de otros préstamos de nombres de magistraturas romanas en osco, como KVAÍSSTUR o AÍDÍL. En este caso, el grafema <Í> estaría representando *ĩ*, lo que no plantea ningún problema, ya que es éste uno de sus valores fonéticos.

Sin embargo resulta extraño el paso de un tema temático en *-no-* a un tema consonántico en *-n-*. Parece más natural esperar una forma como **tribuns* (con *-ns* secundaria a partir de **-nōs*)². ¿Hay que suponer que se trata de un ejemplo más de interacción entre la 2ª y la 3ª declinación en osco, o bien han pesado en la adaptación algunos otros temas en *-uf*, *-uneis* existentes en dicha lengua?³

2) Se trata de una forma genuinamente osca. El problema morfológico desaparece, pero surge la cuestión de cómo explicar *-b-* en lugar de *-f* < **-b^h-*. Si descartamos que se trate de una anomalía gráfica y fonética -algo no del todo imposible⁴- resulta evidente que nos encontramos ante algún tipo de interferencia con otra raíz. Teniendo en cuenta que osco <Í> puede muy bien representar, además de *ĩ*, una *ē*, parece lógico imaginar aquí la presencia de la raíz *trēb-* “construir (?); habitar (?); construcción con vigas, edificio, casa”, raíz bien documentada en tanto en osco (TRÍIBUM ‘aedificium’, TRÍBARAKAVÚM ‘aedificare’).

Cuestión más complicada es explicar qué clase de interferencia es la que aquí se ha producido. Podemos imaginar, entre otras posibilidades, dos como las más probables:

a) dada la presencia comprobada en latín y en umbro de **tri-b^hu-*, la forma osca TRÍBUF es una alteración paretimológica de un **TRÍFUF* < **trib^huns* < **trib^hu-n(ō)s* idéntico en origen al latín

² Cf., por ejemplo, PÚMPAIANS < **pompayanos* (Ve. 11).

³ Untermann (com. pers.) recuerda, a propósito de esto, la forma osca *humuns* (nom. pl.), un tema en **-ōn-* (< **hom-ōn-es*), cf. igualmente sudpiceno NEMÚNEÍ (dat. sg.) < **ne-hemōn-ey*.

⁴ Recuérdense que tenemos en osco formas como *μεβιτη* frente a *μεφιτη* o *σταβαλανο* frente a *STAFLATASSET*, *vid* en relación con esto Meiser (1986:73). Se trata, de todos modos, de formas excepcionales. Por otra parte, en la misma inscripción que estamos comentando tenemos *PLÍFRIKS*, no ***PLÍBRIKS*.

tribūnus. Dicha alteración paretimológica habría sido provocada, evidentemente, por la raíz *trēb-*. Por tanto, el osco disponía de un título de magistrado comparable formalmente al latín *tribunus*, pero alterado por etimología popular

b) existía ya en osco una palabra *trēb-ōn-* que es identificada directamente con latín *tribūnus* por simple asonancia y tal vez por alguna motivación semántica que se nos escapa. Tal vez representaba ella misma algún tipo de magistratura propia cuyas competencias podían de algún modo identificarse con las de un *tribunus* romano.

Esta última hipótesis encuentra una atractiva, aunque no del todo segura, conexión con una forma documentada en etrusco. Steinbauer⁵ propone atribuir a etrusco *trepu* el significado de “artesano” y considerarlo un préstamo de una forma umbra **trebu* < **trebō*, lógicamente derivada de la misma raíz *trēb-* que aquí estamos comentando. El argumento en que se apoya Steinbauer es de entrada enormemente sugestivo: un espejo etrusco (Ta S. 8, CIE 10202 con foto) en el que aparecen Šeθlans (el Hefesto-Vulcano etrusco), Uni (Hera-Juno) y un individuo que está clavando un clavo con un martillo y cuyo nombre es *trepu*.



⁵ D. Steinbauer en: H. Rix, Oskisch-Umbrisch. Texte und Grammatik, Arbeitstagung der Indogermanischen Gesellschaft und der Società Italiana di Glottologia vom 25. bis 28. September 1991 in Freiburg. Wiesbaden 1993, 294-296.

Se trata, como bien comenta Steinbauer, del conocido mito de la venganza de Hefesto contra su madre Hera por haberle precipitado desde el Olimpo: Hefesto envía como regalo a su madre un trono de oro que encadena a quien se sienta en él. En la escena del espejo puede verse el final del mito: Hefesto está desatando a su madre. El individuo al que acompaña la palabra *trepu* parece estar ayudándole.

El principal problema es que la lectura *trepu* no está exenta de dificultades: tal vez haya de leerse *tretu* en vez de *trepu*⁶. Sin embargo, en tanto que *trepu* está muy bien documentado en etrusco (siempre como parte de nombres de persona), *tretu* sería un hápax. Volviendo al artículo de Steinbauer, vale la pena citar las palabras con las que concluye su propuesta de interpretación de *trepu*: “Es is aber wahrscheinlich[er], daß im Ostitalischen zur Wurzel *treb-* (vgl. osk. Akk. *tríbúm* “Haus, Gebäude”) ein *-on*-stämmiges Nomen agentis gebildet wurde” (Steinbauer 1993:294–296). Resulta muy significativo que osco TRÍBUF pueda interpretarse precisamente de este mismo modo: **trēb-ōn-s* (para el grado alargado de la raíz cf. TRÍBÚM y TRÍBARA-KAVUM). Dicho de otra manera, la forma “ostitalisch” **treb-on*- que Steinbauer proponía sería de hecho una forma común sabelia, pues estaría presente también en osco.

Finalmente, es necesario observar que estas dos hipótesis (origen a partir de **tribhū-no-* pero alterado paretimológicamente frente a procedencia directa de la raíz *trēb-*) han fijado como premisa la interpretación del editor de la inscripción de que TRÍBUF PLÍFRIKS es la traducción osca del título *tribunus plebis* latino. Esta parece, por ahora, la interpretación más satisfactoria y por ello la hemos hecho nuestra, pero creo que no se ha de descartar que estemos ante una magistratura propiamente osca y tal vez sin relación alguna con el *tribunus plebis* latino.

2. PLÍFRIKS. Esta forma, que De Caro se limita a comparar con latín *plēbs* y a insinuar que es un préstamo⁷, me parece de especial importancia por las razones siguientes:

⁶ De hecho es *tretu* la lectura adoptada por Rix en sus *Etruskische Texte*.

⁷ “Il passaggio del latino *pleb-* all’osco PLÍFR- e confortato dal confronto con casi come *lex = lixs* e LÚVFREÍS = Liberi”. Justamente la presencia de *f* tanto en PLÍFR- como en LÚVFREÍS obliga a descartar ya de entrada un préstamo en ambos casos. Tampoco está claro que osco *lixs* sea un préstamo latino – aunque parece que sí hay influencia latina en el empleo de esta forma). Para LÚVFREÍS y *lixs* véase ahora J. Untermann, *Wörterbuch des Oskisch-Umbrischen*, Heidelberg, 2000, ss. vv.

a) La presencia de una *-f* implica que, en latín, *plēb-* ha de venir o de **pleh₁b^h-* o de **pleh₁d^h-u-*. Esta segunda forma permite recuperar con claridad la ya antigua comparación con griego πληθύς (f.) “multitud” (cf. igualmente el neutro πληθος), formulada por Brugmann⁸, pero muy cuestionada⁹.

b) Resulta sorprendente la presencia de *r* tras la raíz: PLÍFRIKS presupone, pues, un origen a partir de **plēd^hr-iko-s*, sin duda un derivado secundario mediante sufijo *-iko*¹⁰ de una forma adjetival previa **plēd^hro-* (< *pleh₁d^hro-*). Aunque no abundan en itálico los ejemplos de sufijo *-iko-* (frente al mucho más frecuente y productivo *-iko-*), puede traerse a colación, por su paralelismo con PLÍFRIKS, el sustantivo latino *rubrica* (f.) “tierra o tiza roja”, surgido de un adjetivo **rubr-ico-* < **rud^hr-iko-*, a su vez derivado de **rud^hro-* (< **h₁rud^hro-* > lat. *ruber*).

Si al lado de la forma adjetival **pleh₁d^hro-* que el testimonio osco PLÍFRIKS nos obliga a reconstruir traemos a colación los dos sustantivos griegos antes mencionados, πληθύς y πληθος, nos encontramos entonces ante un cuadro muy peculiar:

- un adjetivo en *-ro-* (**pleh₁d^hro-*),
- un sustantivo neutro en *-os* (**pleh₁dh-os*)
- un adjetivo en *-u-* (**pleh₁d^hu-*, del que ha surgido el sustantivo femenino en *-ū-* [< *uh₂* o bien *-uh₁*, cf. *infra*] πληθύς).

Este tipo de interrelación entre diferentes tipos de temas, entre los que se incluye un tema temático en *-ro-* junto a temas en *-u-* o en *-os* es lo que se conoce como sistema Caland-Wackernagel (de acuerdo con elaboraciones posteriores a los trabajos de estos dos autores)¹¹.

⁸ En K. Brugmann-B. Delbrück, *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen*, II (2ª ed.), 1, pág. 220: “*plēbēs* (vermutlich aus **plēdh₂ē-s*, zu gr. πληθύς ‘die Menge’)”.

⁹ Así, en A. Ernout - A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine*, Paris, 1985 (4ª ed., 4ª tirada), s. v. *plēbs*, se señala sobre esta propuesta: “hypothèse ingénieuse, mais où l’on ne peut voir plus qu’une possibilité, la seule admissible, il est vrai, parmi les étymologies indo-européennes proposées.” A continuación se insinúa que se trate de un préstamo, como *urbs* y quizás *populus*.

¹⁰ A favor del carácter largo de la *i* del sufijo (*-iko-*, no *-iko-*) habla el empleo de <I>, no <Í>.

¹¹ A partir de los trabajos de W. Caland (“Beiträge zur Kenntniss des Avesta”, KZ 31, 1892, 257-274 y KZ 32, 1893, 589-595 y J. Wackernagel (*Vermischte Beiträge zur griechischen Sprachkunde*, Basel, 1897). Véase también F. Bader, “La loi de Caland et Wackernagel en grec”, *Mélanges Émile Benveniste*, Paris, 1975, 19-32 y las recientes observaciones de F.J. Martínez

La nueva forma osca nos descubre, pues, un ejemplo de derivado mediante *-ro-* hasta ahora no documentado ni en griego ni en latín.

En el caso concreto de la forma latina *plēbs* (arcaico *plēbēs*), estamos ante un cuadro algo complicado, ya que encontramos una vacilación en el tipo flexivo, sin que esté del todo claro qué formas son las originarias y cuáles simple refacción. Bastará con remitir a la oportuna discusión de las diferentes probabilidades de interpretación que ofrece Schrijver¹² y con recordar que tras un nominativo *plēbēs* ha de haber, por lógica, una forma **pleh₁dh₁ueh₁s* o, más remotamente, *pleh₁d₁ueh₂s*¹³. Sin duda, estas formas han de verse como “transponados”, ya que esperaremos en indoeuropeo una diferencia de grados entre raíz y sufijo. Por tanto, es probable que la forma originaria del nominativo singular fuera **pl₁d₁ueh₁(-s)* o **plēh₁d₁uh₁(-s)* o incluso **plh₁d₁ueh₂(-s)*. Sea como fuere, lo que parece fuera de discusión es que la palabra latina presupone un tema en *-u-* como base para la derivación, frente a osco PLÍFRIKS, cuyo origen hay que buscar en un tema en *-ro-* hasta ahora no documentado, tal como hemos señalado más arriba.

García, *Los nombres en -v del griego*, Frankfurt am Main, 1996, 281–283. Un estado de la cuestión con amplia bibliografía lo ofrece N. E. Collinge, *The Laws of Indo-European*, Amsterdam-Philadelphia, 1985, pags. 23–27. Evidentemente, hablamos aquí de “sistema Caland” en el sentido más amplio y convencional (juego de sufijaciones asociado a una misma raíz) y sin entrar en consideraciones sobre el sentido y funcionamiento exacto que tal sistema tenía en la morfología del indoeuropeo (nótese que no tenemos atestiguado para **pleh₁d₁-* la derivación en *-i-* en primer elemento de compuesto, justamente el fenómeno que desencadenó las observaciones de Caland). El trabajo más reciente sobre el “sistema Caland” que conozco es T. Meissner, “Das ‘Calandsche Gesetz’ und das Griechische – nach 100 Jahren” en W. Meid (Ed.) *Sprache und Kultur der Indogermanen*, Innsbruck 1998, 237–253.

[Ahora también A. J. Nussbaum en: H. Eichner: *Compositiones Indogermanicae in memoriam J. Schindler*, Praha 1999, 404; A. J. Nussbaum, *Two Studies in Greek and Homeric Linguistics*, 1998, 146 ff. Sobre todo lo aquí tratado, cf. H. Rix en: A. Hintze/E. Tichy, *Anusantatyai. Festschrift für J. Narten*, Dettelbach 2000, 226–228; H. Rix, Tribù Stato, in: *Archivio Glottologico Italiano* 85/2, 2000, 196 ss.]

¹² P. Schrijver, *The Reflexes of the Proto-Indo-European Laryngeals in Latin*, Amsterdam-Atlanta 1991, 380–381.

¹³ T al es la propuesta de Steinbauer (*apud* M. Mayrhofer, *Indogermanische Grammatik I.2: Lautlehre*, Heidelberg, 1986, 113). Evidentemente, tal propuesta implica la existencia de la ley de Eichner, ya que tendríamos aquí *ēh₁ > ē*, no *ē*.

Consider the lilies: prolepsis and the development of complementation

By BRUCE FRASER, Cambridge

Synopsis: In the paper, an examination is made of prolepsis in ancient Greek, concentrating on its grammatical and prosodic structure. The feature is analyzed not as a stylistic curiosity, but as a syntactically anacoluthic construction, which demonstrates a transitional phase in the development of finite subordination, when an expansion in the transitivity of reporting verbs was taking place. The proleptic element is interpreted as a “building block” in the inter-clausal link, functioning syntactically in both clauses. The study is structural rather than historical, but a developmental sequence is inferred from the features of proleptic and other accusative constructions observed in Homeric and classical texts¹.

Definitions

Prolepsis does not here refer to the classical trope of rhetorical anticipation², but describes the presence, in a completive construction, of a word or phrase in the main clause, which functions syntactically in it, and is also co-referent with the subject (or sometimes object) of the following subordinate clause. In the most common type, the proleptic element functions as accusative object of the main verb. By completive is meant a complex sentence in which the subordinate clause functions as the complement of a “reporting verb”. These may be categorized as verbs of emotion, cognition (including perception or judgment), and speech³. The dependent completive clause may be

¹ Especial thanks are due to Professor Geoffrey Horrocks, under whose supervision the initial research was undertaken, and to Professor James Diggle, who very kindly read a draft of the paper, and by his corrections and suggestions has enabled me to improve both the presentation and the argument.

² For this sense, see Hermogenes, *Meth.* 10.17 and Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.49, 9.2.16. Its connection with the grammatical construction discussed here can be seen from its definition in the Oxford English Dictionary (1933): “A figure in which a matter is stated in a brief summary manner, before being set forth in detail.”

³ Noonan (1985, 10–133) gives a taxonomy of the verb types, as utterance predicates (“say”), propositional attitude predicates (“believe”), pretence

a declarative, a question, or a final clause, and may be introduced by a variety of conjunctions, canonically called “complementizers”⁴.

A frequently-cited Homeric example, from *Il.* 2.409, illustrates the construction⁵:

ἦδεε γὰρ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀδελφεὸν ὧς ἐπονείτο
for he knew in his mind his brother, how he was troubled

It is common in classical, and especially dramatic, texts, and occurs also in *NT* Greek, as in the celebrated instance at Matthew 6.24:

καταμάθετε τὰ κρίνα τοῦ ἀγροῦ πῶς αὐξάνουσιν
consider the lilies of the field, how they grow

It occurs also in Latin⁶, and has lasted into modern languages (where the typical use of pronominals suggests a loss of prosodic prominence compared with most finite classical constructions), as in Boccaccio, *Decameron* 7.8.29:

Tu il saprai bene, rea femina, chi è.
You shall soon have cause enough to know him, lewd woman, who he is.

and Shakespeare, *3 Henry VI* II.1.11–12:

I saw him in the battle range about,
And watch'd him how he singled Clifford forth.

The problems

Though familiar in classical languages, the form has proved surprisingly difficult to analyze structurally. The central problem is to explain the position and function of the proleptic element (ἀδελφεόν, τὰ κρίνα τοῦ ἀγροῦ, *il*, and *him* in the previous examples). Three specific questions require explanation:

- 1) Is the proleptic element best viewed as having moved out of the subordinate clause, or as functioning “in situ,” as the object (or subject) of the main verb?

(“imagine”), commentative or factive (“regret, be significant”), knowledge (“know, see”), manipulative (“persuade, let”), and others.

⁴ The term “complementizer” to denote a complement-introducing conjunction was introduced by Rosenbaum (1967).

⁵ Similar Homeric constructions include *Il.* 1.536–8, 3.192, 5.85–6; *Od.* 4.832–3, 17.373, 19.245.

⁶ See discussions by Touratier (1980) and Christol (1989).

- 2) What is the relation of the proleptic accusative to the subordinate verb?
- 3) Is the proleptic element emphatic?

These questions have been approached in two ways: syntactically and stylistically. The traditional structural interpretation is that the proleptic element has moved from the subordinate clause as a form of hyperbaton, or, in structural terminology, as a “transformation” or “raising movement”⁷. Alternatively, the element may be analysed entirely by its function within the main clause, which requires it to have circumstantial or relational force (“he knew **about** his brother ... think **about** the lilies of the field”).

An explanation of the structural relationship between the two clauses must then be given. A satisfactory structural model is the more difficult to achieve because of the existence of syntactic variation. Rather than accusative objects, genitives and datives may occur. A variety of introductory conjunctions appear, and the proleptic element may have different functions within each clause: it may represent the subordinate verb object, as at Hdt. 3.130: εἰρώτα ὁ Δαρεῖος **τὴν τέχνην** εἰ ἐπίσταίτο (Darius asked if he understood **the art**), while it has nominative case in impersonal constructions like Hdt. 2.174.1:

λέγεται δὲ ὁ **Ἀμασις**, καὶ ὅτε ἦν ιδιώτης, ὡς φιλοπότης ἦν ...

It is said that **Amasis**, even when he was a private man, was fond of drinking ...

The position of even accusative objects is variable within the main clause too. In the most common form, it immediately precedes the complementizer, but also occurs earlier. It may be a single word, or a phrase, whose constituents may be separated, as at S.*OT* 842–3:

Ληστὰς ἔφασκες αὐτὸν **ἄνδρα** ἐννέπειν

ὡς νιν κατακτείνειαν ...

you were saying of **robbers**, that he said

that they killed him ...

There is, rarely, a co-referent word in the subordinate clause, as at S.*Ph.* 549ff. (one of the few constructions involving ὅτι):

... ὡς ἤκουσα **τούς ναύτας** ὅτι

σοὶ **πάντες** εἶεν συννεναυστοληγότες,

ἔδοξέ μοι μὴ σίγα ... τὸν πλοῦν ποεῖσθαι

⁷ These terms derive from the work of Chomsky (1965, 1981).

... when I heard that **the sailors** were **all** of your crew,
I resolved not to silently ... complete my voyage⁸

Accusative elements also function as subjects of non-finite subordinate clauses, including participials like S.OT 955–6:

Ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου, **πατέρα τὸν σὸν ἀγγελῶν**
ὡς οὐκέτ' ὄντα Πόλυβον, ἀλλ' ὄλωλότα.
... from Corinth, to announce **your father**
as no longer living, Polybus, but dead.

and accusative and infinitive (henceforth AI) constructions, as at X.An. 4.6.18:

ἐλπίζω δὲ οὐδὲ **τοὺς πολεμίους** μενεῖν ἔτι
And I hope that **the enemy** will remain no longer ...

Other variations and “prolepses manquées” are noted by Kühner-Gerth (1904, 578–82) and Sibilot (1983, 356–8). Structural variety may, clearly, affect stylistic interpretations, and the differences of structure and style make it difficult to identify whether the proleptic element is emphatic.

However, three distinctive features are common to all types, and may help to identify the structural and communicational influences behind the form: i) The proleptic element is almost always animate, and in fact human. ii) The construction is particularly common in dramatic texts. iii) The complementizer involved is very rarely ὄτι.

The proposal

Prolepsis is not the result of movement, or of a regular anaphoric relationship, but is anacoluthic, because the accusative functions in both clauses: it is a real object of the main verb, as well as having a semantic function in the subordinate clause. This double role typically leads to prosodic emphasis.

The construction may be analyzed in historical terms as an early form of complementation, structurally more inchoate than the more conventional types, but close to circumstantial relative clauses on the

⁸ Συννεναυστοληκότες at line 550 is Dobree's conjecture: the *codd.* have οἱ νεναυστοληκότες. The textual crux does not directly affect the point at issue, though it illustrates the interpretative difficulties of constructions with ὄτι following an accusative, as discussed below.

pattern of οἶδά σε ὅς / ὅς εἶ (“I know you who/how you are”), which are common in ancient Greek⁹.

Its existence demonstrates an expansion in the transitivity of reporting verbs, from having an object with real-world reference, to a purely formal one: a clausal complement. This change is mediated through the proleptic accusative itself, which identifies the main verb object with the subordinate subject, and introduces the introductory conjunction as an adverbial. Later structural developments may be seen in the use of textually-referring pronouns rather than proleptic accusatives, and finally the change of function of the subordinating conjunction from an adverbial to a complementizer, which itself serves as the main verb object.

The organization of the paper

First, previous structural and stylistic analyses are briefly described. Then, a structural and stylistic interpretation of prolepsis is advanced, and a formal model outlined. A chronology of the development of the form is proposed, with particular attention to demonstrative pronouns, both as proleptic elements and as emphatic textual links in conventional complementation. This leads to a structural comparison between proleptic accusatives followed by ὅς and the syntactic and semantic functions of completive ὅτι. Finally, the possible influence of participial and of AI clauses on the origin of the form is discussed, and its structural and historical significance is summarized.

Structural approaches

The central question is whether the position of the proleptic element can best be explained by movement from the subordinate clause, or whether it functions as a regular object of the main verb. The traditional analysis is that the element has moved out of the subordinate clause, in some type of hyperbatic movement. This interpretation is followed by Kühner-Gerth (1904, 577–8) and Chantraine (1963, 234). However, it is then difficult to explain the accusative case.

A number of interpretations have been advanced, suggesting that the construction is the result of interference between forms (as Paul

⁹ See Smyth (1956, 601–2).

1920, 166), or is an imperfect form: Monro (1891, 238) analyzed *Il* 2.409 (cited above) as a relative construction with a suppressed antecedent (“he knew of his brother, [as to the manner] in which he laboured”). Other alternatives to movement into the main clause include “extraposition” out of the sentence, along the lines of the “nominativus pendens” (Touratier 1980); and case attraction, as may have occurred with the AI construction. Christol (1989) proposes that the accusative element is case-marked, not according to its own function, but to that of the whole dependent clause as complement of the main verb. This effectively means that it functions as a complementizer (a view that will be explored later in this paper). Such interpretations identify plausible structural influences behind the form, but not their motivation, or the details of their development.

Gonda (1958, 120–1) was the first commentator to describe a linguistic function for prolepsis, viewing it not simply as a stylistic phenomenon, but as a narrative tool for ordering ideas according to their importance:

The construction is an excellent device in composing larger sentences consisting of small units which, being complete in themselves, do not strain the hearer’s or reader’s patience or intelligence by postponing to a later clause elements necessary for a right understanding of a preceding unit of the sentence . . . it allowed the speaker to pronounce a dominant idea in the first clause of the sentence postponing particulars or explications to a following unit.

The feature identified by Gonda as “a dominant idea” may be described as the “topic” of the sentence: what it is about¹⁰. This interpretation of the construction as a linking device gives it a historical significance too: *Il* 2.409 is, as Gonda (1958, 19) puts it, “a more or less mechanical reproduction of an originally paratactic supplementation to a short sentence” (“for he knew in his heart with regard to his brother how he worked hard” – a somewhat surprising translation). The proposal is plausible, but does not model the resulting structure: the clauses in a proleptic construction are not simply placed paratactically, but linked by a conjunction. An integrated syntactic model would be desirable, to complete the explanation.

¹⁰ The topic may be defined as the logical subject. Lyons (1977, 501) describes the difference as categorial: “The subject, then, is the expression which refers to and identifies the topic and the predicate is the expression which expresses the comment.”

An interpretation of the proleptic element's syntactic function within the main clause was proposed by Lecarme (1978), who calls it an "accusatif de relation." This seems to be a type of "accusative of topic," as identified in clauses with speech verbs by Jacquinod (1988), who notes that the meaning "speak of" with accusative occurs in Homer ("Ἀνδρά μοι ἔννεπε ... *Od.* 1.1) and is quite common in Aristophanes and Plato too. Jacquinod describes four types, involving slight changes in the meaning of the governing speech verb:

- 1) "invoke" or "name" a person (*Od.* 19.162: ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς μοι εἰπέ τεδὸν γένος, ὀππόθεν ἐσσί. Yet, even so, tell me of your stock from where you are);
- 2) "refer to" (*Ar.Ra.* 124: Ἔρα κώνειον λέγεις; Are you referring to hemlock?);
- 3) "mean" something (*Isoc.* 12.26: λέγω δὲ τήν τε γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν ... I mean geometry and astronomy ...);
- 4) "talk about" a person or thing (*Pl.R.* 571c: λέγεις δὲ καὶ τίνας, ἔφη, ταύτας; Which of these are you talking about? he said).

Many of Jacquinod's examples (as *Od.* 1.1, *Od.* 19.162, and *Isoc.* 12.26 above) introduce subordinate relative clauses, with the "accusatif du topique" anticipating an element (normally the subject) within the subordinate clause. It therefore seems reasonable to consider a proleptic accusative as a type of topical accusative, as Jacquinod does. Its syntactic function in the main clause is close to that of an accusative of respect¹¹. However, a proleptic accusative appears to have a closer relationship with a cognitive governing verb, so the transitive, clumsy hyphenation, meaning ("he knew his brother") is also discernible, and indeed is an integral part of the stylistic effect (as is discussed below). This stronger verb-object relation may have a historical implication, since most early prolepsis involves cognitive verbs.

The structural relation between a proleptic accusative and the subordinate clause must also be defined. Milner (1980) proposes that the proleptic element has a co-referential relation with a "null anaphor" in the subordinate clause: that is, an implied pronominal in it. This paper adopts a similar but not identical view, arguing that there is a realized anaphor in the subordinate clause, namely the verb inflection¹², and that the proleptic element in fact has a structural relation

¹¹ That is, "to denote a thing *in respect to which* the verb ... is limited" (Smyth 1956, 360).

¹² This is, of course, true only for proleptic elements which express the

with the subordinate clause, by virtue of its position preceding the complementizer.

Structural interpretations have a bearing on the stylistic question: is the proleptic element emphatic? Traditionally, it has been considered so (as by Kühner 1904 and Gonda 1958), but Panhuis (1984) argues that it is not, because it is usually in the latter part of the main clause (rather than in the initial position of the following, subordinate, one) and so is narratively "thematic" rather than "focal"¹³. Slings (1992), using a similar theoretical apparatus, considers that the placing of the proleptic element is a way of "better articulating the focal information," that is, of making the remaining part of the subordinate clause more prominent than it otherwise would be: the main clause effectively becomes a presentational frame for the subordinate predicate. The variety of these interpretations suggests that stylistic criteria, while suggestive, are not sufficient to identify emphasis. The structure must be considered first.

The formal model

The sentence structure is described in terms of a basic clause with emphatic elements and subordinating conjunctions preceding it. The basic clause is termed the "inflection phrase" (IP), since its head element is the verb inflection¹⁴, and subordinating conjunctions and emphatic elements are analyzed as in a "complementizer phrase" (CP) preceding it¹⁵. The CP is modelled with an initial emphatic position and a following head position. The proleptic accusative may, then,

subordinate subject: the few which express the object may well be co-referent with a null anaphor.

¹³ These terms are adapted by Panhuis from the functional grammar of Dik (1978, 1989), in which they have specific structural meanings. The essence of the distinction is that theme is less prominent than focus. In this paper it is termed "narrative theme," in distinction from "thematic" in the sense of having "real-world" reference.

¹⁴ The head of a phrase may be defined as the governing element. However, a number of other definitions are possible: see Lyons (1977, 391-2).

¹⁵ These terms derive from the X-bar schema of Jackendoff (1977) and Chomsky (1981, 1986). The tree diagrams in this paper are marked accordingly, with co-referent elements marked by orthogonal lines. However, the diagrams are intended as a general visualization, and may be understood aside from the X-bar terminology.

be analyzed either as being within the basic clause (IP) of the main clause, or in the initial position of the subordinate CP. Only in the second case is it communicatively emphatic.

If it is in the main clause, the configuration might, provisionally, be shown as in Fig. 1:




Figure 1

In this configuration, it is not specified whether the complementizer is emphatic: this depends on its position within the CP (not defined here). The proleptic phrase is not emphatic, though it would be, if preposed within the main clause, as at *S.Ph.* 444: **τοῦτον** οἶσθ' εἰ ζῶν κυρεῖ . . . Do you know **of him** if he is alive?).

However, textual observations (considered below) show that a clause-final proleptic element is generally prosodically prominent. The weakness of the structure in Fig. 1 derives from its failure to describe this. The prosodic trajectory is therefore better modelled with the proleptic element in the emphatic position of the subordinate CP, followed by a conjunction in the head position. As the emphatic element also functions as the object of the main verb, the double co-reference is marked in Fig. 2:




Figure 2

The clauses could equally be modelled as overlapping, since the main clause NP and the emphatic position in the subordinate CP are occupied by the same element. In either case, the construction is formally anacoluthic, because (in X-bar terms) a verbal argument can have only one thematic (“real-world”) role¹⁶. However, the broken-backed structure models the construction accurately, integrating its stylistic and syntactic features, and suggests how it may have developed.

The difference between the structures in Figs. 1 and 2 also affects the status of *πῶς*, which is in complementizer position in Fig. 2, and bears no emphasis. The construction therefore demonstrates the development of separate emphatic and complementizer positions in the CP, within which the linking conjunction follows an emphatic element

¹⁶ See Chomsky (1981, 36). “Thematic” is used with this sense here and throughout this paper. Thematic functions may be defined in terms of causality or agency (Tesnière 1959, Fillmore 1968), or of spatial or temporal goals (Gruber 1976, Jackendoff 1983). The roles of most relevance to this paper are “patient” and “goal” (often corresponding to direct and indirect objects respectively).

which functions in the main clause, but is also in subordinate focus position, and is prosodically emphatic.

Its relationship with the subordinate clause IP is of co-reference with the verb inflection. It is unnecessary to hypothesize a null anaphor (as proposed by Milner 1980, 42), as this is applicable only to languages like French and English where subjects are obligatory (“consider the lilies_i of the field, how they_i grow”). In Greek, where pronouns are optional, the inflection may constitute the anaphor (as also in the Italian vulgate translation of Matt. 6.24, where there is no resumptive pronoun: guardate li **gigli**_i del campo, come crescono_i).

Textual support: main verb objects preceding ὡς-complements

Prolepsis demonstrates, in particularly vivid form, a general structural feature of early complementation: the presence of an element functioning as main verb object. Explicit objects regularly precede ὡς-completives, and it will be proposed that even complementizing ὅτι carries a pronominal meaning, and functions as an accusative in the main clause.

Objects preceding complete ὡς-clauses may be divided into three categories, which accord with a chronological sequence: indirect “circumstantial” objects, proleptic accusatives, and, finally, nouns and demonstrative pronouns with purely textual reference.

1) Circumstantial constructions with indirect objects, often introduced by prepositions, constitute the most primitive type. It can be seen at *Od.* 8.266ff.¹⁷:

Αὐτὰρ ὁ φορμίζων ἀνεβάλλετο καλὸν αἰεῖδεν
ἀμφ’ Ἄρεος φιλότητος ἔϋστεφάνου τ’ Ἀφροδίτης,
ὡς τὰ πρῶτ’ ἐμίγησαν ἐν Ἥφαιστοιο δόμοισι
 λάθρη· . . .

Then he struck the lyre and began singing well **about** Ares and sweet-garlanded Aphrodite, **how** they first lay together in the house of Hephaistos secretly . . .

This is very close to the “paratactic” model of Gonda (1958), as the clauses are joined through a (narratively) thematic link. Structurally, the ὡς-clause is adverbial, so the whole construction has a double meaning: Demodocos sang the familiar story, and also described its details (“how”).

¹⁷ This type is discussed in detail by Monteil (1963, 354–7).

2) Proleptic accusatives create a syntactically more integrated construction. They appear in Homer, and are common in tragic complementation: every instance of completive ὡς in the *Oresteia* (11), and most in *OT* (10 out of 15) and *Medea* (10 out of 14)¹⁸, follows a main clause accusative element, many of which are proleptic (the function of the others is discussed below). There are at least 90 instances in Aristophanes (Sibilot 1983).

3) The remaining accusative elements are textually-referring words: they seem to be a structural development from the proleptic type. They are of two kinds. NPs may explicitly name “these words”: here, the object refers to the whole subordinate clause, and also comments on its form, along the lines of the Homeric introductory phrase ἔπεα πτερόεντα¹⁹. Instances include *Il.* 17.641–2:

... ἐπεὶ οὐ μιν οἶομαι οὐδὲ πεπύσθαι
λυγρῆς ἀγγελίης, ὅτι οἱ φίλος ὄλεθ' ἑταῖρος.
 ... since I think he has not yet heard
the terrible news, that his dear companion has perished.

and *E.Med.* 776–7:

μολόντι δ' αὐτῶ **μαλθακούς** λέξω **λόγους**,
 ὡς καὶ δοκεῖ μοι ταῦτ' αἰ καλῶς ἔχει ...
 when he comes I shall speak **soothing words**
 how the matter seems the same to me ...²⁰

A few other such constructions occur in tragedy²¹. A more common structural link, however, is provided by the neuter demonstrative τόδε (or occasionally the plural τάδε)²², used with textual reference (rather than as a proleptic element which functions as subordinate subject). It occurs with verbs of speech and of knowing. The construction occurs at *A.Ag.* 494–7:

... μαρτυρεῖ δέ μοι κάσις
 πηλοῦ ξύνουρος διψία κόνις **τάδε**,

¹⁸ These texts were chosen at random, and there is no reason to think that a different sample would evince a lower proportion.

¹⁹ “Winged words,” at *Il.* 1.201, 2.7, 3.155, 4.92, and 110 other occurrences.

²⁰ Suggestions to replace the uncertain ἔχει in line 777 include ἔξειν (Page) and γαμεῖ (Bolkestein), but do not affect the point at issue.

²¹ They include *E.Or.* 892–3 and (with a dative) *S.El.* 44: **λόγω** δὲ χρω **τοιῶνδ'**, ὅτι ξένος μὲν εἰ ... (Use **this story**, that you are a foreigner ...).

²² Constructions with **τάδε** occur at *A.Ag.* 494ff., *E.Med.* 1405, *Ph.* 692; *Hdt.* 5.97.2, 8.84.2, 8.94.3; *X.Eq.Mag.* 1.11; *Pl.Lg.* 661b5.

ὥς οὐτ' ἄναυδος οὐτέ σοι δαίων φλόγα
 ὕλης ὀρείας σημανεῖ καπνῶ πυρός·
 ... and the neighbouring brother of mud,
 thirsty dust, witnesses to me **this**,
 how he is not voiceless, nor for you kindling the flame
 of mountain wood will he signal with smoke of fire

It seems to become more common over time. In Homeric complements, main-clause τόδε always has proleptic function (co-referent with the subordinate subject), as at *Od.* 3.255:

ἦ τοι μὲν τόδε καὐτὸς οἶεαι ὥς κεν ἐτύχθη ...
 Indeed, you yourself surmise for yourself **this**, how it would have happened ...

The textually-referring uses are quite different, with the demonstrative referring to the whole subordinate clause, as a complementizer does (this will be argued below). The clauses are prosodically integrated, since they always involve ὥς, often adjacent to the pronoun, as at *A.Ag.* 494–7 (cited above) and *S.OT* 729–30:

Ἔδοξ' ἀκοῦσαι σοῦ τόδ', ὥς ὁ Λαῖος
 κατασφαγείη πρὸς τριπλαῖς ἀμαξιτοῖς.
 I thought I heard from you **this**, that/how Laius
 was killed where three roads meet²³.

E.Med. 85–6:

... ἄρτι γινώσκεις τόδε,
 ὥς πᾶς τις αὐτὸν τοῦ πέλας μᾶλλον φιλεῖ ...;
 Have you only just now learned **this**,
 that/how each loves himself more than others?

and *S.Ant.* 735:

ὄρᾳς τόδ' ὥς εἴρηκας ὥς ἄγαν νέος;
 Do you see **this**, that/how you have spoken too much like a child?

The object may be preposed within the main clause, as at *E.Med.* 1405:

Ζεῦ, τὰδ' ἀκούεις ὥς ἀπελαυνόμεθ' ...
 Zeus, do you hear **this**, that/how I am driven away ...

Two features show that the form is not motivated purely by metrical convenience. Firstly, the demonstrative can be used on its own to

²³ On the demonstrative force of the definite article here, see Dawe (1982, 165).

stand for a whole utterance, as in the exchange between Ismene and Antigone at S.OC 1730ff:

μῶν οὐχ ὄρας;	Do you not see?
τί τόδ' ἐπέπληξας;	Why do you make this rebuke?
καὶ τόδ', ὡς ...	And (do you not see) this, that ...
τί τόδε μάλ' αὐθις;	What is "this," again?

Secondly, the textually-referring function is also common in prose, occurring in Herodotus, as at 3.108.1²⁴:

Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τόδε Ἀράβιοι ὡς πᾶσα ἄν γῆ ἐπίπλατο
τῶν ὀφίων τούτων, εἰ μὴ γίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτοὺς οἷόν τι κατὰ τὰς
ἐχίδνας ἠπιστάμην γίνεσθαι.
The Arabians say **this**, that the whole world would swarm with
these serpents, unless the same thing happens with them as I under-
stand happens among vipers.

and in Xenophon, as at *Hell.* 5.2.18.7²⁵:

δεῖ γε μὴν ὑμᾶς καὶ τόδε εἰδέναί, ὡς ἦν εἰρήκαμεν δύναμιν μεγάλην
οὖσαν, οὐπω δυσπάλαιστός ἐστιν.
But you must understand **this** also, that the power which we have
described as great is not yet hard to wrestle with.

It seems to be a particular feature of Platonic style, providing introductions to at least 19 complements, most elaborately at *Lg.* 723b3²⁶:

ταῦτ' οὖν εἰπών, τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄν μοι βουλευθῆῖν εἰρησθαι; τόδε,
ὡς τὸν νομοθέτην πρὸ πάντων τε ἀεὶ τῶν νόμων χρεῶν ἐστὶν μὴ
ἀμοίρους αὐτοὺς προοιμίῳ ποιεῖν καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ..
Having said this, what is the next statement I would wish to make?
This: that the lawgiver must never omit to furnish preludes, both
to the laws as a whole and to each one ...

The use of a demonstrative gives great structural cohesion to the inter-clausal link when the demonstrative is clause-final. The proposed structure is shown in Fig. 3, where the principal formal difference from Fig. 2 is that the clauses are shown as overlapping (as the main clause object NP is interpreted as being also in the subordinate CP)²⁷:

²⁴ Other instances are at *Hdt.* 8.68.29–31 and 9.95.3–4.

²⁵ See also *X.Eq.Mag.* 8.16.1.

²⁶ Other Platonic examples of τόδε with ὡς occur at *Sph.* 248d10; *Plt.* 259c6, 266c.10, 276c6; *Phlb.* 20d7, 32d9, 43a1; *Phdr.* 245b5, 265c5; *Men.* 93e2; *R.* 370b7, 387d11, 526b5, 572b4; *Lg.* 788d4, 791b5, 805c2, 809e3.

²⁷ The citation is from *E.Med.* 85–6, "Have you only just learned this, that each loves himself more than others?"




Figure 3

The difference between proleptic and textually-referring elements is that the latter have a syntactic function only in the main clause, although (when clause-final) they are in the emphatic position in the CP of the following subordinate clause. The construction therefore represents a development beyond prolepsis, to conventional (though emphatic) complementation. This textually-referential use of *τόδε* is, as will be discussed below, analogous to the early use of *ὅτι*.

4) Finally, *ὡς* becomes fully grammatical and loses its adverbial sense, and the inter-clausal link becomes prosodically weaker (“I tell you *this*, how x” becomes the unemphatic “I tell you that x”)²⁸.

Prolepsis, verb types, and transitivity

The development of complementation involves an expansion in the transitivity of the introductory verbs: the ability to take textually-referring as well as thematic objects represents an increase in formalization, because a clausal complement does not have a (real-world) referring function, but is a purely formal relation²⁹. Though transitive

²⁸ On the meaning of *ὡς*, see Neuberger-Donath (1982), Biraud (1985), and Cristofaro (1998).

²⁹ However, Gruber (1976, 128) and Jackendoff (1983, 203) identify even clausal complements of speech verbs as thematic, in a rather abstract way:

relations presumably originally reflected real-world ones, their expansion to encompass textual objects as well as referring expressions is evident throughout Homeric and tragic complementation. The importance of proleptic objects lies in their function in the clause link, both as object of a reporting verb, and as mediating the change in function of ὡς from an adverbial to a complementizer.

This increasing formalization reduces any logical or causal (as opposed to purely linguistic) link between the clauses. There is progressively less causal force in the sequence [emotional > cognitive > speech] verbs: in the first type, the conjunction effectively means “because” or “in that,” which presupposes the truth of the subordinate proposition, rather than merely asserting it, while speech verbs are purely assertive (“say that x is y”)³⁰. This increase in formalization accords with the historical sequence of complete-introducing verbs proposed by Chantraine (1963, 288–299) and Monteil (1963, 248). However, these categories could be more exactly defined, since some cognitive verbs are causal while others seem to be purely assertive³¹, and speech verbs may carry causal force when used with topical accusatives. This may explain the greater frequency with which verbs like εἶπον, ἐννέπω, ἀγορεύω (Sibilot 1988, 110), καταλέγω (at *Od.* 4.832) and μυθέομαι (at *Od.* 19.245: καὶ τόν τοι **μυθήσομαι**, οἷος ἔην περ and I will tell thee of him too, what manner of man he was) appear in proleptic constructions. The simple verb λέγω appears later: there are no Homeric examples, and few in tragedy³².

By contrast with speech verbs, the link between a cognitive verb and a proleptic object frequently exploits its intra-clausal meaning. This is evident at *E. Med.* 37 (δέδοικα δ’ **αὐτήν** μή τι βουλεύση νέον I fear **her**, lest she plot some new plan), and similarly at 39–40, where the fear is also “of” Medea, and not simply “that”:

the clause itself is interpreted as a thematic entity [“patient”] moving from the speaker [“agent”] to the hearer [“goal”]. See Munro (1982) and Amberber (1996) for further discussion.

³⁰ See Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) and Lyons (1977, 599–606 and 794–809).

³¹ “See that x is y” presupposes [x is y], but (despite Lyons 1977, 794) “know x is y” could be interpreted as asserting rather than presupposing [x is y], at least with a first-person main verb.

³² Twice with non-animate objects, at *A. Eu.* 308–311 and *Th.* 375–6, and three times with human objects: *A. Ag.* 672, *E. Med.* 248–9 and 452. Topical accusatives follow λέγω in Aristophanes, Plato, and Menander (see Sibilot 1988, 106–7), but none of these is proleptic.

... ἐγῴδα τήνδε, δειμαίνω τέ **νιν**
μῆ θηκτὸν ὥση φάσγανον δι' ἥπατος
 ... I know her, and fear **her**,
 lest she drive a sharpened sword through her liver

It may be demonstrated that the double transitivity of such constructions was perceived in the fifth century, from the evidence of an Aristophanic joke at *Ra.* 41, where a transitive sentence is re-interpreted as a complement main clause, by the addition of an unexpected subordinate clause. The humour depends on the double transitivity of *δέδοικα*, so “afraid of” becomes the circumstantial “afraid for/about”:

Ὦς σφόδρα **μ'** ἔδεισε. Νῆ Δία, **μῆ** μαίνοιό γε.
 (Dion.) How terribly afraid of **me** he was. (Xan.) Yes, [afraid] **that**
 you were mad.

A comparable example of proleptic double meaning occurs with *ὡς* at *Ar. Nu.* 842, where, as suggested by Süvern (1836, 9), the humour appears to involve an allusion to the Delphic inscription Γνώθι σαυτὸν (know thyself)³³, and so to make “a pleasant and comic allusion to the practice of the real Sokrates”:

γνώσει δὲ **σαυτὸν** ὡς ἀμαθῆς εἶ καὶ παχύς.
 and you will know yourself, how stupid and thick you are.

Knowledge in a more serious, religious, sense is described at *E. Ba.* 859–61³⁴:

... γνώσεται δὲ **τὸν Διὸς**
Διόνυσον, ὡς πέφυκεν ἐν μέρει θεὸς
 δεινότατος, ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἠπιώτατος³⁵.
 ... and he will recognise the son of Zeus
 Dionysus, how he is by turns a most awesome
 and a most gentle god to mortals.

Similarly, at Luke 13.25 = 13.27 (οὐκ οἶδα **ὕμᾱς** πόθεν ἐστέ I know you not, whence you are), the rejection of the sinners is emphasized by the grammar.

³³ See *X. Mem.* 4.2.24.

³⁴ This construction was brought to my attention by Professor Diggle, who takes the main clause to be “complete, before the *ὡς*-clause, which then shows that we must acknowledge prolepsis” (personal communication).

³⁵ The text is as Diggle (1994b). The change from *τέλει* to *μέρει* (discussed in Diggle 1994a, 468–70) does not affect the point at issue. However, if *ὡς* instead of *ὡς* were read, the construction would exemplify the οἶδά **σε** ὃς εἶ type.

This sort of word play is not, perhaps, surprising, since the verbs have not simply changed, but rather extended, their meaning. We can still perceive the jokes, because the corresponding modern verbs have the same double transitivity. In prolepsis with cognitive verbs, then, we can see the resonance between the meanings of two originally independent clauses, and this accords with the early appearance of such constructions.

Objects and ὅτι-complementation

The rarity of proleptic constructions involving ὅτι may be explained by its pronominal form: since a demonstrative is morphologically emphatic, it is very difficult to place an emphatic element immediately before it, and as it is pronominal, it can itself function as main verb object, in a similar way to the textually-referring use of τόδε discussed above. Ὅτι, therefore, has a syntactic function in the main clause, and this is reflected in the prosody.

In early specifying constructions, where ὅτι has a meaning of “in that,” or “because,” it is unambiguously in the second clause, as at *Il.* 1.56:

κήδετο γὰρ Δαναῶν, ὅτι ῥα θνήσκοντας ὄρατο.
for she pitied the Danaans, because/in that she saw them dying.

and *Il.* 23.555–6:

Ὡς φάτο, μείδησεν δὲ ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεὺς
χαίρων Ἀντιλόχῳ, ὅτι οἱ φίλος ἦεν ἑταῖρος.
So he spoke, and brilliant swift-footed Achilles smiled,
favouring Antilochos because/in that he was his dear companion

These are the causal “substantivals” which Chantraine (1963) and Monteil (1963) consider to mark the origin of complementation. Structurally they constitute a primitive type, because the clauses are not formally linked. This may be seen from the placing of the intonation break, and from the presence of enclitics (typically dative pronouns) which are normally placed in the second position in the clause, so here signalling that ὅτι is in emphatic first position.

A similar prosodic trajectory is evident in the rare transitive constructions with cognitive verbs, as at *Od.* 8.461–2:

χαῖρε, ξεῖν', ἵνα καὶ ποτ' ἐὼν ἐν πατρίδι γαίῃ
μνήσῃ ἐμεῖ, ὅτι μοι πρώτη ζῳάργρι' ὀφέλλεις.

Good-bye stranger and think of me sometimes when you are back at home, because/in that I was the first you owed your life to.

In tragedy, by contrast, the intonation break occurs after ὅτι, so it is prosodically within the main clause. Strikingly, it appears in very few proleptic constructions: of the 53 subordinates with ὅτι in tragedy³⁶, only two follow proleptic elements³⁷. In Aristophanes, as Sibilot (1983, 351–2) notes, out of at least 90 constructions, only one (*Ach.* 375–6) is associated with complementizing ὅτι (and this also appears to have a causal, specifying, sense):

τῶν τ' αὖ γερόντων οἶδα τὰς ψυχὰς ὅτι
οὐδὲν βλέπουσιν ἄλλο πλὴν ψηφισακεῖν.

And I know the minds of the elderly jurors, in that they see nothing other than biting with their ballots.

Other emphatic elements occasionally precede ὅτι, yet retain their subordinate case, at *S.OT* 525–526, *E.Hel.* 1491–4, *Ba.* 173–4, and *Ar.Ra.* 519–20. All may be explained as the preposing of an element into the emphatic position of the CP (see Fig. 2) without its functioning as main verb object, and all are structurally irregular and interpretatively difficult.

It is proposed (as argued in Fraser 1999) that the structural reason why proleptic accusatives are so uncommon with complementizing ὅτι is because it retains its meaning as a demonstrative pronoun, and so functions as object in the main clause as well as complementizer in the subordinate.

This function seems to be a structural development of the Homeric use of ὅστις in free relative constructions which depend on the same verb types³⁸. These demonstrate an inter-clausal overlap: ὅστις functions syntactically in the relative clause, but is also semantically the object of the main verb, as at *Od.* 10.109–10³⁹:

³⁶ They comprise: 3 in Aeschylus (*Eu.* 98–9, 970–1, and the relative *Ag.* 97–8), 7 in *Prometheus*, 30 in Sophocles, and 13 in Euripides. Many are cited in Fraser (1999, Appendix 3B).

³⁷ These are *S.Ph.* 549ff. (cited earlier) and *A.Eu.* 970–1 (where ὅτι is substantival, and is followed by the enclitic dative μοι).

³⁸ There are 13 Homeric examples. By “free relative” is meant a construction in which there is no antecedent to the relative pronoun. Following reporting verbs, they are often called “indirect questions”.

³⁹ The others are at *Il.* 3.167, 3.192, 11.219, 14.509, 16.424, 20.363, *Od.* 4.380 = 423 = 469, 4.552, 8.28, and 9.331–2.

οἱ δὲ παριστάμενοι προσεφώνεον, ἐκ τ' ἐρέοντο
ὅς τις τῶνδ' εἶη βασιλεὺς καὶ οἷσιν ἀνάσσει.

My men stood by her and talked with her, and asked her who was king of these people and over whom he was lord.

The closest analogue of complementizing ὅτι, however, is the neuter form ὅτι, which is common in Homeric free relatives, mostly following speech verbs⁴⁰. These demonstrate a syntactic clausal overlap, since case does not restrict the pronoun to either clause, and it is therefore possible to interpret it as functioning in both, as at *Il*14.195 = *Od*5.89⁴¹:

αὐδα ὅτι φρονέεις ...
Say **what** you are thinking ...

There is no evidence that the step from such free relatives to a complement (“say that you are thinking”) eliminates the pronominal meaning, and some evidence that it does not – in particular, the parallel use of pronominals as complementizers in Latin (“quod”), English, Italian, and other languages. The structure of ὅτι-complementation may, therefore, be shown as in Fig. 4⁴².




Figure 4

⁴⁰ There are 39 Homeric constructions, all cited in Fraser (1999, Appendix 3A).

⁴¹ Speech and cognitive verbs are quite often (as here) both involved in the same construction.

⁴² *S.O*759–60: “for I know well that you are all sick”. The complementizer is here (as almost always in Sophoclean trimeters) prosodically highlighted by its position in the last foot of the line (the only exception appears to be *S.Ant.* 2: a notorious crux).

The double syntactic function of ὅτι (as demonstrative and complementizer) seems to derive from the clause sequence. However, the pronominal force becomes even clearer if the reporting clause follows, and the reference is retrospective: a point first made, for English, by Davidson (1968), where the logical form of the complement “Galileo said that the earth moves” is shown to be equivalent to the two sentences: “The earth moves. Galileo said that”.⁴³

The presence of a demonstrative object in the main clause, therefore, leaves no place for a proleptic phrase. However, the use of ὅτι does not preclude the co-occurrence of another pronoun with purely emphatic force. This occurs in five tragic constructions, creating a very emphatic effect, as at *S.Ant.* 98⁴⁴:

... τοῦτο δ' ἴσθ', ὅτι
 ἄνους μὲν ἔρχη, τοῖς φίλοις δ' ὀρθῶς φίλη.
 But know **this much**, that
 you are foolish in your going, but truly dear to those who are your own.

The possibility of such reinforcement shows that ὅτι, while usually prosodically prominent, is not necessarily communicatively emphatic. In Fig. 4, therefore, the position of ὅτι within the subordinate CP is ambiguous.

The value of the analogy between complements with ὅτι and proleptic constructions with ὡς is that it illustrates how both complementizers may have emerged independently, but on semantically parallel lines, using a main verb object as the semantic component of the inter-clausal link.

Accusative and infinitive

It has been shown that an accusative element is regularly associated with the inter-clausal link in finite complementation. The AI construction provides a non-finite analogue, because it has been identified (by

⁴³ The same clause order occurs in Greek too, with cognitive verbs, as at *S.Ant.* 276 (πάρεμι δ' ἄκων οὐχ ἐκοῦσιν, οἶδ' ὅτι “and I am here unwilling to those who do not welcome me, I know that”), *Ph.* 1616–7, *Ar. Lys.*154, *Plu.* 838, and *Pl. Cri.* 53a3.

⁴⁴ At *S.Ant.* 188, *El.* 988, and *E.fr.*951.1, too, the pronoun is the normally anaphoric τοῦτο, rather than the standardly anticipatory τόδε. At *S.El.* 332, the main clause reads: τοσοῦτόν γ' οἶδα κάμαυτήν, ὅτι ... (I know this much about myself, that ...).

Meillet and Vendryes 1927, 589; Aitchison 1979, 53) as the forerunner of finite constructions. If that is so, it might be expected to influence proleptic complements. It is also likely, as argued by Christol (1989), that the function of the accusative element is semantically parallel in both (case-marking the subordinate clause as main verb object).

There is, however, structural evidence to suggest that the AI construction is not a direct forerunner of finite prolepsis, as may be seen by looking at the functions of the accusative. Case assignment in AI is usually described on the analogy of jussive sentences, where a semantically indirect but accusative object has a thematic relation with the main verb, as goal (“order someone” = “give an order *to* someone”). Variations of case in jussives (δέομαί σου ἔλθειν or δέομαί σε ἔλθειν, I beg you to go) are traditionally explained with the accusative as default, and other cases as the result of case attraction to that of the main verb object (Kühner-Gerth 1904, 24; Smyth 1956, 438–440): a description that does not explain the origin of the supposed default, other than by citing jussives which do take accusatives (κελεύω meaning “urge on,” προεῖπον “proclaim,” νουθετέω “advise”). Yet the high proportion of jussives which take datives (ἐπιστέλλω, παραινέω, παραγγέλλω, προστάττω etc.) and of other verbs which may do so when used in jussive sense (λέγω, εἶπον, φωνέω, βοάω, φράζω) weakens the argument for an accusative norm: there is likely to have been another, transitive, construction which provided the analogy⁴⁵.

In addition, there is little historical support for the view that AI complements are the precursors of finite constructions, as early instances of the relevant types are quite rare. Homeric AI constructions may be grouped in three categories⁴⁶, only one of which is semantically analogous to prolepsis:

1) Jussive constructions, as *Il.* 2.11:

θωρηξαι ε̅ κέλευε κάρη κομόωντας Ἀχαιοῦς
Bid him arm the flowing-haired Achaians

and *Il.* 17.30:

⁴⁵ There is, as Smyth (1956, 444) notes, a difference in meaning: with accusatives, it is not specified to whom the order is given.

⁴⁶ The first three are derived from discussions by Monro (1891, 202–203), Kühner-Gerth (1904, 26–33), Meillet and Vendryes (1927, 561 ff.), and Chantraine (1963, 312–318).

ἀλλά σ' ἔγωγ' ἀναχωρήσαντα κελεύω / ἐς πλῆθὸν ἰέναι
 but I myself tell you to get back into the multitude

Meillet and Vendryes (1927, 561) consider this to be the earliest type⁴⁷. As noted above, the accusative element is semantically an indirect object, and so its case must be motivated by some other construction.

2) Final clauses, where the accusatives also function as “goals,” as at *Od.* 4.209–210:

ὡς νῦν Νέστορι δῶκε διαμπερὲς ἡματα πάντα,
αὐτὸν μὲν λιπαρῶς γηρασκέμεν ἐν μεγάροισιν ...
 As now he has given to Nestor, forever, all his days,
 for himself to grow old prosperously in his own palace ...

The function of accusatives as thematic goals may derive from their use as physical goals with verbs of movement⁴⁸. In impersonal constructions, too (“it seems that/it is necessary that [x]”), as at *Il.* 1.126 (ἐπέοικε), 2.24 (χρή), *Od.* 14.193 (εἶη), the accusative element is semantically an indirect object, and must occur by analogy with some other construction.

3) Constructions following perceptual and judgmental verbs approach the proleptic type, because the accusative element is logically the object of the main verb, and the infinitive describes an additional fact or action, as at *Il.* 4.247:

ἢ μένετε **Τρῶας** σχεδὸν ἐλθέμεν;
 Are you waiting for the Trojans to come close?

and at *Il.* 6.386–7:

... οὐνεκ' ἄκουσε / τείρεσθαι **Τρῶας** ...
 ... because she heard of the Trojans being pressed hard ...

The analogy with prolepsis is the stronger because of the rare appearance in such constructions of speech verbs (which, it has been suggested above, take only “topical” objects in early prolepsis). Only one speech verb, φημί, is regularly involved, as at *Il.* 1.521:

νεικεῖ, καὶ τέ **μέ** φησι μάχη Τρῶεσσιν ἀρήγειν
 she accuses [me], and speaks of how I help the Trojans in battle

⁴⁷ Similar constructions occur at *Il.* 14.62, *Od.* 10.531–3, and *Od.* 23.258.

⁴⁸ The thematic roles of accusatives following Homeric verbs of movement (βάλλω, ἵκω, ἰκάνω, etc.) are discussed by Kühner-Gerth (1898, 303), Haudry (1977), and Boel (1988).

Moorhouse (1955, 179–81) estimates there to be 191 infinitive constructions with this verb in Homer, and cites the figures of Fournier (1946, 138), showing there are only five with other verbs⁴⁹. He explains this by categorizing $\phi\eta\mu\acute{\iota}$ as a cognitive rather than a speech verb: “ $\phi\eta\mu\acute{\iota}$ is basically subjective, ‘affirm, maintain, declare, think,’ it gives expression to a judgment or opinion.” He also observes that in many constructions the subject is omitted, even if it differs from the main verb subject, suggesting that the accusative is “a later addition to the [infinitive] construction.”

Of these types, the jussives (1) cannot, as argued above, motivate the accusative use in complementation. The “goal” accusatives in final clauses (2) could provide the earliest analogue, as they derive from accusatives after verbs of movement: it is plausible that all thematic relations derive ultimately from spatial ones⁵⁰. However, circumstantials involving reporting verbs (type 3) are semantically closer to the proleptic type, as the function of the accusative as a “topical” object of the main verb is the same.

These constructions do not, however, pre-date finite prolepsis. As Christol (1989, 66) notes, the AI construction is not of Indo-European date (rarely occurring in Sanskrit), yet prolepsis appears in the earliest texts, including Sanskrit (Haudry 1977, 328). AI does not predate circumstantial participial clauses either, and so is not likely to be a significant influence.

Participial complements

Participial constructions are more plausible as an influence, partly for structural reasons⁵¹: they appear to derive, as Smyth (1956, 471) suggests, from circumstantial use following cognitive verbs, when $\omicron\upsilon\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \eta\delta\epsilon\sigma\alpha\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu\ \tau\epsilon\theta\nu\eta\kappa\omicron\tau\alpha$ (“they did not know him as being dead”) may be interpreted as completive (“... know that he was dead”). The accusative subject of such a construction is functionally the object of the main verb, just as proleptic accusatives are.

The origin of the accusative is, however, less clear if the main verb is not transitive: for example, as Kühner-Gerth (1904, 49) notes, a

⁴⁹ The verbs are $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\pi\omicron\nu$ (3 instances), $\alpha\upsilon\delta\acute{\alpha}\omega$, and $\mu\upsilon\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$.

⁵⁰ See Gruber (1976) and Jackendoff (1983).

⁵¹ There is a chronological reason too: participials appear in the earliest Indo-European texts.

dative is normal after σύννοιδα (σύννοιδά σοι εὔ ποιήσαντι), and seems to be the basic form: the prefix implies an indirect object. The accusative (σύννοιδά σε εὔ ποιήσαντα) may then be a stylistic variation. The cases can be varied with great freedom, as at A. *Ch.* 216–7, where the change of case from the dative creates some ambiguity, hiding the object (Ὀρέστην) among the other accusatives:

καὶ τίνα σύννοιθά μοι καλουμένη βροτῶν;
 σύννοιδ' Ὀρέστην πολλά σ' ἐκπαλουμένην.
 (El.) And whom among men do you know of me that I call upon?
 (Or.) I know that it is Orestes whom you very much admire.

It is likely that such accusatives developed by analogy with constructions depending on verbs which do take accusatives⁵². The importance of cognitive verbs is that most do.

In sum, prolepsis does not derive from AI complements, though there may be some influence from participials. There is a structural feature common to all types: the accusative element, depending on a reporting verb, and marking the subordinate clause as its object. Yet there is no evidence for a historical genealogy: the chronology suggests that any influences are likely to have been mutual.

Emphasis

The question of emphasis can now be answered, in terms of the structural features described above. The view of Panhuis (1984, 38) that “there is nothing emphatic or vivid etc. in a sentence containing a prolepsis” seems mistaken: the proleptic element is regularly prosodically emphatic, so is therefore likely to be communicatively emphatic⁵³, and its double function in both the main and the subordinate clauses gives it a structural prominence.

This view is supported by three features: firstly, the morphology. Proleptic elements are usually morphologically heavy: typically nouns or NPs. Proleptic pronominals are (in classical texts) typically demonstrative pronouns, where the suffix itself creates some phonetic prominence (in contrast with AI, participial, and post-classical construc-

⁵² The increase over time of transitive constructions is discussed by Coleman (1989) and Bauer (1993).

⁵³ A relation between prosodic and pragmatic prominence is normal in many languages: it might be said that “loud” often implies “important”.

tions). The complementizers are generally phonologically light, such as *ὥς*, *εἰ* or *μή*, which create a contrast with the preceding element.

Secondly, emphasis is implied by the function of the proleptic element as main verb object⁵⁴. By completing the syntax of the main clause, it finishes the word group and forces an intonation break, and so creates some emphasis through the lengthening of the final syllable⁵⁵. As with case attraction of a relative pronoun to that of a preceding main clause (Gonda 1954, 29), the accusative also demonstrates the grammatical integration of the subordinate clause in the main. This may be seen in minimal clauses of the *οἶδά σε ὡς / ὥς εἶ* type, as at *Il.* 9.527–8:

μέμνημαι **τόδε ἔργον** ἐγὼ πάλαι οὐ τι νέον γε
[ὥς ἦν· ...]

I remember **this behaviour** of old, it is not a new thing, how it was
...

and *A.Eu.* 454:

γένος δὲ **τοῦμόν** [ὥς ἔχει] πεύση τάχα.
you will soon learn **my race**, how it is.

Such constructions always reduce the subordinate clause to a parenthesis, and usually emphasise the accusative⁵⁶.

Finally, proleptic elements are likely to be communicatively prominent, as they announce the topic of the following clause⁵⁷. They may have inter-textual reference too, as in the allusion to the Delphic inscription at *Ar.Nu.*842 (cited earlier), and, in the construction at *Matt.* 6.28 (cited at the start of the paper), where the proleptic element *τά κρίνα τοῦ ἀγροῦ* may be an echo of *ἄνθος τοῦ ἀγροῦ* (a flower of the field) in *Psalm* 103.15⁵⁸.

⁵⁴ An association between syntactic object and communicative emphasis in modern languages is noted in Hopper and Thompson (1982).

⁵⁵ The tendency for the last syllable of a word group to be lengthened is discussed by Allen (1973, 204–7), and the emphatic effect of a final long syllable is described by Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.4.91–3 and Demetrius, *Eloc.* 39.

⁵⁶ As with other types of prolepsis, the construction is more common in Euripides than in the other tragedians: *ὥς ἔχει* occurs 15 times (*Alc.* 280, *El.* 427, *HF* 956, *Ion* 1416, *Tr.* 394, 923, 931, 1144, *LA* 106, 446, and in the fragments) as against two in Aeschylus (*Eu.* 454 and *Frag.* 726 g), three in Sophocles (*Tr.* 622, *OT* 1172, *El.* 791), and one in Aristophanes (*Eq.* 153). *Ὦς ἦν* occurs in tragedy only in Euripides (*Andr.* 381, *HF* 27, *El.* 690, *IT* 532, *Ph.* 1280).

⁵⁷ As the logical subject, a topic tends to be an agent, and so dynamic: see Lyons (1977, 502).

⁵⁸ *Psalm* 102.15 in the Septuagint.

Such prominence of the accusative has a structural implication, because it shows that a prosodic trajectory of declining emphasis is not followed: the main clause has final rather than (the more normal) initial weight⁵⁹. The construction therefore provides an example of how clause linking in complex sentences may change intra-clausal prosody. It can change word order too: both the clause-final proleptic accusative and its textually-referring descendants create VO order in the main clause.

Conclusions

Answers have been proposed to the three questions posed at the start of this paper:

- 1) Is the proleptic accusative best viewed as having moved out of the subordinate clause, or as functioning as the object of the main verb?
- 2) What is the relation of the accusative to the subordinate verb?
- 3) Is the proleptic element emphatic?

No movement is required, since the element functions semantically in the main clause. The proleptic element has a double function, as a regular object in the main clause, and as co-referent with the inflection of the subordinate verb. The construction is, in structural terms, overlapping, with a prosodically and communicatively emphatic element in common.

Explanations can therefore be offered for the three features of the construction noted near the start of the paper.

1) The construction almost never involves ὄτι, because that complementizer occupies the object position in the main clause, just as it does in the indefinite relatives which are the forerunners of ὄτι-complements⁶⁰.

2) The construction is particularly common in dramatic texts, both tragic and Aristophanic (and Kühner-Gerth 1904, 578 observes that Latin examples are particularly common in Plautus and Terence). This

⁵⁹ Most commentators, as Denniston (1952, 44), consider that “the weight of a Greek sentence or clause is usually at its opening, and the emphasis tends to decline as the sentence proceeds.”

⁶⁰ Co-reference between elements in each clause may also be encouraged by the use of ὡς, which, as Monteil (1963, 329) notes, was originally anaphoric: “Ancienne forme casuelle d’instrumental, ὡς a dû primitivement se référer à un substantif antécédent, à l’intérieur d’un énoncé anaphorique puis relatif.”

might be expected from a topic-based linking function, as proposed by Gonda (1958): there is less burden on the memory if the topic of the following clause is already stated in the previous one.

3) The reason why the proleptic element is typically animate, and indeed usually human, is related to its topic function: there seems to be a cross-linguistic tendency for a topical element to be animate⁶¹. Prolepsis is primarily a way of talking about people: an animate topic creates a particularly vivid narrative link⁶².

In conclusion, prolepsis is a regular feature of ancient Greek, resulting from the developing structure of complementation. It demonstrates an incompletely grammaticalized inter-clausal link, with a (normally human) topic referring to the following clause. This proleptic accusative seems to be the structural forerunner of textually-referring pronouns (exemplified by *τόδε*) and of *ὅτι* (which retains an identifiable pronominal force), and, like them, it is, normally, prosodically and communicatively emphatic.

Bibliography

- Aitchison, J. (1979): "The Order of Word Order Change," *IPhS*, 43-65.
- Allen, W.S. (1973): *Accent and Rhythm. Prosodic Features of Latin and Greek: A Study in Theory and Reconstruction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Amberber, M. (1996): "The Transitivity of Verbs of *Saying* Revisited," in Camacho, Choueiri, and Watanabe (1996), 1-15.
- Bach, E. and Harms, R. T., eds. (1968): *Universals in Linguistic Theory*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Bauer, B. M. L. (1993): "The Development of Latin Absolute Constructions: From Stative to Transitive Structures," *General Linguistics*, 33, 64-83.
- Bierwisch, M. and Heidolph, K. E. (1970): *Progress in Linguistics*, The Hague: Mouton.
- Biraud, M. (1985): "La Syntaxe de *ὡς* dans la langue homérique: du subordonnant relatif au subordonnant conjonctif," *Annales de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Nice*, 49, 158-172.
- Boel, G. De (1988): *Goal Accusative and Object Accusative in Homer: A Contribution to the Theory of Transitivity*, Brussels: Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België.

⁶¹ See Comrie (1981, 198-200), and, on the relation of both with word order, Tomlin (1986).

⁶² It may also be noted that if it were not animate, it would usually be neuter, so its case would be unclear (though it has never been suggested that *τὰ κείνα* at Matt.6.24 is not accusative).

- Calboli, G., ed. (1989): *Subordination and Other Topics in Latin: Proceedings of the Third Colloquium on Latin Linguistics, Bologna 1-5 April 1985*, Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Camacho, J., Choueiri, L., and Watanabe, M., eds. (1996): *The Proceedings of the Fourteenth West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics*, Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
- Chantraine, P. (1963): *Grammaire homérique, tome 2: syntaxe*, Paris: Klincksieck.
- Chomsky, N. (1965): *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.
- (1981): *Lectures on Government and Binding*, Dordrecht: Foris Publications.
- (1986): *Barriers (Linguistic Inquiry Monograph 13)*, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.
- Christol, A. (1989): “Prolepse et syntaxe indo-européenne,” in Calboli (1989), 65–89.
- Coleman, R. (1989): “The Rise and Fall of Absolute Constructions: A Latin Case History,” in Calboli (1989), 353–374.
- Comrie, B. (1981): *Language Universals and Linguistic Typology: Syntax and Morphology*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Cristofaro, S. (1998): “Grammaticalization and Clause Linkeage Strategies: A Typological Approach with Particular Reference to Ancient Greek,” in Ramat and Hopper (1998), 59–88.
- Davidson, D. (1968): “On Saying That,” *Synthese*, 19, 130–146.
- Dawe, R. D., ed. (1982): *Sophocles: Oedipus Rex*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Denniston, J. D. (1952): *Greek Prose Style*, Oxford: Clarendon.
- Diggle, J. (1994a): *Euripidea: Collected Essays*, Oxford: Clarendon.
- , ed. (1981–1994b): *Euripidis fabulae (Oxford Classical Texts)*, 3 volumes, Oxford: Clarendon.
- Dik, S. C. (1978): *Functional Grammar*, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
- (1989): *The Theory of Functional Grammar. Part 1: The Structure of the Clause*, Dordrecht: Foris.
- Fillmore, C. J. (1968): “The Case for Case,” in Bach and Harms (1968), 1–88.
- Fournier, H. (1946): *Les Verbes “dire” en grec ancien: exemple de conjugaison supplétive*, Paris: Klincksieck.
- Fraser, B. L. (1999): *Word Order, Focus, and Clause Linking in Greek Tragic Poetry*, PhD. dissertation, Cambridge University.
- Gonda, J. (1954): “The Original Character of the Indo-European Relative Pronoun *io-*,” *Lingua*, 4, 1–41.
- (1958): “On the So-called Proleptic Accusative in Greek,” *Mnemosyne*, Series 4, 11, 117–122.
- Gruber, J. S. (1976): *Lexical Structures in Syntax and Semantics*, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.

- Haudry, J. (1977): *L'Emploi des cas en védique: introduction à l'étude des cas en indo-européen*, Lyons: Editions l'Hermès.
- Hopper, P. J., and Thompson, S. A., eds. (1982): *Syntax and Semantics, Volume 15: Studies in Transitivity*, New York: Academic Press.
- Jackendoff, R. (1977): *X' Syntax: A Study of Phrase Structure*, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.
- (1983): *Semantics and Cognition*, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.
- Jacquino, B. (1988): "Accusatif, topique et verbes 'dire'," in *ΗΔΙΣΤΟΝ ΛΟΓΟ-ΔΕΙΠΝΟΝ. Logopédies. Mélanges de Philologie et de Linguistique grecques offerts à Jean Taillardet*, Paris: Peeters/Selaf.
- Kiparsky, P. and Kiparsky, C. (1970): "Fact," in Bierwisch and Heidolph (1970), 143–173.
- Kühner, R. (1898): *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache II: Satzlehre*, Volume 1, revised by Gerth, B., 3rd Edition, Hannover: Hahnsche.
- (1904): *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache II: Satzlehre*, Volume 2, revised by Gerth, B., 3rd edition, Hannover: Hahnsche.
- Lecarme, J. (1978): *Aspects syntaxiques des complétives en grec*, PhD Thesis, University of Montreal.
- Lyons, J. (1977): *Semantics*, 2 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meillet, A. and Vendryes, J. (1927): *Traité de grammaire comparée des langues classiques*, Paris: Champion.
- Miller, D. G. (1974): "On the History of Infinitive Complementation in Latin and Greek," *JIES*, 2, 223–246.
- Milner, J.-C. (1980): "La Prolepse en grec ancien," in Perrot and Lallot (1980), 39–52.
- Monro, D. B. (1891): *A Grammar of the Homeric Dialect*, Second Edition, Oxford: Clarendon.
- Monteil, P. (1963): *La Phrase relative en grec ancien: sa formation, son développement, sa structure: des origines à la fin du Ve siècle A.C.*, Paris: Klincksieck.
- Moorhouse, A. C. (1955): "The Origin of the Infinitive in Greek Indirect Statement," *AJPh*, 76, 176–183.
- Munro, P. (1982): "On the Transitivity of 'Say' Verbs," in Hopper and Thompson (1982), 301–318.
- Neuberger-Donath, R. (1982): "Der Gebrauch von ὄτι und ὡς in Subjekt- und Objekt-Sätzen," *Reinisches Museum für Philologie*, 125, 252–274.
- Noonan, M. (1985): "Complementation," in Shopen (1985), 42–140.
- Panhuis, D. (1984): "Prolepsis in Greek as a Discourse Strategy," *Glotta*, 62, 26–39.
- Paul, H. (1920): *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte*, 5th ed., Halle: Niemeyer.
- Perrot, J. and Lallot, J., eds. (1980): *LALIES: Actes des sessions de linguistique et de littérature I (Aussois, 3–7 septembre 1979)*, Paris: Presses de l'École Normale Supérieure.
- Ramat, A. G. and Hopper, P., eds. (1998): *The Limits of Grammaticalization*, Amsterdam: Benjamins.

- Rosenbaum, P. S. (1967): *The Grammar of English Predicate Complement Constructions*, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.
- Schwyzler, E. (1950): *Griechische Grammatik: auf der Grundlage von Karl Brugmanns griechischer Grammatik, Zweiter Band: Syntax und syntaktische Stilistik* (completed and published by Debrunner, A.), Munich: Beck.
- Shopen, T., ed. (1985): *Language Typology and Syntactic Description, Volume II: Complex Constructions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sibilot, M.-C. (1983): "Les Prolepses chez Aristophane," in *Mélanges Edouard Delebecque*, ed. C. Froidefond, Marseilles: Laffitte.
- Slings, S. R. (1992): "Written and Spoken Language: An Exercise in the Pragmatics of the Greek Sentence," *CPh*, 87, 95-109.
- Smyth, H. W. (1956): *Greek Grammar* (first published 1920, revised by Messing, G. M.), Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Süvern, J. W. (1836): *Two Essays on "The Clouds" and on "The Γῆρας" of Aristophanes*, tr. W. R. Hamilton F.R.S., London: Murray.
- Tesnière, L. (1959): *Eléments de syntaxe structurale*, Paris: Klincksieck.
- Tomlin, R. S. (1986): *Basic Word Order: Functional Principles*, London: Croom Helm.
- Touratier, C. (1980): "L'Accusatif proleptique en latin," in Perrot and Lallot (1980), 53-6.

Negatives and Noun Phrases in Classical Greek: A Reconsideration

By EVA-CARIN GERÖ, Stockholm

0. Introduction

In Gerö (1997) I discussed a much commented upon chapter in Greek grammar, viz. the usage of the two negatives, οὐ and μή, in noun phrases. In older as well as more recent grammatical descriptions aiming to account for the distribution of noun phrases with οὐ and μή respectively which we find in the texts of the classical authors two tendencies can be distinguished: some (in fact: most) theoreticians assume a clearly delimited field of operation for each of the two negatives, usually connecting μή with a (strictly speaking) generic or sometimes “characterizing” use of noun phrases and οὐ, on the other hand, with an – in one way or other – referential use¹; others do not draw the line between phrases with the one and the other negative so sharply, but simply register the usage of both negatives as “legitimate”², sometimes mentioning non-semantic factors (e. g., style and metre) as possibly having influenced the choice³. In Gerö (1997) I examined the usage of noun phrases with οὐ and μή respectively in the (authentic) works of Plato⁴, which constitute a large enough text corpus with a high frequency of the construction in question, in order

¹ This is indeed the *communis opinio* attested by the traditional grammars; cf. for instance Kühner-Gerth (1904:201, note 4) and Goodwin-Gulick (1958:340f.). Not every grammarian, however, has found the view that μή in noun phrases always should be associated with classes, οὐ with singular, definite individuals or things to be congruent with the evidence of the texts. An example of this is Laird (1922) (where the author’s perplexity is shown already in the title, “When is generic μή particular?”). A similar attitude, on a somewhat more general level, is exemplified in Gildersleeve (1892:259): “To understand οὐ and μή a certain mobility is necessary, and particular and generic are often poor formulae”.

² E. g. Stahl (1907:776f.).

³ Cf. for instance Postgate (1894) and Moorhouse (1959).

⁴ 28 dialogues selected in accordance with the authenticity classification in Brandwood (1976). All the letters were, in part *pace* Brandwood, excluded from the corpus, basically in view of their general difference of style and purpose.

that some conclusions be drawn about what factors determine the interplay between the two negatives in such cases. I then found that in the Platonic corpus – as well as in material from other classical authors – the explanations given by the earlier theoreticians did not quite match with my findings.

In the investigated material there was a considerable overlap between phrases with οὐ and μή in the uses which the current descriptions in a rigid way connect with the one and the other negative. Still, there was distinctly a certain pattern to be observed, so that a “pell-mell” mode of explanation also seemed to be ruled out. The distribution of the two negatives in the collection of articular expressions (the material most focused on in my investigation) was basically as follows: a) only οὐ in noun phrases picking out individual entities or groups of such *in a purely referential way*, b) οὐ or μή in noun phrases used in an *attributive or “characterizing” way*⁵ – whether or not some particular entity was ultimately referred to, c) μή in *purely generic cases*⁶, d) οὐ or μή in cases of *inherited genericity*, i. e., where a noun phrase receives a generic interpretation by being referentially dependent on a generic concept⁷. (Additionally there was, as could be ex-

⁵ Donnellan (1966 *et alibi*) employs the terms “referential” and “attributive” to distinguish the following two uses of definite descriptions: a definite description is used referentially if it is employed by the speaker simply *as a tool for picking out a specific referent* (One of Donnellan’s examples is the sentence “Who is the man drinking a martini?” uttered by someone who simply wants to be informed about the identity of a person he sees at a party, the content of this person’s glass being unimportant [It could be water, for instance]); in the attributive use something is stated, asked, etc. about *whoever or whatever has a certain quality*. (An example is the same question asked by the chairman of the local Teetotallers Union, who has just been informed that a man is drinking martini at their annual party but still has no particular person in mind about whom he asks the question – in this case. The attribute of being the man who drinks a martini is all-important [cf. *op.cit.*; 287]). Whereas Donnellan only discusses the referential-attributive distinction as it applies to definite descriptions, more recent authors use this distinction also in their treatment of plural and indefinite terms. In Gerö (1997) I follow this latter practise.

⁶ I. e. noun phrases in contexts where one does not speak of the one or other group or particular individual of a certain kind, but of a whole class; for some definitions, cf. for instance Lyons (1977:193f.).

⁷ An example from Dahl (1988) of inherited genericity is “The eyes work together”, where the domain needed in order to interpret the reference of the noun phrase is something like “any human body”. Link (1988) uses a similar approach to indefinite noun phrases, with examples like “Cowboys

pected, a great deal of material involving the phenomenon of *constituent negation*, where οὐ was used in spite of a referential status of the noun phrase which *per se* would have called for μή.) In my discussion of this distribution of the two negatives I adopted the following approach: οὐ I saw as selected in referentially used noun phrases as well as in attributive and “inherited genericity”-cases because of an *existential* import which these uses have in common (This use of οὐ in noun phrases could, then, further be connected with the *assertive* or *indicative* value generally associated with the applications of this negative); the use of μή, on the other hand, in attributive, purely generic and “inherited genericity”-cases I classified as *predicative* (and ultimately to be connected with the general *non-assertive* or *non-indicative* use of μή); since part of the μή-cases in my material had a predicative, part of it an existential import, whereas the οὐ-cases *always* had an existential import (except for some cases where constituent negation was involved), I described the noun phrases with the former negative as having a more general and ambiguous meaning, the ones with the latter negative as being more explicit; accordingly, the οὐ-phrases in some contexts, I argued, had a communicative advantage over the corresponding μή-phrases, viz. in the effecting of disambiguation and clarity.

1. The problem

Now, the problem with this kind of analysis, I think, is that although it gives a quite acceptable *description of the facts* – with the merit of correcting some rather fundamental errors in the traditional exposés – and probably also a useful picture of the material from a *pragmatic* point of view, it does not really provide us with a satisfactory *semantic* explanation of the data. There are indeed already indications in the collection of instances of Gerö (1997) – a great deal of which I have now reexamined in their context – that it is necessary to go further than what was the case in the analysis there carried out, and that partly something else is at stake than what was there focused on.

carry guns”, where the noun phrase “guns” is seen as referentially dependent on the generic “cowboys”. (For indefinite noun phrases in such contexts Dahl adopts another type of analysis, cf. *op.cit.*: 93.) In my discussion of inherited (or dependent) genericity I intend to cover *promiscue* expressions of both types.

What that is – and along what lines a more fully developed semantic description could be achieved – I intend to show below.

2. A new approach

As is well known, *intensional* or *opaque* contexts are linguistic milieus where *alternative worlds* or *world-states* are involved – for instance worlds of belief, fear and purpose. In *extensional* or *transparent*⁸ contexts, on the other hand, the “actual” world or world-state is dealt with⁹. Now, in working with Greek texts it would seem natural to connect μή – the negative of wishes, fears, thoughts, etc. – in noun phrases, in a sort of general way with a quality of intensionality of the context where the noun phrase appears, and οὐ – the negative of facts, etc. – with extensionality of the context. And indeed intensionality – in a quite perspicuous way – seems to provide the key to the usage of μή in many passages:

- 1) Hdt. 6.94 ... ἄμα δὲ βουλόμενος ὁ Δαρεῖος ... καταστρέφει τῆς Ἑλλάδος τοὺς μὴ δόντας αὐτῷ γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ
 “... and moreover Darius desired to subdue all the men of Hellas who had not given him earth and water”
- 2) Eur. *Hel.* 1288f. σὸν ἔργον, ὦ νεᾶνι· τὸν παρόντα μὲν | στέργειν πόσιν χρῆ, τὸν δὲ μηκέτ’ ὄντ’ ἔαν
 “Princess, your part is this: with him who is now your lord, content yourself; him who is no longer alive, you must let be”

⁸ “Intension” and “intensional” (not to be confused with “intention” and “intentional”) are terms referring to, roughly, the *sense* of an expression; “extension” and “extensional”, on the other hand, apply to its *reference*.

⁹ For an introduction to this matter, cf. for instance McCawley (1981), especially 326ff., and Partee, ter Meulen & Wall (1993), 401ff. Here, for those not so familiar with the category of intensionality or opacity, it may in all brevity be mentioned that for intensional contexts the following two phenomena are characteristic: (i) failure of substitution of predicate-logical equivalents (i. e., failure of the so-called “Leibniz’ law”), (ii) failure of existential generalization. An example of (i) is a) “Robin wants to look at the Morning Star” *versus* b) “Robin wants to look at the Evening Star”, where meaning is not preserved between a) and b) in spite of “the Morning Star” and “the Evening Star” coreferring to the planet Venus; an example of (ii) is (a) “John wants to catch a fish and eat it” and b) “There is a fish that John wants to catch and eat”, where (b) does not necessarily follow from (a). This is different for extensional contexts, where the laws of predicate logic, such as the mentioned ones, are valid.

- 3) Pl. *Phdr.* 243 e 4f. Ποῦ δὴ μοι ὁ παῖς πρὸς ὃν ἔλεγον; ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀκούσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀνήκοος ὢν φθάσῃ χαρισάμενος τῷ μὴ ἐρῶντι
 “Where is the youth to whom I was speaking? He must hear this also, lest if he do not hear it, he accept a non-lover before we can stop him”

In (1) and (2) the noun phrases are within the scope of typical intensional (or: world-creating) predicates – *χρή* (“it is necessary”) and *βουλόμενος* (“desiring”); in (3) we have a noun phrase in an opaque context constituted by the embedded sentence introduced by the conjunction *μή* (“lest”), further cases chosen from the extensive material of this type are the following ones:

- 4) Soph. *Ant.* 770f. Ἄμφω γὰρ αὐτῶ καὶ κατακτεῖναι νοεῖς; Οὐ τήν γε μὴ θιγοῦσαν
 “Surely, you do not mean to slay them both?” “Not her who did not touch the body”
- 5) Eur. *Hec.* 1250f. ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τὰ μὴ καλὰ | πράσσειν ἐτόλμας, τλήθι καὶ τὰ μὴ φίλα
 “Forasmuch as you have dared to do what was not fair, even suffer what is not sweet”

In other passages where we find noun phrases with *μή*, the intensional character of the context is *prima facie* not quite as obvious but nevertheless is at hand, e. g.:

- 6) Soph. *O.R.* 396f. ... ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ μολών, | ὁ μηδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους, ἔπαυσά νιν ...
 “... but I came, the unknowing Oedipus; I stopped her mouth ...”

In this sentence there is no overt sign of intensionality similar to those in (1)–(5)¹⁰, but still it is easy to see that alternative worlds are also here involved: the expression *ὁ μηδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους* is clearly not to be taken as a description with which Oedipus seriously characterizes himself, but it may rather be looked upon as a description due to *someone else* (either to the addressee, Teiresias, or to the people of Thebes in general, who did not think very much of him before he delivered the city from the sphinx). The truth of the statement “Oedipus is unknowing” would then only be put forward as relative to the *belief worlds* of some person or other¹¹. The sentence can thus be seen

¹⁰ As for the opacity-inducing effect of tense, cf. below, p. 43, note 12.

¹¹ An interpretation of the mentioned passage along these lines we find in Kühner (1870:756, note 4): “so sagt S. OR. 397 zu dem Tiresias: du hast das Räthsel nicht gelöst, ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ ... ὁ μηδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους ..., *ich, von dem du meinst, er wisse Nichts*” (my italics). In the first and second edition of Kühner’s

as being within the scope of an unexpressed but easily reconstructable world-creating predicate¹².

Another example to be mentioned here is the following one:

- 7) Pl. *Parm.* 160 e 2f. Καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν
 “And the non-existent one partakes of ‘that’ and ‘some’ and ‘this’ and ‘relation to this’ and ‘these’ and all notions of that sort”

Seen in its context also this sentence shows its intensional character: the alternative worlds here involved are those corresponding to the hypothesis “if one does not exist” which is assumed earlier in the text and afterwards constitutes the frame for a considerable stretch of discourse (cf. 160 b εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἐν, τί χρῆ συμβαίνειν, ἄρ’ οὐ σκεπτόν μετὰ τούτου; “... and ought we not next consider what must happen, if one does not exist?”).

Another instance of a similar type in the same context is the following one:

- 8) *ibid.* 160 c 2f. Τί δ’ εἴ τις λέγοι εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἄρα ἐφ’ ἐκάστου ἂν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι ...; “Now if a person should say ‘if greatness does not exist’, ‘if smallness does not exist’, or anything of that sort, would he not in each case make it clear

Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache (1835, 1870) the explanation of μὴ as caused by an *oratio obliqua*-like force is not uncommon (cf. Kühner 1870: *loc.cit.*: “μὴ (steht) ... wenn ... Etwas aus der Seele eines Anderen als nicht seiend ausgesprochen wird”); in Kühner-Gerth these original interpretations by Kühner are replaced by other ones. The same type of interpretation we also find in Franke (1832) and it is in these writers, for sure, ultimately to be seen as an application of Hermann’s (1802 *et alibi*) programmatic “μὴ negat cogitationem” (Hermann himself, however, was – rather than taking refuge in an *oratio obliqua*-force of μὴ – inclined to interpret the presence of this negative in comparable cases by a modality of “assumption” or “likelihood”, cf. for instance Hermann *ad Soph. Phil.* 712f. ὦ μελέα ψυχά | ὅς μηδ’, οἰνοχύτου πώματος ἦσθη δεκέτει | χρόνῳ ... “Si quis mirabitur, quod hic μηδέ, non οὐδέ dictum sit, cogitet velim μὴ ut negationem, quae proprie non ad rem ipsam, sed ad cogitationem ejus spectet, quadam conjectandi dubitandique potestate praeditam esse, ut si Germanice dicas ‘wohl nicht.’”)

¹² Another factor, however, which we may want to consider in cases like the one discussed, is the effect of the past tense – another feature commonly looked upon as opacity-inducing. We would then be dealing not with alternative worlds, but with alternative world-states. This will be discussed in more detail below, cf. pp. 48f.

that the thing he speaks of as not existing is different?’ ‘Certainly’. ‘And in our case does he not make it clear that he means, when he says ‘if one is not’, that the thing which is not is different from other things ...?’”

Once we have gotten used to the idea that sentences may be within the scope of an opacity-creating expression which has to be recovered from some earlier section of the text or sometimes reconstructed, in fact whole series of μή-cases can be accurately appreciated, e. g.:

9) Pl. *Tim.* 25 c 2f. ... ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐσχάτους ἀφικομένη κινδύνους, κρατήσασα μὲν τῶν ἐπιόντων τρόπαιον ἔστησεν, τοὺς δὲ μήπω δεδουλωμένους διεκώλυσεν δουλωθῆναι, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους, ὅσοι κατοικοῦμεν ἐντὸς ὄρων Ἡρακλείων, ἀφθόνως ἅπαντας ἤλευθέρωσεν

“... after encountering the deadliest perils, it [viz. your state] defeated the invaders and reared a trophy; whereby it saved from slavery those who were not as yet enslaved, and all the rest of us who dwell within the bounds of Heracles it ungrudgingly set free”

10) Pl. *Soph.* 263 b 2f. Τούτων δὴ ποιόν τινα ἐκάτερον φατέον εἶναι; Τὸν μὲν ψευδῆ που, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ. Λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθῆς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν περὶ σοῦ. Τί μήν; Ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδῆς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων. Ναί. Τὰ μὴ ὄντ’ ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει

“Now what quality shall be ascribed to each of these sentences [viz. ‘Theaetetus sits’ and ‘Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies’]?’ ‘One is false, I suppose, the other true’. ‘The true one states facts as they are about you’. ‘Certainly’. ‘And the false one states things that are other than the facts’. ‘Yes’. ‘In other words it speaks of things that are not as if they were”

11) Pl. *Rep.* 422 e. ἀλλ’ ἐὰν εἰς μίαν ... πόλιν συναθροισθῆ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων χρήματα, ὄρα μὴ κίνδυνον φέρῃ τῇ μὴ πλουτούσῃ

“Yet consider whether the accumulation of all the wealth of the other cities in one does not involve danger for the state which has no wealth”

In (9) the description τοὺς ... μήπω δεδουλωμένους can be interpreted as being relative to a set of worlds accessible via some epistemic stance of the Athenian deliverers (not necessarily corresponding to the perhaps more imprecise picture which the speaker may have of its denotation)¹³. Also in (10) τὰ μὴ ὄντα is not a description due to the speaker but due to the *line of argumentation* presented by the speaker on the basis of the prior verbal exchange between him and

¹³ The opacity-inducing effect of past as well as future tense will be discussed later, cf. below, pp. 48f.

the addressee. The reference worlds of the sentence τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ... λέγει are probably best seen as the set of worlds where the chain of argumentation holds true – again a set of hypothetical worlds. As a context (11) is already in itself heavily opaque, but the constructions which probably are of most interest for the interpretation of the expression τῇ μὴ πλουτούσῃ we find earlier in the text: (421 e f.) ἔτερα δὴ ... τοῖς φύλαξιν εὐρήκαμεν, ἃ παντὶ τρόπῳ φυλακτέον ὅπως μήποτε αὐτοὺς λήσει εἰς τὴν πόλιν παραδύνα. ... πλοῦτός τε ... καὶ πενία ... (“Here, then, is a second group of things ... that our guards *must guard against and do all in their power to keep from slipping into their city without their knowledge* ...: wealth and poverty ...”) and: (422 a 4f.): τόδε μέντοι ... σκόπει, πῶς ἡμῖν ἢ πόλις οἷα τε ἔσται πολεμεῖν, ἐπειδὴν χρήματα μὴ κεκτημένη ἦ (“yet here is a point for your consideration ..., how our city, *possessing no wealth*, will be able to wage war ...”). The picture we get of the alternative worlds here involved is a rather complex one: proceeding from a set of “morally perfect” worlds, where it is true that the guards, in accordance with their duty, try their best to keep wealth and poverty away from the city, we reach the ultimate reference-worlds, so to speak, for “the state which has no wealth”, viz. a set of belief worlds (or: “worlds of purpose”) where this goal is achieved¹⁴.

Turning now to the expressions with οὐ we on the one hand find cases like the following one – in a context which to all appearances is extensional and deals with the “actual” world¹⁵:

¹⁴ Note the interesting use of the particle ἄν (attached to the conjunction ἐπειδή) in a temporal clause within the scope of a world-creating predicate. Comparable uses of ἄν (κε) are discussed in Gerö (2002).

¹⁵ Indeed also such sentences may be interpreted as being within the scope of an intensional operator, viz. if we focus on the sentence describing the speech act involved, in this case something like “I assert that ...”. (Cf. Hintikka’s (1967:47) remark that the only thing he misses in Donnellan (1966) “is a clear realization that the distinction he is talking about (i. e., the referential-attributive distinction – with sentences like “Smith’s murderer is insane”, without overt signs of intensionality, as examples) is only operative in contexts governed by propositional attitudes or other modal terms” and Kaplan’s (1978) observation “that the remark falls into place when we realize that Donnellan is concerned essentially with a given speaker who is *asserting* something, *asking* something or *commanding* something”. Cf. also the explicit analysis in von Stechow (1984:396f.) of asserted non-embedded sentences.) However, as we shall see, contexts set up by verbs like “assert” in Greek still need to be separated from those created by intensional predicates such as have been exemplified up till now.

- 12) Eur. *Alc.* 400f. ... ἀντιάζω | σ' ἐγώ, μάτερ, ἐγὼ | ... καλοῦμαί σ' ὁ | σὸς ... νεοσσός. | Τὴν οὐ κλύουσσαν οὐδ' ὄρωσαν
 "... O, I cast myself upon you ..., mother! I plead with you for a word! - I, your our own little bird!" "With her who neither hears, nor sees"

On the other hand, many expressions with οὐ are embedded in quite complex sentences which clearly set up contexts of an intensional type, e. g.:

- 13) Isocr. 15. 112 καί τοι τοιοῦτον ἔργον ἂν τις ἄλλος φανῆ πεποικώς, ὁμολογῶ ληρεῖν, ὅτι διαφερόντως ἐπαινεῖν ἐπιχειρῶ τὸν οὐδὲν περιττότερον τῶν ἄλλων διαπεπραγμένον
 "And if you can point to any other man who has done a like thing, I stand ready to admit my folly in attempting to praise superlatively one who has done no more than others"

To begin with, we here again have a conditional clause which introduces a set of possible worlds. Secondly, ὁμολογῶ ("admit") and ἐπιχειρῶ ("attempt") are both intensional verbs. Finally, also the embedded sentence introduced by ὅτι ("since") is in itself an intensional construction. In comparing this case with those above involving noun phrases with μή there are, however, a couple of important differences. First, ἐπιχειρῶ - a prime example of an intensional predicate, comparable to the ones we have seen above - does not have the expression τὸν οὐδὲν περιττότερον τῶν ἄλλων διαπεπραγμένον in its scope. (Clearly, for the attempt in question it would not be essential that the object of praise be "one who has done more than others"!)

Further, by ὁμολογῶ and the ὅτι-embedding intensional contexts are induced which, it can be argued, are of a somewhat different type than those induced by e. g. clauses introduced by εἰ and (non-iterative) εἰάν/ἂν ("if") or verbs like ἐπιχειρῶ. In cases like the one under discussion, then, the "modal subordination"-phenomenon induced by an ἂν-clause seems to matter less.

A noun phrase with οὐ in what seems to me a (two-ways) non-extensional context we have also in the following case:

- 14) Pl. *Soph.* 260 d 6f. τάχα δ' ἂν φαίη τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ μὲν μετέχειν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τὰ δ' οὐ, καὶ λόγον δὴ καὶ δόξαν εἶναι τῶν οὐ μετεχόντων
 "but he (i. e., the sophist) might say that some of the ideas partake of not-being and some do not, and that speech and opinion are among those which do not"

Here a modality of possibility, expressed by the adverb τάχα ("perhaps") and an optative with ἂν as well as an overt verb of

assertion create opacity. Still, as we shall see, also such contexts are of a different type than those where noun phrases with μή appear.

Another type of context, finally, where noun phrases with οὐ often occur and for which an analysis focusing on intensionality may be suggested is exemplified by the following two passages:

15) Pl. *Gorg.* 493 a 5f. ... καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ... παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμύητους, τῶν δὲ ἀνοήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ αἰ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρημένος εἶη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπλητίαν ἀπεικάσας

“... and so some smart fellow ... made a fable in which – by a play of words – he named this part (viz. the part of the soul in which we have desires), as being so impressionable and persuadable, a jar, and the thoughtless he called uninitiate: in these uninitiate that part of the soul where the desires are, the licentious and fissured part, he named a leaky jar in his allegory, because it is so insatiate”

16) Pl. *Phd.* 79 c 2f. ἢ ψυχῇ, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὄραν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι’ ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως ..., τότε μὲν ἔλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα

“whenever the soul makes use of the body for any inquiry, either through seeing or hearing or any of the other senses ..., then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the same ...”

Interpreting noun phrases in such contexts as cases of inherited genericity¹⁶ and generics, generally, as involving alternative worlds¹⁷, we here get a reading where situations (or entities) of a certain type must be considered in *all possible worlds*, and where some other situation, entailed by the first one, can be located in all of these worlds. It seems, thus, that for our analysis of these noun phrases we will have to regard them as located in an opaque context ultimately created by an *necessity operator*, i. e., we have to reconstruct a predicate like *χρῆ* or *δεῖ*.

Interestingly enough, now, cases like the ones just quoted contrast with such as the following ones, where we find noun phrases with μή:

¹⁶ Cf. Dahl (1988).

¹⁷ As suggested by Dahl (1975).

- 17) Pl. *Laws* 925 b 4f. ἂν οὖν δὴ τις ἀπορουμένη τῶν αὐτόθεν ὀρᾷ τινα εἰς ἀποικίαν ἀπεσταλμένον, ἧ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν αὐτῆ κληρονόμον ἐκείνον γίγνεσθαι τῶν τοῦ πατρός ... ἐὰν ... ἐκτὸς γένους (ἧ), τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὄντων ἔξω τῆς συγγενείας, κύριος ἔστω κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐπιτρόπων καὶ τῆς παιδὸς τοῦ τελευτήσαντος αἴρεσιν γῆμαι καὶ τὸν κληρον ἐπανελθῶν οἴκαδε λαβεῖν τοῦ μὴ διαθεμένου
 “so if any girl, being at a loss to find a spouse on the spot, sees one that has emigrated to a colony and desires that he should become heir to her father’s property ...; ... if he be outside the kin, and there be no one of near kin in the State, then by the choice of the guardians and of the daughter of the deceased he shall be entitled to marry and to take the lot of the intestate man on his return home”
- 18) Pl. *Symp.* 200 e 2f. Καὶ οὗτος ἄρα καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ μὴ ἐτοίμου ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τοῦ μὴ παρόντος, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἔχει καὶ ὁ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτὸς καὶ οὗ ἐνδεής ἐστι ...
 “Then such a person, and in general all who feel desire, feel it for what is not provided or present; for something they have not or are not or lack ...”

Here also other opacity-inducing features are operative – in (17) (non-iterative) ἐάν (“if”) and κύριος ἔστω “shall be entitled”, in (18) ἐπιθυμεῖ “feels desire for”/“wants”. Below we shall see that it is indeed possible to interpret contexts of the discussed type, where noun phrases with οὐ appear, in a way which distinguishes them from such as the latter two with μή.

So far the whole question of tense and its opacity-inducing effect has almost entirely been neglected. Since, however, *past* as well as *future* tense are commonly described as creating opaque contexts¹⁸, the material should be approached also from this angle. As for my collection of instances, however, it is in dealing with the μή-cases always possible to focus on some other opacity-creating item, whether expressed or reconstructable, which in a more natural way accounts for the intensional character of the context which *ex hypothesi* is responsible for the choice of this negative. How this works for sentences in the past tense (6) and (9) above illustrate. Clear examples

¹⁸ Cf. for instance Dahl (1971), Ejerhed (1980) and Partee, ter Meulen & Wall (1993). This, however, is not an uncontroversial issue: for instance, Needham (1975) (according to Ejerhed) takes a different attitude to this matter, and Givón (1973) counts future tense as opacity-inducing, but not past tense.

in the future tense are scarce – also the one quoted below is not an ideal one, but serves to illustrate the same principle:

19) Thuc. 1.22.4 καὶ ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν (τῶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ γραφέντων) ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται

“And it may well be that the absence of the fabulous from my narrative will seem less pleasing to the ear”

The presence of ἴσως (“perhaps”) here complicates the picture, but still, I think, this example can easily be paralleled to (6) and (9). Here too it seems natural to interpret the noun phrase relative to the belief worlds of, from the author’s point of view, the future readers of his work. The issue here is thus not so much which *time or world-state* we have to consider in interpreting the noun phrase, as which *world(s)* – the “actual” world of the speaker or alternative worlds accessible via some epistemic stance of others¹⁹.

An instance with οὐ, on the other hand, in an embedded sentence within the scope of the past tense operator we have in the following case:

20) Pl. *Apol.* 32 b 1f. καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ ... πρωτανεύουσα ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβουλεύσασθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν ...

“and it happened that my tribe held the presidency when you resolved to judge collectively, not severally, the ten generals who had failed to gather up the slain after the naval battle”

What time or world-state we shall interpret the noun phrase as relative to is here again, I think, not as essential for the choice of negative as is the fact that we are dealing with the “actual” world of the speaker. (Significantly enough, the noun phrase is outside the

¹⁹ Of this instance, again, we in the earlier editions of Kühner’s *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache* (1835, 1870) – but no longer in Kühner-Gerth (1904) – find an interpretation along the lines here suggested: “auditori fortasse scripta mea, quia nullae in eis *existent* fabulae ... minus jucunda videbuntur (aus der Seele der Leser gesagt)”. The same type of reading we find also in Franke (1832). That the choice of negative in cases like this still continues to puzzle scholars working with Greek texts, we see e. g., in Flory (1990:196f.), who in his discussion of “the difficulty and boldness of this phrase” (i. e., τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν) tentatively appeals to three different factors, when he attempts to explain the use of μή – to the general application of the phrase (with Classen-Steup (1897): “μή, nicht οὐ μυθῶδες in der allgemeinen, nicht auf einzelnes bezüglichen Beurteilung”), to the elevated and emotionally charged style of the passage and, finally, to the author’s desire to avoid hiatus (*op.cit.*, 196, note 8 and 197, note 14).

scope of ἐβουλεύσασθε – in itself an opacity-inducing item to be ranged with the expressions mentioned above, which are followed by noun phrases with μή.)

To sum up, now, if we try to analyse the use of οὐ and μή in Greek noun phrases focusing on the intensional versus extensional character of the contexts where they appear – something which not only seems intuitively attractive but also immediately finds support in a large portion of the material provided by the texts – we seem to end up with the following situation: we have noun phrases with μή in intensional contexts set up by many well-known opacity-inducing expressions, e. g., χρή (“it is necessary”) and βούλομαι (“want to”); οὐ in noun phrases we find in extensional contexts as well as in certain contexts which are obviously also intensional or at least possible to interpret as such; the opacity-inducing effect of past and future tense does not seem to be of primary importance for the choice of negative. Below I am going to present some ideas about how to bring clarity into this state of affairs.

3. Some conclusions

It seems to me that the very general notions of intensionality and extensionality introduced so far cannot quite sufficiently account for the use of οὐ and μή in some of the cases under discussion. There are indeed several possibly interrelated problems involved here, above all in the interpretation of the cases with οὐ. (The solutions of these, then, naturally affects the whole picture). One important observation registered above is, I think, that μή is found in noun phrases in the scope of typical intensional predicates such as χρή (“it is necessary”) and βούλομαι (“want to”), whereas in the scope of past or future tense this negative seems to occur *only if additionally some opacity-inducing expression of the first type is involved* (modals, predicates of attitude). This shows, I think, that we might have to work with a more fine-grained analysis of intensional contexts, e. g., distinguishing between *strong and weak intensional contexts*²⁰. (Noun phrases with a

²⁰ I adopt here the the view-point found in von Stechow (1994, 1995), that past and future tense set up *weak* intensional contexts, whereas certain modals and verbs of attitude, e. g., “believe”, set up *strong* intensional contexts. The argumentation in Farkas (1992 *et alibi*), building on McCawley (1980), in favour of a weak intensional interpretation of the context set up by e. g., “believe” I do not find convincing.

negative in strong intensional contexts, then, would *ex hypothesi* exhibit μή, whereas in weak intensional contexts we would find οὐ).

For some of the material, however, something else seems to be at stake. Above we have seen that noun phrases in the complement of verbs of assertion and in embedded clauses introduced by ὅτι (“because”) have οὐ. As for the semantics of verbs of assertion it has been suggested that they do not always take propositional complements, the way verbs like e. g., “believe” does, but may instead take a *quotational complement*²¹. This could explain the choice of οὐ in noun phrases within the scope of e. g., λέγω and φημί (i. e., inasmuch as that the quotational complement would reflect the *oratio recta* of the quoted speaker). It may well be the case, however, that verbs of assertion need some other, more refined analysis²² – a separation of these from “classical” verbs of attitude at any rate seems justified, which indeed is supported by the distribution of noun phrases with οὐ and μή in Greek. If we then turn to the ὅτι-clauses, the reader will probably not find it very surprising that a noun phrase with a negative embedded in such a construction (also in a heavily opaque context like (13) above) exhibits οὐ, considering the use of this negative and furthermore, of the indicative mood, generally in such clauses. Here, however, two things should be pointed out. First: which negative a construction in itself takes is not necessarily a secure diagnostic for the choice of negative we should expect in an embedded noun phrase (cf. e. g. (7) above), and secondly: even if, admittedly, in most cases there is a correspondence between the (potential or actual) choice of negative in the type of construction where the noun phrase is found and in the noun phrase itself, ὅτι-clauses in general (not only with a causal import) indeed seem to occupy a special position in this respect, viz. somewhat vacillating between οὐ and μή²³.

²¹ Cf. Cole (1978: 13f.).

²² Cf. the discussion of “behaupten” in von Stechow (1991).

²³ In the literature on Greek grammar interesting examples of μή in indicative clauses introduced by ὅτι and ἐπεὶ are mentioned. Usually this usage is seen as typical for later Greek with its decreasing appreciation of the distinctions in the use the two negatives in the language of the classical period. Not all theoreticians, however, have adopted this view, cf. for instance Hermann (1832:621f.) apropos the use of ἐπεὶ μή in Plutarch: “Lange vor Plutarch hat man überall so geredet”, quoting as an example of this Aristotle *De part. animal.* 3.4 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀνάγκη θάτερον μὲν τούτων ἀρχὴν εἶναι, μή ἐστι δὲ τὸ ἦπαρ, ἀνάγκη τὴν καρδίαν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ αἵματος ἀρχὴν. Also Cook-Wilson (1889-90) mentions many examples of this use, also in impeccably classical

The general picture, however, is that ὅτι-clauses in classical Greek are not treated as if they by themselves would set up intensional contexts of a “strong” type²⁴. Probably a more detailed semantic analysis of such clauses and the contexts in which they appear can clarify why this is so. (Perhaps again a mode of assertion is reflected in the choice of negative?)

Another type of context which needs some further analysis is the one where we encounter the phenomenon of inherited or dependent genericity (cf. above, pp. 47f.). In the interpretation of generic statements often universal quantification of some kind is considered to be involved – over individuals or situations in possible worlds²⁵, in a “fuzzy” way over situations or occasions²⁶ or perhaps over possible individuals or situations. In choosing οὐ in noun phrases in such contexts, now, Greek seems to range cases of inherited genericity together with extensional expressions: it is rather as if we would have a regular ἀεὶ (“always”) there, which sets up an *extensional* context²⁷. Whether we now prefer the viewpoint that nominal negation in cases of inherited or dependent genericity in Greek behaves the way it does, because a *real extensional quality* of this context is reflected or because only an extensionality-inducing *component* of the construction underlies the choice of expression, it is certainly quite possible to grasp the choice of an extensional mode of expression in such cases. Another possible way to approach the choice of negative in noun phrases in this particular type of context, however, would be to focus on a presupposition at hand in such cases, viz. that (with a generic appli-

authors, and like Hermann he tries to explain this use as being consistent with what he himself regards as a regular type of usage in classical Greek (seeing μή in such cases as a means of expressing *emphatic* negation). Several of these cases, it should be noted, have not found favour with the editors of the Greek texts where they are found, who – in the conviction that indicative clauses introduced by ὅτι and ἐπεὶ, when negated, *must* have οὐ – have emended them (The most blatant example of this is Antiph. 5.21 καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὰ ταῦτα σκοπεῖτε, ὅτι μὴ προνοία μᾶλλον ἐγένετο ἢ τύχη, where Jebb writes ὅτι οὐ τῇ ἐμῇ προνοία, Maetzner ὅτι οὐ προνοία in the teeth of the whole manuscript evidence!)

²⁴ Interestingly enough, when μή occurs in indicative clauses introduced by ὅτι and ἐπεὶ, this clause is often within the scope of an intensional expression of a “strong” type, e. g., in the just-quoted Antiph. 5.21 (the imperative σκοπεῖτε).

²⁵ Cf. Dahl (1975).

²⁶ E. g. Lawler (1973).

²⁷ For a semantics of “always” cf. von Stechow (1994)

cation) the state-of-affairs referred to in the “antecedent” of the inherited genericity-construction really will be actualized; such a presupposition could in a semantic representation of such sentences again be traced back to a predicate of assertion or the like, i. e., to a predicate which tends to induce *extensionality*.

I am aware that some of the conclusions here formulated are rather tentative – at least as far as a more detailed semantic analysis of some of the contexts where noun phrases with οὐ occur is concerned. It should, however, be clear that with some additional semantic framework an analysis along these lines can be carried out. In support of the general approach here advocated, it may furthermore be pointed out that the categories of “strong intensionality” *versus* “extensionality” and “weak intensionality” can be shown to provide the key also to other problematic areas of Greek grammar which are of a type related to the one here discussed. One such area is the use of the so-called “modal” particles ἄν and κε, which are regularly employed in strong intensional contexts and omitted in extensional and weak intensional contexts as defined above²⁸.

Bibliography

- Brandwood, L. (1976): *A Word Index to Plato*. Leeds.
- Cole, P. (Ed.). (1978): *Syntax and Semantics*, Vol. 9: *Pragmatics*, New York.
- Cole, P. (1978): “On the Origins of Referential Opacity”, in P. Cole (Ed.), 1–22.
- Cook-Wilson, J. (1889–90): “On some apparent anomalies in the use of μή”. *Transactions of the Oxford Philological Society*, 23–56.
- Dahl, Ö. (1971): “Tenses and world-states”. *Gothenburg papers in theoretical linguistics*, 6.
- (1975): “On generics”. In Keenan, E. L. (Ed.). *Formal Semantics of Natural Language*. Cambridge, 99–111.
- (1988). “Inherited Genericity”. In Krifka, M. (Ed.), 85–94.
- Donnellan, K. (1966): “Reference and definite descriptions”. *Philosophical Review* 75, 281–304.
- Ejerhed, E. (1980): “Tense as a source of intensional ambiguity”, in F. Heny (Ed.) *Ambiguities in Intensional Contexts*, Dordrecht, etc., 231–252.
- Farkas, D. F. (1992): Two types of ‘world-creating predicates’. In D. Brentari, G. Larson and L. Macleod (Eds.) *Joy of Grammar*, 35–63.
- Flory, S. (1990): “Thucydides 1.22.4”. *Classical Journal* 85/3.
- Franke, F. (1832): “De particulis negantibus linguae Graecae commentatio, I”. In

²⁸ Cf. Gerö (2002).

- Annalium scholasticorum particula undetricesima qua publicata ad examina in Gymnasio Electorali Hasso-Schaumburgo DD. IX, X, XII, XIII Aprilis instituenda.* Rinteln.
- Gerö, E.-C. (1997): *Negatives and Noun Phrases in Classical Greek. An Investigation Based on the Corpus Platonium.* Frankfurt am Main.
- (2002) “The usage of ἄν and κτ in Ancient Greek: Towards a Unified Description”. *Glotta* LXXVI.
- Gildersleeve, B.A. (1892): “Brief mention”, *American Journal of Philology* 13, pp. 258–259.
- Givón, T. (1973): “Opacity and Reference in Language: An Inquiry into the Role of Modalities”, in J. Kimball (Ed.), *Syntax and Semantics*, 2, New York.
- Hermann, G. ([1802] 1822): Cf. Viger (1627).
- , (1832): Review of F. Franke (1832). *Allgemeine Schulzeitung*, 2/77, 617–628.
- Hintikka, J. (1967): “Individuals, Possible Worlds and Epistemic Logic”. *Noûs* 1, 33–62.
- Kaplan, D. (1978): “Dthat”. In P. Cole (Ed.), 221–243.
- Krifka, M. (Ed.). (1988): *Genericity in Natural Language. Proceedings of the 1988 Tübingen Conference.* Seminar für natürlich-sprachliche Systeme, University of Tübingen. (SNS-Bericht 88–42.).
- Kühner, R. (1835): *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, 2. Theil: Satzlehre.* Hannover.
- , (1870): *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, 2. Theil: Satzlehre*, 2nd ed. Hannover.
- Kühner and Gerth = Kühner, R., *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, 2. Teil: Satzlehre*, 3rd ed. revised by B. Gerth, I–II (1898), (1904). Hannover/Leipzig.
- Laird, A. G. (1922): “When is generic μή particular?”. *American Journal of Philology* 43, 124–145.
- Lawler, J. M. (1973): “Tracking the generic toad”. In C. Corum, T. C. Smith-Stark, A. Weiser (Eds.) *Papers from the ninth regional meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society.* Chicago.
- Link, G. (1988): “Dependency in the Theory of Generics”. In Krifka, M. (Ed.), 313–335.
- Lyons, J. (1977): *Semantics*, I–II. Cambridge.
- McCawley, J. D. (1981): *Everything that Linguists have Always Wanted to Know about Logic ...* Oxford.
- Moorhouse, A. C. (1959): *Studies in the Greek Negatives.* Cardiff.
- Needham, P. (1975): *Temporal Perspective. A Logical Analysis of Temporal reference in English, Philosophical Studies* 25, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
- Partee, B. H., ter Meulen, A., Wall, R. E. (1993): *Mathematical Methods in Linguistics.* Dordrecht, etc.
- Postgate, J. P. (1894): “Grammatical annotations upon the *Oedipus Rex*”. In *Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society* 3 1886–93, 50–73.

- Stahl, J. M. (1907): *Kritisch-historische Syntax des griechischen Verbums der klassischen Zeit*. (Indogermanische Bibliothek, I. Reihe: Grammatiken, 4.) Heidelberg.
- Stechow, A. v. (1984): "Structured Propositions and Essential Indexicals". In F. Landman and F. Veltman (Eds.) *Varieties of Formal Semantics*. Dordrecht, 385–403.
- , (1991): *Intensionale Semantik – eingeführt anhand der Temporalität*, Universität Konstanz. *Arbeitspapiere der Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft*.
- , (1994): "Tense in Intensional Contexts". *Semantics in Natural Language*, Blaubereuren, Seminar für Sprachwissenschaft, Universität Tübingen.
- , (1995): "On the Proper Treatment of Tense". *Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT)*. Ithaca, NY.
- Viger, F. ([1627] 1802] 1822): *De praecipuis graecae dictionis idiotismis liber. Cum animadversionibus Henrici Hoogeveeni, Ioannis Caroli Zeunii et Godofredi Hermannii*, 3rd ed. Leipzig.

Modern Greek τυφλόμυγα, a Descendant of χαλκή μυῖα?

By KIMMO JÄRVINEN, Lidköping

Χαλκή μυῖα does *not* denote the blind man's buff variety of that name as well as "it". Τυφλόμυγα fits *both* meanings of *Blindekuh*: the game and "it". Despite this semantic difference, χαλκή μυῖα in Classical Greek may well be the origin of τυφλόμυγα.

In my essay "Who or What Was the *Copper Fly*?" *Eranos* 95 (1997) 62–77, I aimed at explaining the sense and origin of χαλκή μυῖα, the puzzling Greek name for a variety of blind man's buff¹. The earliest instance of χαλκή μυῖα is Herodas 12 Cunningham; the only descriptions of χαλκή μυῖα proper are Pollux 9.123 Bethe and Suetonius περὶ παιδιῶν 17 Taillardat².

Surveying a number of solutions proposed from 1622³ onwards, I was bound to come across τυφλόμυγα, the Modern Greek word for blind man's buff⁴. According to Lorenz Grasberger's work on *Knabenspiele* and Demetrios Moutsos' article on some insects' names in Greek (Classical, Byzantine, and Modern), τυφλόμυγα is a case of *survival*⁵.

¹ The other Greek names known to us: μύινδα (several varieties), ψηλαφίνδα, and δραπετίνδα; on blind man's buff see also my essay "The Case of the Blindfold Aggressor", *Museum Helveticum* 54 (1997) 219–24.

² The fragment is from Eustathius *ad Hom. Il.* 1243.29ff. van der Valk. Unlike Jean Taillardat, the editor of the Greek fragments of Suetonius, I do *not* attribute Eustathius' λέγεται . . . ἀφιᾶσιν to Suetonius; v. *Eranos* 95 (1997) 62 n. 1.

³ Johannes Meursius deals with the game in his *De ludis Graecorum*, Leyden 1622, s.v. "μύια χαλκή"; the second edition (Leyden 1625) has a new title, *Graecia ludibunda*, but it is basically the same book.

⁴ The Demotic form is τυφλόμυγα; some dictionaries put the accent on the penultimate syllable, as in καθαρεύουσα Greek (yet the form ought to be τυφλόμυια, τυφλομύια probably being due to confusion caused by *casus obliqui*).

⁵ L. Grasberger, *Erziehung und Unterricht im klassischen Alterthum I* (Würzburg, 1864, repr. Aalen 1971) 42: "... noch immer τυφλόμυγα ...". D. Moutsos, "Greek μύωψ and τζιμούριον", *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung* 94 (1980) 156: "... τυφλόμυγα should be understood as the etymological counterpart of German *Blindfliege* though semantically it corresponds to *Blindekuh*."

However, the reasons that the two scholars give – or suggest – for supposing this are not valid. Χαλκή μυῖα and τυφλόμυγα do *not* mean “gadfly”, an insect that is called blind in several languages; far from it: *neither* designation seems to have that meaning⁶.

Unlike several modern names such as *Blindekuh*, χαλκή μυῖα is *not* a term that signifies “it” as well as the game itself. Τυφλόμυγα, on the other hand, seems to fit *both* meanings of *Blindekuh*. Is it possible, despite this semantic difference between the two Greek names, that χαλκή μυῖα is the origin of τυφλόμυγα?

As I have shown in my *Eranos* article, the ancient game was called χαλκή μυῖα on account of the dialogue between “it” and the seeing players, a nonsense ditty with the *incipit* χαλκήν μυῖαν θηράσω⁷. Later on, the ditty seems to have been left out by the players⁸; thus, a variety in which neither “it” chants “θηράσεις, ἀλλ’ οὐ λήψει” nor the rest of the assembly respond “θηράσεις, ἀλλ’ οὐ λήψει” was to inherit a baffling name without any obvious *raison d’être*⁹.

We can treat a quaint expression that we are not able to explain, I think, in three different ways. First, we can retain it, without bothering about the problem. Secondly, we can reject it and replace it with something entirely novel. Thirdly, we can try to make sense of it by replacing its most obscure component with something more intelligible. To illustrate the third possibility, it suffices to cite the Americanism “blind man’s bluff”¹⁰. That New-World term parallels Modern Greek τυφλόμυγα: in lieu of the obscure attribute χαλκή we have the sensible component τυφλο-

⁶ Cf. *Eranos* 95 (1997) 69f. The entomological sense is *rose chafer*, *Cetonia aurata* L., a beetle whose metallic lustre (whence *aurata* and χαλκή) is reflected in modern vernacular names too, e.g. French *carabe doré* and Swedish *guldbagge*, even modern Greek χρυσόμυγα. Dictionaries give no other sense for τυφλόμυγα but “blind man’s bluff”.

⁷ Cf. *Eranos* 95 (1997) 72ff.

⁸ The descriptions of μυῖα χαλκή (*sic*) in Photius and Hesychius do not contain the ditty; v. Hsch. μ 1813 Latte and Phot. μ 580 Theod.

⁹ Cf. *Eranos* 95 (1997) 74f.

¹⁰ How-to-play books often advise against too much roughness towards “it”. Should the buffeting be lacking or much limited the word “buff” makes little sense, even if one should know it is short for “buffet”. “Bluff” does not make very good sense, but it is an every-day word, and “buff” is not. “Blind man’s bluff” is seldom found in dictionaries. The form seems common enough: an American lady, perusing an essay of mine, perceived “buff” and “bluff” alike as “bluff”, without noticing the difference in sense, spelling, and pronunciation, between the British and American forms till I told her about it.

I have not found any early instances of τυφλόμυγα; I have found two other terms instead¹¹. In his dictionary compiled c. 1700 (printed posthumously in 1709), Father Alexis de Sommevoir gives the translation τυφλομάτι for “giuoco à mosca cieca” (s.v. “Mosca”); and in 1804, Karl Weigel gives τυφλομάτι and τυφλοπανίτζα for “Blind-*dekuh*”¹². But these two early names do *not* rule out the possibility of a third one in Modern Greek¹³. Perhaps one day some Byzantine or post-Byzantine author, unknown and unedited hitherto, will grant us an early specimen of τυφλόμυγα; yet, even without such early instances, it is, I think, fairly reasonable to regard Modern Greek τυφλόμυγα as a case of survival – with a difference.

¹¹ Moutsos mentions also the names σκυλλόμυγα (Chian), τζαμούσας (Pontic), and τζαμωχτό (Pontic).

¹² Alessio da Somavera, *Tesoro della Lingua Italiana e Greca-Volgare* (Paris 1709, repr. Sala Bolognese 1977); K. Weigel, *Deutsch-Neugriechisches Wörterbuch* (Leipzig 1804). Τυφλο- needs no explanation; -μάτι is ὀμμάτιον, and -πανίτζα a diminutive of *pannus*; cf. C. du Fresne, Sieur Du Cange, *Glossarium ad Scriptores mediae et infimae Graecitatis* (Lyons 1688, repr. Graz 1958) s.v. “τυφλοπανιάζειν”. *Blind-eye* and *blind-rag* seem to be *bahuvrihi* compounds.

¹³ Italian influence on Modern Greek (or *vice versa*) is a possibility – in this sketch I cannot treat *mosca cieca*, which might or might not be connected with τυφλόμυγα and/or χαλκή μυία –, or the name τυφλόμυγα might have arisen spontaneously; we cannot *know* for certain.

Zwei versteckte Wörter

Von KLAUS LENNARTZ, Hamburg

1. *Call.ep. 28,5 f. Pf.: ἀνίη*

Das *carmen vexatum*¹ Callimachus ep. 28 Pf. lautet:

ἐχθαίρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κυκλικόν, οὐδὲ κελεύθω
χαίρω, τίς πολλοὺς ᾧδε καὶ ᾧδε φέρει·
μισέω καὶ περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον, οὐδ' ἀπὸ κρήνης
πίνω· σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια.
Λυσανίη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλὸς καλός – ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν
τοῦτο σαφῶς, Ἥχώ φησί τις· ἄλλος ἔχει.²

Ich hasse das kyklische Gedicht, noch erfreut mich ein Weg, der viele Menschen hierhin und dorthin bringt: Ich hasse auch den vielgefragten Liebbling und trinke nicht aus der Quelle: Ich mag all das nicht, was jedem zugänglich ist. Lysanias, du aber, ja, du bist schön, so schön – doch bevor ich noch diese Worte deutlich ausspreche, sagt mir ein Echoruf: „Ein anderer hat ihn!“

Ein Streitpunkt unter wichtigeren (Anknüpfung des letzten Couplets; Stoßrichtung des Gesamtepigramms) ist die Erklärung des ‚Echoeffekts‘ V.5 f.² Der springende Punkt ist, daß Echo offenbar nicht sagt, was sie – zumindest philologisch gesehen – sagen muß, nämlich eine (womöglich partielle) Wiederholung von bereits Gesagtem³. Um ἄλλος ἔχει irgend im Vorangegangenen aufzutreiben, sind alle möglichen Wege beschritten worden: In ἔχει soll gesprochenes ναίχι stecken

¹ Bibliographie v. L. Lehnus, *Bibliografia Callimachea 1489–1988*, Genua 1989, 295–297. Darüber hinaus u. a. A. Cameron, *Callimachus and His Critics*, Princeton, New Jersey 1995, 388–399; U. Hübner, *Kallimachos' 28. Epigramm ohne Lysanias*, in: *Philologus* 140 (1996) 225–29. A. Porro, *Per l'interpretazione di Callimaco, epigr. 28 Pf.*, 5–6, in: *Lexis* 14 (1996) 87–91.

² Ich gehe hier nicht näher auf den Gedanken ein, das Schlusscouplet gehöre überhaupt getilgt (wodurch sich der sprachliche Befund im übrigen nicht ändert): Hierzu neigen nach M. Haupt und anderen Gow-Page, *Hellenistic Epigrams* II 156 f. Vgl. auch Hübner (wie Anm. 1), wo die diesbezüglichen Argumente, die mir nicht zwingend erscheinen, gesammelt sind.

³ Zu diesem beliebten ‚Wiederholungsspiel‘ vgl. u. a. Bömer zu *Ov. Met.* 3,388 mit einschlägigen Stellen und Lit.

(Bentley⁴ u. a.), ἄλλος gebe καλός wieder: Es bleibt, wenn man vom Wegfall des ν und κ einmal absieht⁵, das Problem der umgekehrten Reihenfolge der vermeintlich wiederholten Wörter⁶. Um diesem zu entgehen, hatte Schneider in *oratio obliqua* geändert (ἄλλον ἔχειν), Wilkinson⁷ nahm an, nur ἄλλος werde von Echo aus καλός wiederholt und ἔχει vom Dichter hinzugefügt, oder man hat zu methodisch und sprachlich gänzlich verfehlten Änderungsversuchen gegriffen⁸. Wilamowitz⁹ freilich hatte alle Erklärungsversuche, die den ‚Echoeffekt‘ in ἄλλος ἔχει hörten, zurückgewiesen: „daran dass jemand ναίχι καλός καλός und ἄλλος ἔχει für gleichklingend halten würde, konnte er (d. i. Kallimachos) unmöglich denken“¹⁰. W. Schmid¹¹ sah die Echowirkung in der „Wiederholung des καλός“ bei ναίχι καλός καλός, interpungierte nach Ἥχώ und verband φησί τις (coll. εἶπέ τις ep. 2,1): „also wenn jemand ναίχι καλός sagt, wiederholt sie καλός (das ist τοῦτο v. 6). Aber noch bevor sie das vollständig getan, verkündet ein Gewisser ‚ἄλλος ἔχει‘.“

Aber gegen einen solchen Ansatz hatte wiederum Wilamowitz (l.c.) längst eingewendet: „der einfall zu interpungiren ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν ταῦτα σαφῶς ἡχώ, φησί τις richtet sich dadurch, daß ἡχώ hierin vollkommen überflüssig ist und auf die Bemerkung eines quidam Kalli-

⁴ In den *Notae* zu Graevius' Kallimachosausgabe, Utrecht 1697, ad loc.: „Poetae dicenti ναίχι καλός Echo responsat ἔχει ἄλλος unde apparet, quod ai et e iam a tempore Callimachi eodem fere sono efferebantur, quod notandum.“ (Zitat nach Schneiders Kallimachosausgabe, Bd. 1, Leipzig 1870, 423).

⁵ Dies ist keine Quisquillie, denn beim literarischen Echoeffekt kann eben – im Gegensatz zum komischen Effekt (vgl. die Ausführungen von L. Grasberger, *Die griechischen Stichnamen*, Würzburg 1883, 17) – die einfache Parachese nicht ausreichen.

⁶ „... iure omnes mirantur echo ad ναίχι καλός respondisse vel respondere visam esse non ut debebat ἔχει ἄλλος, sed ἄλλος ἔχει ...“ (Schneider [wie Anm. 4] 80). Vgl. hierzu den Vorschlag von A. Porro (s. u. Anm. 15).

⁷ CR N.S. 17 (1967) 5.

⁸ σὺ δὲ καλός νήχ' εἶ· ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν Cataudella; Ἥχώ φησί τί; ἄλλος ἔχει Giangrande; ἄλλον ἔχει Cameron mit besonders kniffliger Begründung.

⁹ Homerische Untersuchungen, Berlin 1884, 355 Anm.

¹⁰ Mit „gleichklingend“ meinte Wilamowitz m. E. „gleichklingend im Sinne des Echoeffekts“, weshalb seine Skepsis auch nicht durch die naheliegende Vermutung L. Radermachers, *Griechischer Sprachgebrauch V.*, in: *Philologus* 60 (1901) 500 f. zu Call.Ap. 103 ἠ ἠ παιῶν i.q. ἔει ἔει, παῖ, ἰόν aus dem Wege geräumt wird.

¹¹ RhM N. F. 70 (1915) 145 f. mit Hinweis auf E. Petersen, *Progr.* Dorpat 1875, 3–6. Schmid's Lesung auch in Cahens Kallimachosausgabe, Paris 1948 (Coll. Budé).

machos unmöglich etwas geben kann.“ Schmidts Erklärung ist indes diagnostisch wichtig: Wenn Kallimachos den Effekt in der bekannten Weise erzielen wollte, muß dasjenige, was Echo sagt, erkennbare wörtliche Wiederholung eines Teils des Voraufgegangenen sein. Die einzige sichtbare Wiederholung in den beiden Versen ist diejenige von καλός, so daß man sich entweder dazu bequemen muß, Schmidts Ansatz als den richtigen anzuerkennen, oder aber davon ausgehen, daß nach φησί eben *keine* wörtliche Wiederholung von etwas vorher Gesagtem steht. So hat Düntzer interpretiert, aber gleichsam das Kind mit dem Bade ausgeschüttet¹². Dessen Deutung übernahm Meineke¹³; und in dieser Richtung erklärte auch Wilamowitz (l.c.): „er ist nur sicher, daß {er} auf seine Liebesschwüre die Antwort ‚bin versagt‘, so sicher folgt, wie das Echo. ‚für meinen Ruf Λυσανίας καλός ist ἄλλος ἔχει das Echo.“ Doch müßte Kallimachos unter dieser Voraussetzung der Vorwurf gemacht werden, eine sprachliche Pointe zu insinuieren, die dann nicht erfolgt: Was bei diesem Dichter wohl nicht wahrscheinlich ist.

Wir sollten bei der Erklärung von folgenden festliegenden Punkten ausgehen: (a) Was Echo – wenn auch wahrscheinlich verkürzt – sagt, muß *verbatim* vom Dichter vorher gesagt sein. (b) Wenn nicht der gewöhnliche Echoeffekt, also erkennbar *ausgeschriebene* Wiederholung, benutzt wird, so ist dennoch unbedingt ein *jeu d’esprit* vorauszusetzen, also eine *versteckte, nicht ausgeschriebene* sprachliche Pointe. (c) Diese gilt es, im Überlieferten zu entdecken, denn der überlieferte Text zeigt keine Anzeichen von Schädigung. Aus (a) folgt, daß die Worte ἄλλος ἔχει nicht den *Wortlaut* der Echo wiedergeben können. Wenn sie dies nicht tun, können sie nur Deutung des Dichters von etwas sein, das Echo sagt, aber *nicht verbatim* *ausgeschrieben* ist, sondern vom Leser – und hierin liegt die versteckte sprachliche Pointe (b) – aus dem vorher Gesagten extrapoliert und dann in derselben Weise wie vom Dichter *entschlüsselt* werden muß: Dies aber dürfte das Wörtchen ἀνίη sein, das die Göttin ganz nach ihrer Gewohnheit aus

¹² Zeitschrift f. d. Altertumsw. 5 (1847) 936: „Ἠχώ“ heisst hier nicht *Wiederhall*, sondern *Ruf, Stimme, Laut* ... „Zwar sage ich zu mir: *Schön bist du, Lysanias*, aber ehe ich dies gesprochen, ruft eine andere Stimme in mir: *Ein Anderer besitzt ihn*.“ Daß Echo nicht immer wiederholen muß, ist ja klar (Pind.Ol.14,17 ff. u. oft).

¹³ Kallimachosausgabe, Berlin 1861, ad loc.: „... nihil impedit quo minus ἡχώ non illam πέτρας ὄρεινῆς παιῖδα esse dicamus, sed de qualibet voce intelligamus, quam amans sive audit sive audire sibi videtur.“

Λυσανίη verkürzt, und das besonders passend ist für die zu erwartende Pein des wegen eines Rivalen Verschmähten¹⁴. Damit klärt sich auch zwanglos ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν/τοῦτο σαφῶς: Bevor Kallimachos den Satz überhaupt zu Ende spricht¹⁵, hat „eine Echo“ – hierin wird man eine Hindeutung des Dichters darauf sehen, daß die folgenden Worte nicht Zitat, sondern Deutung sind! – schon gesagt, daß ein Rivale siegreich war: ἀνίη.

2. Ar.Lys.860: *κινήσια

ΛΥ. ὦ χαῖρε φίλτατ' οὐ γὰρ ἀκλεῆς τοῦνομα
τὸ σὸν παρ' ἡμῖν ἔστιν οὐδ' ἀνώνυμον.
ἀεὶ γὰρ ἡ γυνή σ' ἔχει διὰ στόμα.
κἂν ὦν ἢ μῆλον λάβῃ, Κινήσια
τουτὶ γένοιτο, φησίιν.

KI. ὦ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν.

ΛΥ. Νῆ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην· κἂν περὶ ἀνδρῶν γ' ἐμπέσῃ
λόγος τις, εἴρηκ' εὐθέως ἡ σὴ γυνὴ
ὅτι λῆρός ἐστι τᾶλλα πρὸς κινήσιαν.

„Willkommen, mein Liebster: Dein Name ist nämlich nicht ohne Ruf bei uns noch unbekannt. Denn stets führt deine Frau dich im Munde. Und immer wenn sie ein Ei oder einen Apfel nimmt, sagt sie: „Für meinen Gatten!“ „Oh bei den Göttern!“ „Bei Aphrodite, ja! Und immer wenn wir über die Männer sprechen, sagt sie sofort, daß alles andre nichts ist im Vergleich zum (Be)gatten.“

Ar.Lys.853–60 steckt notorisch voller Zweideutigkeiten. Daß diese Zweideutigkeiten aber nur durch die Feststellung eines Athesauristons völlig sinnfällig werden, scheint jedenfalls nicht ausdrücklich bemerkt zu sein. Wenn Kinesias erscheint und Lysistrate bemerkt, daß ἀεὶ γὰρ

¹⁴ Sappho 1,3; Theocr. 2 öfter (2,55 αἰαῖ Ἔρωσ ἀνιαρέ). 29,9; das ἀνηγρὸν πνεῦμα des unglücklich Verliebten Call.ep.43, besonders deutlich Lucian.dial.meretr.(80) 8,1.2 u. an v. a. Stellen.

¹⁵ Gemeint ist also εὐθὺς πρὶν εἰπεῖν πάντα (Men.Epitr.264). An dieser Tatsache scheitert m. E. der ansonsten ingeniose Erklärungsansatz von A. Porro (wie oben A.1), die nach Bentley und genauer K. Strunk, Frühe Vokalveränderungen in der griechischen Literatur, in: Glotta 38 (1960) 74–89, bes.85, den Echoeffekt in der *mehrfachen* Wiederholung der Laute ... αἶχι καλὸς καλὸς ... αἶχι καλὸς erfüllt sah. Aber soweit kommt der Dichter gar nicht, da ist es schon Echo *allein*, die ἄλλος ἔχει sagt.

ἡ γυνή σ' ἔχει διὰ στόμα (855), ist natürlich gemeint, daß Myrrhine halt immer vom κινεῖν (i.q. βινεῖν) spricht, vgl. Σ ad loc. διαπαίζει τὰς γυναῖκας ὡς ἐρώσας τοῦ κινεῖν. (Gleichzeitig legt die Formulierung einer zureichenden Bomolochie des Zuschauers allerdings auch den Gedanken an *fellatio* nahe). Der Toast 856 f. Κινησία/τουτί γένοιτο mag vielleicht noch nicht mehr als den Mann selbst meinen: V. 858 ff. operiert dann aber, meine ich, als double entendre mit einem beim Hörer und Leser vorausgesetzten möglichen Appellativum *κίνησια, und man sollte das κ klein drucken: ... κἂν περὶ ἀνδρῶν γ' ἐμπέση/λόγος τις, εἴρηκ' εὐθέως ἢ σὴ γυνή/ὄτι ληρός ἐστι τᾶλλα πρὸς κίνησιαν: Der Name des Dithyrambendichters wird zu einem der Bildung nach sublitterarischen Appellativum *sensu obsceno* umgedeutet (κίνησις ist mit obszöner Bedeutung nicht belegt; das Suffix -σία auch in dieser Wortfamilie nur bei [meist mit ἄ-privativum gebildeten] Komposita¹⁶: εὐκίνησια bei Epikur und technischen Schriftstellern, vgl. auch ἀπρονοησία aus demselben Umkreis, ἀστροβολησία Thphr.CP 5,9,4, daneben v. a. spätgriechische oder technische komponierte Bildungen wie αὐτοκίνησια, ἀκίνησια); das Sprachniveau dürfte also ähnlich sein dem von φιλησία zu φιλέω, vgl. Hesych. φ 480 φιλησίαις· κλεψοσύναις, die Bildung *ad hoc*¹⁷ wie ἀπορησία Eubulos fr.139 K.-A. (mit V. Schmidts Hinweis auf inschriftliches Erscheinen des Wortes), und daß die Griechen mit dem fließenden Übergang zwischen Nomen proprium und Appellativum rechneten, ist notorisch und zeigen Soph.fr.658 Σιδηρώ ... φρονούσα τοῦνομα und Demetr. Rhet. Eloc.187 Ἀλέξανδρε, δράμε σου τῆς μητρὸς τὸ ὄνομα zur Genüge (vgl. auch Archil. 270 W., Amphis fr.36 K.-A., die Wortspiele Arist.rhet.1400b19 u. a.)¹⁸. τᾶλλα kann ohne weiteres auf Personen gehen (Alexis fr.25 K.-A.), ist aber hier vom Dichter gewählt, weil es als Neutrum auf „Praktiken“ bezogen gehört werden soll (es ist dasselbe „erotische“ Neutrum wie etwa Ov.Amor.3,2,84 *alio cetera redde loco*, heroid.15,133 *omnia fiunt* und sonst oft), und der Gedanke an sich wird wohl auch sonst als eher weiblich vorgestellt: Vgl. Si-

¹⁶ Vgl. hierzu A. Debrunner, Griechische Wortbildungslehre, Heidelberg 1917,143 u. P. Chantraine, La formation des noms en Grec ancien, Paris 1933,86.

¹⁷ So E. Fränkel, Zur Geschichte der Verbalnomina auf -σιο- -σια-, in: Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung (= Kuhns Zeitschrift) 45 (1913) 178 f. (Hinweis bei K.-A. ad Eubul.l.c.).

¹⁸ Über das dahinterstehende Phänomen vgl. den klassischen Beitrag von F. Dornseiff, Redende Namen (1940), in: Ders., Antike und alter Orient, Leipzig 1956,101-123.

maithas ἐπράχθη τὰ μέγιστα (Theocr.2,143) im Gegensatz zu Archilochos' τέρπιές εἰσι θεῆς (*Veneris*) πολλαὶ νέοισιν ἄνδρασιν παρ᾽ ἐξ τὸ θεῖον χρῆμα (196,12 ff. W.), des Hirten ἔστι καὶ ἐν κενεοῖσι φιλήμασιν ἀδέα τέρπις (Theocr.3,20) und der Selbstaufgabe des μειράκιον Aristaeus. 21.

“Not” again?

By ROLAND G. MAYER, London

At a seminar held at the Institute of Classical Studies in London University in 2001, Michael Reeve sought to explicate a commonly misunderstood sentence in Hyginus, *De astronomia*, *praefatio* 6, lines 76–8 (the Teubner edition of Ghislaine Viré [Stuttgart 1992] is cited): *etenim necessariis nostris hominibus scientissimis maximas res scripsimus; non leuibus occupati rebus, populi captamus existimationem*. The pointing with a comma after *rebus*, here reproduced, imposes the following translations, first, A. Le Boeuffe’s (Paris, 1983, the Budé edition): “absorbé dans des activités sans frivolité, nous recherchons l’estime du public”, and then M.F. Vitobello’s (Bari, 1988): “occupati nei nostri non superficiali studi cerchiamo di accattivarci la stima del pubblico”. Recent editors and translators believe that *non* is to be taken with *leuibus* alone, which produces a flat contradiction: Hyginus has just claimed to be writing on important matters for the highly learned, so how can he then consistently say that, concerned with serious matters (*non leuibus rebus*), he aims to secure popular acclaim? Professor Reeve urged that sense is restored only if the negative *non* covers both *occupati* and *captamus*; we could then say either that *non* does “double duty” or, more accurately, that the negation applies to the whole sentence: “not occupied with a trivial subject, I am <not> courting popular esteem”. Yet another way of looking at it would be to see the participial expression as part of the predicate: “I am not courting popular esteem by occupying myself with trivialities”. This is surely a better interpretation (because it makes sense), but it wanted confirmatory examples.

The usage postulated is clearly seen in Catullus 64.210–11:

*dulcia nec maesto sustollens signa parenti
sospitem Erectheum se ostendit uisere portum.*

nec must negate both *sustollens* and *ostendit*. Translators deal with this in various ways, and yet commentators do not draw attention to the negation’s scope, probably because our knowledge of the myth precludes error. We see best that *sustollens* shares in the negative idea of the predicate if we translate with a gerund: “Theseus did not reveal his safe return by hoisting the sails”. In this way the single negative is seen to go with the verb, as is normal; the gerund (in English)

partakes of the negative idea. The question now arises, how common in Latin is that use of the single negative to negate the whole idea of the sentence. There does not seem to be a general discussion of the issue, so in a tentative way I offer some scattered reflections on the phenomenon, which sometimes passes unremarked (where unproblematic, as in Catullus), but sometimes it causes even the most practised scholars to stumble. Let me offer an instance of just such a stumble in Horace, and then notice the phenomenon in Greek, before passing to my list of examples.

This usage is misunderstood in Horace, *Carmina* 1.13.17–20:

*felices ter et amplius
quos inrupta tenet copula nec malis
diuolsus querimoniis
suprema citius soluet amor die.*

Commentators get into difficulties with the second part of the sentence, and the old view, e. g., of Kiessling, was that “*diuolsus amor*” should be taken as an instance of the “*ab urbe condita*” construction, and so the negative applied only once. This was rightly repudiated by Nisbet-Hubbard: the participle and noun are too far apart; but their own nonsensical paraphrase shows that the construction still has not been identified: “and whom love, torn asunder by silly quarrels, will not separate”. How could a love so described last until death? Here too it must be the case that *nec* does “double duty”: love, <not> torn asunder by silly quarrels, will not separate the lovers. The admirable H. Darnley Naylor saw this in *Horace Odes and Epodes: a Study in Poetic Word-Order* (Cambridge, 1922), and crisply noted on p. 29 that *nec* qualifies both *diuolsus* and *soluet*. (To be fair to Nisbet-Hubbard, by the time they comment on *querimoniis* in line 19 the mud has settled, and they refer to the absence of quarrels.)

So here is the issue: a leading negative may negate the whole idea of the sentence, because a subordinate idea (usually but not always expressed as a participle in agreement with the subject word) is really part of the predicate and so shares in the negation. I surmise that Nisbet-Hubbard were misled by our modern tendency to read in a logical line and took the nominative participle with the subject word; fair enough, so long as one paraphrases with the negative “doubled”.

That the usage is easy to misunderstand can also be shown by a Greek example, Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 290–1:

ὁ δ' οὔτι μέλλων οὔδ' ἀφρασμόνας ἕπνῳ
νικώμενος παρήκεν ἀγγέλου μέρος.

Commentators now know that the negatives in 290 apply both to the participles and to the main verb. Fraenkel’s note is useful to our present discussion, in that he draws attention to comments by Hermann and Paley, no mean students of Greek in their day, which show that they failed to recognize this usage, and so gave an unacceptable sense to the main verb, *παρήκεν*. But he might have drawn attention as well to Kühner-Gerth’s grammar, II 2.199, § 513 A. 1, which describes and amply illustrates the phenomenon, chiefly from prose. A. C. Pearson drew fuller attention to this usage in poetry in his note on Sophocles, *Aleadae*, fr. 88.8 (The Fragments of Sophocles [Cambridge, 1917] i.55), where he refers us to his note on Euripides, *Heraclidae* 813; there he also adduced *Hipp.* 1429–30, Herodotus 7.150 οὐδὲν ἐπαγγελλομένους μεταίτεειν (where How-Wells agree, adding 5.39.1 οὐκέτι περιεὼν ἐβασίλευε), and Thucydides 6.33.1 οὐ καταφοβηθεὶς ἐπιστήσω. Kühner-Gerth even note an instance where a genitive absolute shares in the negation of the finite verb, at Homer, *Iliad* 8.164–5. The Hellenists have thus sorted themselves out in this matter, but we Latinists seem to remain a bit in the dark.

This brief preface demonstrates that there is a problem, and that we need a full discussion with a comprehensive range of examples to solve it. I cannot provide either, but would at least like to set the ball rolling by offering such instances of the usage as I have collected over the years.

1. *Lucr.* 5.299: *nec loca lux inter quasi rupta relinquit*. In his translation Munro takes *nec* as negating both *rupta* and *relinquit*: “nor is the light ever broken off nor does it quit the spots illuminated”. In his translation and commentary Bailey follows suit and paraphrases “nor is the light broken off, nor does it leave the spot”. Neither comments. To make do with a single negative, as in the Latin, we need our own gerund: “the light does not abandon the spot by being broken off”.

2. *Catull.* 61.97–101 *non tuus levis in mala deditus uir adultera, probra turpia persequens, a tuis teneris uolet secubare papillis*. Plainly the young husband is not fickle, nor is he in pursuit of adulterous relations. *non* negates *levis* and *deditus* as well, as Baehrens and Kroll troubled to note (they should have added *persequens*). Catullus, whilst following the basic structure – negative + participle + finite verb – introduces a fresh element, the adjective, *levis*. This will become commoner in Latin poetry. (I know of no examples in Greek.)

3(i). *Cic. Verr.* II 4.6: *qui tamen signa atque ornamenta sua cuique reddebant, non ablata ex urbibus sociorum atque amicorum quadridui causa per simulationem aedilitatis domum deinde atque ad suas uillas*

auferebant. (Michael Reeve provided this example, and noted that we are here dealing with an object, rather than a participle in agreement with the subject.) Cicero contrasts former Roman governors with Verres. They returned what they borrowed (*signa . . . reddebant*), they did not remove works of art on pretence of needing them for a brief period and then carry them off to their own estates (this is virtually the rendering in the Loeb). *non* is taken to negate both *ablata* and *auferebant*. So in the commentary of Richter-Eberhard: “herholten, um sie . . . zu entfernen”. It might be thought that *ablata* need not be negated since the statues are actually removed, but it is important to take the whole phrase into account and include *quadridui causa per simulationem aedilitatis*, for it is that part which makes it clear that the negative has to operate over the whole sentence: these honourable officials are not using pretence in removing the statues.

3(ii). Cic. *Off.* 1.80: *fortis uero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis nec tumultuantem de gradu deici*. The recent English translations of M. T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins (Oxford, 1991) and of P. G. Walsh (Oxford, 2000) run respectively as follows: “it is the mark of a truly brave and constant spirit that one remain unperturbed in difficult times, and when agitated not be thrown”; “it is the mark of a brave and resolute spirit not to get rattled in difficult circumstances, and when plunged into commotion not to be knocked off one’s balance.” They take *tumultuantem* positively (“when agitated” and “when plunged into commotion”), but that makes nonsense of the context, in which the rational imperturbability of the brave man is the point. Older translators did not hesitate to negate the whole idea; thus G. B. Gardiner (London, 1899): “[the strong and resolute man] is never disconcerted or thrown off his balance”, and C.R. Edmonds (London, 1880, the Bohn Library translation): “[the character of a brave and resolute man is] not to be in such confusion as to quit his post.” These clearly preserve the argument of the context.

Now this clause is mentioned by Eric Laughton in his invaluable monograph, *The Participle in Cicero* (Oxford, 1964), p. 147, where he is arguing for the marked development of the adverbial present participle in agreement with the subject in the treatises of Cicero’s last period. It is a pity that he did not point out how the negative works here, but since he saw this participle as fundamentally adverbial, there can be no doubt that he appreciated that it necessarily shared in the negative idea. A further example of this phenomenon from the same period was promptly provided by my London colleague Professor Jonathan Powell:

3(iii). Cic. *Sen.* 37: *nec languescens succumbebat senectuti*. Powell observes that the usage is unmistakable here, and our comprehension of it is also helped by the phrase's crispness (cf. the previous example, and those from the Greek historians quoted above). Again, the participle is, in Laughton's terms, adverbial: "Appius did not feebly give in to old age". These two examples may begin to confirm a suspicion that we are dealing with a graecism, since the treatises show other influence of Greek idiom in the use of the participle (see Laughton, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-5).

4(i). Virg. *Georg.* 1.83: *nec nulla interea est inaratae gratia terrae*. This is included with hesitation, since interpreters differ about the sense of the line: Page's note would bring this passage into line with the general argument of this essay, but Mynors disagrees, and takes *nec nulla* together. If Page's view is correct, the passage is unusual in that the participle is not in the nominative, a clear case of which follows.

4(ii). Virg. *Aen.* 4.438-40 *sed nullis ille mouetur fletibus, aut uoces ullas tractabilis audit; fata obstant placidasque uiri deus obstruit auris*. Interpretation of this sentence is disputed, especially as regards the meaning of *placidas* in 440 (though that is not the issue for the purposes of this note). Servius takes the epithets in a positive sense, asking, "cur mitis et placidus et tractabilis non audit?", and replying, "quasi mirum est, excusat dicendo 'fata obstant'." T. E. V. Pearce in *CQ* 18 (1968) 13-14 reckoned that this is the only possible way to understand *placidas*, given Virgilian usage; he translated it as "kindly". By implication he presumably took *tractabilis* (amenable) too as positive. But this, which may be the correct interpretation overall, is certainly not the standard one. The common view is that embodied in, say, Austin's paraphrase in his commentary *ad loc.* (Oxford, 1955): "But by no tears was he moved, he would not be managed and gave ear to no words". As usual, we find the English translation doubling the negative, though there is only one negative idea expressed in the Latin (here the negative in *nullis* carries over *aut*, an unexceptionable usage, upon which all interpreters agree, however they understand *tractabilis* and *placidas*). It is odd that none of the commentators who endorse this interpretation have drawn attention to what they are doing when they refer the negative to two words, *tractabilis* and *audit*. Still, they have sound warrant for their practice.

4(iii). Virg. *Aen.* 7.498 *nec dextrae erranti deus afuit*. Servius did not think it nonsense to take *erranti* as positive (this is significant, since perhaps the phenomenon eluded some ancient readers as well as mod-

erns). He is followed by R. D. Williams in his commentary *ad loc.* (Basingstoke and London, 1973), who says categorically that “it is impossible to get out of the Latin the meaning which some wish to get – *non erravit nam deus non afuit*”. This is misguided: the negative here too covers the whole idea, especially where the participle is so obviously part of the predicate. Alexander Weiske in a crisp note in *Philologus* 54 (1895) 355 suggested that we are here dealing with the Greek construction. Perhaps, but it may by now have stronger Latin roots than he imagined (Weiske thought it was not found in Cicero). Conington and Fordyce further explain by taking *erranti* proleptically, and the latter maintains that the negation covers the whole sentence, virtually agreeing with Weiske: the god wasn’t absent, so Ascanius’ right hand didn’t waver. Horsfall of course has a full and accurate note *ad loc.* in his commentary (Leiden, 2000).

4(iv). Virg. *Aen.* 9.220 *nec mea iam mutata loco sententia cedit*. No real problem here (indeed Weiske, just mentioned, used this example to bolster his account of 7.498), since the context precludes misprision: Euryalus’ opinion is not changed, and so does not give way: *nec* must negate the whole idea (or, do “double duty”, as in Fairclough’s Loeb translation: “nor does my purpose now change or give way”). Neither Hardie nor Dingel comment.

5(i). Hor. *Carm.* 2.18.34–6 *nec satelles Orca callidum Promethea reuexit auro captus*. Charon was not “auro captus” and didn’t ferry clever Prometheus back; here the participle negated along with the main verb follows rather than proceeds, so there is little scope for misunderstanding.

5(ii). Hor. *Carm.* 4.6.13–16 *ille non inclusus equo . . . falleret*. Achilles was not shut up in the horse and so would not trick the Trojans. Once again our gerund is helpful: Achilles wouldn’t trick the Trojans by shutting himself up in the horse.

6. Propertius 1.8.38 *non tamen illa meos fugit auara sinus*. (The example is kindly provided by Professor Joan Booth.) Context makes it clear that the girl is not greedy, inasmuch as she now declines to go abroad with the rich rival. *auara* can hardly be adverbial with a verb of motion.

7. Livy 34.4.14 “*cur non insignis auro et purpura conspicio?*” H. D. Naylor, *More Latin and English Idiom* (Cambridge, 1915), 102 elucidates thus: “Observe the position of *non*. The order *cur insignis auro . . . non conspicio?* would mean: ‘Why, when I am a blaze of gold, . . . am I not to be looked at?’ The negative in Livy’s order does, as it were, double duty, as if ‘Why am I not a blaze of gold, and therefore

not looked at?’” (Naylor was cited above, for having rightly detected the same phenomenon in Horace.)

8(i). Lucan 6.345–6 *flumina dum campi retinent nec peruia Tempe dant aditus pelagi*. The double use of the negative escaped the usually vigilant J.D. Duff in his Loeb translation (“nor did the outlet of Tempe suffer them to reach the sea”). In the context Tempe is *not yet* open, and that is why it doesn’t give the water an outlet to the sea. P. F. Widdows’s translation (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1988) – “Tempe did not yet exist to give them a seaward outlet” – gets this right, though it doesn’t really tackle *peruia*. The outlet will only be made when Hercules comes along and pushes the valley through the mountain chain. Best then take *nec* as negating *peruia* as well.

To this passage I hesitate to compare 5.439–40 *nec peruia uelis aequora frangit eques*, a description of the Danube frozen solid. Housman there followed Weise in taking the negation to apply only to *peruia*, and *frangit* to mean *conterit*. Duff, who gleaned some of the renderings for his Loeb from Housman’s lectures, translates thus: “the rider strikes the solid floor that no sail may traverse”. Solid floor? *aequora*? I suggest the point is rather that the rider cannot break the water, which he would usually do by riding into it, now that it is solid ice. The negative applies across the sentence, and produces a more paradoxical notion: the ships cannot get through the water, the horseman cannot break it. But I could very easily be wrong here.

8(ii). Lucan 4.750–1 *quippe ubi non sonipes motus clangore tubarum saxa quatit pulsu*. Duff here is as usual on the ball: “for there the war-horse was not roused by the trumpet’s blare, nor did he scatter the stones with stamping hoof”. But here the negative really does seem to be doing “double duty”, since it is not so easy to make *motus* part of the predicate (Lucan’s point is that there was no trumpet-call to rouse the beast, so down-hearted were all the troops).

9. Petronius, *Sat.* 26.3: *ac ne puella quidem tristis expauerat nuptiarum nomen*. This is the vulgate, and it caused no problem to editors or translators, e. g., Sullivan in the Penguin version: “even the girl had not been dismayed or scared by the mention of marriage”. He, like others, saw that the force of the context determined that the negative must be cover *tristis* as well as *expauerat*. The current Paravia edition of Giardina and Melloni (Turin, 1995), however, adopts Fraenkel’s emendation *triste* (to go with *nomen*) recorded in Konrad Müller’s first edition (Munich, 1961); I assume the change was made from failure to recognize the idiomatic usage of the negative in this sentence. The “correction” is unnecessary and should be dropped; Müller

in his fourth edition for Teubner (Stuttgart, 1995) does not even mention it. Still, we see from this example that even a consummate scholar (who recognized the idiom in Greek) could be tripped up by its appearance in Latin.

10. Stat. *Theb.* 2.482: *nec piger ingenio scelerum fraudisque nefandae rector eget*. Mozeley in the Loeb renders with two negatives: “but the monarch is not slothful, nor lacks cunning resource of crime and fraud unspeakable”. Common sense saves us from error here, but we should note that again it is an adjective without verbal colour that is also negated.

11(i). Tac. *Agr.* 18.6: *nec Agricola prosperitate rerum in uanitatem usus expeditionem aut uictoriam uocabat uictos continuisse*. Commentators do feel called upon here to note that *nec* must negate both *usus* and *uocabat* (so Furneaux, Nipperdey, and Richmond), and their view is endorsed by the authors of the *Lexicon Taciteum*, Gerber and Greef, s.v. *nec* I(A)1)aa)BB)b (p.9 21a): “*nec* coniungit ita ut negatio et ad participium et ad verbum finitum pertineat”. Ogilvie has a good observation in his commentary *ad loc.* (Oxford, 1967), which refines upon Richmond’s earlier note to the effect that the negative does “double duty”: “strictly, *nec* qualifies the finite verb and then the negated finite verb is further qualified by the participial phrase”. Ogilvie has seen that *usus* is part of the predicate, a fact we best render with our gerund: “by using”.

11(ii). Tac. *Ann.* 3.11.2 *haud alias intentior populus plus sibi in principem occultae uocis aut suspicacis silentii permisit*. “*haud alias*” covers both *intentior* and *plus sibi . . . permisit*, as Woodman and Martin observe in their recent commentary *ad loc.* (Cambridge, 1996), 137. Again, we are not dealing with a participle, the standard pattern, though *intentior* is participial in origin.

11(iii). Tac. *Ann.* 14.32.2 *neque motis senibus et feminis iuuentus sola restitit*. Nipperdey noted the use of *neque*, and Woodcock followed him. This example is specially interesting just because we have got away from participles in agreement with the subject; the Latin ablative absolute thus negated will recall the genitive absolute in Homer, referred to in the introductory section above.

A trio of examples from Book 9 of Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses* will close this list. The text and translation are taken from the Groningen Commentaries on Apuleius (Groningen, 1995)

12(i). *Met.* 9.11.4 *nec tamen sagacitatis ac prudentiae meae prorsus oblitus facilem me tirocinio disciplinae praebui*; “But I had not entirely forgotten my cleverness and foresight and I did not show myself adept

in my first training in the discipline.” As the commentators note the negation is generally taken by translators to cover both *oblitus* and *praebui*. They follow suit, but toy with the formally possible interpretation that *oblitus* is not negated. I feel myself that this alternative is unlikely, in the light of the evidence gathered above, and from what is to follow.

12(ii). *Met.* 9.36.1 *nec tamen ille uaesanus tantillum praesentia multorum civium territus uel etiam confusus, licet non rapinis, saltem uerbis temperare uoluit*; “That insane man, however, was not in the least frightened or even confused by the presence of many fellow citizens and did not intend to moderate his words, let alone his pillaging.” The special interest of this example is that in the MS F the second hand reads *noluit* for *uoluit*, a reading adopted by some nineteenth-century editors. The Groningen *équipe* observe on p. 299 that one would, indeed, expect another negative in the sentence, but that H. Koziol, in *Der Stil des Apuleius* (Vienna, 1872) p. 321 n. 1, had drawn attention to our previous passage, 9.11.4, to defend *uoluit*. Neither he nor the Groningen commentators cast their net more widely, to show that the phenomenon is after all much commoner.

12(iii). *Met.* 9.41.5 *nec ille tantillum conterritus salutique studens eius, quem in suam receperat fidem, quicquam de nobis fatetur*; “But he did not let them frighten him in the least and, committed as he was to save the life of the man whom he had taken under his protection, he made no confession concerning us”. This passage goes without comment from Groningen or cross-reference to the defence of the paradox of the previous example on p. 299. And yet it must be the most remarkable of all my examples. For while the negative idea clearly applies to both *conterritus* and *fatetur*, in the usual way, it equally clearly does not apply to *studens*. The clause *salutique studens eius, quem in suam receperat fidem* has somehow to be understood parenthetically, outside the influence of the negative idea which, as it were, surrounds it.

*

This brings to a close my brief survey of the application of a single negative to a whole sentence in Latin. As we have seen, in many cases there are no grounds for misunderstanding, though translators need to be vigilant in repeating their negatives, and commentators have also quite often felt called upon to clarify the meaning, since they are aware that mistakes can be made. What is surprising is the silence (or apparent silence) of the Latin grammarians: I have found no

discussion of the usage in our standard handbooks, and certainly none of my commentators have cross-referred me to one. This is regrettable, since we want an historical account of the usage: when does it first crop up, and in what genres is it found? Is it native Latin (but I find no examples in Comedy), or a graecism? This short essay (the title of which I owe to my friend, Ewen Bowie) is offered in the hope that those with greater knowledge may turn their attention to the issue and sort it out once and for all.

Accezione del greco λεύσσω in alcuni passi tragici

Di SABINA MAZZOLDI, Firenze

Il significato del verbo λεύσσω è, come noto, “dirigere lo sguardo verso, vedere”. Si tratta di un vocabolo arcaico, eminentemente poetico¹ e raro, impiegato prevalentemente dai tragici e, sporadicamente, da Omero, Pindaro, Aristofane². Da un punto di vista semantico appare come un sinonimo di ὀράω/βλέπω (termini comuni con cui appare glossato negli scoli)³ – ciò risulta evidente dal suo inserimento nelle sequenze di *variationes* sinonimiche afferenti all’area semantica del “vedere”⁴ –, ma è altrettanto indubbio che vi sono dei casi in cui λεύσσω non è affatto sinonimo di ὀράω/βλέπω e, rispetto a tali verbi deputati ad esprimere la nozione *generale* di “vedere”⁵, presenta un’accezione molto più *specificata*.

Tale specificità risulta particolarmente perspicua in due passi tragici nei quali i due tipi di *verbum videndi* si trovano giustapposti.

¹ Testimoniato però in iscrizioni non poetiche a Cipro e in Arcadia (cfr. C. M. Bowra, ‘Homeric words in Arcadian Inscriptions’, *Class. Quart.* 20, 1926, p. 173) e pertanto probabilmente appartenente al sostrato acheo, cioè miceneo, della lingua: cfr. C. J. Ruijgh, *L’élément achéen dans la langue épique*, Assen 1957, p. 132; A. Morpurgo Davies, ‘Gr. ΛΕΥΣΣΩ and ΛΕΥΤΟ-: An Unsolved Problem’, *Studies in Mycenaean and Classical Greek Presented to J. Chadwick (Minos XXII-XXIII)*, Salamanca 1987, pp. 460-61.

² Compare anche in Licofrone, Teocrito e nella poesia epica ed epico-didascalica (Nicandro, Oppiano, Quinto Smirneo, Nonno, Gregorio di Nazianzo).

³ Già in Pindaro (*Pyth.* 4, 145) λεύσσω equivale ad ὀράω/βλέπω nell’espressione “vedere la luce del sole” = “vivere”: σθένος ἀελίου χρύσειον λεύσομεν corrisponde all’epico ὀράν φάος ἡελίοιο (cfr. p. es. *Il.* 18, 61; I. Rumpel, *Lexicon Pindaricum*, Lipsiae 1883, s.v.). Per altri casi cfr. p.es. Aesch. *Pers.* 710; Soph. *Ant.* 809; Soph. *El.* 106; E. *Alc.* 82; E. *Tr.* 269; E. *El.* 349; E. *Pho.* 1084, 1547, 1562 (originale variazione: τέθριππά γ’ ἔθ’ ἄρματα λεύσσων ἀελίου); E. *Rh.* 967; E. fr. 443 Nauck².

⁴ Cfr., p.es., in ambito tragico: E. *Hec.* 1152-56; E. *Ion* 208-11; E. *Ba.* 596-97.

⁵ Cfr. A. Prévot, ‘Verbes grecs relatifs a la vision et noms de l’œil’, *Revue de Philologie* 9, 1935, pp. 133-35.

In E. *Alc.* 1123–32⁶ Alceste, accompagnata da Eracle, compare davanti ad Admeto e viene svelata; quest'ultimo, *vedendo* (λεύσσω) la donna di fronte a sé (τήνδε), si chiede se non si tratti di un inganno divino. Eracle lo rassicura sulla coincidenza tra la donna che egli *vede* (τήνδ' ὄρας) e sua moglie (δάμαρτα σήν); Admeto, tuttavia, dubita ancora e ipotizza che si tratti di un fantasma degli inferi. Infine Admeto, seppure ancora in forma interrogativa, riconosce la realtà oggettiva di ciò che vede (εἰσορῶ δάμαρτ' ἐμήν). Va rilevato che λεύσσω è impiegato da Admeto con sfumatura soggettiva in riferimento al proprio personale “vedere” un oggetto (τήνδε) che può non corrispondere alla realtà; ὄράω è impiegato invece da Eracle, e poi da Admeto stesso, con connotazione perentoriamente oggettiva e sembra riferirsi alla ricezione di un'immagine indiscutibilmente reale (ζῶσαν). L'alternanza λεύσσω/ὄράω sembra quindi associata alla soggettività/oggettività (apparenza/realtà, δόκησις/ἀλήθεια) della visione.

Si consideri, ancora, E. *Hel.* 569–70, 575–81⁷. Menelao, giunto in Egitto con l'εἶδωλον di Elena che ha portato con sé da Troia e nascosto in una grotta (cfr. v. 573), si vede di fronte la vera Elena. La sua prima ipotesi è che si tratti di un fantasma (ὄψις v. 557; φάσμα v. 569), che pure egli vede oggettivamente simile ad Elena (Ἑλένη σ' ὁμοίαν . . . εἶδον v. 563); pensa pertanto di essere vittima di un'alluci-

⁶ Ad. ὦ θεοί, τί λέξω – θαυμ' ἀνέλπιστον τόδε – / γυναῖκα λεύσσω τήνδ'; – ἐμήν ἐτητύμως; / ἢ κέρτομός με θεοῦ τις ἐκπλήσσει χαρά; / Er. οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τήνδ' ὄρας δάμαρτα σήν. / Ad. ὄρα γε μή τι φάσμα νεωτέρων τόδ' ἦ. / Er. οὐ ψυχαγωγὸν τόνδ' ἐποίησω ξένον. / Ad. ἀλλ' ἦν ἔθαπτον εἰσορῶ δάμαρτ' ἐμήν; / Er. σάφ' ἴσθ' ἀπιστεῖν δ' οὐ σε θαυμάζω τύχη. / Ad. θίγω, προσεῖπω ζῶσαν ὡς δάμαρτ' ἐμήν; / Er. πρόσειπ' ἔχεις γὰρ πᾶν ὅσονπερ ἤθελες. Naturalmente l'interpretazione di λεύσσω che qui si propone è vincolata alla interpunzione del testo stabilita da Murray (Oxford 1901), che separa λεύσσω da ἐτητύμως.

⁷ Il testo è offerto nella sequenza dei versi proposta da R. Kannicht (*Emripides Helena*, herausgegeben und erklärt von -, Heidelberg 1969, Band II, *ad loc.*), il cui intervento di trasposizione appare fondamentale per un logico sviluppo della sticomitia. Ai vv. 569–70 seguono i vv. 575–81 (e poi, di seguito, 574, 571–73, 582); al v. 578 τί σοι δεῖ πίστεως σαφεστέρας; correzione di Badham (accolta nell'ultima edizione oxoniense di J. Diggle) per τί σου δεῖ; τίς δὲ σοῦ σοφώτερος; dei codici. Me. ὦ φωσφόρ' Ἐκάτη, πέμπε φάσματ' εὐμενῆ. / El. οὐ νυκτίφαντον πρόπολον Ἐνοδίας μ' ὄρας / Me. οὐ που φρονῶ μὲν εὖ, τὸ δ' ὄμμα μου νοσεῖ; / El. οὐ γὰρ με λεύσσω σήν δάμαρτ' ὄραν δοκεῖς; / Me. τὸ σῶμ' ὅμοιον, τὸ δὲ σαφές μ' ἀποστερεῖ. / El. σκέψαι; τί σοι δεῖ πίστεως σαφεστέρας; / Me. ἔοικας; οὗτοι τοῦτό γ' ἐξαρνήσομαι. / El. τίς οὖν διδάξει σ' ἄλλος ἢ τὰ σ' ὄμματα; / Me. ἐκεῖ νοσοῦμεν, ὅτι δάμαρτ' ἄλλην ἔχω.

nazione da parte di Ecate. La donna tenta di rassicurarlo sulla sua identità negando di essere un fantasma del corteggio di Ecate (οὐ ... μ' ὄρας), ma egli teme di non essere in senno (οὐ ... φρονῶ εὖ⁸) o di essere affetto da un disturbo visivo (τὸ ὄμμα μου νοσεῖ). Elena allora, con una domanda retorica, spinge Menelao a sovrapporre all'oggetto della sua visione (με λεύσσω), della cui realtà egli dubita, l'oggetto che egli conosce per vero, e che pure vede (σὴν δάμαρτα): quando riconoscerà che i due coincidono, la δόκησις diventerà ἀλήθεια. Si noti come il *vedere* soggettivo di Menelao (δόκησις), riferito a ciò che egli teme essere visione distorta, è espresso da λεύσσω (... δοκεῖς), il vedere che ha invece come oggetto la verità (σὴν δάμαρτ' ὄραν) è espresso da ὄραν (ἀλήθεια). Nel seguito della sticomitia (τὸ σῶμ' ὅμοιον κτλ.) la dualità apparenza/realtà è riproposta in termini diversi: Menelao si esprime su ciò che vede in termini di somiglianza (ὅμοιον) con il vero, ma non vi è certezza (τὸ σαφές); per Elena, d'altra parte, la visione oggettiva (σκέψαι) dovrebbe garantire la πίστις⁹; ancora di δόκησις parla Menelao al v. 579 (ἔουικας): la σαφήνεια non sarà raggiunta, come raccomanda Elena (v. 580), attraverso gli occhi (ἐκεῖ νοσοῦμεν v. 581), ma grazie a precise risposte da parte sua alle incalzanti domande di Menelao su quanto accaduto (cfr. vv. 582 ss.).

Il dato, ricavato dall'analisi di questi due passi, relativo a un *uso specifico con sfumatura soggettiva* del verbo λεύσσω, in riferimento ad una apparenza (δόκησις), come emerge qui evidente nell'alternanza con ὄραω, usato in riferimento ad una realtà (ἀλήθεια), trova conferma da una serie di occorrenze in cui λεύσσω è associato a sogni (a) oppure ad apparizioni o a oggetti che, almeno a prima vista, hanno l'aspetto di fantasmi (b).

(a) In E. *Alc.* 354–56¹⁰ la visione (λεύσσειν) si colloca in un contesto onirico (ἐν ὄνειρασι) e notturno (ἐν νυκτί) e gli oggetti del “vedere” sono delle immagini prive di concretezza; in E. *Her.* 514–17¹¹ Megara

⁸ L'espressione rimanda ad un possibile stato di ἔκστασις φρονῶν (= μανία) provocata da Ecate (cfr. Kannicht 1969, *ad loc.*): una delle prime manifestazioni di essa è lo stravolgimento della realtà, il vedere ciò che non è.

⁹ Cfr. *supra* ἀπιστεῖν in E. *Al.* 1130.

¹⁰ Ad. ἐν δ' ὄνειρασι/φοιτῶσά μ' εὐφραίνουσ' ἄν· ἡδὺ γὰρ φίλους / κὰν νυκτί λεύσσειν, ὄντιν' ἄν παρῆ χρόνον.

¹¹ Me. ἔα· / ὦ πρέσβυ, λεύσσω τὰμὰ φίλατ'· ἦ τί τί φῶ; / An. οὐκ οἶδα, θύγατερ· ἀφασία δὲ κάμ' ἔχει. / Me. ὄδ' ἐστὶν ὄν γῆς νέρθεν εἰσηκούομεν, / εἰ μὴ γ' ὄνειρον ἐν φάει τι λεύσσομεν.

e Anfitrione, che vedono arrivare Eracle (λεύσω τὰμὰ φίλτατα), disceso all'Ade, temono che si tratti di un sogno (ὄνειρον ἐν φάει τι λεύσσομεν); in A.R. 3, 686-92¹² Medea inganna Calciope raccontando di aver veduto (λεύσω) nel sonno (μινυνθαδίῳ ὕπνῳ) sogni luttuosi (ὄνειράτα λυγρὰ) riguardanti i suoi figli.

In questi passi il verbo λεύσω connota quindi il "vedere" un sogno¹³, un'immagine evanescente, che non ha consistenza corporea.

(b) Oltre a E. *Alc.* 1123-28 e E. *Hel.* 574-80, già esaminati, si consideri E. *Or.* 385-87¹⁴: Menelao si interroga su ciò che vede (τί λεύσω): è Oreste, ma egli, per il suo aspetto cadaverico (cfr. vv. 83-84, 188-89, 223-26), pensa che si tratti di un'ombra degli inferi e la sua reazione è di paura superstiziosa, come di fronte ad un fantasma¹⁵.

Come è emerso dalle analisi condotte, λεύσω indica un "vedere" attivo, cioè, in altre parole, strettamente associato all'attività del soggetto¹⁶, a differenza di ὁράω che indica la semplice costatazione della realtà. Tale valore appare assolutizzato quando, come ora vedremo, oggetto del "vedere" sono visioni che non hanno alcuna corrispondenza nella realtà: in tali casi l'oggetto visto afferisce esclusivamente all'ambito della δόκησις, cioè non diventa mai ἀληθές; la sua 'esistenza' dipende, quindi, interamente dal soggetto, un soggetto che si trova in una condizione di alterazione mentale.

È il caso di E. *Cycl.* 578-80¹⁷: Odisseo fa ubriacare il Ciclope per poi accecarlo; costui, ormai ebbro, vede (λεύσω) "il trono di Zeus e tutta la sacra maestà degli dèi"¹⁸. In Soph. *Phil.* 814-15¹⁹,

¹² Χαλκίῳπῃ, περί μοι παίδων σέο θυμὸς ἄηται, / μή σφε πατὴρ ξείνοισι
σὺν ἀνδράσιν αὐτίκ' ὀλέσση· / τοῖα κατακνώσσοῦσα μινυνθαδίῳ νέον ὕπνῳ /
λεύσω ὄνειράτα λυγρὰ τὰ τις θεὸς ἀκράαντα / θείῃ, μηδ' ἀλεγεινὸν ἐφ' υἰάσι
κῆδος ἔλοιο.

¹³ Cfr. J. H. H. Schmidt, *Synonymik der griechischen Sprache*, Leipzig 1876-86, I vol., p. 254.

¹⁴ Με. ὦ θεοί, τί λεύσω; τίνα δέδορκα νερτέρων; / *Or.* εὐ γ' εἶπας· οὐ γὰρ
ζῶ κακοῖς, φάος δ' ὁρῶ / *Me.* ὡς ἠγρίωσαι πλόκαμον αὐχμηρόν, τάλας.

¹⁵ Cfr. C. W. Willink, *Euripides Orestes*, with intr. and comm. Oxford 1986, *ad loc.*

¹⁶ E probabilmente per questo motivo è spesso connesso a determinati stati d'animo (soprattutto stupore e paura): oltre ai passi esaminati *supra* e *infra*, cfr. anche Aesch. *Prom.* 144-48; Soph. *El.* 1475-78. Cfr. Schmidt, 1876-86, I vol., pp. 254-55; Prévot 1935, pp. 248-49; B. Snell, *La cultura greca e le origini del pensiero europeo*, trad. it. Torino 1963, p. 22.

¹⁷ ὃ δ' οὐρανὸς μοι συμμαμιγμένους δοκεῖ / τῇ γῆ φέρεσθαι, τοῦ Διὸς τε τὸν
θρόνον / λεύσω, τὸ πᾶν τε δαιμόνων ἀγνὸν σέβας.

¹⁸ Tale visione, analoga a quella di Penteo nelle *Baccanti* (vv. 918-22), co-

Filottete, preda del terzo accesso della νόσος, indica a Neottolema un punto in alto (ἄνω), forse la grotta o forse il vulcano di cui al v. 799²⁰, e costui, ipotizzando una crisi di delirio (παραφρονεῖς), gli domanda perché *diriga lo sguardo* (λεύσσεις) al cielo, in alto.

Nei due casi considerati è l'atto stesso del "vedere" a dare forma alla visione, a 'creare' il suo oggetto: ciò accade quando il soggetto è mentalmente alterato. È noto che, secondo la concezione greca, ogni forma di alterazione mentale è classificabile come μανία, indicando il medesimo termine sia l'ottenebramento della mente e la privazione delle facoltà intellettive, sia, al contrario, il potenziamento e l'eccitazione dell'intelletto che si trova in grado di scavalcare le barriere dell'umano e acquisisce capacità superiori, poteri al di là della normalità²¹. È possibile riscontrare una frequente associazione del verbo λεύσσω con soggetti affetti da varie forme di follia – sia essa una νόσος (c) o una μανία di altro genere (p.es. telestica) (d) : per essi la visione è una δόκησις che diventa ἀλήθεια attraverso un progressivo "mettere a fuoco" gli oggetti, identificare la realtà (di qui la ricorrente forma interrogativa dell'espressione), e tale processo è del tutto a carico del soggetto del vedere.

(c) In Soph. *Ai.* 260–62²² l'uscita dallo stato di follia, che è νόσος (cfr. vv. 186, 207, 274 ecc.), coincide per Aiace con una graduale ripresa di contatto con quanto lo circonda: nel racconto di Tecmessa Aiace *vede* (ἐσλεύσσειν) le proprie sventure²³, cioè gli animali massacrati; solo attraverso l'identificazione di essi con i nemici che, nella notte, nella sua visione alterata da Atena (cfr. vv. 51–54), credeva di uccidere, può ricostruire l'accaduto e capire, quindi, di essere lui l'autore della strage (μηδενὸς ἄλλου παραπράξαντος). In Aesch. *Prom.*

stituisce "a part of a pattern of Dionysiac initiation": cfr. R. Seaford, *Euripides Cyclops*, with intr. and comm. Oxford 1984, *ad loc.*

¹⁹ FI. Ἐκεῖσε νῦν μ', ἐκεῖσε· NE. Ποῖ λέγεις; FI Ἄνω / NE. Τί παραφρονεῖς αὐ; τί τὸν ἄνω λεύσσεις κύκλον;

²⁰ Per le due ipotesi cfr. rispettivamente R. C. Jebb, *Sophocles. The Plays and Fragments*, Part IV: *The Philoctetes*, Cambridge 1908, *ad loc.*, e R. G. Ussher, *Sophocles Philoctetes*, with intr., transl. and comm. Warminster 1990, *ad loc.*

²¹ Cfr. Schmidt 1876–86, IV vol., p. 243.

²² τὸ γὰρ ἐσλεύσσειν οἰκεία πάθη, / μηδενὸς ἄλλου παραπράξαντος, / μεγάλας ὀδύνας ὑποτείνει.

²³ Cfr. M. Untersteiner, *Sofocle Aiace*, Milano 1946², *ad loc.*: "Aiace, dopo essere stato avvolto nelle tenebre procellose della pazzia, ne esce fuori e con lo sguardo aperto, con gli occhi spalancati, vede οἰκεία πάθη in una luce chiara".

561–62²⁴ Io, sotto l'assillo di Era, giunge in prossimità della rupe, cui è incatenato Prometeo, e si interroga su ciò che *vede* (τίνα ... λεύσσειν); essa, preda della νόσος (cfr. vv. 596, 606, 632 ecc.), alterna lucidità e stato 'maniacale', non sa dove si trovi, deve conciliare realtà e allucinazione (cfr. vv. 566 ss.).

(d) E. *Ba.* 1279–82²⁵. Agave, in preda alla μανία telestica, ha sbrannato il figlio Penteo, credendolo un leone, e ne ha portato la testa verso la reggia; Cadmo sollecita il suo rinsavimento e poi la invita a guardare oggettivamente (σκέψαι, εισιδεῖν) il trofeo che tiene tra le mani²⁶: Agave, sconvolta, uscendo progressivamente dalla *trance* dionisiaca, si interroga su ciò che *vede* (τί λεύσσω)²⁷, che ha tra le mani, e quando l'operazione di identificazione tra quella che credeva la testa di un leone (cfr. v. 1278) e quella che vede realmente, cioè la testa di Penteo, è giunta a conclusione²⁸, constata di vedere (ὄρω) il grandissimo dolore di cui è stata artefice.

Nei casi esaminati il soggetto che *vede* si trova ad operare una mediazione tra apparenza e realtà, tra ciò che vedeva in stato maniacale e ciò che *vede* nel progressivo 'rinsavimento', trasformando così la δόκησις in ἀλήθεια.

Un uso per così dire tecnico di λεύσσω si riscontra nell'ambito del lessico divinatorio, nel quale il verbo esplica tutta la potenzialità della sua accezione *specificca*. Il μάντις nell'atto di profetizzare vive un'esperienza di chiaroveggenza estatica in cui i sensi continuano ad essere operanti, ma travalicano la fisicità, percepiscono un 'altro' che non è normalmente visibile, udibile, tangibile, e lo identificano (grazie alla μαντεία) con la realtà stessa (ἀλήθεια). La vista resta il senso privilegiato e focalizza una realtà che non coincide con quella oggettivamente visibile, ma è collocata in uno spazio e in un tempo diversi da quelli in cui il messaggio profetico è trasmesso.

²⁴ τίς γῆ; τί γένος; τίνα φῶ λεύσσειν / τόνδε χαλινοῖς ἐν πετρίνοισιν / χειμαζόμενον.

²⁵ Ca. σκέψαι νυν ὀρθῶς· βραχὺς ὁ μόχθος εισιδεῖν. / Ag. ἔα, τί λεύσσω; τί φέρομαι τόδ' ἐν χεροῖν; / Ca. ἄθρησον αὐτὸ καὶ σαφέστερον μάθε. / Ag. ὄρω μέγιστον ἄλγος ἢ τάλαιν' ἐγώ. / Ca. μῶν σοι λέοντι φαίνεται προσεικέναι; / Ag. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ Πενθέως ἢ τάλαιν' ἔχω κάρα.

²⁶ Cfr., con analogo valore, σκέψαι di Elena in E. *Hel.* 578.

²⁷ Cfr. l'uso del medesimo verbo λεύσσειν nella ripresa dell'episodio in Nonn. *D.* 46, 197.

²⁸ Cfr. B. Simon, *Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece*, Ithaca-New York 1978, p. 149: "madness is a failure to balance reality and illusion".

In E. *Hyps.* fr. 60, 33–36 Bond²⁹, il μάντις è appellato come colui che vede (λεύσσω) il destino attraverso le sacre offerte: Bond avverte di non aver trovato paralleli per l'espressione λεύσσω τύχας riferita alla divinazione, ma per il verbo applicato alla chiaroveggenza estatica possiamo, come si è detto, registrare alcune significative occorrenze.

In un frammento anonimo di una tragedia ellenistica (TrGF II F *adesp.* 649) si può ricostruire un singolare caso di divinazione: Cassandra, all'interno delle mura della città, profetizza quanto accade all'esterno, e cioè il duello finale tra Ettore e Achille (cfr. Hom. *Il.* 22). Si tratta di un esempio di chiaroveggenza che annulla la distanza spaziale, ma non quella temporale, dal momento che le visioni corrispondono a ciò che avviene in quello stesso momento fuori dalla visuale fisica della profetessa. Dal racconto omerico dell'episodio sappiamo che Atena inganna Ettore fingendosi Deifobo, che si trova invece dentro le mura e non può soccorrere il fratello quando costui fallisce il colpo e perde l'asta (*Il.* 291–99). Ai vv. 11–17³⁰ del frammento ellenistico la situazione narrata profeticamente da Cassandra sembra essere la medesima: mentre la μάντις riferisce che entrambi i contendenti falliscono il colpo, e quindi la situazione è paritaria, Deifobo entra in scena richiamato dalle grida profetiche (τίς ἤχ[ο]ς); a questo punto la veggente lo vede contemporaneamente sul campo, presso Ettore (questo è probabilmente il senso del lacunoso v. 16 ... πρὸ πύργων), e dentro le mura, accanto a sé. La domanda τί λεύσσω posta in termini soggettivi tradisce sorpresa e meraviglia: Cassandra, soggetta a μανία profetica e in condizioni di chiaroveggenza³¹, focalizza ad un tratto l'immagine reale di Deifobo, incompatibile con quella mantica (così come Agave quella di Penteo, incompatibile con quella del leone che prima vedeva) e cerca una spiegazione. La reazione di Deifobo è l'accusa di essere folle, di essere uscita di senno.

²⁹ ἀλλὰ ὦ δι' ἀ[γνώ]ν ἐμπύρων λεύσσω τύχας / Δαναοῖσιν, [εἰ]πῆ τῆδε συμφορὰν τέκνου, / παρὼν γὰρ οἷσ]θα· φησὶ δ' ἦδ' ἐκουσίως / κτανεῖν μ[ε] π[α]ῖδα κάπιβουλεύσαι δόμοις.

³⁰ ΔΗ. τίς ἤχ[ο]ς ἡμᾶς ἐκ δόμων ἀνέκλαγε; / ᾠδή / ΚΑ] ἔα ἔα; τί λεύσσω; / ΔΗ. αἰνίγ[ματό]ς μοι μείζον' ἐφθέγξω λόγο[ν]· / ᾠδή / ΚΑ.].[.]. πρὸ πύργων οὐκ[.]σε.[/ ΔΗ. μέμηνα[ς] αὐτὴ καὶ παρεπλάγχθης φρένα[.]

³¹ La sigla ᾠδή, in coincidenza con l'εἶσθεσις di un solo verso attribuito a Cassandra, si riferisce probabilmente ad una *performance* cantata della μάντις, accompagnata da esclamazioni fuori metro (cfr. B. Gentili, 'Interpretazione di un nuovo testo tragico di età ellenistica (P. Oxy. 2746)', *Mus. Philol. Lond.* 2, 1977, pp. 132–33), del tutto appropriati alla tecnica divinatoria del chiaroveggente, che prevede grida apparentemente sconnesse e disarticolate di carattere rituale.

Tre sono le occorrenze di *λεύσσω* con accezione mantica nell'*Alessandra* di Licofrone (vv. 52, 86, 216): in questi contesti il verbo rappresenta l'annuncio razionale della visione profetica che Alessandra sta focalizzando davanti a sé e di cui introduce l'ordinata narrazione, la trasposizione sul piano del parlato. Si tratta di visioni che trovano corrispondenza reale in un luogo e in un tempo diversi dall'*hic et nunc* della profezia e sono strettamente legate alla soggettività della *μάντις*.

L'insistenza sulle connotazioni soggettive di *λεύσσω* non è ingiustificata: il verbo, come si è detto, ha senso attivo, vale a dire implica un'attività del soggetto (a differenza del sistema verbale principale greco relativo all'area semantica del vedere, costituito dalle radici **weid-* [LIV² 665ss.] (*ἰδεῖν*), **swer-* [LIV² 534 **ser-*] (*ὄραν*) e **okw-* [LIV² 297ss.] (*ὄψεσθαι*), che si fissa progressivamente in senso ricettivo³²); l'esame condotto sulle sue occorrenze ha permesso di rilevare il fondamentale ruolo del soggetto e del suo atteggiamento nell'atto del *λεύσσειν*. Tale specificità del verbo sembra trovare fondamento nella sua etimologia stessa: il termine infatti deriva, come generalmente accettato, dalla radice IE **leuk-*, **luk-*, che vale "luce", "splendore"; il suo primo significato sarebbe pertanto "splendere", o piuttosto "far splendere"³³. Lo slittamento semantico da questo primitivo valore a "vedere", testimoniato peraltro in altre lingue³⁴ e presente in altre radici verbali³⁵, appare particolarmente interessante. Esso infatti risulta coerente con la teoria greca dei 'raggi visivi', secondo la quale l'occhio, come una sorta di lanterna, emette un fascio di raggi che viaggiano nello spazio e urtano gli oggetti, suscitando così la visione³⁶.

³² Cfr. Prévot 1935, p. 134. Altri verbi di "vedere" con senso attivo sono p.es. *δέχομαι*, *σκέπτομαι*.

³³ Cfr. già A. Pott, *Etymologische Forschungen*, Lemgo 1833, I, p. 232; e poi E. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la langue grecque*, Heidelberg 1950⁴, s.v.; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque*, Paris 1968, s.v.; H. Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, Heidelberg 1970, s.v. Dalla medesima radice derivano anche, p.es. lat. *lux* "luce", *luceo* "brillare, splendere"; gr. *λευκός* "lucente, splendido, bianco". Morpurgo Davies (1987) avanza, pure con titubanza, l'ipotesi di una diversa etimologia di *λεύσσω* che renda conto dell'oscuro *λευτον* presente nell'iscrizione di Tegea IG V ii 3.

³⁴ Cfr. sanscr. *lókate*, connesso a *rocate* "splendere"; lett. *lūkut*, lit. *lāukius*, tocar. B *lk-* *lyk-*.

³⁵ Cfr. p.es. *αυγάζω/αυγάζομαι* "illuminare/scorgere", derivato da *αυγή* "splendore, luce, raggio"; cfr. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire Étymologique*, s.v. *λεύσσω*; Prévot 1935, pp. 252-53.

³⁶ Le prime teorie fisiologiche sul meccanismo della visione sono elaborate

L'associazione tra occhio e luminosità e l'idea della visione come irraggiamento sono presenti già in Omero: si trattava quindi di dati tradizionali che un'élite di pensatori rielaborò in termini per così dire scientifici, fondandosi su un'ottica popolare, costituita dall'insieme delle osservazioni e delle intuizioni di tutto un popolo³⁷. λεύσσω pertanto, come segnala Chantraine, esprimerebbe "l'idée d'un flux visuel rayonnant des yeux, non de l'objet"³⁸: apparirebbe così spiegata

in ambito ionico e, come testimonia la definizione pitagorica degli occhi come "porte del sole" (D.K. 58, B 1a, 10), si fondano sull'idea dell'emissione di un raggio di luce quale fonte della percezione visiva (cfr. la formulazione definitiva nell'*Optica* di Euclide); Empedocle sostituisce al paradigma solare il paragone con una lucerna (D.K. 31, B 84) e presuppone la natura ignea dell'organo della vista (cfr. D.K. 31, A 86, 30-31; D.K. 31, A 90; D.K. 31, A 91 e Plat. *Meno* 76C; Thphr. *Sens.* 7); il fuoco all'interno dell'occhio, pertanto, resta per lui necessario alla visione, ma essa è legata anche all'entrata delle emanazioni corporee nei pori dell'occhio (cfr. W. J. Verdenius, *Empedocles' Doctrine of Sight*, in *Studia Varia Carolo Guilielmo Vollgraff a discipulis oblata*, Amsterdam 1948, pp. 155-64). La teoria dei raggi visivi ebbe grandissima fortuna ancora in età medioevale e alcune tracce si trovano persino in Cartesio (cfr. Ch. Mugler, 'La lumière et la vision dans la poésie grecque', *Revue des Études Grecques* 73, 1960, pp. 40-42; O. Longo, 'La luce nell'ottica dei Greci', *Vichiana* 4, 1993, p. 165 e 'Onde e/o corpuscoli. La luce fra Aristotele ed Epicuro', *Atti e Memorie dell'Accademia Patavina di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti C*, 1987-88, parte III, p. 60 n. 14). Una serrata confutazione a questa teoria venne da Aristotele (cfr. *Sens.* 1, 437a 22-2, 437b 23), ma già gli atomisti, a partire da Democrito, proponevano un'opposta spiegazione per il fenomeno della visione, sostenendo che siano gli oggetti ad inviare nello spazio immagini di se stessi (εἰδῶλα). Platone (*Tim.* 45B e ss.; *Theaet.* 156D), sembra operare una sorta di mediazione tra le due teorie: la visione sarebbe determinata dall'incontro e dalla combinazione del "flusso visivo", proveniente dagli occhi e originato dall'interno del corpo umano, e della "luce diurna", proveniente da una sorgente di luce fisica, come il sole. Sull'argomento cfr. R. Pierantoni, *L'occhio e l'idea. Fisiologia e storia della visione*, Torino 1981, pp. 15-17; I. Rizzini, *L'occhio parlante. Per una semiotica dello sguardo nel mondo antico*, Venezia 1998 = vol. 77 delle *Memorie dell'Ist. Ven. di Sc. Lett. e Arti*, pp. 128-44. Per il rapporto tra l'alternanza semantica "splendere/vedere" e l'ottica dei raggi visivi cfr. J. Gonda, 'Reflections on the Indo-European Medium' I and II, *Lingua* 9, 1960, p. 179 (I pp. 30-67; II pp. 175-93); Ch. Mugler, *Dictionnaire historique de la terminologie optique des Grecs*, Paris 1964, p. 249.

³⁷ Cfr. Mugler 1964, p. 8; Rizzini 1998, p. 130.

³⁸ Chantraine 1968, s.v.; cfr. anche Mugler 1964, p. 249; *contra* M. Treu, *Von Homer zur Lyrik: Wandlungen des griechischen Weltbildes im Spiegel der Sprache*, München 1968², p. 64. Appare interessante segnalare la precisa traduzione di Soph. *Tr.* 829 ὁ μὴ λεύσσω da parte di G. Lombardo Radice "chi

la soggettività della visione, nell'ambito della quale l'oggetto non è sentito come parte attiva. "When we are seeing anything, - scrive Verdenius³⁹ - we are not only aware of receiving an impression, but also suppose this impression to correspond to reality. Our being conscious of a correspondence takes the form of a projection by which we return our impressions to the object. Thus seeing is imagined to be at once something passive (to receive impressions) and active (to be directed towards the object). The projection which changes our impression into objective reality is conceived by us as a mental image, as a psychological phenomenon": nell'ambito di questo processo della visione, fondato sulla relazione tra αἴσθησις e νόησις, λεύσσω sembra esprimere la 'fase' della proiezione di un'immagine mentale da parte del soggetto, in mancanza, tuttavia, della ricezione di un'impressione da parte dell'oggetto reale (che in talune delle occorrenze esaminate non esiste neppure), che confermi la corrispondenza della visione con la realtà (ὁράν)⁴⁰.

ha gli occhi svuotati di luce". Snell, analizzando le occorrenze omeriche del termine e notando come in tre dei quattro casi in cui esso è accompagnato dall'oggetto all'accusativo si tratti di fuoco e armi lucenti, sostiene che λεύσσω significhi "guardare qualcosa di lucente" (cfr. Snell 1963, pp. 22-23).

³⁹ Verdenius 1948, p. 162.

⁴⁰ Che, d'altra parte, il verbo λεύσσω possa avere l'accezione di "vedere con gli occhi della mente", non pertinente all'esperienza della visione, ma piuttosto ad un conoscere di tipo intellettuale, è provato da una serie di occorrenze: Hom. *Il.* 3, 108-10 (πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω λεύσσει su cui cfr. G. E. Dunkel, 'πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω', *Zeitschr. f. vergleichende Sprachforschung* 96, 1982-83, pp. 66-87; l'espressione ricorre anche in *Il.* 1, 343-44 e 18, 250, con νοῆσαι e ὁράν, e si tenga presente che la radice **swer-*, da cui deriva ὁράω, aveva primariamente, e ancora in epoca omerica, senso attivo e non ricettivo: cfr. Prévot 1935, pp. 142, 152); Hom. *Od.* 23, 124-25; Emped. fr. 129, 18-20 D.-K.; Parm. fr. 4, 3 D.-K.; Soph. fr. 858 Radt. Cf. anche H. Rix, *Termini der Unfreiheit*, 1994, 78.

Le type latin *uorāgō*: un reflet d'un suffixe indo-européen

Par GEORGES-JEAN PINAULT, Paris

Summary. The Latin derivatives with suffixes *-āgō*, *-igō*, *-ūgō* are nouns of feminine gender, and have been very productive, particularly as descriptions of diseases or defects and as designations of various plants. It is generally assumed that they are based on *-k*-stems, with the help of a nasal suffix, cf. *uorāgō* "deep hole, chasm" beside *uorāx* "ravenous, devouring". Judging from the original meaning, the evidence points to the possessive suffix **-H₃on-*, not to the individualizing suffix **-on-*; this suffix was attached to action nouns and collectives ending in **-k-*, according to a pattern which has parallels in other Indo-European languages.

I. Données du problème*

§ 1. La langue latine possède un ensemble de dérivés nominaux à suffixe complexe terminé par nasale: les substantifs féminins en *-Āgō*, *-Āgin-is* (Ā = voyelle longue), connus précisément sous trois variétés, *-āgō*, *-igō* et *-ūgō* (Leumann, 1977, § 325.B, pp. 368-9). Leur formation n'est pas encore éclaircie, depuis l'étude approfondie publiée par Alfred Ernout dans la *Revue de Philologie* en 1941, et reprise dans le premier volume de ses *Philologica* en 1946 (p. 165 sq.). Il en ressort que ce suffixe, qui servait "à former des mots désignant des altérations, des changements d'état" (1946, p. 189), a connu une remarquable productivité dans la langue médicale, pour désigner des maladies, et dans le vocabulaire de la botanique. Il n'est pas nécessaire de reproduire l'inventaire établi de manière extensive par Ernout (*op.cit.*, pp. 166-185, complété pour les noms de plante par 1965, pp. 136-138), liste à laquelle renvoie d'ailleurs Manu Leumann (*op. cit.*, p. 369). Il s'en dégage les tendances essentielles pour l'histoire des mots, à savoir les points de départ et les axes du succès considérable dont a

* Le présent article est la version élargie d'une communication présentée dans le cadre du X^e Colloque International de Linguistique Latine (organisé par le Centre Alfred Ernout, Université de Paris-Sorbonne), à Sèvres, le 22 avril 1999. Je remercie M. le Prof. Dr. Claude Moussy, professeur émérite à l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, pour l'autorisation de publier ce texte en dehors des actes du colloque.

bénéficié ce type suffixal. La recherche d'une analyse satisfaisante de la formation doit partir de ses représentants les plus anciens. On se bornera ici à reprendre (moyennant quelques vérifications) la liste établie par Ernout lui-même (1946, p. 186 sq.): elle comporte les mots attestés jusqu'à Pline l'Ancien inclusivement, en les classant d'après leur emploi, et en indiquant immédiatement leur base, nominale ou verbale, qui en assure la motivation en synchronie.

a) Maladies, défauts physiques: *coriāgō* (*corium*) "maladie de peau du bétail", *lumbāgō* (*lumbus*) "mal aux reins", *ēsuriḡō* (*ēsuriŕe*) "envie de manger", *intertiḡō* (-*tri-*, cf. *triū*, *dētriŕimentum*) "écorchure ou rougeur de la peau produite par le frottement", *lentūḡō* (*lēns*, *lentis*) "tache de rousseur" [en forme de lentille sur la peau], *mentiḡō* (*mentum*) "mal qui atteint le museau [des moutons]", *ostīḡō* (*ōs*, *ōris*) "dardre, éruption sur la bouche" (analogique du précédent), *dē-petiḡō*, *im-petiḡō* (*petere*) "éruption cutanée, dardre", *porriḡō* (*porrus*) "teigne", *prūriḡōēēū* *ḡmūriŕe* "démangeaison", *tentiḡō* (*tentus*) "tension, érection [extrême]" (du pénis, et par extension du clitoris, cf. J. N. Adams, 1982, p. 103 sq.), *uitiḡō* (*uitium*) "éruption cutanée", *aurūḡō/auriḡō* (*aurum*) "jaunisse, ictère", qui pourrait aussi bien relever de la catégorie d) ci-après.

b) Noms de plantes: *cunilāgō* (variété de *cunila*) "inule visqueuse" (André, 1956, p. 109; 1985, p. 82), *plantāgō* (de *planta* "plante du pied", allusion à la forme des feuilles) "plantain" (André, 1956, p. 254; 1982, p. 202), *tussilāgō* (contre la toux, *tussis*) "pas d'âne" (plante béchique: André, 1956, p. 324; 1985, p. 266), *lappāgō* (variété de *lappa*) "bardanette" (plantes accrochantes par leur feuille, leur capitule ou leur fruit: André, 1956, p. 179; 1985, p. 138), *asperūḡō* (*asper*, plante hérissée de poils rudes) "râpette" (André, 1956, p. 44; 1985, p. 28) vs. *mollūḡō* (*mollis*: aux feuilles moins rêches), variété de *lappāgō* (André, 1956, p. 210; 1985, p. 163), *lānūḡō* (*lāna*) "duvet" (des feuilles, des coings, etc.), "coton" des plantes, et diverses matières rappelant la laine (André, 1956, p. 178).

c) Substances variées, aliments: *farrāḡō* (*far*, *farris* "amidonnier") "mélange de diverses graines qu'on laisse croître comme fourrage" (André, 1956, p. 134), *sartiḡō* (*sartus*) "mélange, ramassis fait de pièces et morceaux" et "poêle à frire", *melliḡō* (*mel*) "verjus, suc mielleux" (André, 1956, p. 205).

d) Couleurs, colorations: *rōbiḡō* (*rōbus*) "rouille", du fer et de certains végétaux, surtout des céréales (cf. André, 1956, p. 273), *plumbāḡō* (*plumbum*) "plombagine" et "plante qui guérit une affection oculaire (*plumbum*) marquée par la couleur livide de la cornée", calque de gr.

μολύβδαινα (André, 1956, p. 255; 1985, p. 203), *cāhīgō* (**cālus*) “fumée noire, nuage ou brouillard opaque”, *fūhīgō* (isolé, comme le précédent) “suié”, *pullīgō* (*pullus, pullum*) “couleur sombre”, *aerūgō* (*aes, aeris*) “vert de gris”, désignant aussi une plante (André, 1956, p. 19; 1985, p. 6), *albūgō* (*albus*) “leucôme”, *ferrūgō* (*ferrum*) “rouille du fer”. Certains de ces noms pourraient simultanément être rangés, d'après une partie de leurs emplois, parmi les noms de maladies: *albūgō*, *rōbhīgō*. Inversement, plusieurs maladies (*lentīgō*, *aurūgō*) sont désignées par des changements de couleur, des taches sur la peau.

e) Autres: *uirāgō* (*uir*) “femme courageuse ou forte comme un homme” (voir plus loin §§ 4–6), *uorāgō* (*uorāre*) “gouffre, abîme”, *forāgō* (*forāre*) “poinçon”, *orīgō* (*orīnī*) “origine, provenance”, *scatur(r)īgō* (*scatur(r)ire, scaterere*) “jaillissement d'eau”, *uertīgō* (*uertī*) “tourbillon, vertige”, *imāgō* (*imitānī*) “image, portrait, copie”, *ūhīgō* (**ūdhīgō*, cf. *ūuidus, ūdus, ūmor*) “humidité du sol”, *Vesperūgō* (doublet de *Vesper*), nom de l'étoile du soir (créé sur le modèle des termes qui réfèrent à des changements de couleur), *Verrūgō*, ville des Volsques bâtie sur une hauteur, cf. *uertūca* “hauteur”, spécialisé pour “excroissance, ver-rue”.

Cette liste suffit déjà à illustrer l'importance du transfert métaphorique dans les désignations d'objets concrets, surtout des plantes (Ernout, 1946, p. 189; Fruyt, 1989, p. 111 sq.), tendance qui restera vivace dans toute la latinité ultérieure.

§ 2. Les hypothèses sur l'origine de ce type suffixal ont été diverses. Pendant longtemps, il apparut intéressant de retrouver dans ce suffixe complexe le vestige d'une formation radicale indo-européenne, autrement dit on voyait dans le suffixe un ancien membre de composé. Plusieurs racines furent évoquées, en premier lieu **ag-* (**H₂eĝ-*) “pousser, mener” pour certains dérivés en *-āgō* (voir par exemple Muller, 1926, p. 551), mais aussi **gen-* (**ĝenH₁-*) “engendrer” (Baecklund, 1914, p. 193), cependant, ces hypothèses n'ont jamais été systématisées, et n'ont pas comporté une véritable restitution du développement de la dérivation dans son ensemble. L'idée fut poussée à l'extrême, et – voudrait-on croire – définitivement déconsidérée, par Fay (1913), qui n'hésita pas à recourir à une vingtaine de racines (dont les deux citées à l'instant) pour rendre compte du sens de toutes les formations. Contre cette tendance, une suffixation originelle en dorsale sonore (*-*g-*), apparentée aux formations en *-*k-* de diverses langues, fut défendue entre autres par Meyer (1865, pp. 414, 514; 1881, p. 135). Cette idée reposait sur des observations précises, qui trouvèrent leur

première formulation nette chez Stolz (1895, § 183, p. 527), suivi par d'autres (notamment Brugmann, 1906, § 392.b, p. 512): dans une phase ancienne du latin, une relation est établie entre thèmes en $-\bar{A}g\bar{o}$, $-\bar{A}gin-is$ et thèmes en $-\bar{A}c-$, soit tels quels, soit sous une forme thématisée: voyez $uor\bar{a}g\bar{o}$: $uor\bar{a}x$ "dévorant", $uert\bar{u}g\bar{o}$: $uertex$ "tourbillon", $impet\bar{u}g\bar{o}$: $impetix$ (doublet, synonyme du précédent, chez Paul. Fest.), $uir\bar{a}g\bar{o}$: $uir\bar{a}c-eus$ "viril", $aer\bar{u}g\bar{o}$: $aer\bar{u}ca$ (doublet du précédent, désignant aussi la "rouille des champs", une plante parasite, cf. *supra*), $alb\bar{u}g\bar{o}$: $alb\bar{u}cum$ "hampe" [de couleur blanche] de l'asphodèle, et la plante elle-même (André, 1956, p. 22; 1985, p. 9), $Verr\bar{u}g\bar{o}$: $uerr\bar{u}ca$ (voir plus haut, fin du § 1). On ne saisit pas de différence chronologique nette entre les uns et les autres.

Ce fait avéré est la base de l'explication classique, déjà énoncée par Thurneysen (1883, p. 305), Sommer (1914, pp. 139 [avec anaptyxe], 359), et reprise récemment par Meiser (1998, § 65.3, p. 89; aussi § 98.1, p. 141): $*wor\bar{a}k-\bar{o}n$, $*wor\bar{a}k-n-es$ > $*uor\bar{a}gnis$, d'où $uor\bar{a}g\bar{o}$, et réfection en $uor\bar{a}gin-is$ (sans supposer d'anaptyxe) sur le modèle du type courant: $hom\bar{o}$: $homin-is$, $multit\bar{u}d\bar{o}$: $-t\bar{u}din-is$. L'évolution $*-kn-$ > $-gn-$ est assurée (Sommer, 1914, p. 233; Leumann, 1977, p. 199 sq.), e. g. $dignus$ (< $*dek-no-$, cf. *decet*), $ilignus$ (*ilix*, *-icis*), $salignus$ (*salix*, *-icis*), de même $segmentum$ (*sec-are*). Curieusement, Ernout note la coexistence des thèmes en $-\bar{A}g\bar{o}$ et des thèmes en $-\bar{A}c-$ (1946, pp. 165 et 191 sq.), mais n'en tire pas parti pour une explication générale, au point qu'il n'exclut pas la présence parmi ces substantifs féminins d'anciens composés (dans la note finale de son étude, p. 192), et renvoie la différence phonétique aux variations entre occlusive sourde et sonore dans les formations correspondantes du grec.

§ 3. Cette solution, par élargissement de thèmes en $*-k-$, ne pose pas de problèmes sur le plan formel, et elle n'implique pas un scénario analogique invraisemblable. Cependant, elle ne convainc pas entièrement, car elle reste très imprécise sur le processus de dérivation. De fait, elle n'est pas reprise par Leumann (1977, p. 369), au motif que la fonction du suffixe en nasale demeure "obscur" dans ses dérivés féminins (*ibid.*, § 114.c.β, p. 103). Cette position est dans la continuité de sa réserve antérieure (1926, § 176.II.D.4, p. 242), qui lui faisait envisager, en raison de la variété des emplois et des significations, une polygénèse de la formation. Le problème de la valeur suffixale a pris aujourd'hui une autre face, dans la mesure où la linguistique indo-eur. distingue rigoureusement deux suffixes secondaires (voir par

exemple l'exposé récent de Stüber, 1998, pp. 9–92, orienté vers la description des faits celtiques):

A. Suffixe individualisant **-on-*: il sert à former des substantifs (qui désignent souvent des personnes) à partir d'adjectifs de qualité: gr. στραβών sur στραβός "louché", οὐρανίων sur οὐράνιος "céleste", lat. *Catō* sur *catus* "finaud", got. *weiha* "prêtre" sur *weihs* "saint", *liuta* "hypocrite" sur *liuts* "trompeur", lit. *ruduō* "automne" sur *rūdas* "rouge"; véd. *vībhvan-* (théonyme) sur *vībhv-* "puissant", lat. *Turpiō* sur *turpis* "laid".

B. Suffixe possessif **-H₃en-*, dit "de Hoffmann" (1955; sur la reconstruction de la laryngale initiale, voir aussi plus loin § 9): il sert à former des dérivés de substantifs thématiques et athématiques: gr. ἵππων "écurie" sur ἵππος, χαλλεών "forge" sur χάλκεα "objets de bronze", Μαράθων sur μάραθος "fenouil", Ἀντρών sur ἄντρον "grotte"; lat. *Nāsō* (**"pourvu d'un nez [caractéristique]"*) sur *nāsus*. Un dérivé hérité de l'indo-européen est représenté par lat. *iūuen-i-s*, véd. *yūvan-* < **H₂yu-H₃η-/*-H₃on-* "pourvu de vigueur vitale" (**H₂óy-u*, cf. véd. *áyū*, plus loin gr. αἰ(φ)ών, lat. *aeuom*). L'alternance **-H₃ōn/*-H₃on-/*-H₃n-* du suffixe le rattache au type amphikinétique ou holokinétique (défini par Schindler, 1975, p. 3 sq.), cf. av. *māθrā* "détenteur de formules" sur *māθra-* (= véd. *mántra-*) "formule [poétique]", nom. sing. en 3 syllabes < **mantraHā* < **mentro-H₃ō*, thème des cas obliques *māθrān-* < **mantrān-* < **mentro-H₃n-*. Si nous appliquons cela au latin, nous pouvons rendre compte de la généralisation du modèle de la prédésinentielle en *-ōn-* dans les dérivés de noms thématiques, cf. *Nāsō*, *-ōnis* < **-ōn* < **-o-Hōn* / **-ōn-es* < **-o-Hn-es*.

Or, le latin possède plusieurs exemples du suffixe possessif, en dehors des anthroponymes et de *iūuen-i-s*, dont la forme originelle de thème en nasale est attestée par les substantifs abstraits *iūuen-tā*, *iūuen-tās* et *iūuen-tūs*. Une forme thématisée **-H₃n-o-*, provoquant l'allongement de la voyelle finale de la base, est reflétée par le "Herrschersuffix" *-nos*, *-nā* (Rix, 1989, p. 226 sq.), cf. *Pōmōna* : *pōmum*, *Bellōna* : *bellum*, *tribūnus* : *tribus*, *Portūnus* : *portus* : *Fortūna* (**fortus*, cf. *ferō*), **pecūnus*, base de *pecūnia* : *pecū* (**pecu*), etc. Un dérivé de ce type est même hérité: *colōnus* "possesseur d'une pièce de terre cultivable" < **k^welōnos* = av. *carāna-* < **k^wel(H)ō-H₃n-o-* (Rix, *op.cit.*, pp. 233–8). Pour prendre un exemple du développement sémantique, *Pōmōna* est l'être divin qui possède les fruits (*pōma*), donc la capacité de les produire et d'en faire don aux humains; elle en vient à incarner la croissance des fruits. Ce suffixe a pu servir aussi comme élargissement d'autres suffixes, sur le modèle du suffixe individuali-

sant. Par exemple, on observe la coexistence du suffixe d'abstrait *-ti- et de *-ti-Hon-, ce dernier étant attesté en latin (-tiō, -ōnis), en celtique, en arménien (suffixe productif -owt'iwn) cf. lat. *mens*, véd. *matí-* "pensée" vs. lat. *mentiō*, v.irl. *°*métiu*. Le suffixe élargi est devenu productif en latin et a éclipsé le suffixe primitif, conservé par des reliques. Le thème faible *-ti-Hn- > -tin- reflété par ombr. abl. sing. *natine*, gr. δωτίνη, etc. garantit la présence d'une laryngale au début du suffixe, mais la relation sémantique entre les deux variantes suffixales ne semble pas compatible avec une valeur possessive (selon Stüber, 1998, pp. 120-123, voir toutefois Olsen, 1999, p. 551). Même si un dérivé possessif peut finir par rejoindre la valeur de l'abstrait de base, dont il fournit en quelque sorte une personnification, il importe de ne pas ramener la valeur individualisante à la valeur possessive (comme le veut Haudry, 1981, pp. 6 et 8, avec une reconstruction différente de la laryngale, soit *-H₁en-), et de distinguer les deux suffixes au niveau de l'indo-européen que nous pouvons atteindre.

II. Interprétation d'un dérivé ancien par le suffixe possessif

§ 4. Il convient de revenir sur un des dérivés en -āgō les plus anciens, qui n'appartient à aucune des catégories productives. C'est précisément dans cette situation qu'il existe quelque chance de déceler un vestige du processus dérivationnel. Le sens de lat. *uirāgō* (Plt. +) est défini ainsi dans OLD s.u.: "A woman having the qualities of a man: (a) a physically strong woman. (b) a warlike or heroic woman; (esp. applied to goddesses)". Le premier emploi est illustré seulement par un passage de Plaute, qu'il vaut la peine de citer en entier:

Merc., v. 414 sq. *Recte. Ego emero matri tuae*
Ancillam uiraginem aliquam non malam, forma mala,
Vt matrem addecet familias, aut Syram aut Aegyptiam.
Ea molet, coquet, conficiet pensum, pinsetur flagro,
Neque propter eam quicquam eueniet nostris foribus flagiti.

"Bon! J'achèterai pour ta mère quelque servante un peu hommasse, un bon gros laideron, comme il sied d'en avoir à une mère de famille, une Syrienne, par exemple, ou une Egyptienne. On la fera moudre le grain, faire la cuisine, filer sa tâche; on la rossera au fouet, et nous n'aurons pas à cause d'elle le moindre scandale à notre porte." (Ernout, 1952, p. 119)

Cette réplique de Démiphon se situe dans la scène (vv. 366-468)

au cours de laquelle ce vieillard amoureux cherche (et parvient) à dissuader son fils, Charinus, d'offrir à sa mère la prétendue servante (*ancilla*) qu'il a ramenée de son voyage d'affaires à Rhodes (cf. v. 390). En effet, le père voudrait garder pour son usage exclusif cette fille, "femme d'une beauté exceptionnelle" (*forma eximia mulierem*, v. 260), qu'il a rencontrée auparavant sur le bateau, en l'absence de son fils. Il propose de la (re)vendre à un vieillard de ses amis, tout en achetant en compensation à son épouse une servante qui fasse mieux l'affaire pour les travaux de la maison. Les qualités décrites ici étaient déjà énoncées, avec le même procédé énumératif, dans une précédente réplique de Démiphon (vv. 395-398). Dans le discours insistant du père, le terme nouveau avancé par la réplique citée est précisément *uirago*, apposé à *ancilla* (v. 415). Cette servante "virile", dépourvue de tout appât (*forma mala, ibid.*), est opposée à une servante trop féminine, à savoir la fille aux charmes affolants, Pasicompsa, que propose Charinus, et dont la présence pourrait braver l'honnêteté, selon la description prémonitoire donnée plus haut par le père (vv. 405-411): comme une courtisane, elle serait harcelée par ses amoureux, qui assiègeraient la porte de Démiphon, et ce dernier risquerait de passer pour un proxénète aux yeux des honorables citoyens. Plaute a choisi le terme *uirago*, opposé à *mulier* (cf. v. 391, et encore *flagitium muliebre* "scandale dû à une femme", v. 423), parce que celui-ci renforce le contraste entre la "beauté", objet sexuel, trop féminine et trop belle pour être une digne servante, et la bonne servante (*aliquam non malam*, v. 414), privée de tous les attraits de son sexe. Ce n'est pas le seul avantage d'un tel achat. La servante proposée par le père n'attirera pas les hommes et fera preuve d'une robustesse toute masculine: elle sera corvéable à merci, et on pourra la rouer de coups comme un esclave masculin. La description réaliste de sa vie représente assurément l'aspect triste de la condition servile dans le monde plautinien (cf. Dumont, 1987, pp. 328, 366 [n. 357], 435 sq.). Cette servante "syrienne" (v. 416) est promise au sort pitoyable de Syra, dont la figure apparaît plus loin dans la même comédie: une vieille esclave qui mourra dans l'esclavage, chargée du fardeau de ses quatre-vingt-quatre ans, s'ajoutant à la servitude, à la sueur et à la soif (v. 673 sq.). La traduction par "hommasse" proposée par Ernout (à quoi correspond "hombruna" dans une récente traduction espagnole, cf. González-Haba, 1996, p. 239) rend compte de l'ensemble des connotations de *uirago*, sans doute mieux qu'un groupe comme "quelque grosse fille robuste" (Naudet, 1836, p. 257) ou "une grande gaillarde de servante" (cf. "a big lusty wench": Nixon, 1924, p. 45). Plaute a

donc exploité les diverses valeurs du terme opposé à *mulier* “femme” (à la fois faible et désirable), à savoir *uir*, lexème de base qu’il pouvait encore reconnaître dans le mot *uirago*.

§ 5. L’usage de Plaute nous a retenu assez longtemps, parce qu’il est exceptionnel. Dans l’emploi le plus fréquent de *uirago*, c’est l’aspect guerrier et héroïque de *uir* qui prédomine: le terme désigne une “vierge guerrière” ou une “jeune femme au courage uiril” (*uir*), que rien ne peut effrayer, et qui au contraire produit l’effroi. Le mot a une coloration épique. C’est l’appellation donnée, dans la poésie augustéenne et post-augustéenne, à des déesses et à des héroïnes de la mythologie grecque: Pallas Athéna (Ovide, *Met.* II, 765 et VI, 130; Stace, *Theb.* XI, 414), Diane (Sénèque, *Phaedra*, 53), Cassandre (id., *Ag.*, 668), Polyxène (id., *Tro.*, 1151). Cet emploi fut inauguré par Ennius, dans un passage très dense du livre VII des *Annales*, où la vierge guerrière était déjà divinisée:

Ann., vv. 220–221 Skutsch (= 520–521 Vahlen)

*Corpore Tartarino prognata Paluda uirago
cui par imber et ignis, spiritus et grauis terra.*

“Née du corps du Tartare, la vierge guerrière Paluda, qui a en proportions égales la pluie et le feu, l’air et la terre pesante.”

Cette traduction reprend avec une légère modification celle procurée par Heurgon (1960, p. 83). Le fragment appartient à une séquence de quatre fragments qui décrivent l’ouverture des portes du temple de Janus (“les portes de la guerre”, v. 226) au début de la deuxième guerre punique, par une Furie, incarnation de la Discorde (*Discordia*, v. 225). La description a été imitée (avec des modifications) par Virgile (*Aen.* VII, vv. 563–571 et 607–622). La vierge guerrière est l’allégorie de la Discorde, et plus précisément, dans la perspective philosophique choisie ici par Ennius, la personnification du principe appelé *νεῖκος* dans le système d’Empédocle, lequel est cité par la mention (v. 221) des quatre éléments constitutifs (*principia*) en lutte (voir les commentaires de Heurgon, 1960, p. 84 et Skutsch, 1985, pp. 394–397). Avec ce dernier, j’ai laissé dans l’incertitude la traduction de *paluda*, s’il s’agit bien d’un nom de la *uirago*, et non pas d’une épithète, qui pourrait être rattachée (indirectement) à *paludamentum* “manteau du général en chef” (à la place de *paludata*), ou bien à *palus* “marais”. Ce problème ne modifie pas l’appréciation du rôle joué ici par l’image de la *uirago*, qui est confirmée par un autre témoignage du poète épique successeur d’Ennius. Certainement par imitation de ce vers des *Annales*, Virgile

applique le même terme, à la même place, à la nymphe Juturne, soeur de Turnus et chargée par Junon de secourir son frère (*Aen.* XII, vv. 138-160); elle intervient dans la bataille quand Enée entraîne ses troupes et se lance à la recherche de Turnus:

Aen. XII, v. 468 sq. *Hoc concussa metu mentem Iuturna uirago
aurigam Turni media inter lora Metiscum
excutit et longe lapsum temone reliquit;
ipsa subit manibusque undantis flectit habenas,
cuncta gerens uocemque et corpus et arma Metisci.*

“Vivement effrayée devant cette menace, la virile Juturne jette à bas parmi ses rênes le cocher de Turnus, Métiscus; tombé loin du timon, elle l’a laissé par derrière; elle-même prend sa place, saisit, manoeuvre les guides ondoyantes, ayant toute l’apparence, la voix, le corps et les armes de Métiscus.” (traduction de Perret, 1980, p. 142)

Il s’agit bien d’une femme qui prend la place d’un homme, comme le dit le commentaire de Servius (*ad loc.*): *uirago dicitur mulier quae uirile implet officium*. Ce grammairien reprend la même explication (*quae uirile aliquid fecit*) à propos de Didon, alors que le mot ne figure pas dans le texte (IV, v. 36). Ces données de la tradition épique sont rappelées par Skutsch (1985, p. 396), et confrontées à l’usage de Plaute. Cependant, le philologue note à juste titre que, même si la glose de Servius semble assez adéquate, la formation et le sens précis de *uirago* ne sont pas encore complètement éclaircis.

§ 6. Le rapprochement de *uirago* avec *uir*, soit directement, soit par l’intermédiaire de l’adjectif *uirilis*, apparaît comme une évidence pour les anciens étymologistes (voir les références dans Maltby, 1991, p. 647); il est repris par Isid., XI.2.22: *Virago uocata, quia uirum agit, hoc est opera uirilia facit et masculini uigoris est*. Contrairement à ce qu’avancent les traducteurs [édition citée, t. II, p. 42 n. 57], cette analyse ne relève pas de “la pure fantaisie”. Mais il se trouve que la présentation en est quelque peu troublée par une autre tentation, elle aussi prévisible, due à la ressemblance formelle de *uirago*, *uiraginis* avec *uirgo*, *uirginis*, et au besoin de différencier les deux termes, qui ne se distinguaient que par une voyelle et qui réfèrent tous deux à une jeune femme. Isidore ajoute en effet (*ibid.*): *Antiqui enim fortes feminas ita uocabant. Virgo autem non recte uirago dicitur, si non uiri officio fungitur. Mulier uero si uirilia facit, recte uirago dicitur, ut Amazona*. La question de *uirago* a été mêlée à celle de *uirgo* (cf. Maltby, *op. cit.*, p. 648), mot à propos duquel s’opposaient deux “écoles”: les

tenants du rapprochement avec *uirga* “branche souple et flexible, rejeton, baguette” (solution peu satisfaisante, mais encore maintenue dans LEW II, p. 799), et ceux du rapprochement avec *uir*, qui s’efforçaient donc de “théoriser” la distinction entre *uirago* et *uirgo*, dont l’origine serait commune. Cette seconde tendance aboutit à l’invention de *uira*, féminin de *uir*, mot qui semblait fournir en effet la “base” de *uirago*, opposé à *uirgo*, selon une segmentation *uira-go* vs. *uir-go*, cf. Festus, 261 (Lindsay, 1913, p. 314, l. 15 sq.): *feminas antiqui uiras appellabant, unde adhuc permanent uirgines et uiragines*; doctrine sans doute assez ancienne, qui est justifiée ainsi dans Isid., XI.2.23: *Quae uero nunc femina, antiquitus uira uocabatur; sicut a seruo serua, sicut a famulo famula, ita a uiro uira. Hinc et uirginis nomen quidam putant*. Il est vrai que la formation d’un tel féminin aurait été possible, selon une application simple de la quatrième proportionnelle, mais il n’a sans doute jamais existé (cf. DELL, p. 738), car sa place dans le lexique était déjà occupé par plusieurs termes bien différenciés: *mulier*, *uxor*, *puella*, etc. En outre, cette dérivation de *uirago* a tout de l’étymologie spéculative, ignorante de l’emploi, car elle comprend comme une “vraie” femme (d’une antique et authentique vigueur) la *uirago*, qui joue constamment un rôle viril, et non féminin, au point que Plaute pouvait l’opposer à la femme (*mulier*) comme objet sexuel. Elle relève de la tendance, toujours renaissante, à l’étymologie du type *lucus a non lucendo* (cf. Collart, 1954, p. 281, et plus généralement pp. 251– 302 sur l’étymologie antique jusqu’à Varron). Implicitement, c’est l’existence de ce **wirā* “femme”, qui a orienté Bréal vers sa glose plaisante de *uirāgō* par “toute une cargaison de femme” (1896, p. 164). Cela dit, il est curieux de constater que des commentaires plus récents de Virgile tirent parti, à propos du passage de l’*Enéide* (XII, v. 468) que nous avons commenté plus haut, d’un spectre paronomastique passant de *uirtus* à *uirginitas* (terme employé pour la malheureuse Juturne, pressentant la mort de son frère Turnus, au v. 878, cf. déjà v. 141), à la suite du scholiaste de Vérone (cf. Conington-Nettleship, 1883, p. 446; Benoist, 1882, t. II, p. 283: “*uirgo uiril ingenii*, la nymphe au cœur héroïque”). L’étymologie de *uirgo* (toujours problématique, cf. DELL, p. 740) constitue pour nous un problème distinct, qu’il vaudra la peine de reprendre quelque jour. Néanmoins, le rattachement de *uirago* à *uir*, qui est satisfaisant pour le sens, admet plusieurs explications formelles, qui se ramènent au choix entre dérivation et composition, dont il a déjà été question (§ 2). De fait, la seconde solution n’a pas manqué d’apparaître dans l’histoire de la recherche, pour être appliquée à ce mot précis.

§ 7. L'étymologie la plus récente, semble-t-il, de *uirago* est due à Szemerényi (1989, p. 61): **wiro-ago-* "Mannen führend", composé à second membre régissant, du même type que gr. στρατηγός, av. *nauu-āza-*, skr. *nāvājā-* (cf. plus loin lat. *nauig-āre*: LEW II, p. 148) et qui aurait un parallèle exact dans le nom propre av. *Virāza-* = **wira-aza-* "qui mène les hommes" (selon Kellens, 1974, p. 282 n. 1; prudence de Mayrhofer, 1977, p. 95, qui évoque les autres solutions proposées, dont la thématisation de **wirāz-*). En dépit de son propre commentaire apodictique, cette analyse n'est qu'une glose différente des lexèmes qui figuraient déjà dans l'explication reprise par Isidore de Séville (XI.2.22): *quia virum agit* "parce qu'elle joue le rôle d'un (agit comme un) guerrier viril". De plus, elle n'est qu'un ravalement superficiel, destiné à justifier ce seul mot, de la vieille théorie qui expliquait les noms en *-āgō* (et *-igō*, *-ūgō*) par des composés avec un dérivé en nasale de la racine **ag-* en second membre (Fay, 1913, p. 122, à propos de *uirāgō*): théorie dont Szemerényi (1913–1996) eut certainement l'occasion de prendre connaissance dans sa jeunesse. En dehors du fait que l'évolution phonétique envisagée (**wiro-ago-* > **wirāgo-*), par contraction, ne va pas de soi (cf. **-o-a-* > **-ō-* dans *cōgō* < **co-agō*, parfait *co-ēgi*, *cōpula*, etc.: Leumann, 1977, § 122, p. 119), cette solution ne rend pas compte de la formation du thème en nasale *uirāgin-*, à moins qu'il faille y voir un élargissement par **-on-* d'un composé **wiro-ag-* avec nom-racine en second membre (sur ce type de composé, voir Leumann, 1977, § 336.1.a, p. 393). Mais cette reconstruction tombe dès qu'elle est formulée, car l'aboutissement prévisible serait **uirēx*, **uirig-is* (et une forme élargie **uirigō*, **uirigin-is*), cf. *rēmex*, *rēmig-is* "rameur" (Plaute +) < **rēmo-ag-* "qui pousse les rames". Il n'est pas nécessaire de poser ici l'application de l'allongement par report des vibrations glottales d'une ancienne sonore ("loi de Lachmann"), d'où **rēmāx*, refait en *rēmex* sous l'influence de *rēmig-is* < **rēmāg-es* (enseignement de DELL, p. 17), ce qui aurait pu nous donner similairement **uirāx*. Il est probable que l'évolution de **-ag-* était parallèle à celle des autres racines **CaC-* en second membre de composé, avec fermeture et palatalisation (Sommer, 1914, § 89, p. 142; Leumann, 1977, pp. 93 et 94). On trouvera des vues en partie nouvelles sur les anciens composés latins en **-ag-* (et indo-européens en **-H₂eĝ-*) dans l'article récent de Dunkel (2000, en particulier p. 88sq.), mais elles n'affectent pas l'argumentation présentée ci-dessus.

§ 8. Pour rendre compte du sens de *uirāgō*, en partant d'un dérivé plausible du prototype de *uir*, il suffit de se rappeler que ce substantif est un ancien adjectif (**wi(H)-ro-* "doté de force virile", nom-racine

de base reflété par lat. *uis*, gr. (F)ἰ-φι, etc.), et de poser, en regard de l'adjectif **wiro*- un substantif collectif **wire*-*H*₂ "actions viriles", d'où serait tiré un abstrait **wire**H*₂-*k*- > **wirā*-*k*- "qualités viriles, force virile". Nous obtenons ainsi la base de *uirāgō*, qui est avec ce dérivé dans le même rapport formel que *uorāc*- (*uorāx*) avec *uorāgō*. Ce substantif **uirāc*- n'est pas imaginaire: il est effectivement présupposé par l'adjectif *uirāc-eus*, qui est relativement ancien, bien qu'il s'agisse d'un hapax (Varron, Men. 300 Bücheler = 297 Cèbe, Meleagri, V). La forme des manuscrits est *uirācius*, reflétant une prononciation vulgaire (comme dans les autres adjectifs en *-eus*, cf. Leumann, 1977, § 42.f, p. 46), et cet adjectif, employé en l'occurrence comme épithète de *uir*, signifie "viril, vraiment mâle". Cependant, il serait erroné d'y voir un simple doublet d'un adjectif **uirāx* (voir Cèbe, 1987, p. 317, pour un résumé de la discussion et la bibliographie). En effet, le suffixe *-eus* (Leumann, *op.cit.*, § 271, p. 286) y présente encore sa pleine force, avec un glissement de la matière constitutive à la qualité caractéristique. Puisque les adjectifs de matière en *-eus* (< **-eyo-*) sont anciennement des dérivés de substantifs, je pense que le modèle de *uirāceus* "fait d'une matière virile" pouvait être trouvé dans *ferreus* (Plt. +) ou *aereus* (Varron +), selon une interprétation: "fait de fer" > "caractérisé par la dureté du fer". Une telle formation analogique ne serait pas inattendue dans la langue de la comédie ou de la satire. Sans mentionner *uirāceus*, Pisani tire parti de **uirāx*, dérivé expressif de *uir*, pour expliquer *uirāgō* au moyen d'un suffixe **-ōn*/**-on-* de féminin (1935, p. 780). Mais cette idée bute sur deux faits: 1) le thème **wirāk-* ne fournit pas directement un adjectif hypocoristique **uirāx*; 2) la catégorie du "féminin" serait ici fondée sur un masculin, par une caractérisation secondaire du genre, ce qui n'est évidemment pas le cas dans le type *uorāgō* en regard de *uorāx*.

La formation de collectif sur des noms thématiques est bien connue en latin, cf. le type *locus*: *loca*, *cliuus*: *clina*, *iocus*: *ioca*, etc. Il se trouve que l'italique a possédé un dérivé collectif sur le substantif **wiro*- (> lat. *uir*, v.irl. *fer*, got. *wair*, etc.; en regard de **wiH*-*rō*- avec conservation de la laryngale, cf. véd. *virá-*, av. *vira-*, lit. *výras*): **wiré*-*H*₂ > **wirā* "ensemble d'hommes" > ombr. *ueiro* (Eichner, 1985, pp. 146-7; complété par Meiser, 1986, pp. 46 et 118), dans la formule *u(e)iro pecuo* (Tab. Ig. VI, passim) "hommes [et] bétail", cf. av. *pasu vira*, etc.: binôme hérité exprimant la totalité de la richesse mobilière (Watkins, 1979). En outre, la formation de l'abstrait **wirā* (élargi en **-k-*) sur la base du collectif d'un adjectif substantivé trouve un parallèle exact en indo-iranien: véd. *ṛtá-* adjectif "juste, correct" (<

* $H_2\gamma t\acute{o}$ - “ajusté”) et $\gamma t\acute{a}$ nt. plur., base de l'adjectif $\gamma t\acute{a}van-$ = v. perse *artāvan-* (< * aH_2won-) “fidèle à la justice, véridique”, etc. < collectif * $H_2\gamma t\acute{e}-H_2$ “justice, véracité” < “ce qui est juste, correct dans son ensemble”, “ensemble des comportements corrects” (cf. Tichy, 1986, pp. 92 et 95). Notre hypothèse inscrit donc les faits latins dans un cadre plus général, et ne constitue pas une trouvaille *ad hoc*.

§ 9. Il devient désormais assez simple de rendre compte de l'emploi de *uirāgō*, par un ancien adjectif substantivé: femme “dotée de force virile, de qualités viriles” soit **wirāk-H₃on-* avec le suffixe possessif ajouté à l'abstrait, nom. sing. *-āgō* < **-āk-H₃ōn*, et thème faible *-āgin-* < **-āgan-* (éventuellement < **-āgn-* avec anaptyxe) < **-āk-H₃n-*. Le substantif véd. *kan(i)yā* “jeune fille” (< **konHi-H₃ōn*, ou *-H₃ēn*) prouve que ce type de dérivé est épïcène, et peut fournir directement une désignation féminine. Sur le plan phonétique, nous avons ici l'effet de la laryngale sonorissante sur l'occlusive finale du terme de base: cette sonorisation est rarement attestée, cf. lat. *bibit*, v.irl. *ibid*, véd. *pībati* < **pībeti* présent redoublé thématique < **pi-pH₃-e-ti* sur la racine **peH₃-* > **pō-* “boire” (Mayrhofer, 1986, p. 143). Justement, le suffixe possessif (§ 3.B) est désormais posé avec * H_3 initiale sur la base de v.irl. *aub* “rivière” < **ab-ū* (cf. ἄβου Ptolémée), gén. sing. *abae* < **ab-ēs* < **ab-en-s*, plur. acc. *aibne* < **ab-en-ās*, dat. *aibnib* < **ab-en-o-bis*; **abon-ā* continué par gall. *afon*, corn. *auon*, bret. *auon*. Le substantif de base est véd. *āp-/ap-* (cf. *anūpā-* “rive” et *dvīpā-* “île” avec allongement par laryngale de la voyelle finale du premier membre de composé), av. *āp-*, d'un nom-racine * H_2ep- . Une occlusive sonore apparaît en anatolien: hitt. *hāpa-*, pal. *hāpnaš*; lat. *amnis* (abl. sing. *amne*) présuppose un thème **abn-*, qui pourrait être secondaire, par sonorisation en groupe. Celtique et anatolien garantissent l'existence d'une forme * H_2abon- < * H_2ap-H_3on- “pourvu d'eau courante” (Hamp, 1972; McCone, 1992). La théorie alternative consiste à poser en indo-eur. deux noms de l'eau vive: * H_2ep- et * H_2ebh- (cf. Watkins, 1973 et Puhvel, 1991, p. 115), mais elle me paraît moins économique, et sans preuve contraignante. Cette reconstruction du suffixe possessif trouverait une confirmation supplémentaire dans les dérivés en *-gō* < **-k-H₃ōn* du latin. J'ajoute un point qui n'a pas de rapport immédiat avec l'histoire de la dérivation latine: le problème structurel posé par la restitution du suffixe **-H₃en-* (et de sa forme thématisée **-H₃n-o-*) avec cette laryngale initiale peut être résolu en admettant qu'il s'agit à l'origine d'un nom-racine en second membre de composé (voir mon article paru en 2000).

§ 10. Sur le point précis de la dérivation à partir de thèmes en **-k-* avec le suffixe “de Hoffmann”, la reconstruction présentée ici est formellement identique à celle proposée par M^{me} Olsen (1994). Des arguments similaires, repris des études antérieures (notamment Ernout, 1946) sont employés spécialement pour expliquer à partir d’un type suffixal commun arm. *dalowkn* “jaunisse” et lat. *aur-ūgō*, même sens (1994, pp. 332–5; voir encore son livre récent, 1999, p. 591 sq.). Toutefois, cette collègue ne traite pas en détail les formations latines en *-Āgō*, et surtout n’attribue pas la même fonction au suffixe **-k-*, qu’elle considère comme primaire (ou éventuellement issu de laryngale [**-H₂-*], cf. 1994, pp. 340 n. 20 et 341). Elle n’accorde pas la même importance à lat. *uirāgō* (mentionné simplement [1994, p. 332], pour sa relation avec *uirāc-ens*), qui doit être interprété, selon moi, de manière parallèle à *uorāgō*, et qui fournit la preuve de la valeur possessive de la dérivation en nasale. Nos conceptions sémantiques sont assez différentes. De fait, M^{me} Olsen interprète *rōbīgō* (“puissance du rougissement”) non pas comme un adjectif possessif personnifié (voir plus loin § 11), mais comme un substantif abstrait, dérivé interne d’un adjectif: “the having of redness, being affected with redness” (*op.cit.*, p. 345). Je crois pour ma part que le problème de la valeur du suffixe **-k-* dans le thème de base doit être examiné (voir plus loin section IV) avant toute conclusion générale sur l’origine de ces dérivés. Nos démarches restent indépendantes, mais je tiens à souligner l’accord sur l’aspect strictement formel du problème, dans les grandes lignes.

III. Origine et développement d’autres formations anciennes

§ 11. La théorie présentée pour expliquer *uirāgō* permet de rendre compte simultanément des dérivés en *-āgō*, *-īgō*, etc. qui sont le point de départ de la productivité de ce type suffixal dans plusieurs champs sémantiques. Ernout suppose que les substantifs de genre animé qui ont servi de modèle à la formation “désignaient des forces agissantes, personnifiées et divinisées, plutôt que des états” (1946, p. 188). Cela s’accorde bien avec notre idée d’un dérivé d’abstrait qui désigne le possesseur d’une qualité ou d’une activité, d’où l’entité investie d’une puissance. Pour reprendre un exemple d’Ernout (*loc. cit.*), *rōbīgō* (Plt. +) désignait (encore pour Varron et Ovide) “la Déesse de la rouille des blés, c’est-à-dire la Force qui rend rouges les blés, puis le fer”: autrement dit, l’être “doté du rougissement” (de la capacité à rendre

rouge), à reconstruire comme **roudhik-H₃ōn*, parallèle à **wirāk-H₃ōn* “doté(e) de qualités viriles”. La forme de base **roudhi-H₂-k* peut s'expliquer par l'élargissement de l'abstrait **roudh-i-* “rougeur” (présupposé par véd. *rohít-, rōhita-, rōhīni-*, etc.), en face de l'adjectif **roudh-o-* “rouge” > *rōbus, rūfus*, got. *rauPs*, v.irl. *ruadh*, lit. *raūdas*, etc. (compte non tenu de la laryngale initiale de cette racine, **H₁reudh-*). Selon le même principe, on pourra reconstruire d'autres dérivés dont les étymologies sont connues, et dont la racine présente une formation d'abstrait attestée ou plausible. Ainsi, *uorāgō* < **worāk-H₃on-* se comprend comme “pourvu de force dévorante”, sur **g^wor(H₃)-eH₂-k-* “dévoration” > abstrait animé “qui dévore” (par excellence, de façon extrême) *uorāx* (Accius +). Le substantif en *-gō* peut désigner aussi un être “dévorateur” (e. g., Cic., *Ver.* III, 23). La racine **g^werH₃-* “avalier, engloutir” (véd. *jagāra*, hom. βεβρωκώς, lit. *gerti*, arm. *e-ker*, etc.) donnait un nom d'action **g^wor(H₃)-e-H₂* “dévoration” > gr. βορῶ (trag., Hdt.) résultatif “pâturer d'une bête de proie, nourriture”. Le verbe lat. *uorāre* peut être analysé comme présent itératif, ou comme dénomiatif de l'abstrait **worā* hérité, prédécesseur de **worāk-*. Parallèlement à cet abstrait en **-eH₂-*, il a existé, comme souvent, un nom d'action thématique: **g^wór(H₃)-o-*; il est connu sous une forme élargie en **-k-*: soit **g^wor(H₃)-o-k-*, base de tokh. B *kerekauna* “torrent, rivière impétueuse” (skr. *ogha-*) < * “ensemble de gouffres, de tourbillons qui avalent” (Hilmarsson, 1993, p. 177; 1996, pp. 132–3). Il s'agit d'une formation de collectif en B *-auna*, cf. *krentauna* “vertus” (*krent* “bon”), *rekauna* (*reki* “parole”), *yapauna* (*yapoy* “pays”), *palauna* (A *palom*) “louange”, *taršauna* (A *tāršom*) “tromperie”. La quasi identité de l'aboutissement sémantique de ce mot tokharien et de lat. *uorāgō* conforte la reconstruction commune d'un nom d'action élargi par une occlusive dorsale. Il faut bien marquer la ligne de partage entre l'interprétation sémantique et son explication morphologique: Havers a interprété aussi *uorāgō* comme signifiant littéralement “le dévorateur” (“der Verschlinger”), mais il y voyait (à la suite de Thurneysen, 1883, p. 305) un dérivé individualisant d'un adjectif (*uorāx*), soit **worāk-on-* (1958, p. 28). J'écarte cette solution, parce qu'elle exclut une solution plausible du problème de *uirāgō*, qui atteste en revanche une valeur clairement possessive du suffixe.

§ 12. Il est possible de procéder selon la même piste pour d'autres dérivés. Pour *uertigō* (Prop. +) vs. *uertex -icis* (Accius +), on pourrait poser, en regard du nom d'agent **wort-ó-* “qui tourne” (véd. *ā-vartá-*), un substantif **wort-i-* “tournoiement” (ou “ensemble de choses qui

tourment”, cf. véd. *vartī-*, avec élargissement en sifflante), élargi en **wort-i-k-* > *uertex*, ou **wort-i-H₂-k-* > **wortik-*, base du dérivé désignant “la force qui fait tourbillonner”. Dans le cas de *fūligō* (Plt. +), il existe dans une autre langue un nom d’action concrétisé: skr. *dhūli-*, *dhūh-* (class.) “poussière”, lit. *dūlis* “fumigation, vapeur”, v.irl. *dúil* “désir, envie” < “objet mis en mouvement vif” (DELL, p. 259), sur la racine de *fūmus*, θύμός, etc. L’abstrait (ou collectif) **dhuH-li-H₂* à côté de **dhuH-li-* serait, après concrétisation, la base de **dhūlik-H₃on-* “pourvu du produit de la fumigation”, “riche de matières déposées par la fumée”, qui acquiert à son tour une référence concrète.

Il est difficile de préciser quel serait le plus archaïque parmi les dérivés que nous avons analysés. Le parallélisme de l’évolution sémantique à partir de la valeur possessive pour plusieurs de ces substantifs pallie les lacunes de notre documentation. La sonorisation par laryngale est un phénomène d’une haute antiquité, qui remonte à la période pré-italique. La suite du développement a vu la restructuration du processus dérivationnel, une fois que le suffixe avait pris sa forme définitive *-Āgō*, par intégration de la voyelle finale du terme de base: réinterprétation dénominative (*rōbigō*, *uirāgō*) ou déverbative (*uorāgō*, *uertāgō*). Ce processus était déjà achevé au début de la latinité, comme le montre un exemple ancien: *imāgō* (Plt. +) “depiction, copy”, en regard du verbe *imitor-ān* “take after, copy”. Pour cette famille, qui comporte encore *aemulus* “rival(ling)”, le seul rapprochement probable est hitt. *him(m)a-* “imitation, substitute, replica, model, toy” (Puhvel, 1991, p. 315). La racine **H₂eim-* donnait un adjectif **H₂im-o-* > ital. **imo-*, d’où un verbe dénominatif **imāye/o-* “prendre modèle, copier”, **imā-ri* (remplacé par le fréquentatif *imitāri*), base de *imāgō* sur le modèle *uorāre* : *uorāgō*. Dès cette époque, *uorāgō* était la “dévoration” incarnée.

IV. Elargissement en **-k-* d’abstrait, de collectifs et de féminins

§ 13. L’hypothèse présentée ci-dessus conduit à postuler, comme intermédiaires dans le processus de formation des dérivés en **-k-H₃on-*, des substantifs abstraits plausibles, mais non attestés (par ex. **roudhik-* “rougissement”, **wirāk-* “force virile”), ou attestés en latin dans un autre emploi, comme **g^wor(H₃)eH₂-k-* > *uorāc-*, devenu un nom d’agent du verbe *uorāre*: “qui dévore, qui engloutit”. Il n’est pas possible, dans le présent cadre, de traiter ce dossier complexe. On se contentera d’ouvrir une voie de réflexion. Des formations en **-āk-*,

*-ik- sont bien connues en latin (cf. Leumann, 1977, § 329, pp. 375-377): elles doivent se comprendre comme l'élargissement en *-k- de formations héritées en *-ā- (*-eH₂-) et *-i- (*-iH₂-). Il suffit d'évoquer les noms d'agent féminins en -trīc- en regard des masculins en -tor. Le suffixe "pur" de féminin en *-iH₂- > -i- n'est plus attesté que par des vestiges, cf. *neptis* "petite-fille, nièce" < **nept-iH₂-s* en regard de *nepōs -ōtis* < **nepōt-s* (cf. véd. *nāpāt*). Le verbe dénominal *nūtrire* "nourrir" < *"allaiter" conserve le type ancien **nūtrī-* "celle qui allaite", alors que la formation vivante présente l'élargissement en *-k- du même suffixe, cf. *nūtrix* "nourrice", et le type *genetrix -icis* < **génH₁-triH₂-k-* en regard de *genitor* < **génH₁-tōr*, cf. véd. *jānitri-* en regard de *janitār-* (Schrijver, 1991, p. 152 sq., contra Martinet, 1955, p. 52). Puisqu'il faut considérer cet élargissement comme réel, on peut admettre qu'il est intervenu dans une période où apparaissaient aussi les dérivés en *-ik- < *-iH₂-k- que nous supposons, et qui remontent à des formations d'abstrait et/ou de collectifs, probablement de genre féminin.

D'anciens abstraits et/ou collectifs élargis en *-k- se dissimulent aussi sous des formations d'adjectifs ou de substantifs, qui s'appliquent à des personnes. Elles se sont développées à partir de l'emploi "illocutoire" de noms abstraits pour désigner des individus, comme fr. "une jeunesse" pour une jeune femme, angl. *youth* "jeunesse", pour "jeune homme, adolescent", de même véd. *yuvati-* "jeune fille", à partir d'un collectif de *yúvan-* (cité plus haut, § 3.B) "jeune" (cf. Pinault, 1996, p. 206). On peut analyser dans cette perspective gr. *μείραξ* (Ar. +) "jeune fille", en remontant de façon linéaire à **meriH₂-k-s* sur **meri-H₂* "jeunesse, virginité", cf. véd. *márya-* "jeune homme", lat. *maritus* (Thieme, 1963, pp. 239-246), etc. Le grec possède un type en -āx- à valeur péjorative (Chantraine, 1933, p. 381): e.g. *γαῦρος* "fier", *γαύραξ* "vantard" (Alcée); son point de départ pourrait être la formation d'un collectif en *-eH₂-k- sur adjectif thématique. Parallèlement, le latin emploie des dérivés en -c-, comme noms d'agent de verbes exprimant un comportement blâmable, cf. *edāx*, *fallāx*, *fugāx*, *uorāx*; ce type est devenu déverbatif, mais on peut le comprendre comme dénominal à l'origine, cf. *fugāx*, *linguāx*, *uorāx*. Dans le discours, le locuteur décrit le comportement, et stigmatise une personne au moyen d'un substantif (éventuellement un abstrait) qui exprime le degré extrême de la qualité qui lui est reproché: "une [forte] langue" > "un terrible bavard", "un [vrai] gouffre" > "le plus grand dévoreur". J'ai étudié ailleurs l'emploi poétique dans les hymnes védiques du substantif apposé, avec valeur de qualification (1997, p. 118

sq.), e. g., la formule véd. *síndhur ná kṣódaḥ* “comme le fleuve [qui est] bouillonnement” = “très bouillonnant”. Dans son principe, le processus est analogue. Le transfert d’un terme originellement à valeur de collectif (ou d’abstrait) a un emploi singulatif s’observe dans d’autres dérivés en **-eH₂-* (cf. Leukart, 1994, pp. 149–154). En fait, tout thème de collectif (ou d’abstrait) est susceptible d’évoluer dans ce sens, mais il importe de retracer les motivations diverses de cette transposition vers la désignation d’un individu représentatif.

§ 14. Un substantif abstrait pouvait être utilisé pour désigner le représentant éminent d’une qualité ou d’une activité, et la force de cette prédication était renforcée (éventuellement) par un élargissement en **-k-*, comme dans les dérivés que nous avons cités. Nous retrouvons ici, par un autre chemin, la valeur expressive du suffixe **-k-* (cf. Ernout, 1946, p. 159 sq.; Solta, 1950; Fruyt, 1986, p. 262): suffixe “de fonction sémantique”: diminution, dépréciation, augmentation, approximation, opposition, caractérisation. Ces diverses applications concrètes sont la monnaie de la fonction fortement pragmatique de cette dérivation dans le discours. Il est aisé de vérifier cette assertion en considérant la forme et l’emploi en latin de l’adjectif indo-eur. **sén-o-* “vieux” (> véd. *sána-*, arm. *hin*, gr. ἔνος, gaul. *seno-*, etc.). La plus grande partie de sa flexion mêle les formes de l’ancien adjectif thématique, gén. plur. *senum* (< **senōm*), et d’un thème en *-i-*, soutenu par l’opposition avec *iuuenis* “jeune”, lui-même refait à partir d’un nom athématique, cf. véd. *yúvan-*: sing. *senem*, *senis*, *seni*, *sene*, plur. nom. acc. *senēs*, etc. (Brugmann, 1908, p. 2 sq.). La conservation d’un thème athématique (**sen-*) est improbable. Ce thème en *-i-* remonte à un collectif (ou abstrait) **sen-i-* “vieillesse, vieillerie”, attendu en regard de l’adjectif thématique. Je reprends ici la théorie proposée dans un autre contexte par Schindler sur la substitution de la voyelle thématique **-o-* par **-i-* dans la formation d’abstrait déadjectivaux (1980, notamment p. 390). Ce substantif **seni-* fut appliqué à une personne: “une vieillesse” = “un vieux débris”, pour “un vieil homme”, d’où son intégration au paradigme. De fait, les abstraits vivants *senec-ta* (Plt. +) et *senec-tūs -tūt-is* (idem) peuvent être employés, par personnification, pour désigner un homme (ou un animal) âgé (cf. OLD *s.u.*). Cela n’est que la répétition d’un phénomène cyclique, qui s’est déjà produit dans la préhistoire du latin. Or, le thème **sen-i-*, ancien abstrait, a un doublet **sen-i-k-*, dans *senex* (< **seniks*), v. lat. *senic-is* et *senec-is*, plur. *senic-ēs* (Plt.), sobriquets *senec-a* (*senica*), *senec-iō*. Il vaut mieux laisser à part véd. *sanaká-*, constamment cité, qui est le

doublet expressif de *sána-* “vieux”, mais qui s’explique indépendamment à l’intérieur de l’indo-aryen, où le suffixe *-ka-* (et non *-k-*) est employé dans un contexte de mépris et de malédiction (Edgerton, 1911, p. 138 sq.). Un thème en *-i-*, dérivé d’un nom thématique, **wlk^wo-* “loup”, et signifiant “se rapportant au loup”, “espèce de loup”, élargi en **-H₂-*, a servi parallèlement de base au féminin véd. *vṛkī-* “louve”, **“celle du loup”* (< **wlk^wi-H₂*) et à l’abstrait gr. λύσσα “rage” < **“louv-ité”* (cf. Pinault, 1996, p. 204), comme qualité commune à tous les loups.

§ 15. La reconstruction formelle de **seniks* n’est pas nouvelle (implicité chez Leumann, 1977, p. 375). En revanche, la reconstruction de **senaks* (< **seneH₂-s*), à la Martinet, est ruineuse (bien qu’elle soit encore prise en compte par Olsen, 1994, p. 340 n. 20). En effet, *senātus* ne saurait être invoqué pour l’existence d’une base **senā* (< **sene-H₂* ou **sen-eH₂*) dont dériverait le collectif **senā-tu-* “assemblée des vieillards” (Martinet, 1955, p. 49). Le suffixe masculin *-tus*, gén. sing. *-tūs* (< **-tu-s/*-tou-s* < **-teu-s*) servait à former des abstraits sur base verbale (cf. Leumann, 1977, § 316, p. 353 sq.). La valeur collective des substantifs en *-ātus*, reposant d’abord sur des verbes en *-āre*, est secondaire, et résulte de la relation sémantique qui s’établit directement, sans passer par le dénominatif, entre le substantif de base employé au pluriel et le nom d’action référant à un certain état social (cf. Porzig, 1956, p. 320): e. g., *eques*, *equit-is* → *equit-āre* “être cavalier” → *equitātus* “état de cavalier”, d’où *equit-ēs* → *equit-ātus* “cavalerie”, conçue comme “ensemble des cavaliers”. Ce modèle, suivi aussi par *comit-ēs* (→ *comit-ārī*) → *comit-ātus*, explique très simplement *sen-ātus* à partir de *sen-ēs*, en l’absence de tout verbe **senāre* “faire fonction de *senex*”. Cette solution, défendue notamment par Porzig (1956, pp. 320–321), est reprise pour l’essentiel par Leumann (1977, § 316.B, p. 355), qui évoque plutôt l’influence du type *magistrātus* (cf. *magistr-āre*, *magister-āre* et *magister*), bien que ce terme ne désigne pas de façon typique un “ensemble de magistrats”, mais la “magistrature”, et, par incarnation de l’abstrait dans une personne, un “magistrat”, un fonctionnaire public. Tout en admettant une grande partie de ces considérations, Szemerényi (1962, pp. 186–7) préfère rendre compte de la valeur collective de *senātus* en postulant un dérivé imaginaire **seno-tāt-* (ou **seno-tūt-*), parallèle à *iuuen-tāt-* “jeunesse” et “ensemble des jeunes gens”, qui sert de point de départ à un scénario arbitraire: réduction de ce dérivé par haplogogie (?) à **senās*, thème **senāt-*, refait comme thème en *-u-* sous l’influence d’un lat. **plētus*,

lui-même postulé pour “expliquer”, à chaque fois par des combinaisons *ad hoc*, aussi bien lat. *plēbs, plēb-is* que gr. *πληθὺς* (*op.cit.*, p. 185 sq.). En l'occurrence, le nombre d'entités intermédiaires est trop élevé. Il me semble que la formation collective en *-tus* est suffisamment établie par *comitātus* “accompagnement” et “groupe de compagnons” (attesté depuis Cic. seulement, mais qui appartient à la langue courante, et qui devait être formé depuis longtemps). Pour expliquer complètement *senātus*, il faut ajouter l'influence très probable (déjà évoquée dans DELL, p. 613) de la désignation grecque du “Conseil des Anciens”, *γερονσιᾶ*, en relation directe avec *γέροντ-ες* “vieillards”: *senātus* serait donc un calque de ce mot grec, fondé sur le parallélisme entre termes de base et dérivés à valeur collective dans les deux langues, alors que *senēs* n'est pas utilisé par les Romains pour désigner les sénateurs: le titre usuel, qui sert aussi de terme d'appel, est, comme on sait, *patres conscripti* (cf. Porzig, *op.cit.*, p. 322).

Lat. *senex* n'est pas un terme noble pour “vieil homme”, et l'ancien abstrait désignant la vieillesse ne se cache pas dans *senātus*: il se trouve justement dans *senex* lui-même. Si le nominatif singulier a généralisé cette forme spéciale, c'est sans doute parce que ce cas est celui employé de façon prédominante dans la prédication attributive, et comme l'écrit Ernout (1946, p. 163) “peut-être parce que la comédie a maintenu la forme pour désigner les hommes âgés qu'elle se plaisait à railler”. La valeur dépréciative et péjorative de cette formation, bien mise en évidence par Ernout, n'est pas seulement due à l'élargissement en dorsale: elle est inséparable de l'emploi expressif de l'abstrait **seni(-k)*- pour désigner une personne. Les dérivés en **-eH₂-k-* et **-i-k-* que nous avons reconstruits pour *uorāx*, *uertex*, etc. sont exactement parallèles à *senex* (< **seni(-k)*-) ainsi analysé, mais leur domaine d'emploi a favorisé la généralisation de la forme élargie, et leur force de noms d'action se maintient encore dans les anciens dérivés en *-āgō*, *-igō*, etc., à savoir dans les noms de maladies et de puissances de transformation.

Références bibliographiques et abréviations

- Adams, J.N. (1982): *The Latin sexual vocabulary*, London.
 André, J. (1956): *Lexique des termes de botanique en latin*, Paris (Etudes et commentaires, XXIII).
 André, J. (1985): *Les noms de plantes dans la Rome antique*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres (Collection d'Etudes Anciennes).

- Baecklund, P. S. (1914): *Die lateinischen Bildungen auf -fex und -ficus*, Inaugural-Dissertation, Uppsala.
- Benoist, E. (1882): *Œuvres de Virgile*. Texte latin avec un commentaire critique et explicatif: *Énéide*, 2 tomes (I-VI et VII-XII), Paris, 3^e tirage.
- Bréal, M. (1896): "Étymologies grecques et latines", *MSL* 9, pp. 160-167.
- Brugmann, K. (1906): *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen. Vergleichende Laut-, Stammbildungs- und Flexionslehre*. Zweite Bearbeitung, Bd. II: Lehre von den Wortformen und ihrem Gebrauch. Erster Teil: Allgemeines. Zusammensetzung (Komposita). Nominalstämme, Strassburg.
- Brugmann, K. (1908): "SENEX IVVENIS", *Archiv für lateinische Lexicographie und Grammatik*, hrsg. von E. Wölfflin, Bd. 15, München, pp. 1-9.
- Cèbe, J.-P. (1987): *Varron, Satires Ménippées*. Edition, traduction et commentaire, t. 8, Paris-Roma, Palais Farnèse (Collection de l'École Française de Rome, 9/8).
- Chantraine, P. (1933): *La formation des noms en grec ancien*, Paris (nouveau tirage, 1979).
- Collart, J. (1954): *Varron, grammairien latin*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres [Thèse principale, Université de Paris, Faculté des Lettres].
- Conington, J. (1883): *The Works of Virgil with a commentary*. Vol. III (containing the last six books of the Aeneid), revised by Henry Nettleship, 3rd ed., London; réimpr. Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1963.
- DELL = Ernout, A. & Meillet, A., *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine. Histoire des mots*, Paris, 4^e éd. (1959), 2^e tirage, 1967.
- Dumont, J.-Ch. (1987): *SERVUS. Rome et l'esclavage sous la République*, Paris-Roma, Palais Farnèse (Collection de l'École Française de Rome, 103).
- Dunkel, G. E. (2000): "Latin verbs in *-igāre* and *-igāre* 8, in: *125 Jahre Indogermanistik in Graz*, hrsg. von M. Ofitsch und Ch. Zinko, Graz (Arbeiten aus der Abteilung "Vergleichende Sprachwissenschaft", Bd. 15), pp. 87-99.
- Edgerton, F. (1911): "The K-Suffixes of Indo-Iranian. Part I: The K-Suffixes in the Veda and Avesta", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 31, pp. 93-150, 296-342.
- Eichner, H. (1985): "Das Problem des Ansatzes eines urindogermanischen Numerus 'Kollektiv' ('Komprehensiv')", in: *Grammatische Kategorien: Funktion und Geschichte*. Akten der VII. Fachtagung der Indogermanischen Gesellschaft (Berlin, 20-25 Februar 1983), hrsg. von B. Schlerath, Wiesbaden, pp. 134-169.
- Ernout, A. (1946): *Philologica* [I], Paris (Études et Commentaires, I); spécialement: "Senex et les formations en *-k-* du latin", pp. 133-164 (repris de *BSL* 41, 1940, pp. 92-128). - "Les noms en *-āgō*, *-igō*, *-ūgō* du latin", pp. 165-192 (repris de la *Revue de Philologie*, t. XV (67^e de la collection), 1941, pp. 85-111).
- Ernout, A. (1952): *Plaute*, t. IV: *Menaechmi, Mercator, Miles Gloriosus*. Texte établi et traduit, 3^e éd., Paris, Les Belles Lettres, CUF.
- Ernout, A. (1957): "Le vocabulaire botanique latin", *Revue de Philologie*, t. XXXI (83^e de la collection), pp. 183-208; cité d'après *Philologica* III, Paris (Études et commentaires, LIX), 1965, pp. 125-150.

- Fay, E. F. (1913): "Composition or Suffixation? Latin Words ending in *-āgo*, *-ūgo*, *-īgo*", *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Sprachforschung* 45, pp. 111-129.
- Fruyt, M. (1986): *Problèmes méthodologiques de dérivation à propos des suffixes latins en ... cus*, Paris (Etudes et commentaires, 99).
- Fruyt, M. (1989): "Métaphore, métonymie et synecdoque dans le lexique latin", *Glotta* 67, pp. 106-122.
- González-Haba, M. (1996): *Plauto, Comedias*, t. II. Introducciones, traducción y notas, Madrid (Biblioteca Clásica Gredos, 218).
- Hamp, E. P. (1972): "Palaic *ḫa-a-ap-na-aš* 'river'", *Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft* 30, pp. 35-37.
- Haudry, J. (1981): "La dérivation en indo-européen", *L'information grammaticale*, n° 8, janvier 1981, pp. 3-11.
- Havers, W. (1958): "Geister- und Dämonenglaube", *Die Sprache* IV, pp. 23-38.
- Heurgon, J. (1960): *Ennius. I: Les Annales*, Paris, Centre de Documentation Universitaire (Les Cours de Sorbonne).
- Hilmarsson, J. (1993): "Development of labiovelars (and tectals plus *ʷ*) in initial position in Tocharian (an overview)", *Die Sprache* 35/2, 1991-1993, pp. 176-186.
- Hilmarsson, J. (1996): *Materials for a Tocharian Historical and Etymological Dictionary*. Edited by A. Lubotsky and G. Porhallsdóttir, Reykjavík (TTES. Supplementary Series. Vol. 5).
- Hoffmann, K. (1955): "Ein grundsprachliches Possessivsuffix", *Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft* 6, pp. 35-40 (= *Aufsätze zur Indoiranistik*, hrsg. von J. Narten, Bd. 2, Wiesbaden, 1976, pp. 378-383).
- Isid. = Isidore de Séville, cf. San Isidoro de Sevilla, *Etimologías*. Edición bilingüe. Texto latino, versión española y notas por J. Ortoz Reta y M. A. Marcos Casquero, 2 tomes, Madrid, La Editorial Católica, 1982-1983 (Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, n° 433-434).
- Kellens, J. (1974): *Les noms-racines de l'Avesta*, Wiesbaden.
- Leukart, A. (1994): *Die frühgriechischen Nomina auf -tās und -ās. Untersuchungen zu ihrer Herkunft und Ausbreitung (unter Vergleich mit den Nomina auf -eús)*, Wien, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Sitzungsberichte, Bd. 558).
- Leumann, M. (1926): *Lateinische Grammatik. I: Laut- und Formenlehre*, München (= 5^e éd., avec J. B. Hofmann, de l'ouvrage de Fr. Stolz).
- Leumann, M. (1977): *Lateinische Laut- und Formenlehre*, München, 1977.
- LEW = Walde, A. & Hofmann, J. B., *Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*. I-III, 3., neubearbeitete Auflage, Heidelberg, 1938-1954-1956.
- Lindsay, W. M. (1913): *Sexti Pompei Festi de verborum significatu quae supersunt cum Pauli epitome*, Leipzig, R. G. Teubner.
- LIV = *Lexikon der indogermanischen Verben. Die Wurzeln und ihre Primärstamm-bildungen*. Unter Leitung von H. Rix, bearbeitet von M. Kümmel et al., Wiesbaden, 1998; 2., erweiterte und verbesserte Auflage, 2001.

- Maltby, R. (1991): *A Lexicon of Ancient Latin Etymologies*, Leeds, F. Cairns (ARCA. Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers and Monographs, 25).
- Martinet, A. (1955): "Le couple *senex-senatus* et le 'suffixe' *-k-*", *BSL* 51, pp. 42–56.
- Mayrhofer, M. (1977): *Die avestischen Namen* (= *Iranisches Personennamenbuch*, Bd. I/1), Wien, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sonderpublikation der Iranischen Kommission.
- Mayrhofer, M. (1986): *Indogermanische Grammatik. I/2: Lautlehre*, Heidelberg.
- McCone, K. R. (1992): "OIr. *aub* 'river' and *amnair* 'maternal uncle'", *Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft* 53, pp. 101–111.
- Meiser, G. (1986): *Lautgeschichte der umbrischen Sprache*, Innsbruck (IBS, Bd. 51).
- Meiser, G. (1998): *Historische Laut- und Formenlehre der lateinischen Sprache*, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Meyer, L. (1861–65): *Vergleichende Grammatik der griechischen und lateinischen Sprache*, 2 tomes, Berlin.
- Meyer, L. (1881): "Castigāre, fastigāre, vestigāre, vectigal, litigāre und noch einige andere lateinische bildungen mit innerem *-ig-* und *-ig-*", *Beiträge zur Kunde der indogermanischen Sprachen* [hrsg. von A. Bezzenger], Bd. 6, Göttingen, pp. 130–137.
- Muller, F. (1926): *Altitalisches Wörterbuch*, Göttingen.
- Naudet, J. (1836): *Théâtre de Plaute*. Traduction nouvelle accompagnée de notes, t. V: *Les Ménechmes. – Le Marchand*, Paris, C. L. F. Panckoucke.
- Nixon, P. (1924): *Plautus*, with an English translation. Vol. III, London-New York, Loeb Classical Library.
- OLD = *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, ed. by P. G. W. Glare, Oxford, 1968–1982.
- Olsen, B. A. (1994): "Armenian *dalowken* 'jaundice' and the Indo-European suffix **-gon-*", in: *In honorem Holger Pedersen*. Kolloquium der Indogermanischen Gesellschaft (25.–28. März 1993 in Kopenhagen). Unter Mitwirkung von B. Nielsen hrsg. von J. E. Rasmussen, Wiesbaden, 1994, pp. 331–347.
- Olsen, B. A. (1999): *The Noun in Biblical Armenian. Origin and Word-Formation*, Berlin-New York (Trends in Linguistics. Studies and Monographs, 119).
- Perret, J. (1980): *Virgile, Enéide*, t. III: livres IX–XII. Texte établi et traduit, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, CUF.
- Pinault, G.-J. (1996): "Aspects de la reconstruction de l'abstrait en indo-européen", in: *Les noms abstraits. Histoire et théorie* (Actes du colloque de Dunkerque, 15–18 septembre 1992). Textes réunis par N. Flux, M. Glatigny, D. Samain, Lille, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, pp. 199–211.
- Pinault, G.-J. (1997): "Le substantif épithète dans la langue de la Ṛk-Saṃhitā", in: *Syntaxe des langues indo-iraniennes anciennes*. Colloque international (Sitges, 4–5 mai 1993) organisé par l'Institut du Proche-Orient Ancien (Université de Barcelone). Actes édités par Eric Pirart, Barcelona (Aula Orientalis. Supplementa 6), pp. 111–141.
- Pinault, G.-J., (2000): "Védique *dāmūnas-*, lat. *dominus* et l'origine du suffixe de Hoffmann", *BSL* 95, pp. 61–118.
- Pisani, V. (1935): "Il suffisso femminilizzante indoeuropeo *-on* (*-jon -tjon -uon*)

- e alcune sue tracce nella declinazione)”, *Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Classe di Scienze morali, storiche et filologiche. Rendiconti*, Serie 6, Vol. XI, Roma, 1935, pp. 775–794.
- Porzig, W. (1956): “Senatus populusque Romanus”, *Gymnasium* 63, Heft 3/4 (= Tagung des Deutschen Altphilologenverbandes in Speyer, 1–4 Juni 1955, hrsg. von F. Bömer und H. Haas), Heidelberg, pp. 318–326.
- Puhvel, J. (1991): *Hittite Etymological Dictionary*. Vol. 3: *Words beginning with H*, Berlin-New York (Trends in Linguistics. Documentation, 5).
- Rix, H. (1989): “Lat. *patronus, matrona, colonus, pecunia*”, in: *Indogermanica Europaea*. Festschrift für Wolfgang Meid zum 60. Geburtstag, Graz (Grazer Linguistische Monographien. 4), pp. 225–240.
- Schindler, J. (1975): “L’apophonie des thèmes indo-européens en -r/n-”, *BSL* 70, pp. 1–10.
- Schindler, J. (1980): “Zur Herkunft der altindischen *cvi*-Bildungen”, in: *Lautgeschichte und Etymologie*. Akten der VI. Fachtagung der Indogermanischen Gesellschaft (Wien, 24.–29. September 1978), hrsg. von M. Mayrhofer, M. Peters, O. E. Pfeiffer, Wiesbaden, pp. 386–393.
- Schrijver, P. (1991): *The reflexes of the Proto-Indo-European laryngeals in Latin*, Amsterdam-Atlanta (Leiden Studies in Indo-European. 2).
- Skutsch, O. (1985): *The Annals of Q. Ennius*, edited with introduction and commentary, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Solta, G. R. (1950): “Alb. *plak* ‘Greis’ und das idg. *k*-Suffix”, *Die Sprache* II/2, pp. 122–126.
- Sommer, F. (1914): *Handbuch der lateinischen Laut- und Formenlehre*, 2. und 3. Auflage, Heidelberg.
- Stolz, F. (1894–95): *Historische Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache*. Bd. I, Leipzig. – Erste Hälfte: Einleitung und Lautlehre [1894]. – Zweite Hälfte: Stammbildungslehre [1895].
- Stüber, K. (1998): *The Historical Morphology of n-Stems in Celtic*, Maynooth, Department of Old Irish (Maynooth Studies in Celtic Linguistics. Vol. III).
- Szemerényi, O. (1962): “Principles of Etymological Research in the Indo-European Languages”, in: *II. Fachtagung für indogermanische und allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft* (Innsbruck, 10.–15. Oktober 1961), Innsbruck, pp. 175–212; repris dans: *Etymologie*, hrsg. von R. Schmitt, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (Wege der Forschung, Bd. CCCLXXIII), 1977, pp. 286–346 et *Scripta Minora. Selected Essays in Indo-European, Greek and Latin*, Innsbruck (IBS, Bd. 53), ed. by P. Considine and J. T. Hooker, Vol. I: Indo-European, 1987, pp. 40–77.
- Szemerényi, O. (1989): *An den Quellen des lateinischen Wortschatzes*, Innsbruck (IBS, Bd. 56).
- Thurneysen, R. (1883): “Urspr. *dn, tn, cn* im lateinischen”, *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Sprachforschung* 26 (N.F. Bd. VI), pp. 301–314.
- Thieme, P. (1963): “Jungfrauengatte’. Sanskrit *kaumārāḥ patih* – Homer. *κουργίδιος πόσις* – lat. *maritus*”, *ZVS (KZ)* 78, pp. 161–248 (= *Kleine Schriften* [I], hrsg.

- von G. Buddruss, 2., unveränderte Auflage, Wiesbaden, 1984 [Glasenapp-Stiftung, Bd. 5], pp. 426–513).
- Tichy, E. (1986): “Vedisch *rtávan-* und avestisch *ašauuan-*”, *Die Sprache* 32 (= Festgabe für M. Mayrhofer), pp. 91–105.
- Watkins, C. (1973): “‘River’ in Celtic and Indo-European”, *Ériu*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 80–89.
- Watkins, C. (1979): “NAM.RA GUD UDU in Hittite: Indo-European poetic language and the folk taxonomy of wealth”, in: *Hethitisch und Indogermanisch*, hrsg. von E. Neu und W. Meid, Innsbruck (IBS, Bd. 25), pp. 269–287 (= *Selected Writings*, ed. by L. Oliver, Innsbruck (IBS, Bd. 80), 1994, pp. 644–662).

A Greek Delocutive Noun? Some Notes on ποίφυγμα and its Alleged Cognates¹

By PÄR SANDIN, Lund

Delocutives are formed with an *utterance* (x) as a radical. Common in Greek are verbs meaning “say x” (e. g., πατερίζω); nominal formations denote for instance a *person* saying x or the utterance x per se. The latter type would explain the hapax ποίφυγμα in A. Th. 280, where Eteocles says, upbraiding a group of women for their hysteria: “do not pray in ποιφύγμασιν”. If ποίφυγμα is taken as a delocutive nominal formation from ποι φύγω (a Greek cliché), the sense would fit the context as well as Aeschylus’ propensity for wordplay.

At the beginning of Aeschylus’ *Septem contra Thebas*, the chorus, consisting of the women of Thebes, is in a state of terror. They approach the gods of the city with desperate supplications and prayers, and are rebuked for their behaviour by Eteocles, its leader (182–281). Towards the end of his speech he describes how best to pray and goes on to utter:

τοιαῦτ’ ἐπεύχου μὴ φιλοστόνωσ θεοῖς
280 μηδ’ ἐν ματαίοις κἀγρίοις ποιφύγμασιν.
οὐ γάρ τι μᾶλλον μὴ φύγῃς τὸ μόρσιμον.

The word ποίφυγμα appears only here in Greek literature, apart, as it seems, from in a damaged papyrus fragment attributed to the late epic poet Dionysius (*fr.* 10v.)² – the context is too fragmentary

¹ I would like to thank Professor Staffan Fogelmark at the University of Gothenburg, Professor Richard Janko at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and Professor Donald Mastronarde at the University of California, Berkeley, for suggestions, corrections and criticisms on earlier versions of the paper. The greater part of the article was written at the University of London Institute of Classical Studies, where I had the privilege of working during the spring and summer of 2000, with the financial support of the *Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education* (STINT) and *Birgit och Gad Rausings Stiftelse för Humanistisk Forskning*.

² Classical authors and works are abbreviated as in LSJ, and cited, unless noted otherwise, from the editions listed in L. Berkowitz & K. A. Squitier, *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Canon of Greek Authors and Works* (Oxford [etc.]

to make it possible to determine the meaning – and also in three ancient and medieval dictionaries: Hesychius, Theognostus and the *Suda*. Hesychius glosses σχῆμα ὀρχηστικόν³, which may be a conjecture based on the present passage: he might have taken the word to refer to the wild movements of the chorus, which is not a bad guess: see below; cf. also Aristocles Musicus in *FHG* 4.332⁴ and Hutchinson on *Th.* 78–181 (pp. 55–56).

Modern scholars have taken ποίφυγμα to be related to the noun φῦσα and the verb φυσάω, and perhaps also to the interjection φῦ (LSJ), being a verbal noun to the likewise supposedly related verb ποιφύσσω. According to this etymology, ποίφυγμα should mean something like a “puff” or a “blow”, a sense which is unsuitable to this context. Theoretically, one could perhaps suppose that the women of Thebes are “panting” with excitement, but it would probably be impossible to find any other example in literature where *breathing* or *panting* are taken as distinct signs of fright and terror⁵. Quite the opposite: φυσάω usually denotes fierceness and/or boastfulness, absolute as well as in expressions like δεινὰ φυσᾶν and μέγα φυσᾶν (cf. LSJ s.v. I). Furthermore, “panting” is irrelevant to the behaviour for

1990³). The names of periodicals are abbreviated as in *l'Année philologique*. The following works are referred to by the author's last name or an abbreviation only: É. Benveniste, “Les verbes délocutifs” in *Studia philologica et litteraria in honorem L. Spitzer* (Bern 1958), 57–63, reprinted (and referred to here) in id., *Problèmes de linguistique générale*, 1 (Paris 1966), 277–85; K. Brugmann, *Vergleichende Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen*, 2.1 (Strassburg 1906²); A. Debrunner, “Zur Hypostasierung von Wünschen und dergleichen” in *Festschrift für Max Vasmer zum 70. Geburtstag* (Berlin 1956), 113–23; M. Fruyt, “Les verbes délocutifs selon E. Benveniste” in *Émile Benveniste vingt ans après*. Actes du colloque de Cerisy la Salle, 12 au 19 août 1995 (LINX special issue, Nanterre 1997), 61–71; G. O. Hutchinson (ed.), *Aeschylus. Septem contra Thebas* (Oxford 1985, rep. corr. 1987); R. Kassel/C. Austin (K.-A., eds.), *Poetae comici Graeci, I, Comoedia Dorica Mimi Phlyaces* (Berlin-New York 2001); F. Létoublon, “Derivés d'onomatopées et délocutivité” in “Ἡδυστον λογοδείπνον: Logopédies: Mélanges . . . offerts à Jean Taillardat” (Paris 1988), 137–54; H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones (LSJ), *A Greek-English Lexicon*, with a Revised Supplement (Oxford 1996⁹); E. Tichy, *Onomatopoeitische Verbalbildungen des Griechischen* (SAAW 409, Vienna 1983). If no further reference is supplied, ad. loc. or s.v. is to be understood.

³ Theognostus' explanation, σχῆμα [ποικίλον] (del. Tichy 312, n. 225), probably derives from Hesychius. *Suda* lists the word but offers no explanatory gloss.

⁴ C. Müller (ed.), *Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum*, 4 (Paris 1851).

⁵ Cf. Tichy 311, n. 224.

which the women are rebuked in this particular case, and when dignified with attributes like ματαίους (“vain”) and ἀγρίους (“savage”), the effect is bathos. In the previous two hundred verses the chorus has been screaming and ranting in fear, at the risk of upsetting and demoralising the entire populace (262), and moreover approached the gods of the city in a disorderly, undignified manner (95–102, 108–81 *passim*). Eteocles would hardly then upbraid them for their “vain, savage *panting*”⁶.

As for the allegedly cognate verb ποιφύσσω, most commentators and etymologists seem certain of its meaning, deriving it from φῦσα, “breath, blast”. Tichy (311–14), however, has rightly observed that the support for such a sense is scant. In fact, on closer inspection, the semantic and etymological evidence for ποιφύσσω and its cognates is utterly confusing.

As for the word-formation, Tichy (314) observes that there is no phonological ground for deriving ποιφύσσω/-φυξ- (> *^op^hūk-je-, *^op^hūk-s-)⁷ from φῦσα (> *p^hūt-sa- or *p^hūs-sa-): a guttural appears in no words of the latter stem. As for the meaning of the word in extant literature, ποιφύσσω is found in Anyte (*AP* 7.215), *Lyc.* 198, *Nic. Ther.* 180 (the adverb ποιφύγδην also appears in 371), *Euph. fr.* 135, *Max.* 101 and possibly *Opp. Hal.* 2.288 (so most mss. and the scholium to the passage). *Pace* LSJ et al., these authors do not seem to be very much in agreement as to the proper sense of the verb. In Anyte and Lycophron at least and certainly in Oppian, if we are to trust the reading of the majority of the mss., a meaning synonymous to the similar verbs παιφάσσω and ποιπνύω (“move about” a ship and a cauldron, respectively, and “quiver” in the case of Oppian) seems much preferable to the traditional “blow”. So Tichy (312–13), who argues that ποιφύσσω is synonymous to these two verbs, and that ποιφύγμα in *Th.* 280 means something like διάδρομος φυγή (cf. *Th.* 191, and cf. Hesychius’ explanation, cited above). The expression ἐν ποιφύγμασιν, however, intimately connects the ποιφύγματα to the

⁶ There is no support in any of the other alleged instances of the stem for translations like “blurtings” (T. G. Tucker, ed., Cambridge 1908), “cris haletants” (P. Mazon, ed. [G. Budé], Paris 1920), “shrieks” (H. W. Smyth, ed. [Loeb Classical Library], London 1922).

⁷ Our only evidence for the quantity of υ in ποιφύσσω is given by Hesychius (π 46) and the *Suda* (π 3103), both of whom render it short in the infinitive ποιφύξαι.

verbal act of praying, and makes it unlikely that ποίφυγμασιν should refer to movement⁸.

On the other hand, the meaning "blow" has to be accepted, *pace* Tichy (312), at least in the fragment of Lycophron, Ζεφύρου μέγα ποιφύξαντος, and perhaps in Nic. *Ther.* 180, of a snake hissing (although the phrase ἄκριτα ποιφύσσοντος might possibly be conceived as "moving uncertainly about"). γλώσση ποιφύγδην in 371 could mean either "with a quivering tongue" or "hissing with its tongue".

Part of the Hellenistic tradition must have taken the meaning as "blow". But apart from Tichy's suggestion of "move to and fro", an apparently unrelated meaning "frighten" (ἐκφοβεῖν) is also recorded by grammarians⁹. The scholium to Opp. *Hal.* 2.288 lists a quite fantastic range of meanings, some of which agree with Tichy's interpretation: ποιφύσσοντα· πνευστιῶντα, ὀρμῶντα, ἀσθμαίνοντα, κινούμενα, στενάζοντα· ποιφύσσειν ἐστὶ τὸ διαφανῶς ὀρμᾶν. Finally, the meaning φυγεῖν for ποιφύξαι is given by the *Suda*.

There is one alleged pre-Hellenistic appearance of ποιφύσσω, in the title of one of Sophron's mimes (*fr.* 49 K.-A., p. 215). Kaibel¹⁰ conjectured Παιδικὰ ποιφύξεις from Σ Nic. *Ther.* 180 παιδικὰς ποιφύξεις (or -φύξεις) and Ath. 7.324f παιδι κασποιφυξίς, but his conjecture is uncertain to say the least. The title "You will blow (scare?) your darling" is, first, unintelligible (*pace* Olivieri¹¹), secondly, text-critically unsound in dismissing the final sigma of παιδικας, which, appearing seemingly independently in both witnesses, is unlikely to be a corruption of the easy παιδικὰ¹².

⁸ See LSJ s.v. ἐν A.III.1, s.v. ἐπέχομαι I.

⁹ Hsch. s.v., Σ Nic. *Ther.* 180 (cf. Σ *ibid.* 371), schol. vet. on A. *Th.* 280. Tichy's (312) manner of connecting the two senses by a mediating one, "snort furiously" (*wütend anschnauben*) is not convincing.

¹⁰ G. Kaibel (ed.), *Comicorum Graecorum fragmenta*, 1.1, *Doriensum comoedia mimi phlyaces* (Poetarum Graecorum fragmenta 6.1, Berlin 1899), 163.

¹¹ A. Olivieri (ed.), *Frammenti della commedia greca e del mimo nella Sicilia e nella Magna Grecia*, 2-3 (Naples 1947), 104-5.

¹² One might suggest παιδικὰς ποῖ φυξεῖς; (Doric fut. of φύζω, "flee", very badly attested, but cf. Sophr. *fr.* *108 K.-A.) - "where can you escape παιδικὰς?"; or παιδικὰς ποῖ φύξεις; - "where find refuge from παιδική?" The noun παιδική is however unattested. The meaning "love" (παιδικαί = παιδικαὶ πράξεις?) would make it an erotic commonplace; cf., e.g., Longus in the preface to *Daphnis & Chloë* πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς Ἔρωτα ἔφηνεν ἢ φεύξεται, Meleager in *AP* 7.196, S. *Ant.* 781-90, E. *Med.* 633, and B. Lier, *Ad topica carminum amatorium symbolae* (Ostern 1914, rep. in the *Garland Library of Latin Poetry* series, New York [etc.] 1978), 17-18, 20-21. Tichy's (313) sug-

Let us return to Aeschylus' ποίφυγμα. Hutchinson ad loc. "expects some kind of cry" (so the schol. rec. θρήνοις, βοαίς)¹³. This may be the case. As observed by Tichy (312), Aeschylus has himself commented on the etymology of ποίφυγμα (in a way typical of his poetical technique¹⁴). As an explanation as to why the chorus should not pray in ποιφύγμασιν, Eteocles says οὐ γάρ τι μᾶλλον μὴ φύγῃς τὸ μόρσιμον. It is unlikely that φύγῃς, repeating the φυγ-element in ποίφυγμα, is coincidental.

A possible solution, not previously advanced, is that Eteocles, and through his mouth Aeschylus, uses ποίφυγμα as if formed from the exclamation ποῖ φύγω, i. e., that he is saying to the chorus: "do not pray in 'where-shall-I-run' – for none the more shall you *run away* from Fate."

The meaning of ποίφυγμα is then "the utterance ποῖ φύγω". The chorus has not said this, but the phrase is a common cliché in Greek literature, uttered by people who are frightened and desperate: cf. *A. Supp.* 777, *S. OC* 828, 1738, *E. Med.* 1271, *IT* 291, *Ion* 1253, *Or.* 1375, *Cyc.* 194, *Ph.* 977, *Trag. Adesp.* 653.42, *Ar. Av.* 354, *Pl.* 438, *Men. Sam.* 568, and also *Il.* 14.507, 16.283, *Od.* 20.43, and in prose, e. g., *Aeschin.* 3.209, *X. An.* 2.4.19–20, *Ach. Tat.* 8.2.1.

The type of formation has been recognised for some forty years by linguists. The words of the type usually go by the term suggested by their "discoverer", Émile Benveniste: *delocutives*. Unlike deverbatives and denominatives, but closely related to, strictly perhaps even a sub-group of, onomatopoeically formed words (see n. 18), delocutives are derived not from verbs or nouns as such, but from human utterances in their capacity as characteristic spoken phrases or sound-patterns¹⁵. The formation is usually simple: a common utterance is

gestion, that παιδικὰς ποιφύξιν (acc. pl.) is a colloquial expression in the accusative, "den man als 'Diese kindliche Schreckhaftigkeit!' zu dem Bewegungsverb ποιφύσσει- stellen könnte", is far-fetched.

¹³ Incidentally, οἰμώγμασιν would fit the metre as well as the context; cf. *Th.* 8, 1023, *Ag.* 1384. Cf. also *Ag.* 1672 ματαίων ... ὑλαγμάτων.

¹⁴ On Aeschylean etymological wordplay, especially on personal names, see W. Kranz, *Stasimon* (Berlin 1933), 83, 287–89; W. Schmid, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* 1.2 (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 7.1.2, Munich 1934), 297 f.

¹⁵ I use the term as referring strictly to the *formation* of words. Benveniste himself as well as some of his followers have confused matters by introducing semantics into the concept. Thus Benveniste allowed as delocutives only, in effect, "verbs formed from an utterance X, meaning 'say X'" (285). But as

taken more or less verbatim and fitted out with a suffix¹⁶. The commonest formation in Greek is a verb (usually Aristophanean), meaning “say/cry so-and-so”, which as good as always take the ending -ζω (or -ίζω)¹⁷, e. g., ἰηπαιωνίζω (“cry ἰη παιών”), καρδαμίζω (“talk about κάρδαμα”), παππάζω or -ίζω (“say πάππα”), πατερίζω (“say πάτερ”), σκορακίζω (“say ἐς κόρακας”), τίζω (“say τί”), χαιρετίζω (“say χαῖρε/χαίρετε”), and, if formations from interjections are allowed¹⁸, φεύζω, βήζω, γρύζω, ἐλελίζω, αιάζω, ἀλαλάζω, βομβάζω, ειάζω, εὐάζω, ιάζω, κοκκύζω, ὀτοτύζω, ὠζω, οἴζω, οἰμώζω, πυππάζω, μύζω, ψιττάζω¹⁹.

we will see, words formed from utterances can take a range of meanings, often referring not to the act of speaking but to, e. g., the utterance itself, the person speaking it, or some act often performed in connection with it. For bibliography on the subject of delocutive word-formation, see Fruyt 70–71.

¹⁶ The formation may be said to be a kind of hypostasis. On this type of word-formation in Indo-European languages, see Debrunner, *passim*, and Brugmann 33ff. Debrunner 115–17 anticipates Benveniste in listing a range of delocutive verbs as a separate category of hypostasis (but without coining a separate term).

¹⁷ Cf. however Debrunner 116 on ὑγαιίνω, χαιίω, and Benveniste 279 on χαιίω. On the Greek delocutive verbs in general, see also J.-L. Perpillou, *Recherches lexicales en grec ancien* (Louvain-Paris 1996), 69–91.

¹⁸ Benveniste (285) claims strict demarcation between delocutives and onomatopoeic words, or, strictly, between words (verbs) derived from interjections (ὠζω, φεύζω etc.), which he argues are “merely” onomatopoeic, and those derived from other utterances: “une délocutif a toujours pour radical un *signifiant*.” But the distinction is not convincing, since the line between signifying and non-signifying utterances is blurred (cf. Fruyt 66–67). The defining quality of this kind of formation appears rather to be the opposite: the morphemes involved are *not* treated as signifiants, but as mere sound-patterns, their semantic value having no relevance in the process of word-formation. Formations from interjections will naturally be more common, since a locution must be immediately recognised as a distinct and common utterance to form a delocutive (or, in the case of several of Aristophanes’ delocutives, the utterance is recognised as base for the formation by virtue of being uttered just before: e. g., *Th.* 616–17 – ἐχθές ἔφαγον κάρδαμα – τί καρδαμίξεις;). Commonality is obviously the case with interjections, but also with clichés such as ποῖ φύγω and ἐς κόρακας, and there ought be no formal distinction between formations like, e. g., φεύζω, μύζω on the one hand, and τίζω, πατερίζω on the other. See also H. E. Breekle, *Sprachwissenschaft* 1 (1976), 367–69; B. de Cornulier, *RLR* 40 (1976), 119, n. 1; J. C. Anscambre, *Revue Romane* 20 (1985), 169–207 *passim*; J.-L. Perpillou, *REG* 95 (1982), 233–74 *passim*; and Létoublon, *passim*.

¹⁹ Debrunner (115) observes that modern Greek contains several even bolder formations, e. g., καληνωρίζω (“say καλήν ὥραν”), καληνωρίσμα (“the

A couple of these words have been used by Aeschylus in the same kind of wordplay as the one we suggest for ποίφουγμα; cf. for instance *Ag.* 1307–8, where φεύζω (φύζω?) is an Aeschylean hapax:

- φεῦ φεῦ
- τί τοῦτ' ἔφευξας;

φῦ φῦ ... ἔφρυξας Heyse

and *Em.* 117–18, 123–24:

- (μυγμός)²⁰
- μύζοιτ' ἄν, ἀνήρ δ' οἴχεται ...
- [...]
- (ῶγμός)
- ῶζεις, ὑπνώσσεις ...

There are also nouns of this kind. Usually, they are not strictly delocutives, but deverbatives of a corresponding delocutive verb: αἶγαμα, -αγμός, ἀλάλαγμα, -αγμός, μυγμός, οἴμωγμα, -ωγμός, σκορακισμός, etc. “True” delocutive nouns or adjectives, i. e., not derived from verbs, are rarer, at least in Greek. Georges Darms, in general survey on the phenomenon of delocutivity, mentions only one Greek example, the personal name Κεϊτούκειτος (*Ath.* 1.1e)²¹. This was given to a prominent scholar among the *Deipnosophistae* (Ulpianus from Tyre) who, according to Athenaeus, was in the habit of always asking fellow scholars “κεῖται ἢ οὐ κεῖται”²². Létoublon (148) adds the epithet of Apollo Ἰηπαιήων to this category: “he whom one invokes crying ἰῆ παιήων” (cf. ἰηπαιωνίζω). Another example of a personal name might be the Homeric Hero Οὐκαλέγων (*Il.* 3. 148), who, one may imagine, would have received his name for similar reasons, always going around saying “I don’t care”.

There are several examples of delocutive nouns and adjectives in other Indo-European languages. In Sanskrit, for instance, we find for “fleeing”, “escaping”, no less a word than *kāṃdiś*, “one who says *kām*

utterance καλὴν ὥραν”, “a ‘goodday’” – see below on nominal delocutive formations).

²⁰ Whether or not these stage-directions are genuine (see, e. g., O. Taplin, *PCPhS* 23 [1977], 121–32), the principle for the “wordplay” remains the same: Clytaemestra describes the sounds of the Erinyes with the delocutive verbs μύζω and ῶζω. Cf. *Ar. Th.* 231: – μῦ μῦ – τί μύζεις; and the passage from Aristophanes quoted in n. 18 above.

²¹ *MH* 37 (1980), 207 ff. On delocutive nouns and adjectives see also Fruyt 67.

²² “Is (the use of) the word current or not current (sc. in Attic Greek)?”

diśam": "in which direction (shall I turn)"²³ – cf. ποῖ φύγω! A *fatalist* is named *yadbhaviśya*, "one who says *yad bhaviśyati*" ("what will be [will be]")²⁴. In Swedish we find *hallåa*, "female TV-presenter", a delocutive formed from the interjection *hallå* ("hello").

ποιφύγμα, on the other hand, would be a designation of the phrase ποῖ φύγω itself, not of the person speaking it or addressed by it. Thus we find in Russian the noun судибоги (*sudibogi*), denoting a speech in which appear the words "God may judge": Богъ его суди!, "may God judge him"; Богъ ему судья!, "God [be] a judge to him"²⁵. There is at least one other example of this kind in Greek (apart from the deverbative formations οἴμωγμα, etc., mentioned before): in Ar. *Eq.* 408, the noun βακχέβακχον denotes the utterance Βάκχε, Βάκχε in the phrase ἰηπαιωνίσαι καὶ βακχέβακχον ἄσαι ("cry ἰη Παιών and sing Βάκχε, Βάκχε"). We may also note that the noun ἀλαλή is formed directly from the cry ἀλαλαί, without an intermediary verb. Nevertheless, one may suspect that Aeschylus, if ποίφυγμα is a word of his own creation, would have been inspired by common nouns like οἴμωγμα and αἶγμα (cf. n. 13 above), without considering the fact that they are not true delocutives, but strictly deverbatives.

As for ποιφύσσω, a solution could be that the verb is a ghost-word, an invention of some Hellenistic scholar-poet trying to reconstruct a verb from which he supposed Aeschylus' ποίφυγμα must be derived (cf. Theocritus' στήτα, "woman" or Euphorio's and Lycophron's πόποι, "gods"). The appearance of a word of the same stem in Sophron must be regarded as uncertain.

²³ *Mahābhārata* 12.6320.

²⁴ The name of a fish in the *Hitopadeśa*. Cf. Brugmann 34, 74.

²⁵ Cf. Brugmann 34. Another interesting type of delocutive nominal formation is found in Swedish *jävlaranamma*, meaning something like "vigorous resolution", thus denoting a *quality* of the "speaker". A person with this quality would, it is understood, utter the manly curse (*d*)*jävlar anamma* (originally "devils may take" [you, it, etc.]).

Some Homeric Words

By Martin L. West, Oxford

ἄγχιστίνοι, -αι. The word occurs twice in the *Iliad* (E 141, P 361) and three times in the *Odyssey* (χ 118, ω 181, 449), always as a nominative plural. Most editors print ἄγχιστ-, and this is how it appears in Liddell and Scott; so too in the *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*, where, however, E.-M. Hamm notes that “ἄγχιστίνοι, -αι ist v.l. an allen Stellen”. In the *Iliad* passages, at least, the spelling with η is the better attested; the papyri support it in both places, as does a good part of the medieval tradition¹. It is further supported by the older grammatical sources. It is true that in the *Etymologicum Genuinum* (α 50; cf. Sym., *Magn.*) the word is explained from ἄγχιστος (though lemmatized ἄγχιστίνοι). But in the *Gudianum* and in Choironboskos’ *Orthographia* it is treated as a compound of ἄγχι, and we are told that it ought accordingly to have been written with ι, like other such compounds, but that it has suffered an Aeolic change of ι to η². This looks as if it derives from Herodian³. These texts do not explain what the second element in the compound is supposed to be. Eustathius, however, derives it from ἄγχι ἕσταναι, and states explicitly that it is written with η in the antepenultimate syllable by change of ε to η (as if anticipating the theory of *Kompositionsdehnung*)⁴. At Ap. Soph. 5.18 the manuscript of the epitome again gives ἄγχιστ-, and the word is explained from ἄγχι, but without further detail.

In modern times the form has usually been analysed as ἄγχιστ- + -ίνο⁵. Friedrich Bechtel, however, justly objecting that a superlative form was semantically inappropriate, proposed an etymology from

¹ See the critical apparatus in my Teubner edition (*Homeri Ilias*, Stuttgart-Leipzig-Munich 1998–2000).

² *Et. Gud.* 19.7; Choir. *Orthogr.* 319.19.

³ Note that Lentz’s insertion of ἄγχιστίνο^ς in his Herodian I 184.15 rests on no authority.

⁴ Eust. 531.43ff.; cf. 257.16. He points to the phrase ἄγχι ἕστηκε at E 185/6.

⁵ So, for example, P. Chantraine, *La formation des noms en grec ancien*, Paris 1933, 204 and *DEG* 16; Frisk, *GEW* I 17; E. Risch, *Wortbildung der homerischen Sprache*, ²1974, 101; Hamm, *LfgE* I 110.

ἄγχι + **stāi-*, giving the required sense “nahe gedrängt”⁶. Both etymologies assume ἀγχιστίνοϛ to be the original spelling. But in view of the weight of evidence for ἀγχηστ-, one should perhaps seek another solution.

I would tentatively suggest that the adjective is formed from *ἀγχηστιϛ < ἄγχι + ἐδ-τι-, “a sitting close together”, “a huddle”. Cf. ἄντηστιϛ, occurring only at υ 387 ἦ δὲ κατ’ ἄντηστιν θεμένη περικαλλέα δίφρον, which I take to mean “setting her chair in a sitting-facing position” (ἄντα-ἐδ-); also ἀλφηστίϛ < ἄλφι + ἐδ-τά-. Calvert Watkins, to whom I am indebted for some comments on these notes, points out that the same result (in semantic terms) could be obtained by assuming the root ἦσ- (as in ἦμαι; Hitt. *ēš-*, Vedic *ās-*) instead of ἐδ-.

Another Homeric word with a somewhat similar appearance is προμνηστῖνοι, -αι, used of people in a group going forward “one by one” or “one after another” (λ 233, φ 230). Its formation has not been convincingly elucidated⁷, but was very likely influenced to some extent by ἀγχηστῖνοι. If so, the case for the ἀγχηστ- spelling is strengthened further.

αἴισσω. Homeric αἴισσω, Attic αἴτω, is assumed to go back to **aiwik-yō*. Wackernagel argued that the Homeric spelling is influenced by the Attic, and that *αἴισσω should be restored⁸. In the Praefatio to my *Iliad* edition, p. xxx, I said that I found this very attractive, but hesitated to introduce an unattested form of what is a very common verb in Homer. Since writing that, I have found that the spelling επαυσσει does in fact occur in a papyrus at X 142. The papyrus is my 673 = P. Duke inv. 4 R, dated to the first century BC. I still doubt whether this is sufficient basis for emending to αἴισσουσι, αἴίξας, ἦίξε, etc., throughout Homer; but the fact deserves to be drawn to the attention of philologists.

αἴσ(ι)ητήρ. The word occurs at Ω 347, in lines describing the human likeness assumed by Hermes:

βῆ δ’ ἰέναι κούρωι αἴσ(ι)ητήρι εἰοικώς
πρῶτον ὑπηνήτηι, τοῦ περ χαριεστάτη ἦβη.

⁶ ZVS 45 (1913) 225; *Lexilogus zu Homer*, Halle 1914, 11; similarly Ernst Fraenkel, *Glotta* 32 (1952) 20.

⁷ Cf. Frisk, *GEW* II 599f.; III 173; Chantraine, *DEG* 941.

⁸ Chantraine, *DEG* 39.

⁹ ZVS 27 (1885) 276 = *Kl. Schr.* I 587.

Editors generally prefer the ancient variant αἰσυμνητήρι, as read by Aristarchus, no doubt on the ground that no such word as αἰσυ(ι)ητήρ is known. The argument would carry more weight, firstly if αἰσυμνητήρι “adjudicator”, “overseer”, made any sense here, and secondly if the other reading were not so strongly attested. Nicander listed it in his Γλώσσαι with the interpretation νομεύς¹⁰. Apion, etymologizing it as ὁ τηρῶν τὰ αἴσια, glossed it as βασιλεύς, while Apollonius Sophista preferred to explain it as νεανίας¹¹. Further guesses are recorded in the bT scholia and in other grammatical sources quoted by Erbse ad loc.

Although the word is not found elsewhere, it derives some support from the proper name Αἰσυ(ι)ήτης, B 793, N 427. I do not pretend to know what it meant, but it looks like the agent noun from a verb *αἰσῦάω or *αἰσυιάω, which would be based on some such noun as *αἰσύη (cf. ἐγγύη ἐγγυάω), *αἰσῦς (cf. ἰχθύς ἰχθυάω), or *αἴσυια. αἰσυμνάω, -ήτης (Doric αἰσυμν-) might be an old compound with the same first element. One wonders whether the adjective αἴσυ-λος “wicked” is related. See further Chantraine, *DEG* 39f.

ἀμφασίη. The word occurs at P 695 and δ 704 δὴν δέ μιν ἀμφασίη ἐπέων λάβε. The antiquity of the reading ἀμφασίη as against the variant ἀφασίη is shown by its adoption by the Hellenistic poets and in lexica (Ap. Soph., Hesych., *Et. Gen.*). It was glossed by ἀφασία, and analysed as a privative compound with a redundant μ¹². This interpretation must already have been prevalent in the fifth century BC, being reflected in literary expressions such as ἀφασία μ' ἔχει (Eur. *I.A.* 837, cf. *H.F.* 515, Pl. *Leg.* 636e); it would be a mistake to take these as support for ἀφασίη in the Homeric text. Cobet, Schulze, and Leaf rightly rejected the assumption of ἀμ- for ἀ-, and felt compelled to print ἀφασίη¹³.

¹⁰ Nic. fr. 125 (p. 204 Schn.); cf. Hsch. α 2130 αἰστήτωρ· [I. αἰσήτωρ] χοιροβοσκός; Συναγωγὴ λέξεων χρησίμων, AB 357. 9 ~ Phot. α 659 ~ *Suda* αἰ 338 αἰσητήρι· χοιροβοσκῶι.

¹¹ Ap. Soph. 16.8 (citing Apion); thence Hsch. α 2139.

¹² Cf. sch. δ 704 ἀμφασίη· ἀφασίη. τὸ δὲ μ περισσόν; Eust. 1123.40 ὅτι δὲ ἡ ἀμφασία ... στομφασμοῦ χάριν προσέλαβε τὸ ἀμετάβολον, δῆλον· ἄλλως γὰρ εἶχεν ἐκταθῆναι εἰς ἀπαρτισμὸν δακτύλου ἢ στέρησις, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀκάματος γέγονε, and 1515.55 ἡ δὲ ἀμφασία πλεονασμὸν ἔχει τοῦ ν διὰ φωνῆς ὄγκον, ὡς προδεδήλωται.

¹³ C. G. Cobet, *Miscellanea critica*, Leiden 1876, 404; W. Schulze, *Quaestiones Epicae*, Gütersloh 1892, 141; W. Leaf on P 695.

For Chantraine¹⁴ “le μ ne possède aucune réalité étymologique mais sert seulement à indiquer la quantité longue de la syllabe initiale”. But as W. F. Wyatt observes,¹⁵ this is “really no explanation at all”. “Why would -μ- be chosen to represent the length of this syllable, when it was not used for ἀπάλαμος and -ν- not used for ἀθάνατος?” He follows Kretschmer (*ZVS* 31, 1892, 408) and others in supposing ἀμφασίη to have been formed (from metrical motives) on the false analogy of ἀμβροσίη, and he assumes that it was already Homeric.

It is surely preferable to explain ἀμφασίη as a haplology for *ἀμφιφασίη, like ἀμφορεύς for ἀμφιφορεύς. The original meaning then was not “speechlessness” but “doubt about what to say”. Cf. ἀμφιλογία.

ἄποινα. Conventionally explained as by haplology for *ἀπόποινα, the prefix as in ἀποτίνω. But it is hard to see why this one word, out of all those beginning ἀποπ-, should have suffered haplology. I prefer to explain it as for *ἄποινα < **sm-k^woina*, “equalizing payment” (cf. ἀτάλαντος), with psilosis as found in several other such compounds¹⁶.

ἄρητός. The word occurs only in P 37 = Ω 741 (cf. Ψ 223*b*), ἀρητὸν δὲ τοκεῦσι γόνον καὶ πένθος ἔθηκας. Many editors adopt the poorly attested variant ἄρηητον. Certainly it is hard to see why ἀρητός, which should mean “prayed for”, is applicable to grief. But the weight of the tradition is not to be gainsaid; this was what Apollonius Sophista, Herodian, and Nicanor read in their text, it is what the available papyri give, and Soph. *Ant.* 972 ἀρατὸν ἔλκος shows that the usage was recognized in the fifth century. (By then, admittedly, the sense “accursed” would come more naturally to mind.) The problem is well discussed by E.-M. Voigt in *LfggE* I 1267 f. I add the observation that while it may seem natural to us to talk of “unspeakable” suffering, ἄρηητος is less in accord with Greek idiom, which applies the word only to things which are literally not spoken (ξ 466) or of which one may not speak because they are too holy or too shameful. ἀρητός, on the other hand, if understood as “accursed”, will be semantically comparable to Homeric οὐλόμενος expressing the idea ὄλοιτο. Calvert Watkins observes that the meaning “accursed” may be ancient, if he is right in relating Luwian *hīrun* to ἀρή¹⁷.

¹⁴ *Grammaire homérique*, i. 99; similarly still in *DEG* 1195 s.v. φημί.

¹⁵ *Metrical Lengthening in Homer*, Rome 1969, 80f.

¹⁶ See Chantraine, *DEG* 2 s.v. ἄ-.

¹⁷ *Indogermanica et Italica. Festschrift für Helmut Rix zum 65. Geburtstag*, Innsbruck 1993, 469f.

ἔδανός. This word is attested only as an ancient variant at Ξ 172, in the description of how Hera adorned herself in preparation for her seduction of Zeus:

ἀλείψατο δὲ λίπ' ἐλαίωι
ἀμβροσίωι ἔδανῶι, τό ῥά οἱ τεθυωμένον ἦεν.

ἔδανῶι is the more strongly attested variant, being given by two papyri, Apollonius Sophista, Herodian, and virtually the whole medieval tradition. The alternative reading ἑανῶι is in two other papyri and a couple of quotations, and apparently supported by *Hymn. Aphr.* 63, where the same line occurs (del. Ruhnken, perhaps rightly). It is to be remembered, however, that the tradition of the Homeric Hymns rests on a much narrower foundation than that of the *Iliad*, and that ἔδανῶι (conjectured by Clarke) may well have been an ancient reading there too.

ἑάνός is known as a noun meaning “dress” (Γ 385, 419, Ξ 178, Π 9, Φ 507, *Hymn. Dem.* 176; Myc. *we-a₂-no-i* = *wehanois* < **wesan-*, cf. Skt. *vásanam*). There is also an adjective ἑάνός, applied to a goddess’s peplos (E 734 = Θ 385), to a cloth covering a dead body (Σ 352, Ψ 254), and to tin from which greaves are made (Σ 613)¹⁸. At Ξ 172 we clearly have an adjective qualifying the oil with which Hera rubs herself. Metre and sense disfavour identification with ἑάνός; nor can the noun meaning “dress” be accommodated¹⁹. If we read ἑανῶι, therefore, we have to assume an otherwise unattested form and meaning, just as we do with ἔδανῶι. But the latter has the advantage of being *difficilior lectio*, as well as being the more strongly supported of the two variants. Just six lines later comes the similar phrase ἀμβροσίον ἑάνόν “ambrosial dress”, which is likely to have influenced the text of 172.

As for the meaning of ἔδανός or ἑδανός (the aspiration is uncertain), we may disregard as mere guesses the interpretations ἡδύς (Herodian) or εὐώδης offered in the scholia, though the latter would suit Felix Solmsen’s connection of the word with MHG *wāz* “fragrance”, *wāzen* “be fragrant” (< **wēd-*)²⁰. M. Lejeune’s suggestion of “proprius”,

¹⁸ The word is discussed by A. Hoekstra, “Homeric ἑάνός”, *Studia Varia Bruxellensia* 2, 1990, 101–14.

¹⁹ A. Hurst, *Živa Antika* 26 (1973) 23–5, cited and followed by R. Janko in the Cambridge commentary, bizarrely construes “the oil which she kept scented for her immortal dress”. This is ruled out by word order: ἀμβροσίωι ἑ(δ)ανῶι cannot belong in the clause introduced by τό ῥά οἱ, but can only be taken as runover epithets qualifying ἐλαίωι.

²⁰ F. Solmsen, *Untersuchungen zur griechischen Laut- und Verslehre*, Strasbourg 1901, 283–5.

from *F_he-δανός²¹, yields a vacuous sense, and if such a word had existed in the Homeric vocabulary, one might expect it to have been used more frequently. V. Pisani's explanation as "sedative" (*sed-) is even less likely to persuade²².

I think it a likelier conjecture that the word meant "bridal", "suitable for the wedding day", from the root seen in ἔδνα/ἔδνα (and English "wed"). That would be ideally suited to Hera's purpose. The IE root was apparently *wedh-, the dental losing its aspiration before a nasal²³, so that one might in theory expect *Fεθανός beside Fέδνα. But the perceived connection with the familiar noun would be sufficient to account for the delta asserting itself in the adjective; *Fεθ- would have been isolated and obscure. Another adjective derived directly from ἔδνα, applied to a garment, appears in Hesych. ε 485 ἔδνιος χιτῶν· ὄν πρῶτον ἢ νόμφη τῷ νυμφίῳ δίδωσιν.

ἴχματα. Here is another *hapax legomenon* under threat of elimination by an ancient variant. At N 71 the Locrian Ajax observes to his namesake that the person who has just spoken to them must have been a god, not (as he appeared to be) Calchas:

ἴχματα γὰρ μετόπισθε ποδῶν ἠδὲ κνημῶν
 ὄει' ἔγνων ἀπιόντος· ἀρίγνωτοι δὲ θεοὶ περ.

ἴχματα (Zenodotus and Aristophanes) is the oldest attested reading, a word not found elsewhere in literature but recognized by Hesych. ι 1151, ἴχματα· ἴχνια. Aristophanes will have taken it from Zenodotus, whom he does sometimes follow, but he must have found the word credible and meaningful. Aristarchus read the facile ἴχνια, which prevailed in the ancient tradition and is generally printed in the editions. But while Poseidon's divinity might in some way be betrayed by his footprints, and ἴχνια might be supplemented by ποδῶν, the addition of κνημῶν "shanks" makes nonsense of it. It is no use saying that ποδῶν ἠδὲ κνημῶν is a formula meaning no more than "feet" (Janko);

²¹ *MSL* 58, 1963, 81-4.

²² *Studia Classica et Orientalia Antonino Pagliaro oblata*, Rome 1969, III 160f., "inteso a calmare le cure".

²³ Cf. É. Benveniste, *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*, Paris 1969, I 240; A. L. Sihler, *New Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin*, New York-Oxford 1995, 184. Frisk (*GEW* I 442f., III 81) and Chantraine (*DEG* 312) both take the root to be *wed-, regarding Skt. *vadhī-* "bride" either as unrelated (which is clearly implausible) or as requiring special explanation.

formulae are not used in such a ludicrous way. The phrase suggests that Ajax recognized the god either by the manner of his walk or by something in the physical appearance of his lower limbs, exposed beneath his clothing, just as at Γ 396 Helen recognizes Aphrodite, despite her disguise, by what she can see of her neck and upper chest and her shining face. ἴχνος or ἴχνιον can refer to a part of the body, but then it is the sole of the foot²⁴, and again incompatible with ἠδὲ κνημάων.

Didymus knew a variant ἴματα, a word known from E 778 and *Hymn. Apoll.* 114 and applied to the gait of goddesses; at E 778 it is glossed with ἴχνη (bT and D scholia, Hesych., Phot.). If this were the only reading attested, we should no doubt be quite content with it. However, it may have been an ancient conjecture. Zenodotus' ἴματα deserves consideration, as it may have been a genuine old Ionic word which happens not to survive elsewhere. ἴχ-μα might exist beside ἴχ-νος as κτῆ-μα beside κτῆ-νος. It is not surprising if it was displaced in the main tradition by the familiar noun ἴχνια²⁵. Calvert Watkins remarks that if ἴχ- is the zero grade of οἴχ(ομαι), ἴχμα as a direct derivative could well have the meaning "gait".

The fact that ἴματα stands midway between ἴχνια and ἴματα should not be regarded as a serious ground for suspicion. In a medieval manuscript two variants may occasionally be conflated to produce a chimerical *vox nihili*, but it is difficult to imagine that this happened in the pre-Alexandrian phase of the transmission, or that the result imposed on Aristophanes of Byzantium.

καπνί(ζ)ω. This verb occurs only at B 399, κάπνισ(σ)άν τε κατὰ κλισίας καὶ δεῖπνον ἔλοντο. The evidence of the papyri and testimonia as well as of the medieval tradition is heavily in favour of κάπνισαν as against the κάπνισσαν which all modern editors print. This is the more remarkable considering that in Classical and post-Classical Greek only καπνίζω was in use, not *καπνίω. (Ap. Rhod. 2.131 has καπνιώσι, of smoking out bees.) The formation is somewhat anomalous, as denominative verbs in -ίω are generally formed from i-stems (δηρίομαι, κηκίω, κονίω, μαστίω, μηνίω, μητίομαι), but the analogy of

²⁴ Cf. τὰ ἴχνη τῶν χειρῶν of the palms in the Septuagint.

²⁵ Cf. H. Düntzer, *De Zenodoti studiis Homericis*, Göttingen 1848, 86, "Ἰχ-μα eiusdem atque ἴχ-νος radicis est . . . Quomodo ἴχνια N 71, dummodo vulgarem huius vocabuli significationem retineas, bene explicetur, me non intelligere confiteor."

κονίω “raise a dust” and perhaps also of κηκίω “gush forth” may have helped to shape it. Most of the verbs listed have secondary by-forms in -ιάω (δηριάομαι, κονιάω, μαστιάω, μηνιάω, μητιάομαι), and καπνίω/καπνιάω fits this pattern.

κλέα ἀνδρῶν. The phrase appears three times in Homer (I 189, 524, θ 73), always at verse-end. In the very late hymn to Selene, *Hymn. Hom.* 32. 18, as in Ap. Rhod. 1. 1, it is altered to κλέα φωτῶν for the sake of better metre, confirming that the κλέα was understood to have a short α in hiatus, not a long one with correption. This was also the view of Aristarchus and Herodian, as we learn from the scholia on B 115 δυσκλέα Ἄργος: (Aristonicus) ὅτι κατὰ συστολήν Ὅμηρος τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκφέρει, ‘δυσκλέα’ καὶ ‘ἀκλέα’ (δ 728) Ἰωνικῶς· οἱ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ ἐκτείνουσιν; (Herodian) συσταλτέον τὴν τελευταίαν τοῦ ‘δυσκλέα’ ὡς ‘ἀμφηρεφέα’ (A 45), ὁμοίως τῷ ἄρα κλέα ἀνδρῶν’ (I 189), ‘ἀκλέα ἐν μεγάρῳ’ (δ 728). κλέᾶ was supposed to come from κλέεα by ἔλλειψις of the second vowel, or what modern philologists have termed hyphaeresis. But the hiatus before ἀνδρῶν is hardly defensible in a formula, and it has long been seen that the original form must have been *κλέφε’ ἀνδρῶν (Payne Knight). The question is how this was realized in the mouths of the poets at the time when the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were written down. Some think that κλέε’ should be written²⁶; others that *κλέεα contracted to κλειᾶ, which then by quantitative metathesis became κλέᾶ, and that this, with correption, is what appears in κλέα ἀνδρῶν²⁷.

There is a more straightforward solution. The expected contraction κλειᾶ is attested in Hesiod, *Th.* 100 Μουσάων θεράπων κλειᾶ προτέρων ἀνθρώπων. So probably in the Homeric tradition *κλέφε’ ἀνδρῶν developed into *κλειᾶ ἀνδρῶν, which in an archaic text would have been written ΚΛΕΑΑΝΔΡῶΝ (or ΑΝΔΡῶΝ). The general preference for a dactyl in the fifth foot afforded no protection against contraction, as we see from such cases as the uniformly transmitted ἦῶ δῖαν, Πατρόκλεις ἰπεῦ, and Διὸς καὶ Λητοῦς υἱός. But it may have favoured the later interpretation of ΚΛΕΑΑΝΔΡῶΝ as κλέα ἀνδρῶν.

²⁶ So Leaf on I 189; Chantraine, *Gramm. hom.* I 7, 74.

²⁷ K. Brugmann, *IF* 9, 1898, 153–78; K. Meister, *Die homerische Kunstsprache*, Leipzig 1921, 153; W. F. Wyatt Jr., *Metrical Lengthening in Homer*, 145.

κλεύθωμαι. Ψ 243–4:

καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν χρυσῆι φιάλῃ καὶ δίπλακι δημῶι
θείομεν, εἰς ὃ κεν αὐτὸς ἐγὼν Ἄϊδι †κλεύθωμαι.

κλεύθωμαι was the reading of Aristarchus, attested also by Herodian, Hesychius, the D scholia, and Venetus A; a papyrus of the third century BC gives κλευσωμαι. Didymus and Herodian knew the variant κεύθωμαι, and this is given by a late papyrus and by the rest of the medieval tradition.

There are two features of the usual reading, Ἄϊδι κεύθωμαι, that cast doubt on it. One is that “Hades” in Homer can always be taken as the god, and does not stand for his house except in the genitive: one goes εἰς Ἄϊδαο or (δόμον) Ἄϊδος εἶσω, not εἰς Ἄϊδην. One may προΐάπτειν ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι, that is, to the care of the god, but to speak of being hidden away Ἄϊδι would be out of line with Homeric usage. Secondly, the form Ἄϊδι appears seven times in the *Iliad*²⁸, always in this position in the verse, but in all the other six instances it is followed by a word beginning with a double consonant (προΐαψεν, προΐαψειν, κλυτοπόλωι), lengthening the short syllable -δι. It is Aristarchus’ κλεύθωμαι, not the vulgate κεύθωμαι, that meets this specification.

Were Aristarchus the only source for it, one might more readily suppose that he was led astray by a chance corruption in the copy he used (though he is normally more circumspect). But a variant of this reading, κλευσωμαι, already appears in a papyrus a century before Aristarchus; both Didymus and Herodian gave credence to κλεύθωμαι, and it is registered in Hesychius, who probably inherited it from Apollonius Sophista. (He also has κλέυσομαι; see n. 29 below.) The form was clearly well established in the tradition.

But what can it mean? Aristarchus and later exegetes supposed it to be syncopated from *κελεύθωμαι, meaning “journey”²⁹. No such verb is attested, and the reduction to κλευθ- seems implausible, though Ernst Fraenkel argued that κέλευθος was a replacement of an older *κλευθος under the influence of the related root κελ- (cf. κέλλω,

²⁸ Not at all in the *Odyssey*, the *Hymns*, the Hesiodic corpus, or the epic fragments.

²⁹ ἀντὶ τοῦ κελεύθωμαι, οἶον πορεύωμαι (Aristonicus); Hsch. κ 2934 κλεύθωμαι· κελεύθωμαι, παραγένωμαι, ὀδεύω, and 2935 κλέυσομαι· κελεύθωμαι, ὀδεύσω; *Et. Gen.* κλεύθωμαι, οἶον ἴφεις Ἄϊδος περὶ ἰόντα κλεύθωμαι (cf. N 415). εἰάν μὲν ὑπὸ τὸν αἰδην κρύπτωμαι, ἔστι κεύθωμαι καὶ πλεονασμῶι τοῦ λ < κλεύθωμαι > · εἰάν δὲ τὸ πορεύωμαι, κελεύθωμαι κλεύθωμαι. (Ἡρωδιανὸς περὶ παθῶν (II 1251 L.).

ὀκέλλω), and that κλεύθωμαι here was a genuine old form, the meaning being, as Aristarchus thought, “until I myself journey to Hades”³⁰. However, the problem of Ἄϊδι remains, indeed it is exacerbated, as the dative now has to express the goal of a journey.

A lesser difficulty is that if the general sense is “until I die”, we might expect an aorist, which is what is usually found after εἰς ὃ κεν³¹. The papyrus’ κλευσσωμαι looks like an aorist, but κλεύθωμαι does not. If κλεύσσωμαι had been the original form, it becomes hard to account for the early variant κεύθωμαι, which probably underlies Sophocles’ phrases Ἄϊδι κεύθων (*Ajax* 635) and μητρὸς δ’ ἐν Ἄϊδου καὶ πατρὸς κεκευθότοιν (*Ant.* 911)³². If we stay with the present κλεύθωμαι, the sense will be equivalent to “until I am dead” rather than “until I die”.

I remain reluctant, for the reasons given, to embrace the specious option of κεύθωμαι. Ἄϊδι is an archaic-looking form, and it seems likely that we are faced with an isolated survival of an old formula containing an otherwise unattested verb form. Its meaning should have been appropriate to a dead man’s relationship to the god Hades; e. g., “be subject to, under the sway of”.

The etymology of the verb is not far to seek: it is built on the familiar old root *kleu-/kleu-*. The full grade appears also in the Hesychian gloss κ 2936 κλευσόμεθα· ἀκούσομεν, φθεγξόμεθα. The semantic connection between “hear” and “obey” is strong. There is in fact a series of forms in related languages deriving from **kleu-s-* and having the sense “obey/obedient”³³: Skt. *śrósamāṇa-* “compliant” (*Rgv.* 3.8.10, 7.7.6, 7.51.1); Av. *sraoša-* “obedience”, *sraošan-* “obedient”, especially of man’s conformity to divine will³⁴; OCS *sluchŭ*, Lith. *klausà* “obedience”; cf. from **klus-* OHG *hlosēn* “attend to, obey”. A Greek *κλευ(σ)όμενος would correspond exactly to *śrósamāṇa-*. It is an easy assumption that as -σ- became more specialized in Greek as an aorist or future marker, the present was re-made with the productive for-

³⁰ *Mélanges Émile Boisacq* I, Brussels 1937, 373–5.

³¹ εἰς ὃ κεν(v) occurs in the *Iliad* in 28 other places, always followed by the aorist except at E 466 ἢ εἰς ὃ κεν ἀμφὶ πύλης εὐποιήθησι μάχωνται, “until they are fighting about the gates”, and I 609 = K 89 εἰς ὃ κ’ αὐτμή ἐν στήθεσσι μένη καὶ μοι φίλα γούνατ’ ὀρώρη, “so long as the breath remains in my body and my knees are functioning”.

³² As noted by Wackernagel, *Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu Homer*, Göttingen 1916, 164.

³³ E. Fraenkel, op. cit. 372.

³⁴ Chr. Bartholomae, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*, Berlin 1904, 1634, 1636.

mant -θ-, perhaps influenced by the semantically close *πειθόμεαι εἰς ὃ κεν αὐτὸς ἐγὼν* "Aἶδι κλεύθωμαι means, then, "until I myself am in submission to Hades".

κλυτός. LSJ recognize just two senses for this word: 1. *renowned, glorious*; 2. of things, *noble, splendid*. This echoes Buttman's analysis: "Aber nicht bloß was wirklich und eigentlich berühmt ist, sondern auch was dem Dichter als solches Ruhmes würdig erscheint, also alles *große, herrliche, treffliche*, heißt κλειτός und κλυτός; und so wird es ein bloßes Belobungswort"³⁵. Similarly Autenrieth-Kaegi, *Wörterbuch zu den homerischen Gedichten* (13. Aufl., 1920): "berühmt, ruhmvoll, herrlich, stattlich, trefflich".

"Renowned" is certainly an ancient and common meaning of κλυτός, paralleled in the usage of Skt. *śrutá-* and Av. *sruta*. It was an early specialization of the basic meaning "heard". But other specializations were possible, as in OHG and OE *hlūd*, "sonorous, loud"; even if not inherited, such a sense might have been re-invented in Greek at any time, given the continuing use of the verb κλύω in poetry. Certain passages of Doric lyric in particular suggest that κλυτός might be used to mean "sonorous", "noisy", "audible", "expressed in sound"; they have sometimes been so understood in the past, though such interpretations seem now to have become unfashionable:

Ibycus, *PMGF* 303b ἄμος ἀύπνους κλυτός ὄρθρος ἐγείρησιν ἀηδόνας³⁶.

Simon., *PMG* 597 ἄγγελε κλυτὰ ἔαρος ἀδυόδμου, κυανέα χελιδοῖ³⁷.

Anon. ap. Hesych. κ 3057 κλυτός ὄρνις· ὁ ἀλεκτροῦν³⁸.

Pind. *Ol.* 1.105 κλυταῖσι δαιδαλωσέμεν ὕμνων πτυχαῖς³⁹

Id. *Ol.* 14.21 ἔλθ', Ἀχοῖ, πατρὶ κλυτὰν φέροισ' ἀγγελίαν⁴⁰.

³⁵ *Lexilogus* I, Berlin 1837, 93f.

³⁶ Interpreted by Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 722d, ἦ καὶ τὸν ὄρθρον ὁ Ἴβυκος οὐ κακῶς κλυτὸν προσεῖπεν, ἐν ᾧ κλύειν καὶ ἦδη φθέγγεσθαι συμβέβηκεν; cf. *Et. Gen./Magn.* 440.53 κλυτὸν ὄρθρον· τὸν τοῦ κλύειν αἴτιον; sch. i 364; J. T. Hooker, *ZVS* 94, 1980, 144f. = *Scripta Minora*, Amsterdam 1996, 479f.

³⁷ Cf. H. Weir Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets*, London 1904, 332, "perhaps 'clear-voiced,' 'loud'"; he compares the famous thirteenth-century English canon, "Sumer is icumen in, lhude sing cucu."

³⁸ Simonides? Cf. Simon. *PMG* 583 ἰμερόφων' ἀλέκτωρ. H. Roehl conjectured ἡὲ κλυτοῦ ὄρνιθος (for ἡ αὐτοῦ) at Nicander fr. 68.2.

³⁹ "With sounding bouts of song" (J. E. Sandys in his Loeb edition (1915)); "resounding folds of song" (S. Instone, *Pindar. Selected Odes*, Warminster 1996, 51, 114).

⁴⁰ Rendered as "loud" by J. W. Donaldson, *Pindar's Epinician or Triumphal*

Id. *Pyth.* 10.5f. Ἴπποκλέαι θέλοντες ἀγαγεῖν ἐπικωμίαν ἀνδρῶν κλυτὰν ὄπα⁴¹.

Id. *Nem.* 7.16 εὐρηται ἄποινα μόχθων κλυταῖς ἐπέων ἀοιδαῖς⁴².

Id. *Isth.* 2.2 ἐς δίφρον Μοισᾶν ἔβαινον κλυταῖ φόρμιγγι συναντόμενοι⁴³.

Id. *Isth.* 7.18f. ὅ τι μὴ σοφίας ἄκρον ἄκρον κλυταῖς ἐπέων ῥοαῖσιν ἐξίκεται ζυγόν⁴⁴.

Id. fr. 75.1f. δευτ' ἐν χορὸν, Ὀλύμπιοι, ἐπί τε κλυτὰν πέμπετε χάριν, θεοί.

Bacchylides (1.1) addresses the Muses as κλυτοφόρμιγγες; this need have no more to do with sound than the Homeric κλυτότοξος (Ἀπόλλων) or δουρικλυτός, but it is tempting to relate it more closely to Pindar's κλυταῖ φόρμιγγι.

Were such meanings confined to lyric, reflecting a dialect usage, or can they be considered for Homer? Some⁴⁵ have seen an instance in ι 308 ἦμελγε κλυτὰ μῆλα, of Polyphemos' sheep and goats; cf. μηκάδες αἶγες. "Noisy" would be particularly appropriate at milking-time: ι 439 θήλειαι δ' ἐμέμηκον ἀνήμελκτοι περὶ σηκούς; Δ 433-5 ὡς τ' ὄϊες πολυπάμονος ἀνδρὸς ἐν αὐλῇ μυρίαί ἐστήκωσιν ἀμελγόμεναι γάλα λευκὸν ἀζηγῆς μεμακυῖαι, ἀκούουσαι ὄπα ἀρνῶν. The expression in the *Odyssey* is assumed to be the model for Soph. *Aj.* 374f., ἐν δ' ἐλίκεσσι βουσί καὶ κλυτοῖς πεσῶν αἰπολίους, where a *scholium recens* says κλυτὰ λέγει τὰ αἰπόλια διὰ τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ταραχὰς καὶ φωνάς. We should like to think that Sophocles attached some more specific meaning to the epithet than "famous" or "goodly"⁴⁶.

Odes, London 1841, and C. A. M. Fennell, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes*, Cambridge 1879, ad loc.

⁴¹ "The loud voices of a comus of men" (Donaldson); "the ringing voices" (Sandys); "the loud voice of men" (C. M. Bowra, *The Odes of Pindar*, Harmondsworth 1969).

⁴² "In echoing words of song" (Bowra).

⁴³ "The sounding lyre" (Sandys); "the harp's loud accompaniment" (Bowra).

⁴⁴ "Sounding"? (Fennell); "the sounding streams of song" (Sandys); "echoing streams of song" (Bowra).

⁴⁵ Cf. Brunck on Soph. *Aj.* 375; Donaldson on Pind. *Ol.* 14.21; A. Fick, *Die ehemalige Spracheinheit der Indogermanen Europas*, Göttingen 1873, 124, 233; H. Ebeling, *Lexicon Homericum*, Leipzig 1885, 833b; W. W. Merry/J. Riddell, *Homer's Odyssey I-XII*, Oxford 1886, ad loc.; N. Wecklein, *Über Mißverständnisse älterer Wendungen und Ausdrücke bei den griechischen Dichtern*, Munich 1911, 30.

⁴⁶ Cf. L. Campbell's note ad loc.

Another case to be considered is the formula *κλυτὰ δώματα*. “Famous, well-known” usually makes good enough sense, and the poets may well have used the phrase with this meaning, or as a simple equivalent of *δώματα* without any particular nuance. But in view of other formulae such as *δώματα ἠχήμεντα* and *αἰθοῦσης ἐριδοῦπου*, it may be suspected that the original sense was “noisy, bustling” or “echoing”.

μυ(ι)ών. This word for “musculature” occurs at Π 315 and 324, and is taken up by late poets (Ap. Rhod. 4.1520; [Theoc.] 25.149; Q.S. 6.239, 11.189). Its etymology is not in doubt: *μῦς* “muscle” is the same as *μῦς* “mouse”⁴⁷. The root *mys-* is extended with the common suffix *-ών*. Or so one would suppose. Only it is odd that the first syllable does not undergo shortening, as in *μυός* etc. The purpose of the present note is not to solve the problem but to draw attention to the fact that most manuscripts of the *Iliad* spell the word *μυίων*, as does Hesychius. (No such variant is reported by editors of the later poets.) I do not know of other examples of *υ* developing into *ι* in the course of manuscript transmission. Normally it is the other way round, *θύω* being written for *θυίω* “furio” and the like.

ὀγάστριος. At Φ 95, *μή με κτεῖν', ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὀμογάστριος Ἐκτορός εἰμι*, Aristonicus records a remarkable Zenodotean variant. In A it is given as *οὐκὶ ὀγάστριος*, in T just as *ιογάστριος*; but on Ω 47 Aristonicus quotes it as *οὐκ ἰογάστριος*, and it is clear from his comment at Φ 95 that this is what he understood Zenodotus to have read, supposedly a compound based on *ἓα* “one”. He quotes instances of this feminine form, including the semantically close example Ω 496 *ἱῆς ἐκ νηδύος ἦσαν*, and implies that Zenodotus himself had justified his reading by referring to that passage. Two counter-arguments are briefly stated: *οὐ τίθησιν Ὅμηρος τὸ μίᾱ ἐπὶ τῆς ὁμοῦ, οὐδὲ κατὰ σύνθετον ἐκφέρει*. A third, supplementary argument appears in the note on Ω 47: that the use of *ὀμογάστριος* there supports it here.

The arguments presumably go back to Aristarchus, and presuppose that he too understood Zenodotus' reading to have been *οὐκ ἰογάστριος*. The first argument is faulty, as L. Friedländer pointed out⁴⁸: *ἓα* or *μίᾱ* can be used to mean “one and the same”, as in Γ 238

⁴⁷ See Chantraine, *DEG* 725.

⁴⁸ *Aristonici Perì σημείων Ἰλιάδος reliquiae emendatiores*, Göttingen 1853, 307.

αὐτοκασιγνήτω, τῷ μοι μία γείνατο μήτηρ⁴⁹. The second argument, however, is sound. ἰο- or μιο- meaning “one” as the first element of a compound is unthinkable.

It is in fact so impossible as Greek that we cannot suppose any rhapsode to have used it or Zenodotus to have invented it. Fortunately there is no need to believe any such thing. Zenodotus left a text without commentary, though he did write Γλώσσαι and perhaps other critical works in which he discussed selected problems. Usually Aristarchus’ accounts of the reasons behind Zenodotus’ textual variants are his own inferences, and so it was in the present case: it was Aristarchus, not Zenodotus, who adduced Ω 496 ἰης ἐκ νηδύος ἦσαν, and other instances of ἰα, to elucidate the supposed variant οὐκ ἰογάστριος. But this was surely a simple misarticulation. There is other evidence that Zenodotus’ text gave little indication of word division⁵⁰. What he intended here was οὐκὶ ὀγάστριος, with the same ὀ- as in the Homeric ὄπατρος “having the same father”, ὄτριχες ἵπποι “with matching coat”. Hesychius preserves a few other examples, including ὀγάστωρ· ὀμογάστωρ⁵¹, and Lycophron 452 has ὀγάστριος (where Tzetzes glosses with ὀμογάστριος but conjectures ὀπάτριος to meet a mythological difficulty raised in the older scholia).

The vulgate reading οὐχ ὀμογάστριος is faultless, and the recurrence of the word at Ω 47 does indeed tend to confirm it, as Aristarchus argued. Yet if it is original, what brought the Zenodotean variant into being, with its very archaic ὀ-? Some doubt must remain. Zenodotus’ reading is not acceptable as it stands, because in Homer οὐκί is not used as a simple proclitic negative, only at the end of a clause, meaning “not so”, *non item*, as in Y 255 πόλλ’ ἔτεά τε καὶ οὐκί, B 300 ἦ ἔτεόν Κάλχας μαντεύεται ἦε καὶ οὐκί⁵². However, it would be possible to

⁴⁹ Cf. T 293; Δ 437 οὐ γὰρ πάντων ἦεν ὁμὸς θρόος οὐδ’ ἰα γῆρος; B 379 εἰ δέ ποτ’ ἔς γε μίαν βουλεύσομεν. Later poetry supplies further pertinent examples: Theognis 300 οὐδ’ ὦι κ’ ἐκ γαστρος, Κύρνε, μιᾶς γεγόνηι (no one cares to be a friend to a man in misfortune), “not even to one born from the same womb (as himself)”; Pind. *Nem.* 6.1 ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι; Eur. *Phoen.* 156 ὃς ἐμοὶ μιᾶς ἐγένετ’ ἐκ ματρὸς.

⁵⁰ At H 127 it gave μειρομενος for μ’ εἰρ-, at Λ 589 Αἰαντος for -αντι ὄς, at M 75 ἀγετως for ἀγεθ’ ὄς, at Ξ 95 σε for σε’ (= P 173), at 249 allotēvi for ἄλλοθ’ ἐήι, at Π 202 μητταασθε for μ’ ἠπι-, at P 368 τοσσον for θ’ ὄσσον, at Ψ 886 ρημονες for ῥ’ ἦμονες. At γ 444 Zenodotus had δαμνιον for δ’ ἄμνιον and listed the word under δ in his Γλώσσαι.

⁵¹ See Chantraine, *DEG* 770 s.v. 1 ὀ-.

⁵² Noted by van Leeuwen, who is the only scholar known to me to have considered the division οὐκὶ ὀγάστριος.

suppose that οὐκί had replaced something else, such as οὐ τοι μὴ με κτεῖν', ἐπεὶ οὐ τοι ὀγάστριος Ἔκτορός εἰμι would be a good match for X 13 οὐ μὲν με κτενέεις, ἐπεὶ οὐ τοι μόρσιμός εἰμι.

πανόψιος. Φ 396–8:

ἦ οὐ μέμνη', ὅτε Τυδεΐδην Διομήδε' ἀνήκας
οὐτάμεναι, αὐτῇ δὲ πανόψιον ἔγχος ἔλοῦσα
ἰθὺς ἐμεῖ ὄσας, διὰ δὲ χροά καλὸν ἔδαπας;

πανόψιον was explained in antiquity either from ὄψις ("seen by all, conspicuous") or from ὀψέ (adverbially, "last of all"). The latter interpretation is linguistically impossible, and neither explanation gives acceptable sense. A variant ὑπονόσφιον, recorded from Antimachus' text and added by the second hand in a Ptolemaic papyrus, is preferred by Wackernagel on the ground that πανόψιον is "sinnlos"⁵³. But it is itself equally obscure, without having the advantage of broad support in the tradition.

The clue lies, I suggest, in the very word that Wackernagel is discussing: ἐπόψιον (Γ 42, Aristophanes' reading). As Fick was the first to realize, the -όψιον in that word is related to ἐψία, ἐψιάομαι, "take sport in", and ἐπόψιον ἄλλων means "the butt of others' mockery". We may understand πανόψιον ἔγχος similarly as "the spear in which is all your sport".

ποδώκης. The nominative ποδώκης occurs in non-formulaic expressions at K 316 and Σ 234, but in the "declined formula" that expresses the idea "Achilles" in the second hemistich its place is taken by ποδάρκης:

ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς (21 ×)
ποδώκεα Πηλείωνα (10 ×)
ποδώκεος Αἰακίδαο (10 ×)
ποδώκεϊ Πηλείωνι (2 ×)

The distribution is complementary, ποδάρκης not being used in the oblique cases. Why is this? Why was *ποδώκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς avoided?

The answer must be that when this formulaic system was created, there was no compound ποδώκης, only the syntagm πόδ' ὠκύς, analogous to those other formulae πόδας ὠκύς Ἀχιλλεύς and Ἀχιλῆα πόδας ταχύν. Similar syntagms with an accusative of respect are seen in T 404 πόδας αἰόλος ἵππος and the personal name Ποδα-λείριος,

⁵³ *Sprachl. Unt. zu Homer*, 42.

and in many common formulae such as βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος, κόρυθ' αἰόλος (κορυθαίολος) Ἔκτωρ, κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοί, Διὶ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντος. πόδ' ὠκέος, πόδ' ὠκέϊ were of an ideal shape for the slot following the trochaic caesura. Levelling produced a matching accusative πόδ' ὠκέα (for ὠκύν), as in εὐρέα πόντον after εὐρέϊ πόντῳ⁵⁴. In the nominative, however, *πόδ' ὠκός was unsuited to this position in the line, involving a breach either of Hermann's Bridge (before a vowel) or of Wernicke's Law (before a consonant). Its place was therefore taken by ποδάρκης, a word not found otherwise in Homer except as a personal name.

At some stage before the composition of our *Iliad*, but after the loss of F in ὠκέφος etc., πόδ' ὠκέος was reinterpreted as an -es- stem compound ποδώκεος, and its nominative ποδώκης became available for occasional use, though it did not displace ποδάρκης in the formulaic system. That happened in the post-Homeric phase of the tradition: the sixth-century poet of the pseudo-Hesiodic *Catalogue* uses ποδώκης δῖ' Ἀταλάντη as a formula of his own (fr. 73.2, 76.5 and 20).

ῥαδαλός, ῥοδανός. At Σ 576 the herd of cows goes, according to the vulgate reading, πᾶρ ποταμὸν κελάδοντα, παρὰ ῥοδανὸν δονακῆα. This is the text given by three papyri and the whole of the medieval tradition. ῥοδανός, however, is an unknown word, occurring otherwise only in scholia and lexica derived from this passage. There is a series of ancient variants:

διὰ ῥαδαλὸν Zenodotus (according to A and *Et. Gen.* B: Ζηνόδορος *Et. Gen.* A), also *Et. Gen.* and A^{7e}.

παρὰ ῥαδαλὸν Aristophanes (according to A: Ἀρίσταρχος *Et. Gen.*). This must be corrupt: ῥαδαλὸν van der Valk⁵⁵, ῥαδινὸν Ludwig, cf. Ap. Soph. 138.10 ῥαδινόν· λεπτόν κτλ. (but see below). Van der Valk's correction is the more plausible in that Aristophanes, as already mentioned, quite often took over readings from Zenodotus. In that case the scholium would be telling us that whereas Zenodotus read διὰ ῥαδαλὸν, Aristophanes read παρὰ ῥαδαλὸν, with the same preposition as the main tradition.

ραδανός P. Maspero 3.67331 (lemma of scholium; Byzantine co-dex).

⁵⁴ Cf. K. Witte, *RE* VIII 2225; K. Meister, *Die homerische Kunstsprache*, 18f.

⁵⁵ M. H. van der Valk, *Researches on the Text and Scholia of the Iliad* II, Leiden 1964, 44f.

Hesychius has entries for ῥαδαλόν, ῥαδανόν, and ῥοδανόν.

Dionysius Thrax (cited by Didymus) recorded that some read an adjectival δονακῆεν instead of δονακῆα; they presumably took ῥοδανόν as the name of the river mentioned in the first half of the line. Cf. *Et. Gen.* s.v. ῥαδαλόν, ... γράφεται δὲ καὶ “παρὰ ΡΟΔΑΝΟΝ”· ἔστι δὲ ποταμός. This must have been a conjecture. The scholar responsible ignored the fact that the river-name is otherwise a masculine, not a neuter.

We require an epithet suitable for a reed-bed. “Waving” would do as well as anything. Zenodotus’ ῥαδαλόν is said to have this meaning⁵⁶, and the third-century poet Nicaenetus of Samos used it of junipers, fr. 1.4 Powell γείνατο δὲ ῥαδαλῆς ἐναλίγκιον ἀρκεύθουσιν⁵⁷. This seems therefore to be a real word, perhaps Ionic.

It is not clear whether Zenodotus was responsible for the impossible derivation from κραδαίνω, οἰοεὶ κραδανόν τινα ὄντα, given in sch. bT; it looks as if there is confusion here with the variant ῥαδανόν, which appears in the Maspero papyrus and in Hesychius (ρ 21): ῥαδανόν· ῥαδινόν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ῥαιδίως δονεῖσθαι, and which should probably be restored in Ap. Soph. 138.10, <ῥαδανόν> ῥαδινόν, λεπτόν, οἰοεὶ ῥαδονόν, παρὰ τὸ ῥαιδίως δονεῖσθαι. The Apollonius entry should refer to Σ 576, as ῥαδινόν does not occur elsewhere in the Homeric corpus.

ῥοδανόν is variously glossed in the scholia and lexica, and again there appears to be extensive confusion with explanations of other readings. bT give (a) τὸν ῥαιδίως ἀναφύοντα; (b) ἢ τὸν εὐκίνητον διὰ λεπτότητα· καὶ ῥοδανίζειν γὰρ αἱ γυναῖκες τὸ συνεχῆς τινάσσειν τὴν κρόκην· (c) οἱ δὲ ῥοανόν, ῥευστικόν, κατὰ πλεονασμόν· (d) οἱ δὲ τὸν ἰσχυροκαλαμῶδη <τόπον> [addidi] ἐκ τῶν δύο. Hesychius (ρ 390) gives (e) ῥοδανόν· τρυφερόν. (a) seems to etymologize ῥαδανόν (ῥαδίως ἀναφύοντα). (b) too reflects this reading, as it corresponds to the explanations of ῥαδανόν quoted above. The verb ῥοδανίζειν cited in support is elsewhere found in the form ῥαδανίζειν (Eust. 1165.23) or βραδανίζειν (Hesych.); it is derived from ῥοδάνη or ῥαδάνη, which is a Hellenistic word for “weft” and cannot be relevant

⁵⁶ τὸν εὐκράδατον καὶ εὐδιάσειστον διὰ τὸ ὕψος, sch. AT/*Et. Gen.*; εὐκίνητον, οἰοεὶ κραδανόν τινα ὄντα, παρὰ τὸ κραδαίνεσθαι, sch. bT; ῥαδαλόν· ἀπαλόν, εὐδιάσειστον, Hsch. ρ 13.

⁵⁷ Van der Valk (op. cit. 45f.) is therefore wrong to state that it is not attested in Greek. It is also found as a variant for ῥαδινόν at Jos. *Ant. Iud.* 17.333, of slimness of body.

to the Homeric passage. (c) should not be understood as attesting a further variant ῥοανόν: the phrase κατὰ πλεονασμόν shows that we are being given an etymology of ῥοδανόν in which it is derived from ῥόος through an imaginary adjective ῥοανός, into which a superfluous δ has infiltrated. (d) starts from the equation of ῥοδανόν with ῥαδινόν “slender”. Since you cannot have a “slender” reed-bed, it is argued that the adjective is closely connected with the δονακ- part of the noun, so that the phrase means not “slender reed-bed” but “slender-reed bed”⁵⁸. Finally, the τρυφερόν of (e) seems to be a variant of the ἀπαλόν which is one of Hesychius’ glosses on ῥαδαλόν.

None of this shows any genuine knowledge of a word ῥοδανόν. Perhaps it was a real word which had become obsolete before the Alexandrian period; perhaps, on the other hand, it was a corruption of the rare ῥαδαλόν, preserved in Zenodotus’ text.

τυμβοχοή. Φ 322-3:

αὐτοῦ οἱ καὶ σῆμα τετεύχεται, οὐδέ τί μιν χρεώ
ἔσται τυμβοχοης, ὅτε μιν θάπτωσιν Ἀχαιοί.

Aristarchus, Ptolemy of Ascalon, and Herodian read τυμβοχοήσ’, as an elided aorist infinitive. There can be no doubt that this is wrong: τυμβοχοης is to be taken as a genitive noun. But what is the correct accent?

Herodian says that Crates, who read it as a genitive, δηλον ὅτι ἐβάρυνεν ὁμοίως τῷ οἰνοχόης, and this analogy is sufficient for Leaf: “the formation is quite regular (cf. οἰνοχόη)”. But the formations are by no means parallel. οἰνοχόη is a feminine counterpart of οἰνοχόος, “wine-pourer”, whereas τυμβοχοη is a determinative compound designating a specific type of χοή. The general rule in Greek is that nouns and adjectives with a modifying prefix are accented recessively, except in the case of oxytones with long final syllable⁵⁹. χοή falls under this provision, so the expected accent will be τυμβοχοή, -χοῆς. This is in accord with the text of the Syriac palimpsest (papyrus 9) and the medieval paradosis (apart from A, which adopted Herodian’s reading). Hesychius has both τυμβοχόης (so accented in the manuscript) and τυμβοχοῆσαι.

⁵⁸ This is a little more explicit in Eust. 1165.24, εἰσι δὲ τινες οἱ φασιν ὑφὲν ῥαδαλονδονακῆα, ἤγουν ἰσχυνοκαλαμάδη, ἐν τι νοοῦντες διὰ τῶν δύο, ὁμοίως τῷ “χορῶι καλῆ Πολυμήλη” (Π 180), ἤγουν καλλιχορος.


⁵⁹ J. Vendryès, *Traité d’accentuation grecque*, Paris 1945, 189-91.

Griechische Antike anschaulich präsentiert

Der Band lädt Latein- und Griechischschüler/innen der Oberstufe, Studierende und alle Interessierten zu einem fiktiven Gastmahl ein, in dessen Rahmen berühmte Autoren der griechischen Antike – von Homer bis Platon – sich selbst, ihr Leben und ihre Arbeit vorstellen.

Die Autorin entwirft durch wechselnden Redestil und Zitate aus den Hauptwerken ein persönliches Bild der Personen, das sich leicht einprägt. Exkurse zur Sozialgeschichte und Kultur bilden den Hintergrund des archaischen und klassischen Zeitalters ab. So erfährt man ebenso etwas über die staatlichen Institutionen Athens und die Stellung der Frau im alten Griechenland wie über die Olympischen Spiele und die Theaterpraxis.

Zahlreiche Zeichnungen zeigen bedeutende Kunstwerke und ergänzen den Text zu einem knappen und vielgestaltigen Gesamtbild der griechischen Antike.



Sonja Beer **Symposion**

Eine Einladung in die griechische Antike

Mit Zeichnungen von Susanne Schewe.

2001. 48 Seiten mit 19 Abbildungen, kart.

€ 12,90 D

ISBN 3-525-71002-X

V&R
Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht

Hypomnemata

Untersuchungen zur Antike und zu ihrem Nachleben

144: Martin Paul Schittko

Analogien als Argumentationstyp

Vom Paradeigma zur Similitudo

2003. 235 Seiten, gebunden € 42,90 D
ISBN 3-525-25243-9

Gegenstand der Untersuchung sind Analogien im weiteren Sinne: Vergleiche, Bilder, Beispiele, Gleichnisse, Allegorien, wie sie bei antiken Schriftstellern, etwa Ovid oder Seneca, zu einem wichtigen Stilmerkmal werden. Der größere Teil der Arbeit gilt den Überlegungen, die Rhetoriker der Antike zum Thema Argumentieren mit Analogien anstellen. Diese theoretischen Ansätze werden erstmals in einer rhetorikgeschichtlichen Untersuchung vorgestellt, die die Entwicklung der Theorie von Aristoteles bis in die späte Kaiserzeit verdeutlichen soll, so etwa die Wechselbeziehung zwischen Stil- und Beweistheorie. In dem sich anschließenden „praktischen“ Kapitel wird der Versuch unternommen, die zuvor erarbeiteten rhetorischen Kategorien in Interpretationsskizzen ausgewählter Textstellen antiker Schriftsteller (Demosthenes, Cicero, Ovid, Seneca) fruchtbar zu machen. Dabei soll durch den Nachweis rhetorischer Stilmuster nicht nur der stilprägende Einfluss rhetorischer Bildung, sondern auch die Eignung der antiken Rhetoriktheorie als stilistisches Deskriptionsinstrument aufgezeigt werden.

146: Christian Utzinger

Periphrades Aner

Untersuchungen zum ersten Stasimon der Sophokleischen „Antigone“ und zu den antiken Kulturentstehungstheorien

2003. 324 Seiten, gebunden € 54,- D
ISBN 3-525-25245-5

Ausgehend von einer umfassenden Erörterung des hochberühmten ersten Stasimon aus Sophokles' „Antigone“ leuchtet der Verfasser den geistesgeschichtlichen Hintergrund dieser Verse aus, indem er der Reihe nach die einschlägigen Texte zur Kulturentstehungstheorie aus den verschiedensten Bereichen (Naturphilosophie, Medizin, Historiographie, Dichtung und Rhetorik) sowie aus der Aischylos zugeschriebenen Tragödie „Prometheus“ sorgfältig analysiert und interpretiert, wobei das fünfte und vierte Jahrhundert v. Chr. im Zentrum stehen, der Bogen aber auch bis in die Spätantike und die christliche Zeit gespannt wird. Dadurch erschließt der Verfasser einen wichtigen, bis heute faszinierenden Gedankenkomplex über Größe und Grenzen der menschlichen Möglichkeiten und stellt ihn in seinen größeren Kontext.

V&R
Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht

Stichwörterverzeichnis

Von KLAUS-JÜRGEN GRUNDNER, Berlin

Urindogermanisch

*-h₃cn- (Hoffmann-Suffix) 89 ff.

Hethitisch

At-ta-ri-iš-ši-ia-aš 264

Griechisch

Atreus 262 ff.

Olphius 219 f.

Tydeus 262

A. c. I. 27 ff.

cohesive focalization 159 f.

delocutive 116

emphasis 31 ff., 148 f.

focus 138 ff.

interrogatives 149 ff.

irrealis 178 ff.

LSJ Supplement 221 ff.

negatives οὐ; μή 38 ff.

ὄτι-complementation 24 ff.

participial complements 30 f.

past tense 178 ff.

prolepsis 7 ff.

prosody 171 f.

second position 138 ff.

subordination 167 ff.

syllabic weight 160 f.

topic phrase 143

ἀγκάς 222

ἀγορεύω 222

ἀγχηστῖνοι, -αι 118

ἀδήφαγος 222

ἀθρέω 222

αἰίσσω 119

αἰσυ(υ)ητήρ 119

ἀκριβολογέομαι 222

ἀλκή 222

ἀλλοιόω 223

ἀλλοιώσις 223

ἄλυπος 223

ἀμφασίη 120

ἄν | κε 183

ἀνάγκη 223

ἀνθέλω 223

ἀνίη (Call.) 59

ἀνομία 223

ἀντίκειμαι 224

ἀντίτεχνος 224

ἄποινα 121

ἀποσοβέω 224

ἀπόσταξυς 224

ἀπώλεια 224

ἄρ 161 ff.

ἀρητός 121

ἄρσην 224

ἀσινής 224

ἀσκαλιάζω 225

ἀσκαλίζω 225

ἄστυτος 225

Ἄτρεϋς 263

ἀϋτμή 225

ἀφίημι 225

ἀφίστημι 226

βαβαί 226

βέβηλος 226

βλέπω 226

βόσις 227

- βρυάζω 227
 γαλαέργα 227
 γλάγος 227
 γυμνάσιον 227
 ὄδαρθάνειν 212
 δεχάς 227
 διακναίω 227
 διάπειρα 227
 διαπτοέω 228
 διατελέω 228
 διεφθιος 228
 διψάω 228
 δραθεῖν 198
 δρέπανον 228
 δωμάω 228
 δωροδόκος 228
 ἐδανός 122
 εἶθαρ 228
 εἶμι 229
 εἶμι 229
 εἶς 229
 ἕκαστος 229
 ἐκάτερος 229
 ἔκβολος 229
 ἐκείθεν, ἐκεῖθι 230
 ἐξελαύνω 230
 ἐξέρχομαι 230
 ἐπαπορέω 230
 ἐπεὶ 230
 ἐπιλήθω 231
 εὐδεν 198
 ἔχω 231
 ἐωρίζεται 231
 ἡμιθνης 231
 ἦνυστρον 231
 ἦσσω 232
 θρασύτης 232
 θυμός 232
 θυρωρός 232
 ἰδιοφυής 232
 ἴριος 232
 ἴχματα 123
 καθάρσιος 232
 καίτοι 233
 κἀναθρον 233
 καπνί(ζ)ω 124
 καρβάτιος 233
 καστερέω 233
 κατασκεδάννυμι 234
 καταστρέφω 234
 κατιθύς 234
 *κινήσια (Ar. Lys.) 62 ff.
 κινώπετον 234
 κλέα ἀνδρῶν 125
 κλεῦθομαι 126
 κλυτός 128
 κνήμη 234
 κολλάω 234
 κούρητες 234
 κράτος 235
 κυρέω 235
 κύων 235
 κώδων 235
 κωλώτης 235
 λεύσσω 75
 ληστήριον 235
 λιποθυμέω 235
 λύκος 236
 μείραξ 101
 μελίτωμα 236
 μεταπηδάω 236
 μυδάω 236
 μυῖα (χαλκῆ) 56 ff.

- μυ(ι)ών 130
 νεόσμηκτος 236
 ξύω 236
 ό, ή, τό 236
 όδός 237
 όγάστριος 130
 όλβιος 220
 όμβριος 237
 όμώνυμος 237
 όνειροπολέω 237
 όψαρτυτής 237
 παλιγγενεσία 237
 πανόψιος 132
 παρατείνω 237
 παρεκτείνω 237
 περιδωμάω 238
 περιτρέπω 238
 πλαταμών 238
 πλέω 238
 πληθύς 5
 ποδώκης 132
 ποιός 238
 ποιφυγμα 110 ff.
 ποιφύσσω 112 ff.
 πόλος 239
 πολύς 239
 πρόβατον 239
 προσλέγω 239
 Πτώϊος 239
 ράδαλος, ροδανός 133
 σαίρω 239
 σαλάμ (semitisch) 239
 σημείον 240
 σπέλεθος 240
 σπυράς, σφυράς 240
 στατός 240
 στρατιώτης 240
 συφεός 240
 σχολάζω 240
 τέλος 241
 τέμνω 241
 τέρας 241
 τραγικός 241
 τρίβω 241
 τρύχινος 242
 τυμβοχοή 135
 τυφλόμυγα (neugriech.) 57 f.
 ύπέρ 242
 ύπηρετικός 242
 φαϋλος 242
 φιτροός 242
 φρεατία 242
 φρουρά 242
 φυσάω 111
 χαλινός 242
 χαλκή μυϊα 56 ff.
 χελιδών 217
 χροϊά 243
 χρυσός 243
Oskisch
 PLÍFRIKS 1 ff.
 TRÍBUF 1 ff.
Lateinisch
 binding theory 244 ff.
 negative 66
 -āgō; -igō; -ūgō (Suffixe) 85 ff.
 hirundo 217
 -ic- 101 ff.
 imāgō 100

plēbs (plēbēs) 4 ff.
rōbīgō 98 f.
senātus 103
senex 102
uir 93 ff.

uirāgō 90 ff.
uorāgō 99

Baltisch

-a- 137

GLOTTA

Zeitschrift für
griechische und lateinische Sprache

Herausgegeben von
Michael Meier-Brügger,
Gerhard Meiser und
Heinz-Günther Nesselrath

LXXVII. Band · 3.-4. Heft · 2001

VANDENHOECK & RUPRECHT IN GÖTTINGEN

GLOTTA

Zeitschrift für griechische und lateinische Sprache
Begründet von Paul Kretschmer und Franz Skutsch
Nach 1945 fortgesetzt von Paul Kretschmer und Bruno Snell

INHALT

77. Band · 3.–4. Heft · 2001
(erschienen 2003)

G. Bonfante, <i>ē</i> > <i>ǣ</i> in baltico e in armeno	137
B. Fraser, The clause start in ancient Greek: focus and the second position	138
E.-C. Gerö, "Irrealis" and Past Tense in Ancient Greek	178
D. Kölligan, Suppletion und Defektivität im griechischen Verbum: εὔδειν und δραθεῖν	198
W. B. Lockwood, On the origin of Lat. <i>hirundo</i> and Gr. χελιδών . . .	217
B. Pastor, Lat. Olphius = ὈΛΒΙΟΣ	219
R. Renehan, Some Supplements to the Revised <i>LSJ</i> Supplement . . .	221
H. Ros, Binding Theory and Valency Grammar in Latin	244
M. L. West, Atreus and Attarissiyas	262
Stichwörterverzeichnis	267

Manuskriptsendungen werden **nur nach vorheriger Anfrage** mit kurzer Zusammenfassung des Inhalts an folgende Anschriften erbeten: Prof. Dr. Michael Meier-Brügger, Freie Universität Berlin, Seminar für Vergleichende und Indogermanische Sprachwissenschaft, Fabeckstr. 7, D-14195 Berlin, E-mail: drmeier@zedat.fuberlin.de; Prof. Dr. Gerhard Meiser, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Institut für Indogermanistik, Allgemeine und Angewandte Sprachwissenschaft, Heinrich-und-Thomas-Mann-Str. 22, D-06108 Halle/Saale, E-mail: meiser@indogerm.uni-halle.de; Prof. Dr. Heinz-Günther Nesselrath, Georg-August-Universität, Seminar für Klassische Philologie, Humboldtallee 19, D-37073 Göttingen, E-mail: HeinzGuenther.Nesselrath@phil.uni-goettingen.de. Die Zusammenfassungen werden mit den Beiträgen veröffentlicht und sollten nicht mehr als etwa 75–100 Wörter umfassen. Manuskripte müssen die deutlich lesbare Privatadresse des Verfassers tragen.

Diese Zeitschrift und alle in ihr enthaltenen einzelnen Beiträge und Abbildungen sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes bedarf der Zustimmung des Verlages. Abbestellungen können nur berücksichtigt werden, wenn sie innerhalb 8 Wochen nach Ausgabe des Schlußheftes eines Bandes beim Verlag vorliegen.
Verlag: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, 37070 Göttingen.
Internet: www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht.de
E-mail: info@vandenhoeck-ruprecht.de (für Bestellungen und Abonnementsverwaltung)
Satz: Satzspiegel, 37176 Angerstein; Druck- u. Bindearbeit: Hubert & Co., 37079 Göttingen.

Verlag und Herausgeber bedauern die durch verschiedene ungünstige Umstände eingetretene Verzögerung im Erscheinen der Glotta. Sie werden alles daransetzen, daß die Zeitschrift künftig wieder in regelmäßigen Abständen erscheinen kann.

ISSN 0017–1298

ě > ǎ in báltico e in armeno

Di GIULIANO BONFANTE, Roma

In báltico troviamo alcuni casi sorprendenti di ǎ per ě: *ašvà* (= lat. *equa*), *ěžeras eāžeras* ‘lago’, pruss. *assaran*, corrispondente allo sl. *ózero* (da **ázero*). Il rapporto con il gr. Ἀχέρων pare insussistente. Viene irresistibile la tentazione di ricordare che le lingue arie conoscono il trapasso ě > ǎ: sui rapporti fra báltico e ario v. p. es. W. Porzig, *Die Gliederung des indogermanischen Sprachgebiets*, Heidelberg 1974, p. 168. Molto saviamente scrive il Porzig (p. 169):

„Aus den vorstehenden Untersuchungen ergibt sich, daß die Beziehungen des Arischen zum Baltischen und Slavischen fast immer beide Sprachen zugleich umfassen. Diese müssen also damals, in der ersten Hälfte des zweiten Jahrtausends, eng verbunden gewesen sein. Erst viel später, nach Herstellung unmittelbarer Nachbarschaft von Slaven und Iraniern im südlichen Russland, hat sich zwischen diesen Sprachen ein Austausch entwickelt, an dem das Indische und das Baltische nicht beteiligt waren.“

* * *

Simile, ma ancor piú chiaro è il caso dell’arm. ě > ǎ. Il trattamento, diciamo cosí „normale“ (in realtà piú antico) dell’ie. ě è in armeno *e*: *eber* ‘portò’ = gr. ἔφερε, *es* ‘io’: lat. *ego*; *ewt’n*: lat. *septem*, ecc., ma alcune volte si ritrova *a*: *tasn* ‘10’ lat. *decem*; *vat’sown* ‘60’ accanto a *vec* ‘6’, lat. *sex*; *caltr* ‘riso’: gr. γέλως. Mi sembra che in questi casi l’influsso ario sia certo, come è certo nel caso di *q* > *ǎ*: arm. *ateam* ‘io odio’ rispetto al lat. *odium*, *akn* ‘occhio’ rispetto al lat. *oculus* (il trattamento armeno antico è *o*: *ost* ‘ramo’: gr. ὄζος, *hot* ‘odiare’ rispetto al lat. *odor*; *orb* ‘òrfano’: lat. *orbis*).

The clause start in ancient Greek: focus and the second position

By BRUCE FRASER, Cambridge

Synopsis: The paper undertakes an examination of the start of the Greek clause, adopting a prosodic approach with two inter-related stages. Firstly, the functions of initial elements are analyzed in terms of their prosodic prominence, rather than of any “pre-set” communicational role. Secondly, clitic words following the initial group are analyzed as placed, not in a single “second position”, but on either side of an intonation break, depending on their function: while pronouns are intonationally and syntactically part of the basic clause, particles emphasize the initial group. Even their connective functions are interpreted as dependent on this emphatic role¹.

The background

The beginning of the ancient Greek clause has two regular features: a prominent word or phrase in first position (henceforth P1), followed by phonetically light words, which are canonically considered to be in “second position”: henceforth P2. Problems of the communicational function of the P1 group are considered below. The meanings of words in P2 are notoriously elusive, but it seems possible to identify their major functions:

- 1) a connective role, which may be correlative, as at *A.Eu.* 1-2:

πρῶτον μὲν εὐχῆ τῆδε πρᾶσβέω θεῶν
τὴν πρωτόμαντιν Γαῖαν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς Θέμιν ...

First then among the gods in this prayer I honour
the first prophet Earth, and (born) from her, Themis ...

- 2) an emphatic force directed towards single words, as that of δὴ at *Il.* 1.295:

ἄλλοισιν δὴ ταῦτ' ἐπιτέλλεο, μὴ γὰρ ἔμοιγε
σήμαιν' ...

Tell others to do these things, yet do not give commands to me ...

¹ Thanks are offered to Professor James Diggle, who very kindly read a draft of the paper, and made valuable comments on its argument.

3) a sententially adverbial use, as at *Il.* 2.103:

αὐτὰρ ἄρα Ζεὺς δῶκε διακτόρω ἀργεῖφόντη ...

and then in turn Zeus gave it to the messenger, the slayer of Argos ...

4) a modal force, directed towards the verb, as of *κε* at *Il.* 9.303:

ἦ γάρ κε σφι μάλα μέγα κῦδος ἄροιο.

for indeed you may win very great glory among them.

5) Pronominals and clitic verbs also appear in P2, as at *Il.* 1.521:

... νεικεῖ, καί τε μέ φησι μάχη Τρῶεσσιν ἀρήγειν.

... she criticizes [me], and speaks of how I help the Trojans in battle.

The problems

A structural analysis of the start of the Greek clause faces a number of problems, which may be grouped under three headings:

1) Words in P1 are normally analyzed by their function: either semantically, in terms of their function with respect to the rest of the clause, or pragmatically, in terms of textual relevance or of “point of view”. These are usually discussed in terms of the structural positions of “topic”, “theme” or “focus”. However, these categories can provide a very restricted model of the clause start, where there appears to be great authorial freedom in the choice of words, and their usefulness is sometimes obscured by terminological confusion.

2) A major problem relates to words in P2, where the placing in the one position of words with differing functions may create interpretative difficulty. The so-called “particles” are especially resistant to categorization: *μέν* at *Em.* 1.1 above has also an emphatic effect on *πρῶτον*, which is different from the effect of *δή* on *ἄλλοισιν* at *Il.* 1.295, while subtleties of meaning may make any translation inadequate, as with *ἄρα* at *Il.* 2.103. Even more problematically, specific aspects of particles are traditionally analyzed in different ways:

a) individually, they have always been analyzed in terms of pragmatic function, as by Denniston (1954), Ruijgh (1971), Halpern and Zwicky (1996), and Rijksbaron (1997a).

b) their relative order within a P2 sequence is standardly interpreted syntactically, either in terms of scope or “domain” (by Ruijgh 1990) or of “movement” from within the basic clause (by Hale 1987, 1996).

c) yet their placing in P2 is canonically attributed solely to phonetic factors – most influentially by Wackernagel (1892).

3) Surprisingly, no syntactic relationship between the elements in P1 and in P2 has ever been proposed, apart from the emphatic function identified for some particles. Yet, in the citations above, the initial words (πρῶτον, ἄλλοισιν, ἀλλά, ἦ, καί) all have a close relationship to the particles following, and indeed mostly have grammatical functions too. A more complete analysis of the clause start might, then, seek to identify functional connections between P1 and P2 elements, while taking into account the variety of particle function, and in particular the placing in the same position of particles with extra-clausal, connective, functions and those with intra-clausal, adverbial, roles.

The proposal

The P1 > P2 sequence can best be described by a model which integrates prosody and structure. Rather than starting with a semantic or pragmatic categorization of the words in P1, their grammatical and textual functions may better be interpreted as deriving from their prosodic prominence, to which enclitics in P2 can be seen as contributing.

The basis of the proposal is an analysis of P2 as not a single position, but as defined by the intonation group to which the words belong: either as enclitic on P1, or (following them in collocations) as preposed at the start of the basic clause. This difference accords with their functions as particles or as pronouns²:

1) Emphatic, co-ordinating, and adverbial particles, being part of the same intonation group as the P1 word, emphasize it by adding their phonetic material to it, like affixes, so are here termed “cohesive focalizers”³. For semantic and prosodic reasons which will be discussed below, indefinite and ethic dative pronouns belong to this group.

2) Interrogative, relative, and personal pronouns, and clitic verbs, are regularly separated from the word in P1 (and any following par-

² In theoretic terms, the difference accords with that between “special clitics” and “bound words”: see Zwicky (1977). A similar distinction between “Wackernagel’s Law clitics” and “WH-words” is drawn by Hale (1987).

³ “Focalization” is defined in this paper as the creation of prosodic prominence for any communicative purpose.

ticles) by an intonation break. Unlike particles, their role is directed towards the following clause, rather than to the initial element, so they are placed proclitically.⁴ The sentence may, then, be schematized as in Fig. 1:

[(P1) cohesive particles] [interrogatives/relatives (personal pronouns, verbs {clause})]

A unified view of particle functions as prosodic focalization may seem to underplay their variety: as Rijksbaron (1997b, 12) argues, "instead of treating 'the' particles as one monolithic block in 'the' Greek literature, there is a need for studies dealing with (groups of) particles in specific dialects, genres, authors and discourse types." However, the intention here is not to deny the value of such specificity, but rather to explore the phonetic relationships which may underlie the multiplicity of discourse functions, as well as the immediate linguistic context in which a particle appears. It will be argued that this constitutes a practical alternative to broader-scale functional interpretations of particle meaning, and can describe more precisely how the words may actually have been used.

Consequences

The proposed [P1 > P2] model has seven principal advantages:

- 1) it combines prosodic and syntactic factors, so paying maximum attention to the actual linguistic form.
- 2) it proposes a specific, emphatic, function for initial elements, whose placing is entirely within authorial control, rather than having to fulfil a preset semantic or pragmatic role.
- 3) it proposes a mechanism by which initial elements gain prominence: that is, by the phonetic assimilation of enclitics.
- 4) the resulting initial prominence contributes to the typically contrastive nature of Greek co-ordinated clause linking.
- 5) it explains certain features of the order of words within P2, such as why particles regularly precede pronouns, more completely than does a purely syntactic approach.

⁴ They typically start with the *spiritus asper*, whose phonetic friction accentuates the prosodic break preceding them.

6) it shows how early subordinating constructions exploit focal patterns similar to those of co-ordinated links, by the placing of indefinite markers (τις and τε) and modal particles (ἄν and κε) in P2.

7) it accords with historical changes in the position of particles, which came to be placed within the clause, with an entirely local emphatic function.

The organization of the paper

In Section 1, reasons for analyzing first position by prosodic rather than by semantic or pragmatic criteria are discussed. A functional categorization of elements in second position is outlined in Section 2, and the bipartite model of second position is described, with analyses of the relative order of particles and pronouns. Textual evidence for the model is considered in Section 3, and extended to subordination in Section 4, where an emphatic function is identified for indefinite τις, “epic” τε, κε and ἄν.

1: Initial position

The start of the clause is always taken to be communicatively special, but there are reasons to question the canonical descriptions of topic, theme, and focus, whose weaknesses can be summarized as their over-rigid association of logical and textual categories with grammatical structure.


1a: Topic

A lexical word may be placed initially because it expresses the topic: what the sentence is “about”. Demetrius (*Eloc.* 4.199) writes of it as τὸ περὶ οὗ⁵. It is standardly associated with the logical subject, which in propositional logic usually precedes the predicate⁶. Initial placing is canonically defined as the topic position in early Indo-European

⁵ Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὠνόμασαι τὸ περὶ οὗ. His example (from *Th.* 1.24) is “Ἐπίδαμνος ἔστι πόλις ἐν δεξιᾷ ἐσπλέοντι εἰς τὸν Ἴόνιον κόλπον” (Epidamnus is a town on the right as you sail into the Ionian gulf).

⁶ See Hockett (1958, 201), Li and Thompson (1976), and Lyons (1977, 503).

languages, as by Steele (1977) and by Kiparsky (1995, 153), who describes it as preceding an emphatic, or “focus”, position. The structure is shown, with a Greek quotation added, at Fig. 2⁷:



A “topic phrase” is standardly considered to be preposed from within the clause. However, the Greek citation shows that an initial element does not always represent the topic: clearly, any phrase could be preposed, in order to make it more prominent. And the prosody here does not support a [topic > focus] sequence: interrogative τί appears less, not more, prominent than the initial phrase, which is emphasized by the intonation break following it⁸. Finally, a topic or subject does not necessarily precede comment or predicate, even in declarative sentences (as may be seen in copulative constructions, such as *A.Ch.* 554: ἀπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος simple [is] the story)⁹. Even Demetrius, who (*Eloc.* 4.199–200) proposed that τὸ περὶ οὗ precedes in the “natural order” (φυσικὴ τάξις), writes (in fact iconically):

⁷ The quotation is from *A.Ag.* 598 (“And now, for the full story, what need have you to tell me it?”). Kiparsky (1995, 154) cites Vedic constructions at *RV.* 10.135.5 (rātham kó nír avat ayat “the chariot, who rolled it out?”) and *RV.* 7.55.7.

⁸ This interpretation is supported by the metre: Raalte (1986, 186) considers that a sequence of two monosyllables following the penthemimeral caesura emphasizes a word-boundary after the third foot (here, between μὲν and τί).

⁹ Thomson (1938, 367) in fact argues that the basic word order of classical Greek is predicate-first, and that subject-first is always an emphatic order.

γίγνοιτο μὲν οὖν ἂν καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλιν ...
οὐ γὰρ πάντα ταύτην δοκιμάζομεν τὴν τάξιν

Of course the order might be reversed ...
for we do not absolutely approve the one order.

A certain confusion has, it seems, been created by terminology: in structural terms, initial elements outside the basic clause are canonically described as “topicalized”¹⁰. The use of that word to describe such extraposition is unfortunate, because it implies an association with the semantic category of topic, yet “topicalization” cannot be always semantically topical (since, although a proposition can logically have only one topic, it is possible to have multiple topicalized elements adjoined to one clause, but at different points)¹¹. Anaphoric pronouns can be topicalized, and are sometimes placed at the start of the clause, as at *A.Em.* 649–650:

τούτων ἐπὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐποίησεν πατήρ
οὐμός ...

For these matters, my father has not set charms ...

However, initial placing appears phonetically motivated: as discussed below, light pronouns regularly appear in second position, and even heavy pronouns may appear elsewhere in the sentence, as at *Em.* 199:

αὐτὸς σὺ **τούτων** οὐ μεταίτιος πέλη ...

you yourself, for this you are not only jointly responsible ...

They may be analyzed as structurally “topicalized”, but seem unlikely always to be topics, which have a unique semantic function in the clause.

¹⁰ This may be defined, following Emonds (1976), as movement to a position adjoined to the clause, with a purely co-referential link to it.

¹¹ See Horrocks (1983, 104) on modern Greek, and Kiss (1995a, 11) for references to other languages.

1b: Topic and theme

A related explanation for initial placing is that the element is thematic, and expresses known information, which has been established in the preceding text¹². Theme is often associated with topic, and so taken to create a parallel between the intra-sentential and textual organization of information: narratively coherent texts may be analyzed as sequences of “discourse topics” in which the sentence topics are embedded, and, in discourse analysis, texts are standardly seen as organized by “clause chaining” or “thematic paragraphs”¹³. However, a congruence of textual theme and sentential topic creates a very constrained model of sentence structure: a topic may be a theme, but there is no reason to consider that it *must* be thematic.

In the functional grammar of Dik (1978, 1980, 1989), topic and theme are allocated different structural positions (theme being more peripheral), so potentially giving a more subtle analysis. However, few sentences have both an element which is topical and another which is thematic, so in most cases the availability of two positions merely reduces the specificity of the analysis (an initial element may be judged topical or thematic, as convenient). Nor does the model explain the instances where a topical element is also thematic.

The two categories of topic and theme have, clearly, been of considerable value in describing function: their formulation by Dik has informed much work on the pragmatic organization of ancient Greek¹⁴. However, they have less power to explain details of clause structure, since they risk presupposing what is to be proved (that structure can be systematically mapped onto specific communicative function). Theme is an especially questionable structural category, since textual cohesion is typically marked by pronouns in second position, and themes are not necessarily expressed explicitly, but are often communicated indirectly¹⁵.

A description of the initial phrase at Hdt. 1.10.2 as “thematic” therefore seems inappropriate:

¹² See Firbas (1964, 268).

¹³ See Givón (1983), Coulthard (1994), and Kuppevelt (1995).

¹⁴ By Ruijgh (1971, 1990); Rijksbaron (1989, 1997a); and others cited throughout this paper.

¹⁵ Through presupposition and implicature: see Strawson (1952) and Grice (1989).

καὶ ἡ γυνή ἐπορεύετο μιν ἐξιόντα.

et (quant à) la femme, elle le voit sortir¹⁶.

Yet Ruijgh (1990, 229) defines ἡ γυνή here as the theme of the sentence – an interpretation which could perhaps be plausible for an noun phrase, but scarcely for the temporal phrase at *Od.* 8.55–56 which he defines similarly:

ὕψου δ' ἐν νοτίῳ τήν γ' ὄρμισαν· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
βάν ᾧ ἴμεν . . .

. . . mais quant à ce qui se passa après cela,
ils se mirent en marche pour aller . . .

Ruijgh's translation puts quite a strain on a two-word phrase, but its length implies emphasis, and the view taken here is that both these phrases are emphatic, either as part of the basic clause (as the first could be) or perhaps "topicalized" to a position preceding the clause, but are not thematic: they may rather establish a new topic, and so create a contrast with the preceding text.

More importantly, neither theme nor topic appears to be a structural category of classical Greek: there is no evidence that any syntactic position is determined by thematic factors, or that any particles mark topic or theme (as they appear to do in some languages)¹⁷.

1c: Emphasis and prosodic prominence

The initial word group in the Greek clause does, however, have an identifiable structural feature: its regular prominence¹⁸. In itself, em-


¹⁶ The translations of this and the following citation are taken from Ruijgh (1990).

¹⁷ As the Japanese theme marker *wa*, on which see Bach (1971). Bakker (1993) argues that *δέ* is a topic marker, but his definition of topic excludes both "what a given sentence is about" and "that part of a sentence providing 'given' information", so is terminologically idiosyncratic.

¹⁸ Most commentators, subsequent to Thomson (1938, 367) identify a specific initial position as emphatic. A slightly different view is held by Denniston (1952, 44), who considers that "the weight of a Greek sentence or clause is usually at its opening, and the emphasis tends to decline as the sentence proceeds."

phasis is a purely formal category, involving phonetic prominence, which may carry stress, perhaps even in classical Greek¹⁹. It is, of course, likely to have a communicative function, as “prominent” usually implies “important”²⁰, and may, in fact, imply a variety of functions, such as emotional stimulation or expositive power (Dover 1960, 32), or the marking of information as new (Halliday 1967, 204; Jackendoff 1972; Lambrecht 1994, 208) or as salient or relevant (Dik 1980, 16; Sperber and Wilson 1986, 202–217). However, any communicative function requires its marker to be prominent, which depends on the prosodic feature itself.

In this paper, prosodic prominence is described as “focalization”, rather than only as “emphasis”, because it appears to be affected by enclitics in P2, whose function is described in Section 3 below. The proposed structure is shown in Fig. 3, with the same citation as in Fig. 2²¹:



The preposing of the P1 element is not a necessary condition of focalization: the presence of an initial prominent element in practically every classical Greek main clause implies that at least some of the

¹⁹ See Allen (1987, 131ff.) and Devine and Stephens (1994, 216) on the possibility of a stress component to the classical Greek accent.

²⁰ The Prague model of “communicative dynamism” exemplifies the connection: see Firbas (1964, 270).

²¹ P1 and P2 are here matched with the specifier and head positions of a “complementizer phrase” (CP) preceding the basic clause: for the terminology see Chomsky (1981).

variations must represent “normal” word order. The functional consequences of this prosodic emphasis, and its relation to following enclitics, are examined in the remainder of the paper.

1d: Emphasis and semantic scope

A functional reason for words to be initial is when they have semantic scope over the basic clause, even if not expressing the sentence topic. This category includes interrogative and relative pronouns²². Scope position is canonically identified with the category of sentence focus, as it is regularly associated with emphasis (in English and other modern languages)²³.

It does, however, appear that scope and emphatic positions are not the same in Greek: though pronominals can be emphasized by preposing, their regular position is in P2 following the intonation break, and they appear in initial position only when emphatic and (almost always) followed by a focalizing particle in P2. In order to test this hypothesis, the 78 finite interrogatives in *Choephoroi* may be considered. If the 25 polar questions²⁴ are discounted (because they are either not marked as questions, or are introduced by the prepositives ἤ or πότερα), the 53 remaining constructions with interrogative pronouns may be categorized in two groups:

- a) In P1: 38.
 - i) With particles following: 24²⁵.
 - ii) With light verbs following: 3 (at 87, 778, 883)²⁶.
 - iii) As quantifier in a noun phrase: 4 (at 10, 12, 338, 530)²⁷.
 - iv) With no P2 elements following: 7 (at 88 × 2, 844, 858,

²² In theoretic terms, these are grammatical “operators”: that is, quantifiers having scope over the clause, or binding variables within it. See Lyons (1977, 454).

²³ See Schachter (1973), Chomsky (1976, 1981), and Kiss (1995a, 23).

²⁴ The expression derives from Jespersen (1924). They may also be termed “yes/no” questions: see Lyons (1977, 754). They comprise: *Ch.* 14, 90, 92, 112, 120, 122, 177, 220, 222, 224, 297, 339, 418, 495, 496, 526, 774, 775, 845, 894, 899, 909, 912, 1010, 1074.

²⁵ *Ch.* 10, 48, 110, 114, 123, 169, 171, 187, 338, 418, 569, 638, 703, 720, 732, 766, 847, 880, 900, 916, 994, 997, 1051, 1075.

²⁶ Of the verbs (φῶ, φής, and ἐστί), the first is not strictly enclitic.

²⁷ At *Ch.*10 (τί χρῆμα λεύσσω; “What thing do I see?”) there could be a prosodic host: Dindorf (1851, Vol. 1) adds <ἔα> before the line, to parallel *A.Pr.* 298.

- 871 × 2: all with interrogative πῶς, and 885, with τί).
 b) In P2, following emphatic elements: 15²⁸.

Most interrogative pronouns are clause-initial, in which case they are almost always followed by P2 enclitics: πῶς is the only pronoun to appear in first position without following enclitics (apart from 885, though here M has τί δ'), so is clearly a stronger prepositive than τί, though Dover (1960, 12) classes it with the other interrogative / indefinite pronouns and adverbs. It is phonetically different from the others in having a long closed syllable.

Because clause-initial placing does not otherwise occur without following particles, it appears that emphasis there is associated with the presence of the P2 particles, and that interrogatives are in P1 only when emphatic, even though that is their most common position (as would be expected for pragmatic reasons).

1e: The contrastive function of emphasis: interrogatives

This interpretation accords with the common placing of emphatic words preceding interrogative pronouns, observed by Thomson (1939) in over 400 Attic constructions. Thomson identifies a number of contexts:

- 1) When one of the clauses in a μέν-δέ construction is interrogative, as at S.O^T 1232–3:

λείπει μὲν οὐδ' ἄ πρόσθεν ἤδεμεν τὸ μὴ οὐ
 βαρύστον εἶναι· πρὸς δ' ἐκείνοισιν τί φῆς;

What we knew before does not fall short by
 not being lamentable: and **in addition to that**, what can you say?

and A.Ag. 598 (also cited in Figs. 2 and 3):

καὶ νῦν τὰ μάσσῳ μὲν τί δεῖ σ' ἐμοὶ λέγειν;

And **now the full story**, what need have you to tell me it?

- 2) When a word is repeated, by one speaker or in a stichomythic exchange, as at A.Eu. 94:

εὐδοῖτ' ἄν, ὡή· καὶ καθευδουσῶν τί δεῖ;

²⁸ Ch. 179, 214, 216, 218, 256, 315, 394, 408, 528, 532, 594, 778, 855, 899, 925.

Do sleep on, hey – and of **sleeping**, what need is there?

3) When there is a shift of emphasis between speakers in dialogue, as *Ar.Ra.* 1430:

εὖ γ', ᾧ Πόσειδον. **σὺ** δὲ τίνα γνώμην ἔχεις;

Brilliant, by Poseidon. And as for **you**, what is your opinion?

Or a change of emphasis between ideas, as *A.Ch.* 924–5:

ὄρα, φύλαξαι μητρὸς ἐγκότους κύνας.
τάς τοῦ πατρὸς δὲ πῶς φύγω παρεῖς τάδε;

(Clyt.) Look, watch out for your mother's spiteful hounds.

(Or.) **Those of my father**, how may I escape them, neglecting this?

Intra-sentential contrast is also associated with the same pattern, as at *E.Cyc.* 525:

θεὸς δ' ἐν **ἀσκῶ** πῶς γέγηθ' οἴκους' ἔχων;

But a **god** in a **wineskin**, how can he be happy to have his home there?

Thomson identifies other functions: to mark stages in an interrogation, to make an objection, or to recall something in the previous text. Metrical convenience cannot be the explanation, as the pattern occurs in Plato too, as at *Cri.* 44a⁹²⁹:

ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;

What was it, the dream?

The use of this construction to express emphasis suggests that P2 is the regular position for interrogatives, and that they appear first in the clause only by being emphasized, in which case they are usually followed by particles, as at *A.Ag.* 1286:

τί **δῆτ'** ἐγὼ κάτοιικτος ᾧδ' ἀναστένω;

Why **then** do I make this pitiful lament?

and *Ag.* 1643–4:

τί **δῆ** τὸν ἄνδρα τόνδ' ἀπὸ ψυχῆς κακῆς
οὐκ αὐτὸς ἠνάριζες, ἀλλὰ σὺν γυνή ...

²⁹ Thomson (1939, 151) cites other Platonic examples at *R.* 349b, *Cra.* 388a, *Ap.* 20c.

Why **then** with your cowardly heart did you not
yourself kill this man ...

Both types of construction express an adversative force: all Thomson's citations involve a contrast with the preceding text (which is mediated through the choice of initial element), while interrogatives placed initially either introduce a new line of argument (as at *Ag.* 1286 above) or raise an objection in dialogue (as at 1643).

This paper argues that prosodic prominence is a regular feature of declarative as well as interrogative clauses, for similar communicational reasons, and that it is amplified by the presence of enclitics in P2. Initial words, therefore, cannot be analyzed adequately without considering their syntactic relationship with words in P2. The functions of these words are summarized in the next section.

2a: P2

The regular presence of grammatical words in P2 is associated with languages having largely free word order, including many early Indo-European languages, which suggests that the position has a regular syntactic function. The variety of roles of words in P2 may be summarized in four main categories, and it will be shown below that these have a systematic relationship with the P1 element:

1) Linking. A connective function is implied in the term σύνδεσμος (conjunction), applied by Aristotle (*Rh.* 1407a20) to μέν and δέ. Aristotle (*Po.* 1456b36–1457a4) identifies two features, a lack of denotative meaning and a postpositive placing, in his definition of σύνδεσμος as φωνῆ ἄσημος ἢ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν πεφυκυῖαν συντίθεσθαι (a sound without meaning which neither hinders nor causes the formation of a single sound or phrase from several sounds), which is not put at the beginning of a phrase which is by itself (ἦν μὴ ἀρμόττει ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγου τιθέσθαι καθ' αὐτόν)³⁰. The qualification seems to allow clause-initial placing within a complex sentence, which has been observed in other languages too³¹. The linking function is subcategorized by Denniston (1954) as addi-

³⁰ *Po.* 1456b38–1457a10 is marked by Kassel (1965) as “corrupta et confusa”, but the general sense may be discerned.

³¹ See Hock (1996, 202ff.) on Vedic Sanskrit. Simpson (1991, 69) notes a similar feature in the Australian “free word order” language Warlpiri, where auxiliaries normally appearing in P2 occur clause-initially in connected speech.

tional (καί), adversative (μὲν οὖν, ἀλλά, δέ, μήν), confirmatory (γάρ), or inferential (τῷ, τοιγάρ, οὖν, ἄρα), though, as noted below, functions cannot be systematically matched with individual particles.

2) Adverbial. Some words, which Demetrius (*Eloc.* 2.55.1) terms παραπληρωματικοὶ σύνδεσμοι (expletive conjunctions), seem to have a primarily stylistic function within the clause, by virtue of their position, ἀρκτικὸς γὰρ τεθεὶς ὁ σύνδεσμος καὶ ἀποσπάσας τῶν προτέρων τὰ ἐχόμενα μεγαλειῶν τι εἰργάσατο (“for, as the conjunction is set initially and separates what follows from what precedes, it creates a certain dignity”: Demetr.*Eloc.* 2.56.4–5). Demetrius’s examples include δῆ, νυ, πρότερον, φεῦ, and even ποῖόν τί ἐστιν, so comprising orthotonic words as well as enclitics, though this paper concentrates on the latter.

As well as Demetrius’s μεγαλειῶν τι, words like “subtlety”, “nuance”, “elusive”, “colour”, and “bouquet” have been used to describe this group³², as they have the most delicate shades of meaning. They are subcategorized by Denniston (1954, xxxvi–xl) as affirmative, intensive, determinative, and limitative particles. Perhaps surprisingly, they cannot be grouped in a binary division between adverbials with scope over one word, and those with clausal scope (which may be called sentence adverbs), because many can be interpreted as being in both categories. It will be argued below that all adverbials belong to the same semantic group: the focalizers. Further, they share features with the connectives, which are also παραπληρωματικοί, and it may be noted that Aristotle (*Po.* 1456b36–1457a4) appears to view the category of σύνδεσμος as including adverbials, as he gives as examples δῆ and τοι, as well as μὲν and δέ. Connectives and adverbials constitute what are now generally termed “particles”, though this does not correspond to ancient use³³.

3) Anaphoric textual reference. Bergaigne (1877) and Delbrück (1878) described second position as the natural place or *Haus* of pronominals as well as of connective particles. Bergaigne (1877, 177–178) suggested that anaphoric pronouns come as early as possible in the sentence because, like conjunctions, they have a linking function, and that first and second personal pronouns are placed there by

³² These epithets are used by Denniston (1954) and Smyth (1956).

³³ The terms μόριον and *particula* were applied by the ancient grammarians to phonetically light words, including lexical ones, rather than only to particles. For references, see Schenkeveld (1988), and, for a historical overview, Sluiter (1997).

analogy. However, an argument by analogy seems incomplete: pronouns might be placed in P2 for purely phonetic reasons, or for reasons of syntactic scope (discussed in Section 1d above).

4) Scope. As noted above, pronominals may be placed early because they have scope over the clause. Similarly, Wackernagel (1892, 34–5) pointed out that clitic verbs (which also have scope over their clause) are regularly placed in P2 in early Greek, and Hock (1982) observes the same feature in Vedic. It may be noted that an element placed in P2 for reasons of scope over a clause is likely to belong to the same intonation group as that clause, rather than to the initial emphatic group, so verb placing in P2 rather than P1 may have more than just prosodic motivation (as assumed by Anderson 1993, and Adams 1994b). However, scope is clearly less important than morphology, because, as inflections became more complex over time, so verbs came to be placed within the clause (and, in classical Greek, often clause-finally).

As no functional motivation appeared to explain why all types are placed in the same position, Wackernagel (1892) attributed their placing in P2 (to which he famously gave the status of *ein Gesetz*) to prosody, by defining P2 words in terms of their lack of accent, and so concentrating on the position itself as attracting all the light elements in categories 1–4 above³⁴. Dik (1980, 23) identifies P2 as the preferred placing for pronominals in a similar way, on the basis of word size. Both criteria identify a phonetic phenomenon, but do not give a complete explanation³⁵. However, both imply a contrast with the element in P1, which is therefore the more prominent. Consequently, even a purely prosodic analysis has a communicative implication.

The relative ordering of words in P2 collocations may shed light on the relations between their position and function, and some recent discussions have, consequently, concentrated on the internal details of the P2 “string”, in Vedic (Hock 1982, 1996; Hale 1987, 1996; Schäufele 1996), Hittite (Luraghi 1998), and Homeric and Koiné Greek (Ruijgh 1990, Wills 1993, Taylor 1996). The two principal syntactic approaches are evaluated in the next section.

³⁴ For a discussion of his model, see Anderson (1993).

³⁵ Mallinson and Blake (1981, 151) combine Dik’s explanation with a pragmatic one, based on theme-first, but reasons not to accept that have been adduced above, in Section 1b.

2b: Function and order in P2 collocations

It was observed by Delbrück (1900, 51) that, in early Greek, connectives precede pronouns³⁶, and Denniston (1954, lx) notes that sentence adverbials usually follow connectives. A more comprehensive ordering is proposed by Ruijgh (1990, 223) for Homeric particle clusters:

- 1) Adverbials with single-word scope (περ, γε, μά, μάν, μέν).
- 2) Preparatory co-ordinating connectives (μέν, τε).
- 3) Connectives (δέ, γάρ, τε, μέν).
- x) (Ruijgh does not discuss the placing of interrogatives and relatives, but others have suggested that they appear in this position: see Hale 1987, 42; Wills 1993, 72).
- 4) Sentence adverbials (ἄρα > νυ, epic τε > κε, ἄν > θην, οὖν > δή > αὖ).
- 5) "One or two" indefinite pronouns or adverbs (not identified).
- 6) Personal pronouns.

Ruijgh (1990, 217) explains this sequence in terms of increasing syntactic domain (which appears equivalent to scope), in that "un postpositif suit immédiatement le mot initial de la séquence qui constitue son domaine", so, in a complex sentence at *Il.* 3.396–8, the postpositives are ordered by increasing domain, with the connective τ' at 398 preceding the adverbial ἄρ' whose domain is the whole line (θάμβησέν ... ὀνόμαζε), while τ' has scope only over the first clause (θάμβησέν ... ἔπειτα):

καί ῥ' [(ὡς οὖν ἐνόησε θεᾶς περικαλλέα δειρὴν
 στήθεά θ' ἰμερόεντα καὶ ὄμματα μαρμαίροντα,
 θάμβησέν τ' ἄρ' ἔπειτα, ἔπος τ' ἔφατ', ἔκ τ' ὀνόμαζε] ...

And then, [(as she recognized the round sweet throat of the goddess
 and her desirable breasts and her eyes that were full of shining,
 she then (both wondered, and spoke a word, and called her by name)] ...

Organization by increasing domain apparently has some validity, since it suggests why particles which have scope over single words (like γε, περ, and adverbial ὡς) precede others in collocations. The position of preparatory linking particles may also be explained by

³⁶ Watkins (1964, 130ff.) generalizes that feature as common to all early Indo-European languages.

their domain: *μέν* and *τε* (in *τε καί*) precede other connectives because their function is limited to the first clause of a compound sentence, while a connective like *γάρ* has scope over both. Ruijgh (1990, 218) infers this from the use of *μέν γάρ* in constructions like *Il.* 11.824–6³⁷:

οἱ **μέν γάρ** δὴ πάντες, ὅσοι πάρος ἦσαν ἄριστοι
 ἐν νηυσὶ κέαται βεβλημένοι οὐτάμενοί τε
 χειρσὶν ὑπο Τρώων· τῶν **δὲ** σθένος ὄρνυται αἰέν.

For [all of those who were before the bravest in battle
 are lying up among the ships with arrow or spear wounds
 under the hands of the Trojans – and their strength is forever increasing].

However, a principle of increasing domain does not explain the standard sequence, decreasing in scope, of [indefinite > personal pronoun], as at *Il.* 4.245³⁸:

... ἐστᾶσ', οὐδ' ἄρα **τίς σφι** μετὰ φρεσὶ γίγνεται ἀλκή.

(connective > adverbial > indefinite > personal pronoun)
 ... stand still, and there is no heart of courage within them?

Nor does it explain the decreasing sequence of *δ'* and *ἄρα* at *Il.* 5.47:

ἦριπε δ' ἐξ ὀχέων, στυγερός **δ' ἄρα μιν** σκότος εἶλε.

(connective > adverbial > personal pronoun)
 and he dropped from the chariot, and the hateful darkness took hold of him.

Ruijgh's ordering has other features which are either over-rigid or ambiguous: *μέν* and *τε* are categorized twice, while *ἄρα* and *νυ* sometimes follow *δή* (as Ruijgh 1990, 225 allows), and the categorizations of *γάρ* as connective only and *οὖν* as adverbial only do not capture their full range of function.

Position by syntactic domain does not, therefore, give a full description. An alternative analysis of P2 in terms of word movement has been suggested for Vedic by Hale (1987), who proposes that sentence adverbials follow connectives because they are enclitic to P1

³⁷ Wills (1993) adopts a similar analysis, observing that particles which emphasize single words are normally adjacent to them, so precede connectives and sentence adverbs. His examples are *γε* and *περ*, and he notes that *μέν*, *δή* and *νυ* may be placed in the same position.

³⁸ Although *τίς* is here an adjective, it occupies the same position as a pronominal.

as defined after the preposing of interrogatives or relatives, but before the emphasizing of lexical words, while connectives are, as it were, “inserted” last, as discourse rather than sentential elements, and so precede question words. Emphatics are “cliticized to the constituent they will emphasize, and . . . following this the emphasized element can be topicalized” (Hale 1987, 46).

This model is formalized by Hale (1996) in terms of a topic phrase and a focus phrase (the latter being the position for pronominals and adverbials). The sequence accords with the observed order [emphatic > connective > interrogative pronoun > adverbial], so agrees with the collocation sequence more closely than does Ruijgh’s principle. However, it is inadequate in two respects: it does not match the prosody, and Hale (1996, 178) admits to being “not entirely comfortable with ‘focus’ as a general name for that function”; and secondly, it is uninformative: no explanation is given of why emphatic preposing should occur after that of relatives, or why indefinites should precede demonstratives.

In addition, neither Ruijgh’s nor Hale’s model explains the great variety of particle function. A more general explanation, which takes account of the prosody as well as the syntax, seems to be required. Yet the two aspects are normally held (as by Halpern 1995, 192 and Hock 1996, 202) to be quite separate, and, of the P2 enclitics, only the emphatics are considered to have a syntactic as well as a prosodic link with their host words.

An influential attempt to overcome this problem was made by Halpern (1995), who proposed that P2 elements are structurally the leftmost elements (adjoined to the basic clause), but are placed in P2 by a prosodic “flip”, which forces an enclitic to move one place rightwards if it lacks a prosodic host (i. e. if there is an intonation break to its left). In Halpern’s view, a phrase can be in P1 only if it is preposed, but a single word in P1 results from an automatic “prosodic inversion” with the enclitic. The functional difference is that only the first, phrasal, construction involves pragmatic motivation. However, it has subsequently been suggested (by Hock 1996, Taylor 1996) that phrases as well as single words can undergo prosodic inversion.

The “prosodic flip” of Halpern is ingenious, but is, as he admits (1995, 67), “a sort of last-resort measure” to stitch together the syntax and the prosody. It will be argued in the next section that they have a more substantive relationship, and that the prosody in fact closely mirrors the syntax.

2c: *The cohesive focalizer/operator division*

The interpretative problem may be solved by the proposal that not only emphatics, but also connectives, adverbials and indefinite pronouns have a syntactic relationship with their prosodic host. All function as “cohesive” particles, and should be analyzed differently from (interrogative / relative) pronouns and clitic verbs.

The whole sentence may then be schematized as in Fig. 1 above, repeated here as Fig. 5, where the P1 intonational group is separate from the main clause, and “second position” is defined, not as a regular syntactic position (which seems an inappropriate description for clitic placing), but as the position of elements at either side of the intonation break which normally separates the P1 group from the clause³⁹:

[{P1} cohesive particles] [interrogatives/relatives (personal pronouns, verbs {clause})]

This interpretation predicts an ordering within particle collocations which differs from the canonical one in two principal respects:

1) Adverbials which can have sentential scope (ἄρα, νυ, epic τε, θην, οὖν, δῆ, αὖ) and the modal particles κε and ἄν form part of the initial intonational group.

2) Indefinite pronouns are also part of the initial group, rather than being placed with the interrogatives. Dative pronominals like τοῦ also function cohesively, with the initial group⁴⁰.

The regular intonation break enables differences in position to be clearly identified, including the distinction between indefinite and interrogative pronouns: interrogatives are preceded by a break, while indefinites are not. However, as τις cannot be used indefinitely without a prosodic host, there may on occasion be interpretative ambiguity: Dover (1960, 12–13) questions whether A.Ag. 1344 (σίγα· τίς πληγῆν ἀϋτεῖ καιρίως οὐτασμένους; Silence: who/someone tells of a blow, mortally wounded) is really a question or an indefinite statement. Any

³⁹ Of course, phonetic factors may eliminate the break, as in the citation from A.Eu. 1.1 at the start of this paper, where there is no discernable pause between μέν and εὐχῆ.

⁴⁰ Liddell and Scott (1968, 1801) suggest that its function corresponds to focal stress in English. Horrocks (1990, 39) notes that μοι, too, may be placed next to the most emphatic sentence constituent, rather than to its governing verb (as at X.Ath. 3.10 and D. 37.23).

ambiguity here depends on the presence or absence of an intonation break: at *Ag.* 449, *τις* is truly enclitic to *σίγα*, with no intonation break, so the indefinite meaning is unambiguous⁴¹:

τάδε σίγά τις βαύζει ...

these things someone mutters in a whisper ...

The semantic basis underpinning the prosodic difference is considered below in Section 4, in discussing constructions where *τις* is enclitic on the relative pronoun *ὅς*.

It might be objected that a prosodic division after the cohesive focalizers does not correspond to syntactic domain: after all, emphatics have a single-word domain, connectives link two clauses, and adverbs may modify a verb or a whole clause. This is what prosodic interpretations like those of Hock (1996) and Taylor (1996) assume. However, it is argued here that emphatics and connectives have the same domains, and that the same can be attributed to other adverbials.

This is because, in all cases, their scope can be interpreted as local, and limited to their prosodic host. Enclitic particles may be seen as functioning like affixes (and indeed the boundary between the two is indeterminate, since many words like *τις* and *δέ* may function as either). As Cervin (1990, 59–65) notes, particles have a regular emphatic effect on constituents to their left (or complex constituents in which they appear late). Assimilation in a larger morphological unit is a general feature of particles, which may be seen in their capacity to function as affixes (*δέ*: *οικόνδε*, *ὄδε*, *ἡδέ*; *δή*: *ἐπειδή*; and *τε*: *ὅστε*), or to have affixes added (*δητα*), or indeed to be composed of other particles (*γάρ* < *γε* + *ἄρα*, *ἄρα* < *ἦ* + *ἄρα*, *γούν* < *γε* + *οὖν*).

The more conventional notion of domain is therefore inappropriate. It is structurally more likely that emphatic, connective, and adverbial particles have similar placing, though the syntactic domain of each appears quite different, because they all function in the same way: by creating a unified prosodic group centred on a focalized word in P1. The proposed mechanism is described in the next section.

⁴¹ The position of *τις* as third word implies that *τάδε* is “topicalized” outside the clause.

2d: The mechanism of "cohesive focalization"

The functions of grammatical words are rarely considered phonologically. Conjunctions are usually described simply by their communicational roles: as "signals" (Hockett 1958, 153–4), "markers" (Matthews 1981, 60–69), or "co-ordinators" (Quirk *et al.* 1985, 918–1007). However, it is reasonable to suppose that function has a relation with form, and this is most clearly so in the case of emphatic elements, which tend to be phonetically prominent.

It is proposed here that the connective function is also a kind of emphasis, because, just as a flag attracts attention by being physically prominent, so connectives also function, by making a contiguous element phonetically prominent. The mechanism has four principal aspects:

1) *Phonetic*. The cohesive focalizers function by adding their weight to the prosodic host, and marking it off prosodically from the following intonation group. This has an emphatic effect, which is inherently short-range (no particle emphasizes a preceding sentence).

2) *Contrastive*. The word in P2 is consequently also prominent in comparison with the preceding text. Its meaning is therefore marked as important or new.

3) *Textual*. The prominent element also introduces the new proposition of which it is a part. If it is a referring expression, it introduces a new referent into the discourse, and so may (though not necessarily) express the new topic. If it is a grammatical word, it expresses the syntactic and pragmatic status of the new clause⁴².

4) *Structural*. In subordinated constructions, the relative pronoun may be focalized by an indefinite affix. This appears to strengthen the inter-clausal link by substituting textual reference for definite, real-world, reference. Connections between indefinite reference, indirect interrogation, and focalization are discussed below in Section 4.

The introductory function of (3) above explains a regular feature of Greek clause linking: the presence at the clause join of a prominent element. When the conjunction is in P2, the link is pragmatically contrastive, because information in the second clause precedes the conjunction. This explains the typically adversative character of classical Greek co-ordination, and also the association of focus with new information, noted above in Section 1c: the word highlighted in con-

⁴² The focalization of the article of a noun phrase, then, marks specificity, though not the specific reference: see Section 3b below on *μὲν γάρ*.

trast with the preceding text is likely to bring a new fact or perspective to the discourse. If this initial element is itself a grammatical word (ἤ, καί, ἀλλά preposed τί, and so on), it highlights the syntactic relation between the clauses, so creating a purely structural, though still contrastive, link⁴³.

In sum, a prominent word is needed to mark the clause link, but the pragmatic effect varies according to the word selected, as much as to the particle itself. Focalization is, in pragmatic terms, epiphenomenal: it is not the presentation of any particular category of information, but the intensification of the presentation of (potentially) any category: it could be described as a framing device⁴⁴. Prosodic emphasis creates pragmatic emphasis, whose function depends on the choice of P1 element, as well as of the particle.

3a: Syllabic weight

It is not proposed here that the prosodic effect of particles is proportional to their weight, in terms of vowel length and number of consonants. All are light words, and shorter syllables do not necessarily imply a weaker effect: the insertion of an extra syllable, of whatever quantity, makes a difference to the sentence prosody, by separating the P1 element from the rest of the clause. Rather than being an intrinsic effect, focalization depends on the phonetic characteristics of the P1 element too: following a light element, collocations of particles are common, as with the μὲν γάρ sequence discussed in section 3b below, and a mere accentual change (that is, a difference of emphasis) creates the radical semantic difference between οὐκ οὖν and οὐκοῦν.

However, its phonetic qualities may have some effect on a particle's function⁴⁵. The factors which could be involved are vowel length and openness, and the presence of a final consonant:

⁴³ The importance of such adversative function is observed by Slings (1997) and Jacquiod (1997), in studies of orthotonic conjunctions and P1 > P2 sequences. Slings examines ἀλλά, ἀλλὰ γάρ, μέντοι, and καί τοι; and Jacquiod καίτοι.

⁴⁴ On information framing, see Goffman (1974) and Tannen (1993).

⁴⁵ Cf. Quintilian (*Inst.* 9.4.84): "plurimum igitur auctoritatis ... et ponderis habent longae, celeritatis breves ..." (so, long [syllables] have most authority ... and weight; short ones most speed).

1) Of the P2 words discussed in depth by Denniston (1954), short- and long-vowelled particles are equally common, the former comprising ἄρα, γάρ, γε, δέ, μά, μέν, νυ, νυν, περ, and τε, while the latter are ἄρα, δή, γούν, δῆθεν, καί, μήν, νύν, οὔν, που, and τοι. Denniston describes an emphatic force for all the long-vowelled particles, and, where there are both short- and long-vowelled variants (ἄρα - ἄρα, δέ - δή, μέν - μήν, νυ - νύν), the longer always has more force or “liveliness”.

2) Particles with the (articulatory) open vowels α and η have intrinsically greater length than high vowels (see Devine and Stephens 1994, 62), and so might be expected to be more prominent. This seems to hold, as ἄρα, γάρ, δή and μήν are all notably emphatic.

3) Open and closed syllables are approximately equally common, too⁴⁶. This does not seem to have a discernable effect on their force, though particles with short, open, mid (or high) vowels (γε, δέ, and νυ) seem relatively unemphatic.

Yet the connection between form and function is not purely mechanical. An interpretation of particle function must allow for their contribution to sentence prosody. What requires analysis is the whole “sound envelope” of the clause start, and not merely the phonetic characteristics of the particle.

3b: Γάρ and dual function

It is argued, then, that the emphatic and linking functions are always shared by the same particles, that particles with one function are always associated with both, and that the same dual function may be observed with all adverbial particles. The connection may be seen in the range of uses of γάρ. Denniston (1954) considers that its core function is causal, all instances having some connective force. Similarly, Sicking and van Ophuijsen (1993, 24) suggest that γάρ is responsive in the sense of “making explicit a presupposition of the previous sentence.” However, noting that “few Greek connecting particles started their careers as conjunctions”, Denniston (1954, 56–57) proposes that “an earlier, asseverative, force lay behind the causal sense”, and links this to the etymology of γάρ from γε + ἄρα. Smyth

⁴⁶ All particles with final closed syllables end in -ν or -ρ rather than -ς. Enclitics ending in -ς, such as τις, πως, and ώς, not discussed by Denniston, have wider contexts than “special clitics”.

(1956, 638) has the same view, suggesting that γε originally gave prominence “either to the word it followed or to the whole clause, while ἄρα marked this prominence as due to something expressed or latent in the context.”

Such an interpretation raises the possibility that retrospective and preparatory function may reflect the same force, and indeed preparatory use is considered by Denniston (1954, 68) to be a stylistic variant, rather than an independent asseveration (which was the view of Kühner 1904, 332–3). In fact, retrospective and anticipatory γάρ simply reverse the dependency ordering: “since a, therefore b” is logically equivalent to “b, because a”, and parenthetical γάρ following the main subject could be translated as either, as *A.Ag.* 1069:

ἐγὼ δ', ἐποικτίρω γάρ, οὐ θυμώσομαι ...

But I, because/since I pity her, will not be angry ...

The emphatic effect appears to be entirely local: the view of Halpern (1995), cited above in Section 2b, that only phrasal focalization is pragmatically motivated, while focalization of individual words is an automatic “flip”, is not supported by the textual evidence: γάρ is always adjacent to the word or phrase which it emphasizes pragmatically, though when it follows noun phrases, the whole phrase may be regarded as prominent, as at *Ag.* 461:

τῶν πολυκτόνων γὰρ οὐκ
ἄσκοποι θεοί ...

for of the killers of many, the gods are not unwatchful ...

However, when γάρ appears within a phrase, as at *Em.* 334, only the demonstrative seems emphatic, and a specific pragmatic effect may be understood:

τοῦτο γὰρ λάχος διανταία
Μοῖρ' ἐπέκλωσεν ἐμπέδως ἔχειν ...

For **this** lot, piercing Fate
spun for us to be permanent ...

After a verb phrase at *Ag.* 222, the adjacent element, rather than the whole phrase, appears pragmatically emphatic (as Dover 1987, 61 implies):

βροτοὺς **θρασύνει** γὰρ αἰσχρομήτις
τάλαινα παρακοπά πρωτοπήμων ...

For it emboldens men, woeful madness –
suggesting evil, the first cause ...

Though γάρ may emphasize cohesive words (as at *A.Eu.* 334 above), Dover (1987, 61–3) argues that it tends to highlight new information. The reason is prosodic: an emphatic function certainly results in a contrastive effect, and when the emphatic and linking functions are in tension, the former is dominant, as at *Eu.* 797, where it is adjacent to ἐκ Διός, though its linking function is related to that of ἀλλ’:

ἀλλ’ ἐκ Διός γὰρ λαμπρὰ μαρτύρια παρῆν ...

and yet, from Zeus, there was clear witness ...

The real-world reference of lexical words may, in such instances, make their prominence appear somewhat arbitrary. The focalization of grammatical words more clearly exposes the function of a particle following them:

- 1) The emphatic function is particularly clear following grammatical words: both those which have anaphoric reference, as at *S.OT* 409:

ἴσ’ ἀντιλέξαι· τοῦδε γὰρ κἀγὼ κρατῶ ...

... arguing equally, for in that I rule too ...

and also those which have a specifying function within the second clause, as at *E.Med.* 1376:

πῶς οὖν; τί δράσω; κάρτα γὰρ κἀγὼ θέλω.

How? What shall I do? For I too very much wish that.

- 2) When the grammatical word is a conjunction, a particle (or cluster) following may create a very emphatic clause link, as at *Il.* 9.515:

εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δῶρα φέροι τὰ δ’ ὀπισθ’ ὀνομάζοι ...

And yet, if he were not to bring gifts and to name still more hereafter ...

Dependency patterns of this type include εἰ γάρ and ἦ γάρ, which appears to have a sense of urgency in Plato⁴⁷.

⁴⁷ Both are common in Plato, εἰ γάρ appearing 128 times and ἦ γάρ 205 times. Aristotle, too, uses the form regularly (581 and 596 times respectively). See also Erp Taalman Kip (1997) on Platonic ἦ γάρ.

3) The P2 combination *μὲν γάρ* cited above is a particularly interesting collocation, as it is very common: in Homer (109 instances), the major tragedians (126), Herodotus (143), Isocrates (254), Demosthenes (360), Plato (447) and Aristotle (2,213). The contribution of *γάρ* does not appear to be only explanatory (as Denniston 1954, 67 proposed), but either balances the preparatory force of *μὲν* to create a two-way logical link, or combines with it to emphasize a definite noun phrase in the second sentence. This interpretation is supported by the regular use of *μὲν γάρ* to carry an argument forward, and by the high frequency with which the sequence follows an anaphoric pronoun or article, as at *Il.* 11.824–6 (cited in Section 2b above), and *Arist.Po.* 1448b25–6⁴⁸:

οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμιμοῦντο πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιοῦτων, οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι τὰς τῶν φαύλων ...

for the more serious [poets] represented fine actions and the actions of fine men,
while those of a cheaper nature represented the actions of inferior men
...

Particle placing within a noun phrase adds proportionally more weight to the light initial element, and also marks specificity of reference (the previous sentence has established that there will be a contrast).

The dominance of the emphatic over the linking function follows from the mechanism of cohesive focalization described above, because the force of *γάρ* cannot be determined without interpreting the P1 element too. It may be observed that emphatic force is implicit in the nature of anticipatory function: it cannot be known by a listener at the moment of utterance that there will be a responsive clause, so every instance of *μὲν* must therefore imply an emphatic force.

3c: Emphasis and co-ordination: chronological factors

A connection may also be drawn between dual force and historical changes of function: Denniston (1954), Ruijgh (1990, 221 ff.) and Wills (1993, 63n7) all relate specific functional variations to historical

⁴⁸ Of the 24 instances in *Arist.Po.*, 18 follow pronouns or articles, and of the 156 instances in *EN*, 111 do.

change⁴⁹. Four factors appear to be involved, implying a sequence in which adverbials acquired, and then lost, a connective function:

1) Adverbial origins. The observation by Denniston (1954, xl-xli) that “it is by no means certain that the connective sense of any Greek particle is the original sense” implies that at least some particles changed function from adverbial to connective. Denniston (1954, xxxvii) maps the functions of γε, δὴ, μὴν, τοι as having originally expressed thoughts in isolation, and (1954, 359) argues that “the primary function of μέν, as of μὴν, is emphatic”, and (1954, xl) also suggests an adverbial origin for apodotic function in conditionals (i. e. in the consequent clause), which involves both adverbials (γε, ἦ, μέντοι, δὴ) and connectives (καί, οὖν, τοίνυν). A general development from adverbial to connective functions is a plausible inference, since intra-clausal meaning might be expected to precede a linking function chronologically (because it precedes logically).

2) Rightwards movement. The (later) converse development is well established: in post-Homeric Greek there was a diachronic movement of enclitics, from P2 to adjacency to head words within the clause⁵⁰. This movement appears to have been motivated in part by an international change, with the movement of a postulated sentence accent from Wackernagel’s position in classical Greek to fall on the main verb in Hellenistic Greek⁵¹.

3) Rightwards movement and subordination. A functional motivation for intra-clausal placing may be found in the replacement of P2 enclitics by orthotonic subordinating conjunctions like ἐπεὶ and ὅτι.

4) A consequent decline in contrastive linking. The change from co-ordination to subordination involves greater syntactic integration of the constituent clauses, which leads to a cohesive rather than contrastive link. This is paralleled by the changing force of co-ordi-

⁴⁹ Ruijgh (1990, 221 ff.) concentrates on πέρ, ἄρα δὴ and δὴ ῥα, and Wills (1993, 63n7) on ἄρα.

⁵⁰ See Dover (1960, 15–19), and Horrocks (1990). “Head-government”, as this may be termed, appears as early as Homer, explaining a feature which Wills (1993, 66) describes as “third position”, adducing constructions like *Il.* 1.81: εἴ περ γάρ τε χόλον γε καὶ αὐτῆμαρ καταπέμψῃ (and suppose even for the day itself he swallow down his anger ...). These, however, are better explained as locally head-governed: “[χόλον γε] [καὶ αὐτῆμαρ]”. Cf. also Ruijgh (1990, 219–20) on γε at *Il.* 2.703.

⁵¹ Cf. the *Satzmelodie* of Schwyzer (1950). See also Comrie (1980, 86), and Dunn (1989, 11). Adams (1994a) observes a similar change in the placing of “weak” pronouns in classical Latin.

nating particles such as *δέ*, which seems to have weakened in force from a “seriously” adversative particle to a continuative one, as Morpurgo Davies (1997) shows for Arcadian⁵².

However, a purely chronological sequence does not give a complete explanation. Temporal change is indeed apparent, but its very possibility depends on synchronic variations, which demonstrate the great freedom of authorial choice.

The use of particles to emphasize a clause link is a notable feature of Platonic style: propositions are regularly introduced by framing them as questions, often negative, and there is a distinctive use of *τί οὖν* to mark logical coherence, and of *τί δέ* to mark a new train of thought⁵³. Co-ordinated and subordinated linking may also be combined, producing great contrast, as at *Cri.* 50e3–4:

ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος
καὶ δούλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι;

Could you say to begin with that you were not our offspring
and slave, both yourself and your ancestors?

Contrastive linking is, naturally, particularly suited to a dialogic style, though even here, authorial variations are considerable: in the Melian Dialogue of Thucydides, there is a marked absence of P2 elements, and consequentially the clause links are strikingly unemphatic. Conversely, the high frequency of *μὲν γάρ* across genres has been noted above.

Particles are, clearly, not mechanical markers of pragmatic function, but are stylistic tools which are used distinctively by different authors. Therefore, rather than viewing historical variation in their function as simply the inevitable result of changes in Greek syntax, a more dynamic interpretation might seek to identify their use in stimulating such structural change. Their roles in the developing structure of early subordination are surveyed in the next section.

⁵² For other discussions of the pragmatic functions of *δέ*, see Dover (1987, 59–61) and Rijksbaron (1997c).

⁵³ See Sicking (1997). *τί οὖν* appears 306 times in Plato, and *τί δέ* 458 times: both far more than in any other author (only Demosthenes also uses *τί οὖν* regularly – 84 times). For brief comments on the Platonic use of particles, see Cook (1992).

4: Subordination

Clause linking in early subordination shares the emphatic character of co-ordinated linking. The emphasis may be purely prosodic, when a P2 enclitic follows a prosodic host in a preceding clause⁵⁴, or may have a structural dimension. The earliest types of subordination, conditional and relative constructions, demonstrate only prosodic emphasis:

- 1) In conditionals which precede their main clause, a focalized constituent regularly precedes the conjunction, as at *A.Ag.* 345–7:

θεοῖς δ' ἀναμπλάκητος εἰ μόλοι στρατός,
ἐγρηγορὸς τὸ πῆμα τῶν ὄλωλότων
γένοιτ' ἄν ...

And even if, without wandering from the gods, the army return,
the awakened pain of the dead might
arise ...

Interpolated or following conditionals, however, always follow an emphatic element in the main clause, as at *Ag.* 37–8:

βέβηκεν· **οἶκος δ' αὐτός**, εἰ φθογγὴν λάβοι,
σαφέστατ' ἄν λέξειεν· ὡς ἐκὼν ἐγὼ ...

... **the house itself**, if it had a voice, could best say ...

- 2) In relative clauses which precede their main clause, the pronoun itself is typically emphatic, as at *A.Ag.* 501–2:

ὅστις τάδ' ἄλλως τῆδ' ἐπεύχεται πόλει,
αὐτὸς φρενῶν καρποῖτο τὴν ἀμαρτίαν·

Whoever prays otherwise for this city
may he himself reap the error of his mind.

This structure has the resumptive pronoun typical of early correlatives, and also the common indefinite > definite sequence, with indefinite reference marked by the (focal) affix.

- 3) When the relative clause follows, the pronoun, though syntactically initial, is prosodically in P2, following its main-clause head word, and has purely definite reference, as at *E.Med.* 702:

⁵⁴ See Hock (1996, 202ff.), and also the observation by Aristotle (*Po.* 1457a3) cited above in Section 2, that a connective is not placed at the start of a clause which is placed “καθ' αὐτόν”.

Κρέων, ὅς ἄρχει τῆσδε γῆς Κορινθίας⁵⁵.

Kreon, who rules this land of Corinth.

However, a syntactic as well as a prosodic dimension appears in free relatives (where there is no head noun in the main clause). In Homer, 64 relative clauses are introduced by ὅστις, as at *Il.* 1.230:

δῶρ' ἀποαιρείσθαι ὅς τις σέθεν ἀντίον εἶπῃ ...

... to take away the gifts of **any who** speaks up against you ...

The pronoun is prosodically in P1, focalized by *τις*, just as in the preposed relative at *Ag.* 501–2 cited above. Here, however, it has an indeterminate syntactic function, being co-referent with an (unrealized) genitive in the main clause, as well as with the subject of the subordinate verb. A stronger linking function appears in indirect questions (free relatives with introductory verbs of speech or cognition), as at *Od.* 10.109–10⁵⁶:

οἱ δὲ παριστάμενοι προσεφώνεον, ἔκ τ' ἐρέοντο
ὅς τις τῶνδ' εἶη βασιλεὺς καὶ οἴσιν ἀνάσσοι.

And they stood by her and talked with her, and asked her
who was king of these people and who was lord over them.

Here, the pronoun has exchanged its indefinite function for an interrogative one (“who” in “they asked who” has a specifying force). The link between indefinite and interrogative function derives from their semantic interdependence: as noted by Lyons (1977, 761–3), an interrogative with “who?” presupposes the truth of an indefinite statement with “somebody”⁵⁷. There is, therefore, a semantic overlap between two types of meaning, expressed through a similar form.

4) A more cohesive link is created by the neuter ὅτι (or ὅττι), in 39 indirect questions in Homer. Here the pronoun straddles the clause break, since it can be analyzed as syntactically in either clause. Its use represents an intermediate stage in the development of the relative pronoun as a textual connective in completive constructions (“say what

⁵⁵ The line is stichomythic, and Κρέων is the only main clause element.

⁵⁶ The other indirect questions are at *Il.* 3.167, 3.192, 11.219, 14.509, 16.424, 20.363, *Od.* 4.380 = 423 = 469, 4.552, 8.28, and 9.331–2. For a discussion of the verb types, see Fraser (1999).

⁵⁷ See also Dover (1960, 12), Monteil (1963, 65, 150, 154), Ruijgh (1971, 310), and Biraud (1985, 162). The semantic link is discussed further below under τε.

...” to “say that ...”). Neuter pronouns retain an indefinite force, as might be expected for semantic reasons⁵⁸, and are mostly followed by *κε*, as at *Il.* 8.408 = 422⁵⁹:

αἰεὶ γάρ μοι ἔωθεν ἐνικλᾶν **ὄττι** κεν εἶπω.

... for it is always her way to cross whatever I may say.

5) The interrogative function of *τις* is shared by epic *τε*, which appears in a number of Homeric indirect questions, as at *Il.* 2.365–6:

γνώση ἔπειθ' **ὅς θ'** ἡγεμόνων κακός, **ὅς τε** νυ λαῶν
ἦδ' **ὅς κ'** ἐσθλὸς ἔησι ...

Then you will see which of your leaders is cowardly, and which of your people, and which also are brave ...

and *Il.* 21.609–10⁶⁰:

μεῖναι ἔτ' ἀλλήλους, καὶ γνόμεναι, **ὅς τε** πεφεύγοι
ὅς τ' ἔθαν' ἐν πολέμῳ ...

... to wait for each other and find out which one had got away and who had died in the battle ...

The functional parallel between *τις* and epic *τε* is supported by the analysis of Ruijgh, who (1971, 9) notes that *τε* is regularly associated with digressive, non-restrictive, relatives (after *ὅς*, *ὁ*, *ὅθι*, *ὅθεν*, *ὅτε*, *οἷος*, *ὡς*) and co-ordinated clauses (after *δέ*, *ἀτάρ*, *γάρ*, *μέν*, *καί*, *ἀλλά*). It is central to his definition of the function of epic *τε* as “digressif-permanent” that it has a linking function and that it marks generic reference⁶¹. That connection was first identified by Delbrück (1897, 511 ff.), who considered that, following a relative pronoun, Indo-European **k^we* always had an emphatic function, linked to indefiniteness, which was prior to a connective function⁶². The indefinite force of

⁵⁸ Because there is no presupposition of specific reference with neuters: Lyons (1977, 763) notes that the answer to interrogative “what?” (unlike that to “who?”) may be indefinite.

⁵⁹ See also *Il.* 15.148 below. The others are cited in Fraser (1999, Appendix 3a).

⁶⁰ Other instances occur at *Il.* 1.411–2 = 16.273–4, 5.331, 8.251, 17.623 and 626–7.

⁶¹ The view of Sihler (1995, 401) that *-τε* is added to relative pronouns “without any apparent change in meaning” is not, therefore, followed here.

⁶² There may be an etymological connection too: Sihler (1995, 396–7)

both τις and τε therefore accords with their use in emphatic clause linking.

6) A parallel between τε and κε may be seen in the use of both at *Il.* 2.365–6 above. Κε appears also to have a general emphatic function, which is shared by ἄν: Howorth (1955) observes that there is a strong tendency for ἄν or κε to be used in indefinite clauses referring to the future, and argues that this is because they are placed after the first important word of the indefinite phrase, in order to emphasize it, even when referring to the main verb, as at *Il.* 15.148:

ἔρδειν ὄττι κε κείνος ἐποτρύνη καὶ ἀνώγη.

If he urges and orders you to do anything, then (κε) do it⁶³.

Similarly, in Attic Greek, ἄν may emphasize the emphatic word or phrase which implies the condition to which the main verb is subject, as at *Th.* 7.13.1:

ἡμῖν δ' ἐκ πολλῆς ἄν περιουσίας νεῶν μόλις τοῦτο ὑπῆρχε ...

This would hardly be our position if we had a great abundance of ships ...

The relationship between the modal and linking functions accords with the local model of focalization advanced here, because the modal force is expressed through the indefinite reference of the emphatic element (“whatever”, “some great abundance”) as well as through the verb. The linking function is, as with other focalizers, one which becomes chronologically less important: Howorth cites a number of similar constructions (*Il.* 24.661, *And.* 1.21, *Pl. Phd.* 101d, *D.* 19.29), which support his claim (1955, 93) that “although in Attic, where ἄν is used with the main clause, it has lost its tendency to come as second word, it has retained this tendency in indefinite clauses, because it was once felt as construed with the main verb.”

7) Focalization may also have a textually-referring function. In early completives involving ὡς, demonstrative τόδε frequently anticipates

observes that the Proto-Indo-European stem **k^w-* has indefinite and interrogative function in every branch, and speculates that the link between relative and interrogative might be that **k^w-* was a focus marker. On the derivation of τε from the stem **k^wo-*/**k^we-*, see Meillet (1898), Kühner (1904, 236, 241), Schwyzer (1950, 573ff.), Monteil (1963, 109–111), and Ruijgh (1971).

⁶³ The translations of this and the following citation are taken from Howorth (1955, 84). Similar constructions occur at *Il.* 8.142–3 and 12.369.

the following clause, as well as creating a contrast with the preceding text, as at *E.Med.* 85–6:

... ἄρτι γινώσκεις τόδε,
ὡς πᾶς τις αὐτὸν τοῦ πέλας μᾶλλον φιλεῖ;

... have you only just now learned this,
that/how each loves himself more than others?

Τόδε and τάδε are used with the same function in Homer, Sophocles, Herodotus, Plato and Xenophon⁶⁴. In such constructions, the P1 intonation group is constituted by the demonstrative, with ὡς having an adverbial function within the subordinate clause, demonstrating how a co-ordinating structure could be adapted to subordinate use. This use of τόδε creates a more emphatic and contrastive clause link than those involving τις, τι, τε and κε (described above). However, all constructions demonstrate the use of focalization in early subordinated linking.

Conclusion: focus and prosody

At the start of the paper, three major problems were described: the functional status of the first position of the clause, the multiplicity of function of P2 elements, and the relationship between the first and second positions. An integrated approach was developed, by mapping the functions of initial elements in terms of their prominence, rather than from a dedicated topical or thematic function. This view was supported by observations on the functions of a number of particles (γάρ, μὲν γάρ, τις, τε, κε and ἄν) in co-ordinated and subordinated constructions.

The principle underlying the argument is that interpretations of the functions of P2 elements must take account of their immediate context. Taxonomies of core meanings and attempts to identify wider pragmatic roles give rather general interpretations: a precise description must also identify a particle's functional relationship with its prosodic host, and its co-occurrence with other P2 elements.

A local interpretation links prosody with syntax, while giving max-

⁶⁴ As *Od.* 3.255; *Hdt.* 3.108.1, 8.68.29–31 and 9.95.3–4; *X.Eq.Mag.* 8.16.1. and *Hell.* 5.2.18.7; *Pl.Sph.* 248d10; *Plt.* 259c6, 266c.10, 276c6; *Phlb.* 20d7, 32d9, 43a1; *Phdr.* 245b5, 265c5; *Men.* 93 ; *R.* 370b7, 387d11, 526b5, 572b4; and *Lg.* 788d4, 791b5, 805c2, 809e3.

imum scope to authorial freedom in sentence composition, and also accords with historical changes in the placing of enclitics. The approach seems therefore appropriate to the study of particles, as well as to the investigation of syntactic changes in ancient Greek.

Bibliography

- Adams, J.N. (1994a): "Wackernagel's Law and the Position of Unstressed Personal Pronouns in Classical Latin", *TPhS*, 92, 103-178.
- (1994b): Wackernagel's Law and the Placing of Copula *esse* in Classical Latin (*PCPhS Supplementary Volume 18*), Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society.
- Allen, W.S. (1987): *Vox Graeca: A Guide to the Pronunciation of Classical Greek*, 3rd Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Anderson, S.R. (1993): "Wackernagel's Revenge: Clitics, Morphology, and the Syntax of Second Position", *Language*, 69, 68-98.
- Bach, E. (1971): "Questions", *Linguistic Inquiry*, 2, 153-166.
- Bakker, E.J. (1993): "Boundaries, Topics, and the Structure of Discourse: An Investigation of the Ancient Greek Particle δέ", *Studies in Language*, 17, 275-311.
- Battye, A. and Roberts, I., eds. (1995): *Clause Structure and Language Change*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bäumlein, W. (1861): *Untersuchungen über griechische Partikeln*, Stuttgart: Metzlerschen.
- Behaghel, O. (1909): "Beziehungen zwischen Umfang und Reihenfolge von Satzgliedern", *IF*, 25, 110-142.
- Bergaigne, A. (1877): "Essai sur la construction grammaticale: considérée dans son développement historique, en sanskrit, en grec, en latin, dans les langues romanes et dans les langues germaniques", Section 3, *Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique de Paris*, III, 169-186.
- Bernert, E. (1940): "Die Partikel -que", *Glotta*, 28, 78-88.
- Cervin, R. (1990): *Word Order in Ancient Greek: VSO, SVO, SOV, or All of the Above?*, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Illinois.
- Chomsky, N. (1976): "Conditions on Rules of Grammar", *Linguistic Analysis*, 2, 303-352.
- (1981): *Lectures on Government and Binding*, Dordrecht: Foris Publications.
- Comrie, B. (1980): "Morphology and Word Order Reconstruction: Problems and Prospects", in *Fisiak* (1980), 83-96.
- Cook, A. (1992): "Particles, Qualification, Ordering, Style, Irony, and Meaning in Plato's Dialogues", *QUCC*, 40, 111-126.
- Coulthard, M., ed. (1994): *Advances in Written Text Analysis*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

- Delbrück, B. (1878): *Die altindische Wortfolge aus dem çatapathabrähmana dargestellt* (published as Delbrück, B. and Windisch, E., *Syntaktische Forschungen* 3), Halle: Waisenhaus.
- (1897): *Vergleichende Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen*, Vol. 2 (Vol. 4 of Brugmann, K. and Delbrück, B., *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen*) Strasbourg: Trübner.
 - (1900): *Vergleichende Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen*, Vol. 3 (Vol. 5.3 of Brugmann, K. and Delbrück, B., *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen*) Strasbourg: Trübner.
- Dennison, J.D. (1952): *Greek Prose Style*, Oxford: Clarendon.
- (1954): *The Greek Particles*, Second Edition, revised Dover, K.J., Oxford: Clarendon.
- Devine, A.M. and Stephens, L.D. (1994): *The Prosody of Greek Speech*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dik, S.C. (1978): *Functional Grammar*, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
- (1980): *Studies in Functional Grammar*, London: Academic Press.
 - (1989): *The Theory of Functional Grammar*. Part 1: The Structure of the Clause, Dordrecht: Foris.
- Dindorf, G., ed. (1851): *Aeschyli tragoediae superstites et deperditarum fragmenta*, (including scholia), 2nd Edition, 3 volumes, Oxford: University Press.
- Dover, K.J. (1960): *Greek Word Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1987): *Greek and the Greeks*. *Collected Papers*. Volume 1: Language, Poetry, Drama, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dunn, G. (1989): "Enclitic Pronoun Movement and the Ancient Greek Sentence Accent", *Glotta*, 67, 1-19.
- Eichner, H., and Rix, H., eds. (1990): *Sprachwissenschaft und Philologie: Jacob Wackernagel und die Indogermanistik heute*. *Kolloquium der Indogermanischen Gesellschaft vom 13. bis 15. Oktober 1988 in Basel*, Wiesbaden: Reichert.
- Emonds, J.E. (1976): *A Transformational Approach to English Syntax: Root, Structure-Preserving, and Logical Transformations*, New York: Academic Press.
- Erp Taalman Kip, A.M. van (1997): "H GAP in Questions", in Rijktsbaron (1997a), 151-156.
- Firbas, J. (1964): "On Defining the Theme in Functional Sentence Analysis", *Travaux Linguistiques de Prague*, 1, 267-280.
- Fisiak, J., ed. (1980): *Historical Morphology*, (*Trends in Linguistics Studies and Monographs* 17), The Hague: Mouton.
- Fraser, B.L. (1999): *Word Order, Focus, and Clause Linking in Greek Tragic Poetry*, PhD. dissertation, Cambridge University.
- Gazdar, G., Klein, E., and Pullum, G.K., eds. (1983): *Order, Concord, and Constituency*, Dordrecht: Foris Publications.
- Givón, T., ed. (1983): *Topic Continuity in Discourse: A Quantitative Cross-Language Study*, Amsterdam: Benjamins.

- Goffman, E. (1974): *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organisation of Experience*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gonda, J. (1954): "The History and Original Function of the Indo-European Particle *k'e*, Especially in Greek and Latin", *Mnemosyne*, 4th Series, 7, 177–214, 265–296.
- Grice, P. (1989): *Studies in the Way of Words*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hale, M. (1987): "Note on Wackernagel's Law in the Language of the Rigveda", in Watkins (1987), 38–50.
- (1996): "Deriving Wackernagel's Law: Prosodic and Syntactic Factors Determining Clitic Placement in the Language of the Rigveda", in Halpern and Zwicky (1996), 165–197.
- Halliday, M.A.K. (1967): "Notes on Transitivity and Theme in English Part 2", *Journal of Linguistics*, 3, 199–244.
- Halpern, A.L. (1995): *On the Placement and Morphology of Clitics*, Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
- and Zwicky, A.M., eds. (1996): *Approaching Second: Second Position Clitics and Related Phenomena*, Stanford: CSLI Publications.
- Hock, H.H. (1982): "Clitic Verbs in PIE or Discourse-Based Verb Fronting? Sanskrit *sá hovāca gárgyah* and Conjoiners in Avestan and Homeric Greek", *Studies in the Linguistic Sciences*, 12, 1–38.
- (1996): "Who's on First? Towards a Prosodic Account of P2 Clitics", in Halpern and Zwicky (1996), 199–270.
- Hockett, C.F. (1958): *A Course in Modern Linguistics*, New York: Macmillan.
- Horrocks, G. (1983): "The Order of Constituents in Modern Greek", in Gazdar, Klein, and Pullum (1983), 95–111.
- (1990): "Clitics in Greek: A Diachronic Review", in Roussou and Panteli (1990), 35–52.
- Householder, F.W., ed. (1972): *Syntactic Theory 1, Structuralist: Selected Readings*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Howorth, R.H. (1955): "The Origin of the Use of *AN* and *KE* in Indefinite Clauses", *CQ*, 5, 72–93.
- Jackendoff, R. (1972): *Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar*, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.
- Jacquiod, B. (1997): "Sur le rôle pragmatique de *καί τοι*", in Rijksbaron (1997a), 131–149.
- Jespersen, O. (1924): *The Philosophy of Grammar*, London: Allen and Unwin.
- Kassel, R., ed. (1965): *Aristotelis de arte poetica liber (Oxford Classical Texts)*, Oxford: Clarendon.
- Kiparsky, P. (1995): "Indo-European Origins of Germanic Syntax", in Battye and Roberts (1995), 140–169.
- Kiss, K.E. (1995a): "Discourse Configurational Languages Introduction", in Kiss (1995b), 3–27.

- , ed. (1995b): *Discourse Configurational Languages*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kühner, R. (1904): *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache II: Satzlehre*, Volume 2, revised by Gerth, B., 3rd edition, Hanover: Hahnsche.
- Kuppevelt, J. van (1995): “Discourse Structure, Topicality and Questioning”, *Journal of Linguistics*, 31, 109–147.
- Lambrecht, K. (1994): *Information Structure and Sentence Form: Topic, Focus, and the Mental Representations of Discourse Referents*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Li, C.N., ed. (1977): *Mechanisms of Syntactic Change*, Austin: University of Texas Press.
- and Thompson, S.A. (1976): “Subject and Topic: A New Typology of Language”, in Li, ed. (1976), *Subject and Topic*, New York: Academic Press, 457–490.
- Liddell, H.G. and Scott, R. (1968): *A Greek Lexicon*, 9th Edition (1940), revised by Jones, H.S. and McKenzie, R., with Supplement ed. Barber, E.A., Oxford: Clarendon.
- Luraghi, S. (1998): “The Grammaticalization of the Left Sentence Boundary in Hittite”, in Ramat and Hopper (1998), 189–210.
- Lyons, J. (1977): *Semantics*, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mallinson, G. and Blake, B.J. (1981): *Language Typology: Cross-Linguistic Studies in Syntax*, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
- Matthews, P.H. (1981): *Syntax*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meillet, A. (1898): “Note sur lat. plerique”, *Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique de Paris*, 10, 271–273.
- Monteil, P. (1963): *La Phrase relative en grec ancien: sa formation, son développement, sa structure: des origines a la fin du Ve siècle A.C.*, Paris: Klincksieck.
- Morpurgo Davies, A. (1997): “Particles in Greek Epigraphic Texts: The Case of Arcadian”, in Rijksbaron (1997a), 49–73.
- Quirk, R., Greenbaum, S., Leech, G., and Svartvik, J. (1985): *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*, London: Longman.
- Raalte, M. van (1986): *Rhythm and Metre: Towards a Systematic Description of Greek Stichic Verse*, Assen/Maastricht: Van Gorcum.
- Ramat, A. G. and Hopper, P., eds. (1998): *The Limits of Grammaticalization*, Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Rijksbaron, A. (1989): *Aristotle, Verb Meaning, and Functional Grammar: Towards a New Typology of States of Affairs. With an Appendix on Aristotle’s Distinction between Kinesis and Energeia*, Amsterdam: Gieben.
- , ed. (1997a) *New Approaches to Greek Particles. Proceedings of the Colloquium Held in Amsterdam, January 4–6, 1996, to Honour C.J. Ruijgh on the Occasion of His Retirement*, Amsterdam: Gieben.
- (1997b): “Introduction”, in Rijksbaron (1997a), 1–14.
- (1997c): “Adverb or Connector? The Case of καὶ ... δέ”, in Rijksbaron (1997a), 187–208.
- Rosier, I., ed. (1988): *L’Héritage des grammairiens latins de l’antiquité aux lumières*.

- Actes du Colloque de Chantilly, 2-4 septembre 1987*, Paris: Société de l'information grammaticale.
- Roussou, M. and Panteli, S., eds. (1990): *Greek Outside Greece*, Volume 2, Athens: Diaspora Books.
- Ruijgh, C.J. (1971): *Autour de "te epique": études sur la syntaxe grecque*, Amsterdam: Hakkert.
- (1990): "La Place des enclitiques dans l'ordre des mots chez Homère d'après la loi de Wackernagel", in Eichner and Rix (1990), 213-233.
- Sadock, J. (1991): *Autolexical Syntax: A Theory of Parallel Grammatical Representations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schachter, P. (1973): "Focus and Relativization", *Language*, 49, 19-46.
- Schäufele, S. (1996): "Now That We're All Here, Where Do We Sit? Phonological Ordering in the Vedic Clause-Initial String", in Halpern and Zwicky (1996), 447-475.
- Schenkeveld, D.M. (1988): "From Particula to Particle - The Genesis of a Class of Words", in Rosier (1988), 81-93.
- Schwyzler, E. (1950): *Griechische Grammatik: auf der Grundlage von Karl Brugmanns griechischer Grammatik*, Zweiter Band: *Syntax und syntaktische Stilistik* (completed and published by Debrunner, A.), Munich: Beck.
- Sibilot, M.-C. (1983): "Les Prolepses chez Aristophane", in *Mélanges Edouard Delebecque*, ed. C. Froidefond, Marseilles: Laffitte.
- Sicking, C.M.J. (1997): "Particles in Questions in Plato", in Rijksbaron (1997a), 157-174.
- and Ophuijsen, J.M. van (1993): *Two Studies in Attic Particle Use: Lysias and Plato (Mnemosyne Supplement 129)*, Leiden: Brill.
- Sihler, A.L. (1995): *New Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Simpson, J. (1991): *Warlpiri Morpho-Syntax: A Lexicalist Approach*, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Slings, S.R. (1997): "Adversative Relators between Push and Pop", in Rijksbaron (1997a), 101-129.
- Sluiter, I. (1997): "Parapleromatic Lucubrations", in Rijksbaron (1997a), 233-246.
- Smyth, H.W. (1956): *Greek Grammar* (first published 1920, revised by Messing, G.M.), Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1986): *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Steele, S. (1977): "Clisis and Diachrony", in Li (1977), 539-579.
- Strawson, P.F. (1952): *Introduction to Logical Theory*, London: Methuen.
- Tannen, D., ed. (1993): *Framing in Discourse*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Taylor, A. (1996): "A Prosodic Account of Clitic Position in Ancient Greek", in Halpern and Zwicky (1996), 477-503.
- Thomson, G., ed. (1938): *The Oresteia of Aeschylus: Edited with Introduction, Translation, and a Commentary, in Which is Included the Work of the Late Walter G. Headlam*, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- (1939) "The Postponement of Interrogatives in Attic Drama", *CQ*, 33, 147-152.
- Wackernagel, J. (1892): "Über ein Gesetz der indogermanischen Wortstellung", *IF*, 1, 333-436, reprinted in Wackernagel (1953), 1-104.
- (1953): *Kleine Schriften*, Volume 1, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck.
- Wakker, G.C. (1997): "Emphasis and Affirmation: Some Aspects of μήν in Tragedy", in Rijksbaron (1997a), 209-231.
- Watkins, C. (1964): "Preliminaries to the Reconstruction of Indo-European Sentence Structure", *Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress (1962) of Linguists*, 1035-1042. Reprinted in Householder (1972), 124-134.
- , ed. (1987): *Studies in Memory of Warren Cowgill, 1929-1985: Papers From the Fourth East Coast Indo-European Conference. Cornell University, June 6-9, 1985*, Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Wills, J. (1993): "Homeric Particle Order", *HSF*, 106, 61-81.
- Zwicky, A.M. (1977): *On Clitics*, Bloomington: Indiana University Linguistics Club.

“Irrealis” and Past Tense in Ancient Greek

By EVA-CARIN GERÖ, Stockholm

1. Introduction

It is a well-known fact that in Ancient Greek the past tenses sometimes are used without past time reference¹. An example of this are so-called “unattainable wishes” expressed by the imperfect of the indicative with εἶθε or with εἰ γάρ. E. g.:

(1) Eur. *El.* 1061 εἶθ' εἶχες ... βελτίους φρένας “Would that thou hadst (now) a better heart!”

Another context where we find the past tenses (usually the imperfect) used in a likewise “irregular” way is supplied by counterfactual conditionals. In the apodosis in such cases we usually find the particle ἄν. E. g.:

(2) Pl. *Symp.* 180 c 6 f. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἷς ἦν ὁ Ἔρως, καλῶς ἄν εἶχε; νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εἷς “If Love were only one, it would be all right; but, you see, he is not one”

In their accounts of this use of past tense forms in Greek the traditional grammars usually adopt one of out of two approaches. (Also cross-linguistically, as has often been observed, the phenomenon is quite wide-spread – cf. e. g. the English translations of the examples above; for the moment being we stay with Greek, however.) The adherents of the first approach focus on the feature of temporal “backshifting” (“Tempusverschiebung”); cf. for instance Kühner and Gerth (1904:471, note 2) apropos the use of preterital forms of the indicative in counterfactual conditionals with a present application: “... die Bedingung erstreckt sich zwar auf die Gegenwart; aber ihre Erfüllbarkeit gehört der Vergangenheit an, da bereits über die Nichtverwirklichung entschieden ist; unter dem Gefühle dieses Gegensatzes versetzt sich der Redende in die Zeit, wo die Erfüllung noch möglich

¹ This is generally acknowledged as being true for classical and postclassical Greek – in Homeric Greek the past tenses always have past time reference, according to the grammars; cf. below.

war"², and likewise apropos present "unattainable wishes" (1898:206): "der Wunsch ist zwar noch für die Gegenwart gültig; aber die Erfüllbarkeit des Wunsches gehört der Vergangenheit an ..."³.

According to this view, the "irrealis" notion commonly associated with such constructions is only a secondary value which is not marked morphologically by the verb form⁴. If we now turn to the other approach, its adherents, by contrast, clearly look upon the past tense morphology in the "non-past" use in counterfactual conditionals, and usually also in "unattainable wishes", as a marker of an "irrealis" value to be connected with such contexts. Usually, diachronical considerations play an important role in this type of explanation. Starting out

² This type of outlook on counterfactual conditionals we also find e.g. in the works of Hermann, whose influence on the theory of Greek grammar in the 19th century hardly can be overestimated; cf. Hermann (1831), where the use of preterital forms of the indicative with *ἄν* expressing a) iteration in the *past* and b) "irrealis" in counterfactual conditionals with a *present* application are seen as basically having the same meaning: (p. 17 f.) "Itaque quum ἔλεγον sine restrictione dicatur, ἔλεγον ἄν refertur ad conditionem aliquam, e cuius eventu pendeat effectio. Nunc conditio illa aut impleta intelligitur, aut non impleta. Si impleta, ut ἔλεγον ἄν, ὅποτε τις ἐρωτῶη, veritas facti ex parte tollitur, ex parte affirmatur ... Non impleta autem si intelligitur conditio, ut ἔλεγον ἄν, εἰ ἐβουλόμην, veritas facti tota tollitur, affirmaturque tantum, impendisse eius effectioem"; (p. 17, *supra*) "Nam quidquid ad conditionem non impletam refertur ex eaque pendet, praeterito tempore dicendum est, quia illud, non esse impletam conditionem, res est iam praeterita ..." (my italics); (p. 18) "Ex his ... colligitur, ἔλεγον ἄν in utroque genere, et in eo quod in re facta, et in eo quod in re non facta versatur, eadem vim habere".

³ Cf. *similia* also in Humbert ([1945]1960), who in his discussion of "irreal" conditionals (as well as in that of "unattainable wishes") makes use of the notion of "possible du passé": "*L'irréel du présent* est exprimé comme un *possible du passé*" (p. 112) as well as, more explicitly, in Wakker (1994: 132 f.). A somewhat more cautious approach we find in Brunel (1980:236), who defines the temporal reference of the "modal" indicative in Greek, *inter alia* in constructions such as the ones which we discuss here, as "*passé ou présent orienté vers le passé*" (my italics); cf. *similia* also in Basset (1988a:27), along more general lines, but clearly with a bearing on such cases as are here treated: "... la conception de l'irréel comme signifiant que le fait exprimé n'a pas eu lieu le limite au temps vécu. En fait, même l'irréel du présent semble, dans cette conception, tourné vers le passé. On justifie ainsi l'usage d'une forme de passé pour signifier la valeur d'irréel".

⁴ Cf. - again apropos counterfactual conditionals - e.g. Smyth ([1920] 1956:519), who adopts the same line of approach as K-G and Humbert: "In the *form* of the protasis and the apodosis of unreal conditions there is nothing that denotes unreality, but, in the combination, the unreality of the protasis is always, and that of the apodosis generally, implied".

from the usage of tense and particles in this kind of contexts in earlier Greek, one argues that an “irreal”, non-past sense of the past tenses (usually the imperfect), in combination with the particle *ἄν*, has developed out of the “irreal” use of past tense forms with real past reference, where “irreality” or counterfactuality was, strictly speaking, unmarked and only to be adduced from the presence of *ἄν* and the general context; cf. Stahl (1907:285): “*Der Gebrauch des Präteritums zum Ausdruck der Irrealität* ist bei Homer noch nicht zur vollen Ausbildung gelangt . . .” (my italics)⁵. Also in more recent investigations aiming to account for the discussed phenomenon in Greek – *separatim* or within the framework of a cross-linguistical investigation – such as Seiler (1971), Vairel (1979) and James (1982), the position taken is that of the past tense marking actually making a semantic contribution towards “irreality” in these cases. The basic idea in these accounts is that the past tense (here and elsewhere) means something like “remote” or “distant”, which in the type of contexts we have discussed so far seems to amount to the meaning of “irreal”.

It should be clear already from the discussion so far that the task of providing a correct analysis of the Greek “non-past” use of the past tenses indeed involves some difficulties: the theoreticians of Greek grammar have chosen quite dissimilar points of departure for their explanations of the phenomenon in question, and even within the framework of each of these models of explanation there are several points which remain obscure. Clearly, some very basic questions still need to be answered which have so far not been settled in a satisfactory way. Does the past morphology in the “non-past” uses actually express a semantic value like “irrealis”? If this is the case, how shall we more precisely define the semantic notion involved? Does the semantics of the “non-past” uses of the past tenses help us to establish a new semantics for the past tenses generally in Greek? What is the contribution of the particle *ἄν* to the meaning of “irreal” past tense constructions in Greek?

⁵ Cf. also Wackernagel (1920:227 f.) – apropos “irreal” past uses in Greek as well as in other languages: “Die Bedeutungsverschiebung ist nichts absonderliches . . . Man wird wohl sagen dürfen, daß in solchen Fällen die Aufmerksamkeit des Sprechers nicht so sehr auf die Zeitstufe, als auf die durch die Ausdrucksform gegebene Irrealität gerichtet war und man daher ein solches irrealen Präteritum überhaupt als Ausdruck der Irrealität anwandte”. – A detailed analysis of the Greek use of the past indicative along these lines we find in Basset (1989). For further discussion with a bearing on this topic, cf. Ruijgh (1992:81–83) and Hettrich (1998:261 ff.).

Focusing, now, briefly on each of the two types of explanation advocated by the theoreticians of Greek grammar, we see that both of them have certain weak, or at least unclear, points. If the relation between past tense morphology and “irrealis” is indeed as clear-cut as has been suggested by the grammarians who see “irreal” past uses as being, in a way, really past (e. g. Kühner and Gerth), the contribution of the particle ἄν remains quite obscure. Further, for this line of interpretation it must be considered a problem that the Greek texts, as we shall see below, also provide testimony for “irreal” uses of the past tenses (with as well as without ἄν) which do not agree so well with the analysis suggested for counterfactual conditionals and “un-attainable wishes”. For the other type of approach – the one which considers the indicative “non-past” past morphology to denote a semantic value like “irrealis” (e. g. Stahl) – it could possibly be seen as a complication that in earlier Greek not the past tenses of the indicative, but the basically tenseless optative, was often employed in e. g. counterfactual conditionals – a usage which to some extent lives on in Classical Greek. Also cross-linguistically, as we shall see, there are certain problems connected with this kind of outlook.

Below I shall look into these various matters more in detail and try to answer, at least tentatively, the questions posed. The problem will be discussed from a synchronic as well as from a diachronic point of view.

2. “Irrealis” in Greek and other languages

In modern linguistic studies of “irreal” uses of past tenses – a phenomenon which cross-linguistically is quite wide-spread⁶ – both of the two lines of interpretation advocated by the traditional Greek grammarians find support. Among those who see an “irrealis” notion as being, in some sense, marked in such uses, Seiler (1971), Vairel (1979) and James (1982) have already been mentioned; Seiler and Vairel, on the one hand, are adherents of the quite popular theory that temporal and non-temporal (“irreal”) uses can be regarded as special cases of a general meaning like “remote” or “distant”⁷; James, on the other hand, suggests that the “hypothetical” uses she discusses

⁶ For discussion, cf. especially James (1982).

⁷ In modern language studies this approach seems to have been introduced by Joos (1964) (cf. Dahl, 1997).

are extensions from the basic meaning of past tenses. Support for the other approach of the Greek grammarians – the one which focuses on a “retrospective” feature in the meaning of counterfactual conditionals and “unattainable wishes” – is provided by Dahl (1997). Starting out from the observation that marking of “irreality” in languages is rarely achieved by means of a past tense alone, but usually by the combination of past tense and something else – often a futural marker, Dahl adopts a critical attitude towards the popular “past-as-unreal” hypothesis, introducing in its place an account which makes use of the concept of so-called “branching futures” and of diachronic considerations concerning counterfactual markers. According to Dahl’s analysis, which mainly focuses on counterfactual conditionals, past tenses are used in cases of counterfactuality because of, again, a choice point in the past which semantically plays an important role in this type of construction. How the use of the future markers fits into this picture and, further, what role the diachronical considerations play in Dahl’s theory, will be clear from the discussion below.

Surveying, now, again some Greek material I shall first adduce in more detail the theory of Dahl and see how it fits the Greek data. Afterwards I shall return to the other type of theory, viz. in the form it has been proposed by James. As we shall see, both of these theories provide important pieces of the “irreal past” puzzle in Ancient Greek.

It has already been mentioned that the use of the particle *äv* in “irreal” conditionals in Greek does not really get to be accounted for within the framework of the “retrospective” explanatory model proposed in traditional Greek grammar. Now, applying to the Greek material the theory suggested by Dahl, this problem could indeed be considered to get a solution. As was earlier mentioned, Dahl in his proposal focuses on the use in “irreal” conditionals of past tense and *future markers*: e. g. in the English sentence “If Mary were here now, John would be happy” the apodosis contains the auxiliary “would”, the past form of the future marker “will”. Applying, now, the “branching futures model”, as discussed by Tedeschi (1981), in which, basically, time is treated as having a tree-like structure, so that at any point in time there is one past and an infinite set of possible futures, Dahl finds an explanation for the combined use of past tense and a future marker in English and other languages. With respect to a point in time *t*, a counterfactual situation is located at a branch of the time-tree which can be found by going backwards in time from *t* (because of the past choice point, cf. above) and then

forwards along an alternative path⁸. If we now return to the Greek material, it will be seen how this approach provides a possible solution to the problem posed by the use of ἄν (and its epic equivalent κε) in “irreal” conditionals. This solution, then, having been introduced, it will, however, also be obvious why it most probably only should be seen as an *initially attractive* solution. Let us first consider the following passages:

(3) Hom. *Il.* 22.505 f. νῦν δ' ἄν πολλὰ πάθησι, φίλου ἀπὸ πατρὸς ἀμαρτῶν
 “But now, seeing he has lost his dear father, he will suffer ills full many”

(4) *ibid.* 1. 174 f. πᾶρ' ἔμοιγε καὶ ἄλλοι | οἳ κέ με τιμήσουσι ... “With me are others that will do me honour ...”

(5) Pl. *Ap.* 29 c 8 f. εἰὰν δὲ ἀλώς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων ἀποθανεῖ “and if you are caught doing this again, you will die”

In this use of ἄν/κε with the subjunctive – which in post-Homeric Greek is restricted to embedded sentences but occurs more freely in the older language – or with the future of the indicative – mainly found in Homer but occasionally also in later Greek⁹, these particles are clearly used with reference to events which are envisaged as futural. In Homeric Greek this use of the subjunctive and the future of the indicative contrasts with the employment of the same moods and tenses without the particle, but still with reference to futural events. As a parallel in post-Homeric Greek of a construction with a “prospective” use of ἄν contrasting with another construction without the particle (and presumably without this value) – in this case, however

⁸ Cf. Tedeschi (1981) (apropos sentences like “If Germany had invaded England, they would have won the war”, which can be interpreted: “It was the case: if Germany invades England, it will be the case: Germany wins the war”): “We evaluate counterfactual conditional sentences as if we returned to the past and looked at possible futures with respect for the past”, and Dahl, apropos Tedeschi’s proposal: “This account of the semantics of counterfactuals would thus predict precisely a combination of past and future markers in such sentences”.

⁹ E. g. Pl. *Rep.* 615 d 3 Οὐχ ἦκει ... οὐδ' ἄν ἦξει δεῦρο. Like other uses of the “modal” particle which do not suit the Procrustean notions of the editors, ἄν with the future of the indicative is often emended; cf. K-G (1898:209). (In this particular case the wording of the best MSS is kept by Burnet and other recent editors; the reading οὐδ' ἄν ἦξοι is found, however, in some older editions.)

differing in mood and tense – subjunctive conditionals introduced by *ἐάν* *versus* future indicative conditionals introduced by *εἰ* may be mentioned¹⁰:

(6) Hom. *Il.* 1.338 f. τῷ δ' αὐτῷ μάρτυροι ἔστων | ... |, εἰ ποτε δὴ αὐτε |
 χρειώ ἐμεῖο γένηται ... “Howbeit, let these twain themselves be witnesses
 ..., if so be hereafter there shall be need of me ...”

(7) *ibid.* 4.182 ὧς ποτέ τις ἐρέει “So shall some man speak in aftertime”

(8) Soph. *El.* 1209 f. ὦ τάλαιν' ἐγὼ σέθεν, | ... τῆς σῆς εἰ στερήσομαι ταφῆς
 “Ah! woe for thee, ... woe is me, if I am not to give thee burial”

In cases like (3), (4) and (5) it has been proposed that *ἄν/κε* has a *temporal* value, giving to the containing sentences a sense of “prospective futurity”, or the like, which is missing in (6) and (7) and (8)¹¹. It ought to be evident how this kind of “prospective” value of *ἄν/κε* for the Greek material, at least upon an initial survey of the Greek data, indeed could be seen as providing a solution of the problem posed by the use of these particles in “irreal” past constructions¹². Consulting more Greek material, however, this solution seems less attractive:

¹⁰ For discussion, cf. e. g. Gildersleeve (1876).

¹¹ Cf. Basset (1988b:31 f.): “... la référence à l'avenir est fondamentale dans tout les emplois de la particule avec un subjonctif comme avec un futur l'indicatif ...” In this *temporal* use of *ἄν/κε* (Basset also distinguishes a “*logical*” use), two particles which Basset looks upon as always expressing “une enchaînement prospective”, the domain of *ἄν/κε* are situations and the effect of their use is “un enchaînement temporel”; where the same moods and tenses are used without the particle, the temporal reference of the sentences is still seen as futural but without this special shade of meaning.

¹² From this point of view, it is certainly interesting to find in Homer an instance where a past tense form of μέλλειν is apparently employed as an equivalent to the combination of *ἄν/κε* with a past indicative in a *de facto* counterfactual conditional, viz. in *Od.* 13.384 f. φθίσεσθαι κακὸν οἶτον ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἔμελλον, εἰ μὴ μοι σὺ ἕκαστα ... κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες. Most probably, however, the two constructions are *not* equivalent (*pace* Smyth 1956:437); cf. Basset's (1989:216) treatment of this issue, where the instance just referred to and *Il.* 5.679 f. καὶ νῦν κ' ἔτι πλέονας Λυκίων κτάνε διὸς Ὀδυσσεύς, | εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὄξυ νόσησε ... are contrasted in the following way: “... le rapprochement de κ' ... κτάνε et φθίσεσθαι ἔμελλον est illusoire parce que les structure des deux tours sont différents. Dans φθίσεσθαι ἔμελλον, une marque temporelle de passé (augment et désinence secondaire) est appliquée à une périphrase

(9) Hom. *Il.* 2.229 f. ἦ ἔτι καὶ χρυσοῦ ἐπιδύεσθαι, ὃν κέ τις οἴσει | Τρωῶν ἱποδάμων ἐξ’ Ἰλίου νίος ἄποινα, | ὃν κεν ἐγὼ δήσας ἀγάγω ἢ ἄλλος’ Ἀχαιῶν ...; “Or dost thou still want gold also, which some man of the horsetaming Trojans shall bring thee out of Ilios as a ransom for his son, whom I ... (shall) have bound and led away or some other of the Achaeans?”

(10) *ibid.* 1.204 f. ... τὸ δὲ καὶ τελέεσθαι οἶω· | ἧς ὑπεροπλησι τάχ’ ἄν ποτε θυμὸν ὀλέσση “... and methinks this shall verily be brought to pass: through his own owerweening pride shall he presently lose his life”

(11) Soph. *Phil.* 564 f. Οὐκ οἶδ’ ἀκούσας δ’ ἄγγελος πάρεμί σοι ... Πῶς οὖν Ὀδυσσεὺς πρὸς τὰδ’ οὐκ αὐτάγγελος πλεῖν ἦν ἐτοῖμος ...; Κεῖνός γ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλον ἄνδρα ὁ Τυδέως τε παῖς ἔστελλον, ἠνίκ’ ἐξανηγόμεν ἐγώ. Πρὸς ποῖον ἄν¹³ τόνδ’ αὐτὸς Ὀδυσσεὺς ἔπλει; “I know not; I report but what I heard”. “How came it that Odysseus had no mind to sail on his own business ...?” “He and the son of Tydeus were engaged in quest of yet another, when I sailed.” “Another? Who this second man for whom Odysseus sailed himself?”

Here we find ἄν and κε in typical *opaque* or *intensional* contexts, i. e. in contexts which do not deal with the actual world, but, in one way or other, with alternative worlds – e. g. worlds of belief, fear or purpose¹⁴. In (9) and (10) the clauses containing the particles are

prospective φθίσεσθαι μέλλειν. ... Dans κ’ ... κτάνε en revanche, κε est appliqué à une forme qui est déjà marquée aspectuellement (aoriste) et temporellement (passé)”; cf. *similia* also in Basset (1979).

¹³ In the teeth of the whole manuscript evidence some editors have decided to emend the text in this point (Dobree reads αὖ instead of ἄν, Dissen οὖν). Considering, however, the use of this particle in Greek generally, as well as the distribution of comparable markers in other languages (cf. the material discussed in James 1982), there is no need for an emendation here.

¹⁴ In intensional (or opaque) contexts expressions refer *indirectly*, i. e. they refer to their *senses* – to their intensions – whereas expressions in extensional (or transparent) contexts apply to their *reference* – to their extensions. One typical trait of intensional contexts is that substitution of coreferential expressions may not preserve the truth value of the entire statement; e. g. from “Bertie believes that the owner of the supermarket is rich”, we cannot always infer the truth of “Bertie believes that Mr Jones is rich”, since Bertie may not know that the owner of the supermarket and Mr Jones are the same person. In an extensional context, by contrast, substitution of coreferentials can take place *salva veritate*, cf. “Bertie is talking to the owner of the supermarket”, which in the case under discussion implies “Bertie is talking to Mr Jones”. In intensional contexts, which are induced by various linguistic items, e. g. *modals* and so-called *verbs of attitude*, expressions have reference in al-

within the scope of overt intensional (or: world-creating) predicates – ἐπιθεύει (“want”) and οἶω (“believe”). In (11) the situation is somewhat less clear, but also here, in an *oratio obliqua*-like construction reporting *hearsay*, a governing intensional predicate can easily be reconstructed (e. g. λέγει (τις) “asserts”). In fact, it can be argued that *all* contexts where ἄν and κε occur can be described as intensional and that the use of the particle reflects this property of the context¹⁵. With such an approach, ἄν/κε is always to be seen as a modal or intensional particle which occurs as a marker of so-called *strong intensional contexts* like those constituted by certain modal expressions and verbs of attitude¹⁶. Now, since tense (as well as aspect) does not belong to the categories which set up strong intensional contexts, attributing to ἄν/κε a value of “prospective futurity”, which could indeed account for its use in “irreal” counterfactuals, does obviously not fit very well into the picture. Moreover, even in such uses of the particle where reference to future states-of-affairs, in one way or other, is involved, we can usually distinguish some additional “more powerful” shade of meaning which quite easily can be connected to the particle’s character of a marker of strong intensional contexts [“belief”, “purpose”, etc.; cf. for instance (3)–(5)]. The supposition that ἄν/κε also in the type of contexts looked into in this paper has the function which has just been touched upon, constitutes, as we shall see later, a not unimportant piece in the “irreal past” puzzle in Greek.

Staying presently with Dahl’s account of counterfactuals, light can be shed upon another important aspect of the corresponding Greek construction. Apropos the use in many languages of perfect auxiliaries in counterfactual conditionals with past reference (an idiom which is hard to incorporate into the “branching futures”-analysis) Dahl discusses a grammaticalization process which is of great importance for our correct understanding of the semantics of such constructions. Adducing material from Germanic languages (English, German, Swedish, Gothic) and from Bulgarian Dahl shows that the system of markings in counterfactuals – viewed from a diachronical perspective

ternative worlds (e. g. in Bertie’s “belief-worlds”), in extensional contexts they have reference in the “real” world. – For an introduction to this matter, cf. for instance McCawley (1981), especially 326 ff., and Partee, ter Meulen and Wall (1993), 401 ff.

¹⁵ This is the position taken in Gerö (2000).

¹⁶ Terminology and definition taken over from von Stechow (1995:10 f.).

– does not remain stable, but undergoes processes of renewal with past time reference serving as a starting-point. As a consequence of this grammaticalization process “a construction with the original function of a counterfactual with past time reference may be reinterpreted as a counterfactual without time restriction”¹⁷. As we shall now see, this quite general law of grammaticalization for counterfactual markers (“Dahl’s cycle”) in a quite satisfactory way explains how the past tenses initially got to be employed in Greek counterfactuals, thus providing theoretical support for the intuitions of some early theoreticians of Greek grammar concerning this kind of data in Homeric and later Greek. Let us first take into consideration the following two examples:

(12) Hom. *Il.* 23.274 f. εἰ μὲν νῦν ἐπὶ ἄλλῳ ἀεθλεύοιμεν Ἀχαιοί, | ἦ τ’ ἂν ἐγὼ τὰ πρῶτα λαβὼν κλισίηνδε φεροίμην “If for some other’s honour we Achaeans were now holding contests, surely I would win the first prize and bear it to my hut”

(13) *ibid.* 5.311 f. Καὶ νῦν κεν ἐνθ’ ἀπόλοιο ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Αἰνείας, | εἰ μὴ ἄρ’ ὄξυ νόησε Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἀφροδίτη “And now would the king of men, Aeneas, have perished, had not the daughter of Zeus, Aphrodite, been quick to mark”

In Homeric Greek, as has already been touched upon above, we frequently find the optative mood used in counterfactuals – in the apodosis in combination with ἄν/κε. As is illustrated by (12) and (13), the optative forms were employed indiscriminately for both past and present time reference in such cases¹⁸. *Exclusively with past time reference*, however, we in Homer also find past forms of the indicative used in counterfactuals; the apodosis, again, has ἄν/κε¹⁹:

¹⁷ One of Dahl’s examples of this cyclic development is as follows. In Germanic languages there is a tendency (noted by e.g. Welin (1970) and Leirbukt (1991)) to use pluperfect conditionals without time restriction (e.g., in English, “If I had had money enough (at the present moment), I would have paid you”, which “chiefly in colloquial speech” (Jespersen 1924:266) may be used also of present time). The pluperfect conditionals in Germanic languages, however – initially with *only* past time reference – seem, in their turn, to have been introduced as an innovation to an older system where, again, time reference was *not* marked in counterfactuals (In Gothic the so-called past optative was used in counterfactuals irrespective of time reference).

¹⁸ Occasionally we find this use also in the authors of the classical period; cf. e.g. Eur. *Med.* 568 οὐδ’ ἂ σὺ φαίης, εἴ σε μὴ κνίζοι λέχος.

(14) *Il.* 3.373 f. *καὶ νύ κεν εἴρουσέν τε καὶ ἄσπετον ἦρατο κῆδος, | εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὄξυ νόησε Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἀφροδίτη* “And now would Menelaus have dragged him away, and won glory unspeakable, had not Aphrodite, daughter of Zeus, been quick to see ...”

In Classical Greek, as we know, the past indicative is the form normally used for past as well as present time reference (with only aspect, to some extent, to distinguish the two uses²⁰); i. e.: in the way predicted by “Dahl’s cycle”, a counterfactual marker which originally had only past tense reference gets to be used without this time restriction. From this state-of-affairs, thus, we can conclude that no simple extension of the meaning of the Greek past tenses underlies their use in counterfactual conditionals (as it has been suggested by James in her cross-linguistical discussion)²¹. However, I think, the “synchronic snapshots” we can recover from different stages of the development of Greek counterfactual markers (use of the optative, etc.) can in fact be seen as pointing in the same direction as the analysis above of *ἄν/κε* as a marker of strong intensional contexts. How I more precisely look upon this matter will be made clear in section 3.

Turning now to the theory of James (1982), who, as it was initially mentioned, considers “hypothetical” uses of past tenses in the languages she investigates (including e. g. English, French, Russian and Greek, as well as non-Indo-European languages) to be extensions of their temporal use, it is interesting to note that in a considerable part of her material there are several other environments – beside counterfactuals and “unattained wishes” – where past tense morphology is used without past time reference. Such environments, for which James sees as the common denominator that they involve a high degree of

¹⁹ Cf. e. g. Chantaine (1953:226 f.).

²⁰ Cf. e. g. Bornemann and Risch (1978:229 f.): “Der Indikativ eines Nebentempus mit *ἄν* steht ... als Irrealis zur Bezeichnung der *Nichtwirklichkeit* ... Dabei wird *das Tempus nur mit Hinblick auf den Aspekt gewählt*. So heißen *ἔλεγον ἄν* und *εἶπον ἄν* beide sowohl: ‘ich würde sagen’ ... als auch: ‘ich hätte gesagt’ ... (Wenn für die Nichtwirklichkeit in der Gegenwart oft das Imperfekt, für die Nichtwirklichkeit in der Vergangenheit oft der Aorist steht, so beruht diese Verteilung auf der Tatsache, daß es sich im ersten Fall häufiger um ein allgemeines Geschehen, im zweiten Fall häufiger um einen Einzelvorgang handelt, also jeweils für den Griechen nur um Aspektunterschiede)”.

²¹ Cf. Dahl’s general conclusion (1997, sect. 7).

“remoteness from reality”, are e. g.: sentences or complements expressing *obligation*, *hearsay* or *possibility*, *purpose* clauses, and complements to verbs like “*imagine*” or “*suppose*”. Presented with this material, one may now ask if also in Greek such uses can be found (James, for her part, claims that counterfactual conditionals and wishes are the only “hypothetical” environments where past tense is employed in Greek). And indeed there are comparable “irreal” cases of the past tenses, usually with ἄν/κε, in the Greek texts, albeit not very frequent and rather ill-fated in the hands of the editors. Cf. e. g. the following passages:

(15) Thuc. 5.68.2 Τάξις μὲν ἦδε καὶ παρασκευὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἦν, τὸ δὲ στερατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων μείζον ἐφάνη. ἀριθμὸν δὲ γράψαι, ἢ καθ’ ἐκάστους ἰκατέρων ἢ ζύμπαντας, οὐκ ἂν ἐδυνάμην ἀκριβῶς²² “Such was the order and the composition of the two sides. The army of the Lacedaemonians appeared the larger; but an accurate account of the number, either of the separate contingents or of the total on either side, I could not possibly give you”

(16) [Pl.] *Theag.* 127 d 5 f. ὀπόθεν δὲ ἔδοξέ σοι τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ ἂν μᾶλλον τὸν σὸν υἰὸν οἴός τ’ ἦν ὠφελῆσαι πρὸς τὸ πολίτην ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἢ σὺ αὐτός ... τοῦτο πάνυ θαυμάζω²³ “But how you came to form this opinion, that I ought to be better able to be of use to your son in his aim of becoming a good citizen than you yourself ... – this does fill me with wonder”

(17) Eur. *I.T.* 380 ff. τὰ τῆς θεοῦ δὲ μέφομαι σοφίσματα, ἢ τις βροτῶν μὲν ἦν τις ἄψεται φόνου. | ... , βωμῶν ἀπείργει, μυσαρὸν ὡς ἡγουμένη | αὐτὴ δὲ θυσίαις ἦδεται βροτοκτόνοις. | οὐκ ἔσθ’ ὅπως ἔτεκεν ἂν ἡ Διὸς δάμαρ | Λητῶ τσαυτὴν ἀμαθίαν²⁴ “Out on this Goddess’s false subtleties, who, if one stain his hands with blood of men, ... bars him her altars, holding him defiled, yet joys herself in human sacrifice! It cannot be that Zeus’ bride Leto should have brought forth such folly”

²² Stahl here suggests *δυναίμην* instead of *ἐδυνάμην*.

²³ On the strength of a testimony in Priscianus ἦν is by Burnet changed into εἶν. Cobet suggests excision of ἄν.

²⁴ For this passage Porson suggested the emendation ἔτικτεν (as a replacement of ἔτεκεν ἄν), which is taken over by e. g. the Loeb edition; Diggle, for his part, keeps the wording of the MSS.

(18) Is. 11.6 καίτοι τόν γε πράττοντά τι δίκαιον οὐ προσῆκεν ἀπορεῖν ἀλλ' εὐθὺς λέγειν, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διόμνυσθαι καὶ ... παρέχεσθαι μάρτυρας, ἵνα μᾶλλον ἂν ἐπιστεύετο ὑφ' ὑμῶν²⁵ "Yet one who is acting in good faith ought not to be embarrassed, but ought to be able to answer immediately, and not only so but also swear an oath and produce witnesses ..., so that you shall attach greater credence to what he says"

In (15) we have a "potentialis" use of the past indicative with ἄν – a use where we in Greek would usually find an optative form; in (16) the past indicative seems to express probability, or perhaps again "potentialis"; (17) shows another use of the same idiom, viz. as a kind of negative polarity item after οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ("it cannot be"); in (18), finally, the past tense form is located in a purpose clause, which furthermore is within the scope of a deontic expression ((οὐ) προσῆκεν). The fact that there are such uses of the past tenses in Greek, usually with the "modal" particle, is, I think most important for the analysis of Greek counterfactuals and "unattainable wishes". As we shall see, however, it is possible to make sense out of this additional material without subscribing to James' theory that the "irreal"/ "hypothetical" uses of the past tenses are extensions of their temporal use.

3. Sketch of a theory

Above I have pointed out three factors which I regard as important for the analysis of "irreal" uses of the past tenses in Greek, viz. a) the general function of ἄν/κε as a modal or "intensional" particle, b) the "life-cycle" of the Greek counterfactual markers, c) the existence of a wider range of environments for non-past uses of the past tenses in Greek than is usually assumed. These factors will consequently all play a role when I now turn to the task of sketching an adequate semantics of the Greek "irrealis" construction. Aside of the works by Dahl and James already mentioned, the analysis below draws very much upon the treatment of counterfactual conditionals in von Stechow (1994, 1995, 1996).

To begin with, much of the mystery surrounding the use of past tense morphology in Greek sentences like (2) seems to dissolve if we

²⁵ Editors and commentators have doubted the authenticity of ἄν also in this passage; in the Loeb edition, for instance, the particle is bracketed. Cf. also Goodwin (1889:121).

simply look upon the combination of a past form of the indicative and the particle as the Greek equivalent of a *conditionalis mood*, where the past tense morphology and $\alpha\upsilon$ are mood markers not necessarily to be compositionally accounted for in an exhaustive way. With this kind of an outlook, as we shall see, the “irreal” use of the past tenses in Greek can be seen as a kind of *subordination phenomenon*. Staying presently with counterfactual conditionals, the perhaps most salient use of the “irreal” past, it is easy to see that we here again are dealing with an intensional context of a similar type to those set up by modals and verbs of attitude (“strong intensional contexts”). Again alternative worlds are introduced – in (2), for instance, we are invited to consider the worlds where the statement “Love is only one” is true, and something is then said to be true in those worlds, viz. “It is all right”. If we further recall that in the case of (11) we had to reconstruct a world-creating predicate (“asserts”) in order to analyze the sentence correctly, we also come closer to an understanding of the construction now at issue. Here we have to reconstruct an intensional adverb “would” on which the protasis and the apodosis, so to speak, are dependent. This adverb quantifies universally over worlds and points of time where a certain implicational relation holds true ($p \rightarrow q$), and operates strictly speaking not on sentences but on propositions, i. e. on abstract units without absolute tense, like “Eros BE only one” and “It BE all right”. We now see how counterfactuality equals to subordination and how the “fake” past tense together with the conjunction $\epsilon\iota$ and the particle $\alpha\upsilon$ can be seen as simply marking the construction.

As we have seen in the Homeric material, the optative (usually with $\alpha\upsilon/\kappa\epsilon$) was in older Greek employed indiscriminately for present as well as past time reference. When the past indicative (again with $\alpha\upsilon/\kappa\epsilon$) got to be used in such cases it was first only with past time reference; later this use of the past indicative was extended also to cover present time reference. Now, what this development shows, I think, is the origin of the use of the past indicative with $\alpha\upsilon/\kappa\epsilon$ as a conditional mood in Greek. Whereas in cases like (14) the only morphological reflexes of the counterfactual construction are $\epsilon\iota$ and $\alpha\upsilon$, in later Greek also the past tense morphology was reinterpreted as an indication of the construction. This is how an originally “real” past became the “fake” past in sentences like (2). With other words, because of a certain grammaticalization process (“Dahl’s cycle”), not only $\epsilon\iota$ and $\alpha\upsilon$ came to be used as signals of the subordination under the intensional adverb “would”, but also the past tense morphology.

Whereas past tense in such cases is completely “fake” and only to

be understood *qua* past in the light of the history of Greek counterfactual markers, the situation seems to be quite different for ἄν/κε. Like the past tense morphology, the particle is one of the “grammatical ingredients” of the post-Homeric conditional mood, but from a compositional point of view, ἄν/κε – unlike the past tense marking – can be seen as actually making a semantic contribution. As I have mentioned above, it can be argued that all contexts where ἄν/κε occurs can be described as intensional (“strong intensional contexts”) and that the use of the particle reflects this property of the context. Since, now, as we have seen, also counterfactual conditionals set up such a context, the use of ἄν/κε in this type of sentence makes very good sense. In order to understand better this use, however, we should recall that the intensional adverb “would” – like other world-creating items – operates on *propositions* (cf. above). Propositions, as is well-known, are in explicit semantic representations usually introduced by an *intensional operator* (\wedge)²⁶, and this “logical item”, it seems, is precisely what is reflected in ἄν/κε²⁷. For our counterfactual conditionals, however, there seems to be a problem involved with such an analysis: we saw above that the intensional adverb “would” operates on *two* propositions, like in (2) “Eros BE only one” and “It BE all right”. How come, then, that in this type of construction only the apodosis has ἄν/κε, while the particle is missing in the protasis? This circumstance, however, seems less of a problem, if we take into view passages such as the following:

(19) Lys. 14.21 ... ὑμᾶς δὲ χρῆ ὑπολαμβάνειν πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι, εἰ πάντες Ἀλκιβιάδῃ ὅμοιοι ἐγένοντο, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τῶν στρατηγῶν (οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶχον ὅτου ἡγοῦντο) “... you ought to observe, in the first place, that if everyone had shown the same character as Alcibiades there would have been no need for our generals, – for they would have had nobody to lead”

(20) Hom. *Il.* 23.526 f. εἰ δὲ κ' ἔτι προτέρῳ γένετο δρόμος ἀμφοτέροισι, ἰ τῷ κέν μιν παρέλασσε ... “And if the course had been yet longer for the twain, then had he passed him by ...”

In the parenthetic clause in (19) introduced by οὐδὲ γὰρ the particle is missing, although the counterfactual meaning of the sentence would

²⁶ Cf. *passim* in e. g. von Stechow (1991) and Cann (1993).

²⁷ With Arnim von Stechow’s words (personal communication): “Da sitzt wahrscheinlich der Intensor”. – For more discussion about this approach to the semantics of the Greek so-called modal particles, cf. Gerö (2000).

seem to require its use. To be more precise, the parenthetic clause again, within the framework of a counterfactual conditional, represents another proposition than οὐδὲν . . . ἔδει τῶν στρατηγῶν and could then, from a semantic point of view, be expected to exhibit its own reflex of the intensional operator. Since, however, after οὐδὲν . . . ἔδει τῶν στρατηγῶν the same construction is continued – where we furthermore have to supply the same protasis (i. e. the worlds for which “There is no need for generals” and “They have nobody to lead” are asserted as true are the same) – and this structure is *clear from the context*, ἄν can be omitted²⁸. In the protasis of a counterfactual conditional, now, we have, in a way, a similar situation. As argued above, such a clause could be expected to exhibit ἄν/κε in the way we find this “intensionality marker” in the apodosis. In this case, however, the conjunction εἰ and the conditionalis mood in the apodosis mark the construction sufficiently, so that the past tense alone can be used as a mood marker in the protasis²⁹. – (20), on the other hand, shows that in Homer, where the use of ἄν/κε is more varied than in later Greek, the intensional particle in fact *is* sometimes found also in the protasis of a counterfactual conditional. The reflex of intensionality in the protasis that we were looking for thus exists, in Homer as well as (occasionally) in other authors³⁰, and also its later omission “for reasons of economy” can be well understood. The omission of ἄν/κε in the protasis, it thus seems, does not pose a serious problem for the analysis of Greek counterfactuals here presented.

As has been mentioned above, another important piece in the “irreal past” puzzle in Greek is the existence of a wider range of environments for the non-past use of the past tenses than is usually assumed by the traditional grammars (p. 190 f.). This circumstance, I think, completes the picture of the past tense morphology in combination with ἄν/κε as being a conditional mood in Greek, and, further, of ἄν/κε in this

²⁸ Baiter adds ἄν, but the omission of the particle in cases like this is not uncommon; for more examples, cf. e. g. Frohberger (1863).

²⁹ Cf. *similia* in Goodwin (1889:144, note 1) apropos the way ἄν/κε in Homer is sometimes employed, sometimes omitted in the protasis of the same type of conditionals: “As I do not profess to have any distinct theory of the origin or the original meaning of either κε or ἄν, I have not attempted to define their force, except so far as *they emphasise what we see by usage may be implied by the sentence without their aid*” (my italics).

³⁰ Cf. e. g. Hdt. 1.174.5 Ζεὺς γὰρ κ' ἔθηκε νῆσον, εἴ κ' ἐβούλετο and Ar. Lys. 1098 f. . . . δεινά τᾶν πεπόνθεμες, | αἶ κε εἶδον ἀμὲ τῶνδρες ἀναπεφλασμένως.

construction being a marker of intensionality. As is well known, the conditionalis in various languages which possess such a modal category, whether “non-past” past tense marking plays a role in the conditional paradigm (e. g. French) or not (e. g. Finnish), is often used in counterfactual conditionals *and* in certain other environments for which the semantic notion of “irrealis” could be seen as the common denominator³¹. The more general distribution in Greek of the markers used in counterfactual conditionals thus seems quite normal. Now, when in James (1982) cross-linguistically the multi-environmental use of past tense morphology and a modal/futural marker in combination is discussed (for which she sometimes uses the terminology *conditionalis*), she argues, as we have seen, that the use of the past tense in such cases is an extension of its temporal use, and further that the common denominator of the contexts where this extended use of the past tense is found is “remoteness from reality”. As for Greek, at least in counterfactual conditionals, I have already taken issue with the theory of an extension of the temporal meaning of the past tenses as underlying the “irreal” use (p. 189 f.). Also the idea that in Greek the past tense morphology qua *past* tense morphology semantically contributes towards a meaning of “remoteness” I do not consider correct. How shall we then define this wider-range use of an *ex hypothesi* conditionalis mood in Greek? In a similar way as in the discussion above about counterfactuals, I think that the categories of *subordination* and *intensionality* also here provide the key concepts. In (15)–(18), like in counterfactuals like (2) and in “unattainable wishes” like (1), we are clearly dealing with *alternative worlds* and *quantification over worlds* (or: spheres of worlds). In (1) the concern is with a set of “wish – or belief – worlds” where the statement “Thou hast a better heart” holds true; (15) – (18) can be interpreted in a similar way, letting us consider worlds of probability, purpose, or the like. The use of the “fake” past morphology – usually together with $\acute{\alpha}\nu/\kappa\epsilon$ – in these cases may, then, again, like in the counterfactual conditionals, be seen as a subordination phenomenon. In a similar way as in the case of the intensional adverb “would”, the clauses where these mood markers are used are within the scope of (overt or reconstructable) intensionality-inducing predicates. Also the use of $\acute{\alpha}\nu/\kappa\epsilon$ in most of the cases under discussion makes sense, viz. under the assumption that this particle is a reflex of the intensionality of the context in

³¹ As for French, cf. James (1982:386). A comprehensive account of the conditionalis mood in Finnish we find e. g. in Fromm (1982:268 f.).

which it appears. Clearly, the use of the conditionalis mood in Greek is not as wide-spread as in some modern languages (e. g. Russian³²), competing as it does with other constructions (ἄν/κε with other moods and tenses, infinite constructions, etc.). It thus seems that it is only possible to detect a *tendency* in Greek to use a conditional mood as a marker of subordination under intensional predicates. Some of the scarcity in standard Attic Greek literature of the construction outside of the apodosis of counterfactual conditionals may, however, be due to a certain colloquial or dialectal ring of this idiom in its wider use³³. Textual criticism, for sure, has further contributed to its apparent rarity (cf. e. g. the variant readings of the examples (15)–(18) discussed above).

4. Final words

In the introduction to this paper I mentioned some questions which, to my mind, have not been answered in an adequate way by the traditional accounts of the “irreal” use of the past tenses in Greek. I think we are now in the position to provide a more satisfactory solution. The past morphology in the Greek “non-past” uses, as I have argued, does not express a semantic value like “irrealis”. The past tense marking in these uses is, from a synchronic point of view, completely “fake”; the past tense marking, together with the particle ἄν (κε), is only a mood marker. Consequently, the semantics of the “non-past” uses of the past tenses does not help us to establish a new semantics for the past tenses generally in Greek. As to the contribution of the particle ἄν to the meaning of “irreal” past tense constructions in Greek, a semantic analysis of the constructions involved show that ἄν in these cases has the function of a marker of intensionality.

³² Cf. the data for this language adduced by James (1982).

³³ Cf. the above-quoted example from Aristophanes (p.195, note 31), where past tense with κε is used in the protasis of a counterfactual conditional. The speaker is here a Spartan and the passage heavily dialectal.

References

- Basset, L. (1979): *Les emplois périphrastiques du verbe grec μέλλειν*. Lyon.
- (1988a): “Qu’est-ce que l’irréel?”. In: *Logopédies. Mélanges ... à J. Taillardat*. Paris.
- (1988b): “Valeurs et emplois de la particule dite modale en grec ancien”. In: *In the footsteps of Raphael Kühner* (eds. A. Rijksbaron, H.A. Mulder, G.C. Wakker). Amsterdam, 27–37.
- (1989): *La syntaxe de l’imaginaire. Étude des modes et des négations dans l’Iliade et l’Odyssée*. (Collection de la Maison de l’Orient Méditerranéen 20, série philologique 2.) Lyon.
- Bornemann E. and Risch, E. (1978): *Griechische Grammatik*, 2nd edition. Frankfurt am Main.
- Brunel, J. (1980): “Périodes conditionnelles et optatif en grec”, *BSL* 75.
- Cann, R. (1993): *Formal semantics. An introduction*. Cambridge.
- Chantraine, P. (1953): *Grammaire Homérique, II: Syntaxe*. Paris.
- Dahl, Ö. (1997): “The relation between past time reference and counterfactuality: A new look”. In Athanasiadou, A. et al. (eds), *On Conditionals Again*, Amsterdam, 97–114.
- Frohberger, H. (1863): “Über die Unterordnung mehrerer Verba unter ein ἀπό κοινοῦ stehendes ἄν”, *Philologus* 19, 599–613.
- Fromm, H. (1982): *Finnische Grammatik*. Heidelberg.
- Gerö, E.-C. (2000): “The usage of ἄν and κε in Ancient Greek: Towards a unified description”. *Glotta* 76, 177–191.
- Gildersleeve, B.L. (1876): “On εἰ with the Future Indicative and εἰάν with the Subjunctive in the Tragic Poets”. In: *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 2–23.
- Goodwin, W.W. (1889): *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*. London.
- Hermann, G. (1831): “De particula ἄν libri IV”. (= *Opuscula*, 4, Leipzig, 181–204).
- Hettrich, H. (1998). “Die Entstehung des homerischen Irrealis der Vergangenheit”. In *Mir curad: Studies in honor of Calvert Watkins* (eds. J. Jasanoff et al.). Innsbruck, 261–270.
- Humbert, J. ([1945] 1960): *Syntaxe grecque*. 3rd edition. Paris.
- James, D. (1982): “Past tense and the hypothetical: a cross-linguistic study”. *Studies in Language* VI, 3, 375–403.
- Jespersen, O. (1924): *The Philosophy of Grammar*. London.
- Joos, M. (1964): *The English Verb*. Madison, Wisc.
- Kühner and Gerth = Kühner, R., *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*, 2. Teil: *Satzlehre*, 3rd ed. revised by B. Gerth, I-II (1898), (1904). Hannover/Leipzig.
- McCawley, J.D. (1981): *Everything that Linguists have Always Wanted to Know about Logic ...* Oxford.

- Partee, B.H., ter Meulen, A., Wall, R.E. (1993): *Mathematical Methods in Linguistics*. Dordrecht, etc.
- Ruijgh, C.J. (1992). “L’emploi le plus ancien et les emplois plus récentes de la particule $\kappa\epsilon/\acute{\omicron}v$.” *La Langue et les textes en grec ancien. Actes du Colloque P. Chantraine* (ed. F. Létoublon). Amsterdam, 75–88.
- Seiler, H.J. (1971): “Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek”. *Language* 47, 79–89.
- Smyth, H.W. ([1920] 1956): *Greek Grammar*, 2nd ed., rev. by G.M. Messing. Cambridge, Mass.
- Stechow, A. v. (1991): *Intensionale Semantik – eingeführt anhand der Temporalität*, Universität Konstanz. *Arbeitspapiere der Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft*.
- (1994): “Tense in Intensional Contexts”, In *The Blaubeuren Papers* (eds. F. Hamm, A. von Stechow), Semantics in Natural Language. Seminar für Sprachwissenschaft, Universität Tübingen.
- (1995): “On the Proper Treatment of Tense”. SALT.
- (1996): “Comments on Sabine Iatridou’s ‘Fakes’”. Ms., Universität Tübingen.
- Tedeschi, P. (1981): “Some Evidence for a Branching-Futures Semantic Model”. In: *Syntax and semantics 14: Tense and Aspect* (eds. P. Tedeschi, A. Zaenen). New York.
- Vairel, H. (1979): “Moindre actualité et moindre actualisation”. *Revue Roumaine de Linguistique* 24, 563–84.
- Wackernagel, J. (1920, 1928): *Vorlesungen über Syntax*, I–II. Basel.
- Wakker, G. (1994). *Conditions and Conditionals: An Investigation of Ancient Greek*. Amsterdam.

Suppletion und Defektivität im griechischen Verbum: εὔδειν und δραθεῖν¹

VON DANIEL KÖLLIGAN, Köln

Zusammenfassung: εὔδειν und δραθεῖν bilden im Griechischen ein suppletives Paradigma. In der Sprache Homers bedeuten beide Verben „sich schlafen legen“ und „schlafen“, nicht aber „einschlafen“. Erst in nachhomerischer Zeit findet sich das Paar Prs. δραθάνειν: Aor. δραθεῖν / δραθειν in der Bedeutung „einschlafen“. Im Suppletionsverhältnis kann δραθεῖν die Bedeutungen „schlafen“ und „einschlafen“ als komplexiven bzw. ingressiven Aorist zu εὔδειν ausgebildet haben.

§ 1. In seiner Griechischen Grammatik Bd. II S. 257 f. nennt Schwyzler unter den seiner und wohl allgemeiner Ansicht nach suppletiven Verben wie φέρειν: ἐνεγκεῖν, λέγειν: εἰπεῖν u. a. auch das Paar εὔδειν: καταδραθεῖν, allerdings ohne dies weiter zu begründen. Da in seiner Liste auch fragliche Fälle wie ζητεῖν: εὔρειν und εἶναι: φῶναι (neben γενέσθαι) aufgeführt sind, scheint eine Überprüfung dieser These nicht unangebracht. Zugrundegelegt werden dabei die von Strunk 1977 erarbeiteten Kriterien, die eine Bestimmung eines Formenpaares als suppletiv erlauben: 1. Synchrone Beleglage, 2. Hinlängliche Überschneidung der lexikalischen Bedeutung, 3. Komplementäre Verteilung im Paradigma. Damit sind direkte Vergleiche zwischen Autoren verschiedener Zeiten ausgeschlossen (1), etwa zwischen Homer und Platon, Platon und Plutarch usf. Bezüglich der Bedeutungsüberschneidung (2) ist einerseits damit zu rechnen, daß Verben, die in ein Suppletionsverhältnis eintreten, Bedeutungsnuancen verlieren und neue vom Suppletionspartner übernehmen. Unterschiedliche Ausgangsbedeutungen liegen z. B. bei ἐσθίειν: φαγεῖν: βεβρωκέναι „essen“, urspr. „beißen, essen“: „einen Anteil bekommen“: „verschlingen“ vor. Andererseits müssen in einem suppletiven Paradigma nicht alle Bedeutungen den Suppletionspartnern gemeinsam sein; so scheint es denkbar, daß

¹ Dieser Aufsatz ist im Rahmen des DFG-Projektes „Verbalcharakter, Suppletivismus und morphologische Aktionsart im Indogermanischen“ (GA 641/2-1) entstanden. Für Diskussion und Hinweise danke ich Prof. Dr. J. L. García Ramón, Antje Casaretto, Elvira Veselinović und Dejan Matić. Die Übersetzungen der Homerstellen orientieren sich i. d. R. an Schadewaldt, vollständige Zitate sind entsprechend gekennzeichnet.

ein Verb in seinen verschiedenen Bedeutungen zu verschiedenen Verben suppletiv ist, etwa φέρειν: ἐνεγκεῖν „tragen, bringen“ und φέρειν: τλήναι „ertragen, auf sich nehmen“². Umgekehrt können zwei Verben derselben Bedeutung auch denselben Suppletionspartner haben, etwa ἔσθαι, ἐσθίειν und bei Homer auch präsentisch gebrauchtes ἔδομαι, die alle den Aor. φαγεῖν haben. Zur dritten Voraussetzung, der komplementären Verteilung im Paradigma, sei schließlich bemerkt, daß vereinzelt belegte Neubildungen nach einem produktiven Muster (etwa eines Aorists auf -ησ- zu einem -εο/ε-Präsens) kaum für die Existenz eines vollständigen Paradigmas sprechen, sondern eher auf Dauer gesehen erfolglose Versuche darstellen, die fehlende Form hinzuzubilden³.

Nach den genannten Kriterien soll nun untersucht werden, ob die Verben εὔδειν und δραθεῖν in der Sprache des homerischen Epos (§§ 2–6) und in späterer Zeit (§ 7) ein Suppletionspaar bilden⁴.

§ 2. Zunächst also zu εὔδειν und δραθεῖν bei Homer⁵. (°)εὔδειν ist in den homerischen Gedichten 69mal, ausschließlich im Präsensstamm, in den Bedeutungen „schlafen, ruhen“ und „sich schlafen legen“ belegt. Das Präsens °δραθάνειν kommt bei Homer nicht vor; es ist erst ab Platon in der Bedeutung „einschlafen“ belegt. An 8 Stellen findet sich der Aorist (°)δραθεῖν⁶, εὔδειν erscheint 7mal in Komposition mit κατα-⁷, 2mal mit ἐν-⁸. δραθεῖν erscheint nur einmal

² S. García Ramón (im Druck):§ 11.

³ Z. B. καθυδῆσαι, Hp. 1x, Luc. 1x, 1x Suda ε 2471, 1x Suda σ 829 (Sokrates) 1x Theopomp., 1x Them., als Aor. zum Prs. καθεύδειν.

⁴ Suppletion bei Verba für „schlafen“ findet sich auch sonst, z. B. im Fall ved. Prs. *sas-*: Aor. *svap-*; s. dazu Jamison 1982/3, Barton 1985 und García Ramón (im Druck):§ 15.

⁵ Zur Etymologie der Formen: Mayrhofer 1956:116 f. schließt gr. εὔδειν an got. *sutis* „ruhig, sanft“ (übersetzt gr. ἡσυχίος, ἐπιεικής; nach Seebold 1967 Gen. Sg. eines Substantivs **sut(s)* „Friede, Ruhe“) und lat. *sūdus* „sanft, wolkenlos, schön (vom Wetter)“ an. Damit ergäbe sich eine uridg. Wurzel **seyd-* „schlafen, ruhen“ (gr. **seyd-ō*, lat. **soyd-o-*). δραθεῖν findet unmittelbar keinen weiteren Anschluß; nur wenn man *-d^h- als „Erweiterung“ abtrennt, läßt es sich mit lat. *dormiō* (**der-* + *-m-*, etwa **d̥m-jo/e-*) und ai. *drā-* (**dre-* + *-H-*) verbinden.

⁶ 1x *Il.*, 7x *Od.*

⁷ *Od.* 8.313, *Od.* 20.141, *Od.* 3.402, *Od.* 4.304, *Od.* 6.1, *Od.* 7.344, *Il.* 1.611.

⁸ *Od.* 3.350, *Od.* 20.95.

als Simplex⁹, 5mal komponiert mit *κατα*-¹⁰, 2mal mit *παρα*-¹¹. (°)δραθεῖν erweist sich also als bei Homer wesentlich kompositions-freudiger als (°)εὔδειν. Während *παρα*- in der Komposition seine lokale Bedeutung jeweils behält („sich neben jd. hinlegen“ bzw. „neben jd. schlafen“), ist zwischen dem Simplex *δραθεῖν* und dem Kompositum *καταδραθεῖν* kein Bedeutungsunterschied festzustellen. Die Präverbierung mit *κατα*- dürfte also den perfektiven Charakter des Aorists unterstreichen. *κατα*- ist bei beiden Verben das häufigste Präverb.

Zunächst zu den Belegen von εὔδειν: Zur durativen Bedeutung (a) „schlafen, ruhen“¹², vgl.

- 1) *Il.* 2.19 βῆ δ' ἄρ' ἐπ' Ἀτρεΐδην Ἀγαμέμνονα· τὸν δὲ κίχανεν
εὔδοντ' ἐν κλισίῃ, περὶ δ' ἀμβρόσιος κέχυθ' ὕπνος.

„Er [sc. der Traum] ging zum Atreussohn Agamemnon; er fand ihn *schlafend* im Zelt, unsterblicher Schlaf war um ihn gegossen.“

Für das Kompositum *καθεύδειν*, vgl.

- 2) *Od.* 6.1 f. Ὡς ὁ μὲν ἔνθα *καθεῦδε* πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς
ὑπνῷ καὶ καμάτῳ ἀρημένος· . . .

„So *schief* dort der vieles duldende göttliche Odysseus, von Schlaf und Ermüdung übermannt.“

- 3) *Od.* 8.313 ἀλλ' ὄψεσθ', ἵνα τῷ γε *καθεύδετον* ἐν φιλότῃτι,
εἰς ἐμὰ δέμνια βάντες· ἐγὼ δ' ὀρόων ἀκάχημαι.

„Aber schaut doch, wo die beiden in Liebe *ruhen*, auf meine Bettstatt gestiegen. Ich aber sehe es und bin wütend.“¹³

⁹ *Od.* 20.143.

¹⁰ *Od.* 7.285, *Od.* 8.296, *Od.* 22.18, *Od.* 5.471, 1× in der synkopierte Form *καδραθέτην* *Od.* 15.494.

¹¹ *Il.* 14.163, *Od.* 20.88.

¹² Zu euphemistischer und metaphorischer Verwendung für „tot sein“ bzw. für Nichtlebewesen vgl. z. B. *Il.* 14.482 φράζεσθ' ὡς ὑμῖν Πρόμαχος δεδημένος *εὔδει* ἔγχει ἐμῷ „Bedenkt, daß euch Promachos bezwungen von meinem Speer *schläft*.“ und *Il.* 5.524 *εὔδησι* μένος βορέαο καὶ ἄλλων ζαχρειῶν ἀνέμων „Es *schläft* die Kraft des Boreas und der anderen heftigen Winde.“

¹³ Aufgrund des Kontextes ist „schlafen“ hier weniger wahrscheinlich, s. *infra*. Weitere Beispiele u. a. *Od.* 7.344 ὡς ὁ μὲν ἔνθα *καθεῦδε* πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς „So schlief dort der vieles erdulden Odysseus.“ und *Od.* 20.141 οὐκ ἔθειλ' ἐν λέκτροισι καὶ ἐν ῥήγεσσι *καθεύδειν* „Er wollte nicht in Bett und Tuch schlafen.“

Eine zweite Bedeutung (b) „sich schlafen legen“ ist aufgrund der folgenden Stelle anzunehmen:

- 4) *Il.* 1.609 ff. Ζεὺς δὲ πρὸς ὄν λέχος ἦ Ἴ' Ὀλύμπιος ἀστεροπητής,
 ἔνθα πάρος κοιμᾶθ' ὅτε μιν γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἰκάνοι·
 ἔνθα καθεῦδ' ἀναβάς, παρὰ δὲ χρυσόθρονος Ἥρη.

„Zeus aber, der olympische Blitzschleuderer, ging zu seinem Bett, wo er auch sonst zu ruhen pflegte, wenn ihn der süße Schlaf überkam; dort stieg er hinauf und *legte sich schlafen*, neben ihm die goldthronige Here.“

Da es unmittelbar anschließend in 2.1 f. Ἄλλοι μὲν ῥα θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνδρες ἵπποκορουσταὶ εὐδον παννύχιοι, Δία δ' οὐκ ἔχε νῆδυμος ὕπνος, „Die anderen Götter und pferdegerüsteten Männer schliefen die ganze Nacht durch, *den Zeus aber hielt der süße Schlaf nicht fest*.“ heißt, kann καθεῦδε in 1.611 nicht „schlafen“ heißen. Andere Stellen lassen ebenfalls die Lesart (b) von (°)εὔδειν zu, sind aber nicht eindeutig¹⁴.

Fazit: Für (°)εὔδειν ist bei Homer mit den Bedeutungen (a) „schlafen, ruhen“ und (b) „sich schlafen legen“ zu rechnen. Ein Bedeutungsunterschied zwischen Simplex und Kompositum mit κατα- ist nicht ersichtlich.

§ 3. Nun zu (°)δραθεῖν: Entgegen dem von einigen Lexikographen vertretenen Bedeutungsansatz „(ein)schlafen“ ergibt eine Überprüfung der Belegstellen die Bedeutungen (a) „sich zum Schlafen hinlegen“ und (b) „schlafen“, nicht aber „einschlafen“¹⁵. Zu (a) „sich zum Schlafen hinlegen“, vgl. die folgenden Beispiele, in denen die Handlung „(°)δραθεῖν“ vor dem Einschlafen liegt:

- 5) *Od.* 5.471 εἰ δέ κεν ἐς κλειτὸν ἀναβᾶς καὶ δάσκιον ὕλην
 θάμνοισ' ἐν πυκνοῖσι καταδράθω, εἴ με μεθεῖη
 ῥίγος καὶ κάματος, γλυκερὸς δέ μοι ὕπνος ἐπέλθοι,
 δεῖδω μὴ θήρεσσιν ἔλωρ καὶ κύρμα γένωμαι.

„Doch wenn ich nun hinauf zur Böschung und zu dem schattigen Walde steige und *mich* in dem dichten Gebüsch *hinlege* – wenn mich dann losläßt die Erstarrung und Ermattung und über mich der süße Schlaf kommt: so fürchte ich, daß ich den wilden Tieren zum Raube und zur Beute werde.“ (Schadewaldt)¹⁶

¹⁴ Etwa *Od.* 2.397; 3.359; 11.331; 11.374; 15.396; 18.328; 20.109.

¹⁵ Liddell-Scott-Jones geben als Bedeutung „sleep“ an, *LIV* s. v. **derd*ⁱ- „(ein)schlafen“, Snell, B., *LfgE* Bd. II:344 f. dagegen „sich schlafen legen, schlafen (kompl. Aor., *nicht ingr.* ‚*einschlafen*ⁱ)“ (Hervorhebung von mir).

¹⁶ Ähnlich *Od.* 7.285 ... ἐγὼ δ' ἀπάνευθε διυπετέος ποταμοῖο / ἐκβᾶς ἐν

- 6) *Il.* 14.163 ἦδε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνεται βουλή
 ἔλθειν εἰς Ἴδην εὖ ἐντύνασαν ἔ αὐτήν,
 εἶ πως ἰμείραιτο παραδραθέειν φιλότῃ
 ἢ χροῖῃ, τῷ δ' ὕπνον ἀπήμονά τε λιαρόν τε
 χεύῃ ἐπὶ βλεφάροισιν ἰδὲ φρεσὶ πευκαλίμησι.

„Das schien ihr im Sinn der beste Plan zu sein, aufs Ida-Gebirge zu gehen, sobald sie sich zurecht gemacht hätte, ob ihm vielleicht das Verlangen käme, sich in Liebe neben ihrem Leib *hinzulegen*, sie aber wollte ihm einen leidlosen und sanften Schlaf auf die Lider und die klugen Sinne gießen.“ (Schadewaldt: „zu schlafen in Liebe bei ihrem Leib“)

Heras List beruht darin, daß sie den von ihren Reizen entfachten Zeus veranlaßt, sich neben sie zu legen, um der Liebe zu genießen, nicht, um neben ihr zu schlafen, während sie ihn allerdings gleich einschlafen läßt¹⁷. Sachlich scheint daher „sich hinlegen“ besser zu passen¹⁸.

In der Erzählung von Ares, Aphrodite und Hephaistos (*Od.* 8.266–366) muß κατέδραθον „sich hinlegen“ heißen:

- 7) *Od.* 8.296 τῷ δ' ἐς δέμνια βάντε κατέδραθον, ἀμφὶ δὲ δεσμοὶ
 τεχνήεντες ἔχυντο πολύφρονος Ἥφαιστοιο,
 οὐδέ τι κινήσαι μελέων ἦν οὐδ' ἀναεῖραι.
 καὶ τότε δὴ γίνωσκον, ὃ τ' οὐκέτι φοκτὰ πέλοντο.

„Sie stiegen beide aufs Lager und *legten sich hin*. Rings um sie herum ergossen sich die kunstreichen Bande des klugen Hephaistos, und sie konnten ihre Glieder nicht mehr bewegen noch heben, und da erst erkannten sie, daß sie nicht mehr entkommen konnten.“ (Schadewaldt: „Und sie stiegen beide auf das Lager und *schliefen ein*.“)

θάμνοισι κατέδραθον, ἀμφὶ δὲ φύλλα / ἠφυσάμην· ὕπνον δὲ θεὸς κατ' ἀπείρονα
 χεύεν. / ἔνθα μὲν ἐν φύλλοισι, φίλον τετιμημένος ἦτορ, / εὖδον παννύχιος καὶ
 ἐπ' ἡῶ καὶ μέσον ἤμαρ· „Ich aber stieg aus dem schnellströmenden Fluß, *legte*
mich im Gebüsch *nieder* und häufte Blätter rings um mich. Der Gott goß
 unermesslichen Schlaf über mich. Da schlief ich in den Blättern, betrübt im
 Herzen, die ganze Nacht bis zum Morgen und zum Mittag.“

¹⁷ Ihre Absicht tut sie Hypnos kund: *Il.* 14.236 f. κοίμησόν μοι Ζηνὸς ὕπ
 ὀφρύσιν ὅσσε φαεινῶ / αὐτίκ' ἐπεὶ κεν ἐγὼ παραλέξομαι ἐν φιλότῃ. „Schläfere
 mir ein des Zeus Augen, die leuchtenden, unter den Brauen, sogleich, wenn
 ich mich zu ihm lege in Liebe!“ (Schadewaldt).

¹⁸ Eine euphemistische Verwendung, etwa „neben ihr zu schlafen“ für „mit
 ihr zu schlafen“, ist wohl auszuschließen, da φιλότῃ regelmäßig bei Homer
 in diesen Fällen gebraucht wird (μίσγειν, εὐνάζεσθαι, λέχεσθαι, τραπείσθαι
 φιλότῃ).

Hephaistos berichtet im Folgenden den Göttern von den in flagranti Erwischten:

- 8) *Od.* 8.313 ἄλλ' ὄψεσθ', ἵνα τῷ γε καθεύδεται ἐν φιλότῃτι,
εἰς ἐμὰ δέμνια βάντες· ἐγὼ δ' ὀρώων ἀπάχημαι.

„Aber schaut doch, wo die beiden in Liebe *ruhen*, auf meine Bettstatt gestiegen. Ich aber sehe es und bin wütend.“

Wenn unmittelbar, nachdem die Liebenden das Lager bestiegen haben, sich Hephaistos' Netze um sie schließen und sie erkennen, daß sie nicht mehr entkommen können, kann *κατέδραθον* nicht „sie schliefen ein“, sondern nur „sie legten sich (zum Schlafen) hin“ heißen. Entsprechend ist in *V.* 313 *καθεύδεται* als „sie ruhen“, nicht als „sie schlafen“, zu verstehen¹⁹. Nimmt man dagegen für *κατέδραθον* „sie schliefen ein“ an, erklärt sich nicht, wie sie gleich darauf (*τότε*) die Falle bemerken – man müßte annehmen, daß sie einschlafen, aufwachen und die Falle bemerken (und wiederum einschlafen, wenn man für *καθεύδεται* „sie schlafen“ annähme). Für *κατέδραθον* ist also in *Od.* 8.296 „sie legten sich hin“ zu übersetzen²⁰.

Zu (b): An drei Stellen scheint (°)δραθεῖν synonym mit (°)εὔδειν zu sein und „(eine Zeit lang) schlafen“ zu bedeuten. Es handelt sich in diesen Fällen um einen „komplexiven“ Aorist:

- 9) *Od.* 23.18 οὐ γὰρ πῶ τοιόνδε κατέδραθον, ἐξ οὗ Ὀδυσσεὺς
ᾤχετ' ἐποψόμενος Κακοῖλιον οὐκ ὀνομαστήν.

„Denn noch nie habe ich einen solchen [Schlaf] geschlafen, seitdem Odysseus fort ging, um das unsägliche schlimme Troja zu schauen.“

- 10) *Od.* 15.494 ὡς οἱ μὲν τοιαῦτα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀγόρευον,
καδδραθέτην δ' οὐ πολλὸν ἐπὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ μίνυνθα·
αἴψα γὰρ Ἥως ἦλθεν εὐθρονος.

„So sprachen sie miteinander derlei, sie *schliefen* aber nicht lang, sondern nur kurz, denn bald kam Eos auf gutem Thron.“

- 11) *Od.* 20.143 αὐτὰρ ὁ γ', ὡς τις πάμπαν ὀϊζυρὸς καὶ ἄποτμος,
οὐκ ἔθειλ' ἐν λέκτροισι καὶ ἐν ὀήγεσσι καθεύδειν,

¹⁹ In *Od.* 8.316 f. (ἄμφω εὔδειν), 337 und 342 (εὔδειν παρὰ χροσῆ Ἀφροδίτῃ) dürfte euphemistische Verwendung für „mit jd. schlafen“ vorliegen. Da die Bedeutung „ruhen, liegen“ sonst bei Homer nicht auftritt und mit δραθεῖν nicht interagiert, kann sie hier außen vor bleiben.

²⁰ So z. B. Scheibner „sie legten sich nieder“.

ἀλλ' ἐν ἀδεψήτῳ βοέῃ καὶ κώεσιν οἴων
ἔδραθ' ἐνὶ προδόμῳ· χλαῖναν δ' ἐπιέσσαμεν ἡμεῖς.

„Aber er, wie ein ganz Bedauernswerter und Unglückseliger, wollte nicht in Betten und Tüchern *schlafen*, sondern auf ungegerbtem Rindsfell und Schafsfellen *schliefe* er in der Vorhalle; wir legten einen Mantel über ihn.“²¹

Fazit: (°)δραθεῖν bedeutet an vier Stellen (a) „sich schlafen legen“, an drei Stellen (b) „schlafen“, ein weiterer Beleg (s. Fn. 21) kann entweder als (a) oder (b) verstanden werden. Die Bedeutung „einschlafen“ ist an keiner Stelle zwingend anzunehmen, und die Belege in (a) sprechen klar gegen eine solche Bedeutung. Hieraus ergeben sich zwei Fragen: Wie läßt sich einerseits das Nebeneinander von „schlafen“ und „sich zum Schlafen hinlegen“ erklären (§§ 4–6), und wie verhält es sich andererseits mit der in späterer Zeit für den Aorist (°)δραθεῖν und das Präsens °δραθάνειν belegten Bedeutung „einschlafen“ (§ 7)?

§ 4. Zunächst zur ersten Frage: Nimmt man eine durative Wurzel, etwa „schlafen“, an, so ließe sich damit sowohl eine ingressive „fang an zu schlafen, schlief ein“ als auch eine komplexive Lesart „schliefe (eine Zeit lang)“ wie im Falle von βασιλεύειν „König sein“ erklären (vgl. Hdt. 1,130,3 Κῦρος ἐβασίλευσε „Kyros wurde König“ vs. 1,16,1 Σαδυάττης ... ἐβασίλευσεν ἔτεα δωδέκα „Sadyattes war zwölf Jahre lang König“)²². Gegen eine solche Annahme spricht aber in unserem Fall die Tatsache, daß (°)δραθεῖν nur im Aorist vorkommt und daher eher als Wurzel mit momentativer Bedeutung, etwa „sich schlafen legen“ oder „einschlafen“, anzusetzen ist. Aufgrund der oben diskutierten homerischen Stellen ist dabei eher von ersterer Bedeutung

²¹ Nicht eindeutig ist die folgende Stelle: *Od.* 20.88 αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὄνειρατ' ἐπέσσευεν κακὰ δαίμων. / τῆδε γὰρ αὖ μοι νυκτὶ παρέδραθεν εἴκελος αὐτῷ, / τοῖος ἔων, οἷος ἦεν ἅμα στρατῷ· αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ / χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐφάμην ὄναρ ἔμμεναι, ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἦδη. „Aber mir hat ein Gott wieder böse Träume geschickt. Denn auch in dieser Nacht hat er wieder neben mir *geschlafen* / *sich* neben mich *gelegt*, ihm [Odysseus] gleich, wie er war, als er mit dem Heer fortzog; und mein Herz war froh, denn ich meinte, es sei kein Traum, sondern wirklich.“

²² S. Strunk 1971:197 ff. und 1997:106 f. Schon Ruipérez 1954:80 f. stellt fest, daß bei nichttransformativen durativen Verben der Aorist sowohl den Anfangspunkt der Handlung bezeichnen („initiver Aorist“) als auch die Handlung als ganze angeben („neutraler“ oder „komplexiver“ Aorist) kann. S. auch García Ramón (im Druck):§ 2.

auszugehen. Wie erklärt sich dann aber die komplexe Lesart „schief eine Zeit lang“? Geht man von einem suppletiven Verhältnis zwischen (°)εὔδειν und (°)δραθεῖν in der homerischen Sprache aus, so ließe sich vermuten, daß zwischen den beiden in einem Paradigma stehenden Elementen eine Bedeutungsneuvellierung stattfindet, indem entweder Bedeutungen des anderen Partners übernommen oder eigene obsolet werden.

Als Beispiel kann hier der Fall von lat. *ferō: tulī* dienen²³: *tulī* hat neben der etymologisch zu erwartenden Bedeutung „aufheben, auf sich nehmen“ (uridg. **telh*₂-, gr. τλήναι, lat. *tollere* usw.) alle Bedeutungen von *ferō* „tragen, bringen“ übernommen, während umgekehrt *ferō* auch „aufheben, auf sich nehmen“ bedeuten kann, vgl. *tulī/lātus* in der Bedeutung „tragen, bringen“: Ov. *Met.* 9.337 *nymphis latura coronas* „die den Nymphen Kränze bringen wird“, *ferō* als „erheben“: Cic. *Ver.* 4.12 *Iuvat me haec praeclara nomina artificum, quae isti ad caelum ferunt, Verres aestimatione sic concidisse*. „Es freut mich, daß die berühmten Namen der Künstler, welche jene in den Himmel heben, in Verres’ Wertschätzung so sehr gesunken sind.“, *ferō* als „ertragen, erdulden“: Cic. *Phil.* 10.22 *cuius desiderium ferre diutius civitas non potest*. „die Stadt kann das Verlangen nach ihm nicht länger ertragen.“ wie Od. 20.18 τέτλαθι δῆ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ’ ἔτλης „Ertrage es, mein Herz; du hast schon anderes schlimmeres ertragen.“

Für den Fall von gr. (°)εὔδειν: (°)δραθεῖν bedeutet dies, daß momentatives (°)δραθεῖν die komplexe Lesart im Suppletionsverhältnis mit (°)εὔδειν entwickelt haben kann, und daß auf diese Weise der fehlende Aorist für „(eine Zeit lang) schlafen“ gebildet wurde²⁴. Andere Verben kamen hierfür weniger in Frage, weil sie ein vollständiges Paradigma bildeten und/oder sich in ihrer Bedeutung zu stark von (°)εὔδειν unterschieden. Dies ist z. B. beim Fortsetzer der uridg. Wurzel **leg*^h- „sich hinlegen“ im Griechischen der Fall²⁵: Wie das Präsens in der Hesychglosse λέχεται· κοιμᾶται und die bei Homer belegten Aoristformen λέκτο und λέξασθαι²⁶ zeigen, ist von einem ursprünglich

²³ S. hierzu auch García Ramón 1999a:51, 73 f. und (im Druck):§ 9.

²⁴ Der umgekehrte Fall, daß (°)εὔδειν von δραθεῖν die Bedeutung „sich schlafen legen“ bezogen hat, ist ebenfalls denkbar; sie könnte aber auch durch das Präverb κατα- bedingt sein.

²⁵ S. auch García Ramón (im Druck):§ 16.

²⁶ Ob es sich bei λέκτο um einen -s- oder Wurzelaoorist handelt, ist für unsere Belange irrelevant. S. dazu Watkins 1962:54 f. und Harðarson 1993: 200 ff.

vollständigen Paradigma für das Griechische auszugehen, das von κείμαι, κοιμάομαι u. ä. verdrängt wurde, wobei das Präsens offenbar früher außer Gebrauch kam als die Aoristformen²⁷. Während für (°)δραθεῖν immer „sich zum Schlafen hinlegen“ und „schlafen“ anzunehmen ist (s. o.), wird * *leg^h*- im Griechischen auch ohne die zusätzliche Komponente „zum Schlafen“ verwendet, vgl. in der Bedeutung „sich hinlegen“ z. B. *Il.* 9.67 ... φυλακτῆρες δὲ ἕκαστοι / *λεξάσθων* παρὰ τάφρον ὀρυκτὴν τείχεος ἐκτός. „Die Wächter aber sollen sich jeweils außerhalb der Mauer am gezogenen Graben entlang *lagern*.“²⁸, in der Bedeutung „liegen“ *Il.* 4. 131 ἦ δὲ τόσον μὲν ἔεργεν ἀπὸ χροῶς ὡς ὅτε μήτηρ / παιδὸς ἐέργη μυῖαν ὅθ' ἠδέϊ *λέξεται* ὑπνώ „Sie aber wehrte von seinem Leib das Geschloß ab, wie wenn eine Mutter eine Fliege von ihrem Kind verscheucht, wenn es in süßem Schlaf *liegt*.“ Auch Verwendungen mit der Komponente „zum Schlafen“ finden sich bei *λεχ-*, vgl. z. B. kausatives „jdn. (zum Schlafen) hinlegen, einschläfern“ in *Il.* 14. 252 ἦτοι ἐγὼ μὲν *ἔλεξα* Διὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο / νήδυμος ἀμφιχυθείς· σὺ δὲ οἱ κακὰ μήσαο θυμῶ (Hypnos spricht:) „In der Tat, da *betäubte* ich den Sinn des Aigishalters Zeus, sanft um ihn ergossen; du aber sannst ihm Übel im Herzen.“²⁹ und reflexives „sich schlafen legen“ in *Od.* 23.171 f. ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι, μαῖα, στόρεσον λέχος, ὄφρα καὶ αὐτὸς *λέξομαι*. „Komm, Amme, bereite mir ein Lager, damit ich mich *schlafen legen* kann.“ Dementsprechend sind Stellen wie *Od.* 7.344 ff. nicht als Belege für ein Suppletionsverhältnis zwischen *λέκτο* und *καθεύδειν* zu werten, obwohl beide mit ‚schlafen‘ übersetzt werden können:

- 12) *Od.* 7.344 ff. ὡς ὁ μὲν ἔνθα *καθεύδε* πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς
 τρητοῖσ' ἐν *λεχέεσσιν* ὑπ' αἰθούσῃ ἐριδούπῃ:
 Ἄλκίνοος δ' ἄρα *λέκτο* μυχῶ δόμου ὑψηλοῖο

²⁷ Die ungünstige metrische Struktur des Präsens (etwa in *λέχεται*: 3 Kürzen, wenn vor Vokal; *λεχόμεθα**: 3 Kürzen bei Elision, 4 ohne usf.) könnte dessen Abwesenheit im Epos erklären. Für den Aorist könnte die störende Homonymie mit dem häufigen *λέγειν* „lesen, sammeln, erzählen, (nachhom.) sprechen, reden“ in einigen Formen ausschlaggebend gewesen sein (z. B. *λέκτο*, *ἔλεξα* usf.).

²⁸ Vgl. auch *Il.* 6.198 Λαοδαμείη μὲν *παρῆλεξατο* μητιετα Ζεὺς, ἦ δ' ἔτεκ' ἀντίθεον Σαρπηδόνα χαλκοκορυστήν. „Zu Laodameia *legte sich* der sinnreiche Zeus, und sie gebar den gottgleichen Sarpedon mit dem Erzhelm.“

²⁹ Das Aktiv ist bei Homer nur 2mal belegt, hier und in *Il.* 24.635 *λέξον* „gib mir ein Lager“.

„So *schliefe* dort, der vielduldende göttliche Odysseus, im gurtdurchzogenen Bett in der lautdröhnenden Halle. Alkinoos aber *schliefe* im Innern des hohen Hauses.“ (Schadewaldt: legte sich nieder).

Hier liegt eine einmalige Variation der zweimal belegten Formel „καθεῦδε μυχῶ δόμου ὑψηλοῖο“ vor (*Od.* 3.402; 4.304). Auch in anderen Fällen kommt λεχ- der Verwendung von καθεύδειν und (°)δραθεῖν sehr nahe, vgl. z. B. die folgende Szene, in der sich der schiffbrüchige Odysseus am Strand ein Lager aus Blättern bereitet, mit der parallel gebauten oben zitierten Stelle *Od.* 7.285 (Fn. 16):

- 13) *Od.* 5.486 f. τὴν μὲν ἰδὼν γήθησε πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς,
 ἐν δ' ἄρα μέσση λέκτο, χύσιν δ' ἐπεχεύατο φύλλων.
 ...
 ὡς Ὀδυσσεὺς φύλλοισι καλύψατο. τῶ δ' ἄρ' Ἀθήνη
 ὕπνον ἐπ' ὄμμασι χεῦ' ...
 „Ὡς ὁ μὲν ἐνθα καθεῦδε πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς
 ὕπνω καὶ καμάτῳ ἀρημένος.“

„Die[se Menge an Blättern] erblickend, freute sich der vieles duldende Odysseus und *legte sich mitten hinein* und schüttete einen Haufen Blätter auf sich. ... So barg sich Odysseus unter den Blättern. Athene aber goß ihm Schlaf auf die Augen ... So *schliefe* dort der vieles erduldende göttliche Odysseus, von Schlaf und Ermattung übermannt.“

Da λεχ- eine allgemeinere Bedeutung „(sich) hinlegen/liegen“ hat, die „(sich) schlafen legen“ impliziert, fällt es für eine Suppletion mit einem Verb, das nur die Bedeutungen „schlafen/liegen“ und „sich schlafen legen“ aufweist, aus. Gegenüber (°)εὔδειν / (°)δραθεῖν ist λεχ- also als nicht markiert zu betrachten.

§ 5. Da somit andere Verben aus dem semantischen Bereich „sich schlafen legen, schlafen usf.“ aufgrund abweichender Bedeutung und/oder vollständiger Paradigmen als mögliche Suppletionspartner für (°)εὔδειν ausscheiden³⁰, bleibt zu untersuchen, ob (°)δραθεῖν dafür

³⁰ Hierzu gehören u. a. (κατ-)ευνάω (17× Aor.), (κατ-)ευνάζω (6× Prs., 2× Aor.), κοιμάομαι (6× Prs., 38× Aor.) und ἰαύω (14× Prs.st., 1× Aor.), die – bis auf (κατ-)ευνάω – vollständige Paradigmen bilden. Seltener und mit wohl stärker abweichender Bedeutung: κνώσσω „schlummern, fest schlafen“ (1× *Od.* 4.809), βριζώ „schläfrig sein“ (1× Prs., 2× Aor.), ὑπνώω (3×, nur in der Formel τοὺς δ' αὖτε καὶ ὑπνώοντας ἐγείρει „er/sie weckt sie, auch wenn sie (fest?) schlafen“), ἰαύω „verweilen, (die Nacht) verbringen“, vgl. *Il.* 9. 325 u. *Od.* 19. 340 αὔπνοὺς νύκτας ἰαυὸν „schlaflos verbrachte ich die Nacht.“, s. García Ramón 1999b.

in Frage kommen könnte. Das formale Kriterium der komplementären Verteilung im Paradigma wird von der homerischen Sprache erfüllt. Von den für einen Aorist zu einem durativen Lexem „schlafen“ zu erwartenden Bedeutungen (a) „einschlafen“ (ingressiv) und (b) „eine Zeit lang schlafen“ (komplexiv) weist (°)δραθεῖν bei Homer allerdings nur (b) auf (Belege s. o.). Für das Konzept „einschlafen“ stehen in der homerischen Sprache andere Ausdrücke zur Verfügung: Der Eintritt des Schlafs wird als von außen den Menschen überkommene Macht vorgestellt, so daß nicht „ich schlief ein“, sondern „der Schlaf kam über mich“ oder „der Gott goß Schlaf über mich / meine Augen / usf.“ gesagt wird, vgl.

14) *Il.* 1.610 ἔνθα πάρος κοιμᾶθ' ὅτε μιν γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἰκάνοι
 „Wo er auch sonst sich schlafen zu legen pflegte, wenn der süße *Schlaf* ihn überkam.“

15) *Il.* 24.445 τοῖσι δ' ἐφ' ὕπνον ἔχευε διάκτορος Ἀργειφόντης
 „Und über sie *goß einen Schlaf* der Geleiter, der Argostöter.“ (Schadewaldt)

Der Ausdruck des Konzepts „einschlafen“ durch ein Verb allein scheint bei Homer also noch nicht gegeben zu sein³¹.

§ 6. Nun zu den Belegen, die für ein Suppletionspaar (°)εὔδειν: (°)δραθεῖν bei Homer sprechen könnten. In der komplexiven Lesart „(eine Zeit lang) schlafen“ finden sich:

(a) εὔδειν und δραθεῖν im Syntagma „in der Vorhalle schlafen“:

16) *Od.* 15.5 εὔρε δὲ Τηλέμαχον καὶ Νέστορος ἀγλαὸν υἱὸν
 εὔδοντ' ἐν προδόμῳ Μενελάου κυδαλίμοιο
 „Sie [Athene] fand Telemach und den glänzenden Nestorsohn in der Vorhalle (des Palasts) des ruhmreichen Menelaos *schlafend*.“³²

17) *Od.* 20.143 αὐτὰρ ὃ γ', ὡς τις πάμπαν οἴζυρος καὶ ἄποτμος,
 (= 11) οὐκ ἔθειλ' ἐν λέκτροισι καὶ ἐν ῥήγεσσι καθεύδειν,
 ἀλλ' ἐν ἀδεψήτῳ βοῆῃ καὶ κώεσιν οἴων
 ἔδραθ' ἐνὶ προδόμῳ χλαῖναν δ' ἐπιέσσαμεν ἡμεῖς.

³¹ Auch andere Sprachen kommen wie das homerische Griechische ohne ein Verbum „einschlafen“ aus, etwa das Albanische, wo man i. d. R. „der Schlaf ergreift mich“ sagt (*më zë/merr gjumi*).

³² S. zur Stelle auch Strunk 1971:214 f.

„Aber er, wie ein ganz Bedauernswerter und Unglückseliger, wollte nicht in Betten und Tüchern *schlafen*, sondern auf ungegerbtem Rindsfell und Schafsfellen *schliefe* er in der Vorhalle; wir legten einen Mantel über ihn.“

(b) καθεύδειν: καταδραθειν „schlafen“

18) = 17)³³

19) *Od.* 23.18 οὐ γάρ πω τοιόνδε κατέδραθον, ἐξ οὗ Ὀδυσσεὺς
(= 9) ὄχετ' ἐποπόμενος Κακοῖλιον οὐκ ὀνομαστήν.

„Denn noch nie habe ich einen solchen [Schlaf] geschlafen, seitdem Odysseus fort ging, um das unsägliche schlimme Troja zu schauen.“

Faßt man den Beleg *Od.* 20.88 (s. Fn. 22) von παρέδραθον als komplexives „neben jd. schlafen“ auf, so ließe auch er sich hier anführen, vgl.

παρά + εὔδειν: παρέδραθον „neben jd. schlafen“

20) *Il.* 10.1 Ἄλλοι μὲν παρὰ νηυσὶν ἀριστῆες Παναχαιῶν
εὔδον παννύχιοι μαλακῶ δεδημημένοι ὕπνω·

„Die andern Anführer aller Achäer *schliefen* neben den Schiffen von sanftem Schlaf überwunden.“

21) *Od.* 20.88 αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὄνειράτ' ἐπίσσευεν κακὰ δαίμων.
τῆδε γὰρ αὖ μοι νυκτὶ παρέδραθεν εἵκελος αὐτῶ,
τοῖος ἐὼν, οἷος ἦεν ἅμα στρατῶ· αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ
χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐφάμην ὄναρ ἔμμεναι, ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἦδη.

„Aber mir hat ein Gott wieder böse Träume geschickt. Denn auch in dieser Nacht hat er wieder neben mir *geschlafen*, ihm [Odysseus] gleich, wie er war, als er mit dem Heer fortzog; und mein Herz war froh, denn ich meinte, es sei kein Traum, sondern wirklich.“

Für den eingangs zitierten Beleg *Il.* 1.609 ff. (Bsp. (4)) mit καθεύδειν als „sich schlafen legen“ finden sich Parallelen in *Od.* 5.471 (Bsp. (5)), *Od.* 8.296 ff. (Bsp. (7)) und *Od.* 7.284 ff. (Fn. 16): In allen Fällen ist das Verb mit einer Form von βαίνω / ἔβην mit Richtungsangabe durch Präpositionalfügung oder Präverb koordiniert.

Für die homerische Sprache ist also festzuhalten: Sowohl für (°)εὔδειν als auch für (°)δραθειν ist mit den Bedeutungen (a) „schlafen,

³³ Auch der Beleg in Bsp. (11) alleine dürfte für Suppletion (°)εὔδειν und (°)δραθειν sprechen.

ruhen“ und (b) „sich schlafen legen“ zu rechnen. Die Kriterien der synchronen Beleglage, der hinlänglichen Bedeutungsüberschneidung und der komplementären Verteilung im Paradigma werden also erfüllt.

§ 7. Nun zu εὔδειν und δραθεῖν bei späteren Autoren. Ab Platon (dort 2×) ist ein Präsens δραθάνειν belegt, in der Regel komponiert als καταδραθάνειν³⁴ – insgesamt im Vergleich zu καθεύδειν aber selten. Im Aorist bleibt (°)δραθεῖν der Dichtung vorbehalten³⁵, während in der Prosa (°)δραθεῖν verwendet wird, vgl. die folgende Tabelle:

Belege von δραθεῖν und καθεύδειν bei einzelnen Autoren

	δραθ-			καθεύδειν nur Prsst.
	Prs.	Aor.	Perf.	
Hdt.	0	0	0	2
Thuc.	0	2	0	1
Ar.	0	12	0	35
Pl.	2	4	1	34
Xen.	0	2	0	40
Plut.	7	10	1	139

(°)εὔδειν weist wie bei Homer auch in späterer Zeit die Bedeutungen (a) „schlafen, ruhen“ und (b) „sich schlafen legen“ auf, so daß hierauf nicht weiter eingegangen werden muß³⁶. Neuerungen finden sich dagegen bei (°)δραθεῖν: In nachhomerischer Zeit zeigt es die Bedeutungen (a) „schlafen“, (b) „sich schlafen legen“ und, anders als bei Homer, (c) „einschlafen“³⁷.

³⁴ Selten ἀποδραθάνω „schlafen“ und 1× bei Aelian „aufwachen“.

³⁵ Theocr. *Id.* 18, 9 κατέδραθες, Kallim. *Frg.* 260, 63 u. 288, 63 καδδραθέτην, Antimachus *Eleg. Frg.* 151, 7 καταδράθου.

³⁶ Beispiele sind für (a) Pl. *Phd.* 71c Τί οὖν; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἐστί τι ἐναντίον, ὡσπερ τῷ ἐργηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν; „... ist nun etwas – sagte er – dem Leben entgegengesetzt, wie dem Wachsein *das Schlafen?*“ und für (b) Xen. *Hell.* 4. 6. 7 Εἰς δὲ τὴν νύκτα οἱ μὲν Ἀκαρνᾶνες ἀπῆλθον, οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται φυλακὰς καταστησάμενοι ἐκάθευδον. „Bei Anbruch der Nacht aber zogen die Akarner wieder ab, und die Soldaten *legten sich schlafen*, nachdem sie Wachen aufgestellt hatten.“

³⁷ In *Od.* 4.793 f. ist zwar eine Übersetzung „einschlafen“ möglich, ebenso gut aber „schlafen“: τόσσα μιν ὀρμαίνουσιν ἐπήλυθε νήδυμος ὕπνος / εὔδε δ' ἀνακλινθεῖσα, λήθεν δὲ οἱ ἄψα πάντα. „So viel überdachte sie, als der süße Schlaf zu ihr kam; sie lehnte sich zurück und *schliefe / schlief ein*, und alle ihre Gelenke entspannten sich.“

Zu der schon bei Homer festgestellten komplexiven Lesart (a) „schlafen“ des Suppletivpaares (°)εὔδειν: (°)δραθεῖν vgl.

- 22) Pl. *Smp.* 223c1 τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἐρυξίμαχον καὶ τὸν Φαῖδρον καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἔφη ὁ Ἀριστόδημος οἴχεσθαι ἀπιόντας, ἔδὲ ὕπνον λαβεῖν, καὶ καταδραθεῖν πάνυ πολὺ, ἅτε μακρῶν τῶν νυκτῶν οὐσῶν, ἐξεγρέσθαι δὲ πρὸς ἡμέραν ἤδη ἀλεκτρούωνων ἀδόντων, ἐξεγρόμενος δὲ ἰδεῖν τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους *καθεύδοντας* καὶ οἰχομένους ...

„Eryximachos und Phaidros und einige andere seien weggegangen, sagte Aristodemos, ihn aber habe der Schlaf ergriffen, und er *habe* sehr viel *geschlafen*, weil die Nächte lang waren, und gegen Morgen, als die Hähne schon krächten, sei er aufgewacht und habe die andern *schlafen* oder fortgehen sehen ...“

- 23) Ar. *Nu.* 38 f. Φε. ἔασον ᾧ δαιμόνιε *καταδραθεῖν* τί με.
Στ. σὺ δ' οὖν *κάθευδε*.

„Laß mich, Schrecklicher, doch noch etwas *schlafen*. – *Schlaf* du nur weiter.“

Zu (b) „sich schlafen legen“ vgl.

- 24) Xen. *Hell.* 7. 2. 23 ὡς δ' εἶδον τὴν σφοδρότητα τῆς ἐφόδου, εὐθὺς ἐκπλαγέντες ἐφυγον, καταλιπόντες τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι πάντα τάπιτήδεια. *κάκεινοι* μὲν ταῦτα δειπνήσαντες καὶ οἴκοθεν ἄλλα ἐλθόντα, ὡς ἐπ' εὐτυχίᾳ σπείσαντες καὶ παιανίσαντες καὶ φυλακὰς κατασκευασάμενοι, *κατέδραθον*.

„Als sie aber die Stärke des Angriffs sahen, ergriffen sie sogleich erschrocken die Flucht und ließen den tapferen Männern all ihren Proviant zurück. Und jene machten sich davon und von dem, was von zu Hause noch dazukam, ihr Mahl, und nachdem sie Trankopfer zum Dank für ihr Glück dargebracht und Paiane gesungen und Wachen aufgestellt hatten, *legten sie sich schlafen*.“³⁸

Eine Neuerung gegenüber dem homerischen Zustand stellt, wie gesagt, die dritte für (°)δραθεῖν festzustellende Bedeutung (c) „einschlafen“ dar, vgl. hierzu

³⁸ Vgl. die ähnliche Konstruktion in Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.7 φυλακὰς καταστησάμενοι ἐκάθευδον (Fn. 36).

- 25) Th. 4.133.2.4. καὶ ὁ νεὼς τῆς Ἡρας τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρου ἐν Ἄργει κατεκαύθη, Χρυσίδος τῆς ἱερείας λύχνον τινὰ θείσης ἡμμένον πρὸς τὰ στέμματα καὶ ἐπικαταδαρθούσης, ὥστε ἔλαθεν ἀφθέντα πάντα καὶ καταφλεχθέντα.

„Und der Heratempel in Argos brannte in demselben Sommer nieder; die Priesterin Chrysis hatte eine brennende Kerze an die Kränze gestellt und war darüber *eingeschlafen*, so daß sie nicht bemerkte, wie alles Feuer fing und niederbrannte.“

- 26) Pl. *Smp.* 223d7 ταῦτα δὴ ἀναγκαζομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐ σφόδρα ἐπομένους νυστάζειν, καὶ πρότερον μὲν καταδαρθεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη, ἤδη δὲ ἡμέρας γιγνομένης τὸν Ἀγάθωνα.

„Zu dieser Annahme gezwungen und eher widerwillig folgend, sei ihnen der Kopf schwer geworden, und als erster sei Aristophanes *eingeschlafen* und später, als es schon Tag war, Agathon.“

In dieser Bedeutung kann es als ingressiver Aorist zu einem durativen Präsens wie in den Fällen βασιλεύω: ἐβασίλευσα „wurde König“ (neben „war eine Zeit lang König“)³⁹, ἔχω: ἔσχον „erhielt“ (als „fing an zu haben“), κτῶμαι: ἐκτησάμην „erwarb“ („fing an zu besitzen“) usf. fungieren, also Präsensstamm „schlafen“ vs. Aoriststamm „anfangen zu schlafen“ = „einschlafen“. (°)δαρθεῖν kontrastiert damit nur aspektuell zu Fällen wie Th. 4.113.2.2. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ὀπλιταὶ καθεύδοντες ὡς πεντήκοντα „Es *schliefen* nämlich zufällig an die 50 Hopliten auf dem Marktplatz.“

Nun zum Präsens °δαρθάνειν: Da es erst relativ spät in der griechischen Literatur erscheint, dürfte es sich um eine Neubildung handeln⁴⁰. Zu (°)δαρθεῖν in der Bedeutung „einschlafen“ wurde so im nachhomerischen Griechischen ein Präsens geschaffen, mit dem sich nun auch im imperfektiven Aspekt das Einschlafen nicht als Einwirkung einer äußeren Macht vorstellen ließ⁴¹. Die beiden frühesten Belege bei Platon weisen in diese Richtung, vgl.

- 27) Pl. *Phd.* 71c10 λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐργηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐργηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ

³⁹ S. Strunk 1997:106 f.

⁴⁰ Wahrscheinlich nach Mustern wie λαβεῖν: λαμβάνειν; μαθεῖν: μανθάνειν; δαρθεῖν: x= δαρθάνειν.

⁴¹ S. zur homerischen Vorstellung § 5, Bspe. (14) und (15).

τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις
αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν καταδαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δ'
ἀνεγείρεσθαι.

„Das eine nenne ich Schlafen, das andere Wachsein, und daß aus dem Schlafen das Wachsein entsteht und aus dem Wachsein das Schlafen, und daß das Entstehen von beidem zum einen das *Einschlafen* sei, zum andern das *Aufwachen*.“

28) *Phd.* 72b8 Οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω· ἀλλ' οἷον
εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἶη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ
ἀνταποδιδοίη γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος ...

„Was ich meine, ist nicht schwer zu verstehen – sagte er: Wie, wenn es zwar das *Einschlafen* gäbe, das *Aufwachen* aber, das aus dem Schlafen entsteht, dem nicht entgegengesetzt wäre ...“⁴²

Da *δαρθ-* nun ein vollständiges Paradigma bildet, scheint es aus dem suppletiven Verhältnis mit (°)εὔδειν auszuscheren, wenn man nicht davon ausgehen möchte, daß (°)εὔδειν, da ihm weiterhin kein

⁴² Möglicherweise liegt diese Bedeutung auch der Hesychglosse ἀποδαρθάνει· ἀποκοιμάται zugrunde, während ἀποκοιμάομαι sonst „(von der Heimat) entfernt schlafen“ oder „ein wenig schlafen“ heißt, s. LSJ s.v. Vgl. aber auch Fn. 34. Auch in späterer Zeit scheint sich diese Verteilung zu erhalten: *δαρθάνειν* ist nach Platon u. a. bei Philon von Alexandria (2*) und Plutarch (7*) belegt und weist ebenfalls die Bedeutung „einschlafen“ auf, vgl. Philon von Alexandria, *De Josepho*, 147: τὰ δ' ὕπνω κατεχόμενα, κἂν εἰ πρὸς βραχὺ διανασταίη, πάλιν καθελκόμενα καὶ καταδαρθάνοντα διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εὐθυτενῶς δύνασθαι τῆ ψυχῇ βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ πλάζεσθαι καὶ περιπταίειν. „die andern [sc. die irdischen Dinge] werden vom Schlaf niedergehalten, und auch wenn sie sich für kurze Zeit darüber erheben, werden sie doch gleich wieder nach unten gezogen und *schlafen wieder ein*, weil die Seele nichts geradewegs erblicken kann, sondern umherirrt und -stolpert.“; Plutarch, *De animae procreatione in Timaeo* 1026E/F: ἔσται δὲ τις χρόνου μοῖρα καὶ γέγονεν ἤδη πολλάκις, ἐν ᾗ τὸ μὲν φρόνιμον ἀμβλύνεται καὶ καταδαρθάνει λήθης ἐμπιπλάμενον τοῦ οἰκείου, τὸ δὲ σώματι σύνηθες ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ συμπαθὲς ἐφέλκεται καὶ βαρύνει. „Es wird aber einen Zeitabschnitt geben, und es hat ihn schon oftmals gegeben, in dem das Vernünftige abstumpft und *einschläft*, mit Vergessen des Eigenen angefüllt, das mit dem Körper von Anfang an Vertraute und Mitfühlende aber mitschleppt und schwer macht ...“ Nicht eindeutig ist die Stelle *De Iside et Osiride* 376c Ἐμφαίνει καὶ τὸ σειστρον, ὅτι σειεσθαι δεῖ τὰ ὄντα καὶ μηδέποτε παύεσθαι φορᾶς, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐξεγείρεσθαι καὶ κλονεῖσθαι καταδαρθάνοντα καὶ μαραινόμενα. „Auch die Rassel macht deutlich, daß man das Seiende schütteln muß und niemals mit der Bewegung aufhören darf, sondern es gleichsam wecken und aufscheuchen muß, als ob es *schläft / dabei ist einzuschlafen* und dahinwelkt.“

eigener Aorist zur Verfügung steht⁴³, auf (°)δαρθεῖν zurückgreifen muß. Da °δαρθάνειν aber nur „einschlafen“ und nicht „schlafen“ bedeutet, bildet die Wurzel δαρθ- im Griechischen zwar in dieser Bedeutung ein vollständiges Paradigma, in der Bedeutung „schlafen“ ist der Aorist (°)δαρθεῖν aber weiterhin defektiv und nimmt (°)εὔδειν als Suppletionspartner für das Präsens:

°δαρθάνειν : (°)δαρθεῖν „einschlafen“

(°)εὔδειν : (°)δαρθεῖν „schlafen“, „sich schlafen legen“

(°)εὔδειν und (°)δαρθεῖν stehen also trotz des Präsens °δαρθάνειν in einem suppletiven Verhältnis zueinander.

§ 8. Fassen wie die Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung zusammen: (°)εὔδειν und (°)δαρθεῖν bilden sowohl bei Homer als auch in klassischer und späterer Zeit ein suppletives Paradigma. Gegenüber dem homerischen Zustand, (°)εὔδειν und (°)δαρθεῖν sowohl in der Bedeutung „schlafen“ als auch „sich schlafen legen“, findet sich seit klassischer Zeit bei (°)δαρθεῖν zusätzlich die Bedeutung „einschlafen“. Eine These zu den kausalen Beziehungen zwischen den einzelnen Bedeutungen und ihrer Verteilung auf die Verbalstämme könnte wie folgt lauten: (a) Indem der Aorist (°)δαρθεῖν in ein Suppletionsverhältnis zu (°)εὔδειν geriet, bildete er zusätzlich zu seiner ursprünglichen Bedeutung „sich schlafen legen“ die Lesart „(eine Zeit lang) schlafen“ als komplexiven Aorist zu (°)εὔδειν „schlafen“ aus. Dieser Zustand ist schon bei Homer zu beobachten. (b) In klassischer Zeit übernahm (°)δαρθεῖν auch die Funktion des ingressiven Aorists zum durativen Präsens, konnte also zusätzlich auch „einschlafen“ heißen. Zu dieser Bedeutung wurde dann schließlich das Präsens °δαρθάνειν gebildet (Pl. +). Tabellarisch lassen sich die Ergebnisse wie folgt präsentieren:

⁴³ Nur bei Hippokrates findet sich einmalig καθευδῆσαι neben dreimaligem κατέδαρθον (das Präsens καταδαρθάνω ist nicht belegt): *Int.12.72* ἐσθιέτω δὲ νάρκην καὶ ῥῖνην . . . , τῶν δὲ ἄλλων μηδέν· ἦν δὲ δοκῆ ἀσινέα εἶναι, καὶ κυκεῶνα, ἐπειδὴν θέλη καθευδῆσαι, πινέτω ἀπὸ οἴνου μέλανος, ἥδεος, παλαιοῦ, δικότυλον κύλικα, καὶ μεθ' ἡμέρην τῷ αὐτῷ οἴνῳ χρεέσθω ἐπὶ σιτίῳ. „Er soll Aal und Hai . . . essen, von anderen Fischarten aber nichts; wenn er unversehrt zu sein scheint, dann soll er, wenn er sich schlafen legen will, eine Mischung aus süßem alten Rotwein trinken, und zwar einen zwei Kotylen fassenden Becher, und tagsüber soll er beim Essen denselben Wein trinken.“ Auch in späterer Zeit ist der Aor. καθευδῆσαι selten (s. 1.).

Hom.	(°)εὐδειν	(°)δραθειν	
	„sich schlafen legen“ „schlafen“	„sich schlafen legen“ → „schlafen“	
Nachhom. (Pl. +)	(°)εὐδειν	(°)δραθειν/(°)δαρθειν	°δαρθάνειν
	„sich schlafen legen“ „schlafen“	„sich schlafen legen“ „schlafen“ → „einschlafen“	- - → „einschlafen“

Bibliographie

- Barton, Ch.R. 1985. „PIE **swep-* and **ses-*“, *Sprache* 31, 17–39.
- García Ramón, J.L. 1999a. „Zur Bedeutung indogermanischer Verbalwurzeln: **h₂nek-* ‚erreichen, reichen bis‘, **h₁nek-* ‚erhalten, (weg)nchmen““, in: *Gering und doch von Herzen*. 25 indogermanistische Beiträge Bernhard Forssman zum 65. Geburtstag, hg. v. J. Habisreicinger, R. Plath u. S. Ziegler, Wiesbaden, 47–80.
- 1999b. „Léxico y morfosintaxis en la reconstrucción indoeuropea: IE **h₂nes-* ‚permanecer, permanecer en reposo““, in: *Τῆς φίλης τάδε δῶρα*. Miscelánea léxica en memoria de Conchita Serrano, Madrid, 397–406.
- (im Druck). „Zu Verbalcharakter, morphologischer Aktionsart und Aspekt in der indogermanischen Rekonstruktion“, (erscheint in Hettrich, H. [Hg.]). *Indogermanische Syntax – Fragen und Perspektiven*. (Vorträge der Arbeitstagung Würzburg 1999).
- Harðarson, J.A. 1993. *Studien zum urindogermanischen Wurzelarist*. Innsbruck.
- Jamison, St. W. 1982/3. „Sleep‘ in Vedic and Indo-European.“, *KZ* 96, 6–16.
- Liddell, H.G.; Scott, R. 1996. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. With a revised supplement. 9. Aufl. Oxford.
- LIV = Lexikon der indogermanischen Verben. Die Wurzeln und ihre Primärstamm-bildungen*. 2. Aufl. bearb. v. M. Kümmel u. H. Rix. Wiesbaden 2001.
- Mayrhofer, M. 1956. „Idg. **seud-* ‚ruhen““, *KZ* 73, 116 f.
- Ruipérez, M.S. 1954. *Estructura del sistema de aspectos y tiempos del verbo griego antiguo*. Análisis funcional sincrónico. Salamanca (Nachdr. Madrid 1991).
- Schadewaldt, W. 1958. *Homer. Die Odyssee*. Hamburg.
- 1975. *Homer. Ilias*. Neue Übertragung. Frankfurt.
- Scheibner, G. 2000. *Homer: Ilias*. In Prosa übertragen. Berlin.
- 2000. *Homer: Odyssee*. In Prosa übertragen. Berlin.
- Seebold, E. 1967. „Sind got. *nawis* und *sutis* i-stämmige Adjektive?“, *PBB* 89, 42–53.
- Snell, B. (Begr.) 1955 ff.: *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*. Göttingen.

- Strunk, K. 1971. „Historische und deskriptive Linguistik bei der Textinterpretation.“, *Glotta* 49, 191-216.
- 1977. „Überlegungen zu Defektivität und Suppletion im Griechischen und Indogermanischen.“, *Glotta* 55, 2-34.
 - 1997. „Aspekt“ in: *Der Neue Pauly*. Enzyklopädie der Antike. Hg. v. H. Cancik u. H. Schneider, Stuttgart/Weimar, Bd. 2, 106 f.
- Schwyzler, E. 1939. *Griechische Grammatik*. 3 Bde. München.
- Watkins, C. 1962. *Indo-European Origins of the Celtic Verb*. I. The Sigmatic Aorist. Dublin.

On the origin of Lat. *hirundo* and Gr. *χελιδών*

By William B. LOCKWOOD, Reading

These names for the Swallow (*Hirundo rustica*) have seemed etymologically intractable. A new approach concentrating on onomastic typology will, however, not fail to yield results.

It will be generally agreed that primary bird names can be expected to refer to some obvious feature peculiar to the species concerned, as voice, behaviour, or appearance. It has been suggested, for instance, that *χελιδών* is built upon an onomatopoeic element *χελ-* < IE **ghel-* (Frisk, *Griech. etym. Wb.*, 1084f.). Leaving aside the question of whether such a syllable is a plausible representation of the Swallow's twittering chatter, we would contest this explanation on the grounds that in this case the voice is neither sufficiently distinctive nor prominent enough to inspire a name. After all, so many birds twitter. There is, however, a behavioural feature which one might think could lead to name-giving, namely the bird's rapid flight, and this feature has often been tentatively invoked in etymological speculation. But it is not unique, being shared with the (even faster) Swift (*Micropus apus*). The latter may take its name from the former, as English dial. Black Swallow, but not apparently vice versa. We would concede the possibility of an exception, though one with a low degree of probability.

But the feature most likely to give rise to a name will surely be, by far, the unique, proverbial swallow tail, as transparently in a Common Gaelic name, e.g. Irish *gabhlán*, formally a diminutive of *gabhal* „fork“. Recognition of this simple fact has pointed the way to the interpretation of names previously regarded as enigmatic. Pr. Gmc. **swalwō* is of like origin, the evidence provided by Scandinavian, where ONorse *svala* „swallow“ may be compared with *súla* (1) „two crossed sticks“, other senses „cleft stick, two-pronged fork“ preserved in Faroese and Norwegian, (2) „post, prop“, the latter word contaminated phonetically and semantically by unrelated *súl* „post, prop“ (W.B.L., *Fróðskaparrit*, xxx, 105f., also our *Oxford Book of British Bird Names*, 143f., 149f.).

We have recently recognised the same motivation in the Common Celtic name for the Swallow, best preserved in OIr. *fannall* f. (*Studia Celtica*, xxxvi, 149). This form is referable to a Pr. Celt. diminutive **wandalā* (Pedersen, *Vergleichende Grammatik der keltischen Sprachen*,

passim), and explicable as containing a root **wand-* matching Pr. Gmc. **wand-* present in Goth. *wandus*, ONorse *vǫndr* (whence Eng. *wand*) „rod, stick“, standing in regular ablaut relationship to the verbal root Pr. Gmc. **wend-*, as in OEng. *windan* „wind, turn, twist“. The basic sense of the noun is thus something like „bent or twisted stick“, from which it is no great step to a meaning „two-pronged fork“. To such semantic change Russian offers an instructive parallel in *vila* „fork“ deriving from *vit'*, a verb with meanings comparable to those found in OEng. *windan* above (Vasmer, *Russ. etym. Wb.* I, 200).

Now to the Latin. Morphologically, *hirundo* „swallow“ is quite exceptional, yet remarkably enough this rarest of formations has a virtual replica in *harundo* „reed“ with a range of secondary meanings, including „rod, stick“ (Ernout-Meillet, *Dict. étym.*⁴, 296). Such a curiosity calls for an explanation and this is, of course, now to hand. Here is a repetition of the pattern seen above. The inference seems inescapable: the Latin terms are variants of the selfsame word. There remains the matter of the differing vocalism. The primary form is clearly *harundo*. As for *hirundo*, earlier **herundo* is thinkable („popular *i*“ for *e*), so reducing the phonetic distance from *harundo*. At any rate, we take *hirundo* to be a form proper to rustic dialect which found its way into the standard language by virtue of its unambiguity.

It is sometimes supposed that *hirundo* and *χελιδών* are cognates (Frisk, *loc. cit.*), in which case a word for fork will lie behind the Greek, too. Such a conclusion is in any case highly likely on typological grounds.

Lat. Olphius = ὈΛΒΙΟΣ

By Bárbara PASTOR, Madrid

Martial (9.95) informs us that Athenagoras, after he took a wife, became *Olphius*¹.

Outside this passage, the term *Olphius* is attested in no other place. L. Friedlaender categorically: "Ein völlig unverständliches Wortspiel"². Crusius interprets the antithesis *Alphius-Olphius* as a play upon two Greek words, which leads him to interpret the epigram: "Vor der Hochzeit spielt Athenagoras die erste Violine, nach seiner Heirat die letzte"³, but he offers no discussion on their meaning. W. Ker declares with terseness: "The point of this epigram is unknown"⁴.

J. Mussehl contends that it deals with pederasty: "Dass mit der Heirat des ἐραστής der ἐρώμενος vom A zum U wird, ist ein τόπος der päderastischen Literatur"⁵. K. Barwick, while reminding the reader of the commentary by Heraeus: "*Omnia obscura*," interprets *Olphius* as derived *ab olfaciundo*⁶. Despite its superficial resemblance to *olfacio* "to smell", the fact that it only appears in this context with the Greek name Athenagoras suggests that the term is not Latin at all.

As an explanation of the term *Olphius* Martial provides a similar epigram, in which the proper name is Latin, and, therefore, it carries a Latin adjective:

¹ W.M. Lindsay, ed. *M. Val. Martialis Epigrammata* (Oxford 1903) *ad loc.* Cf. also his book *Ancient Editions of Martial* (Oxford 1903) Appendix A, 99. See D.R. Shackleton Bailey, ed. *Martialis Epigrammata* (Stuttgart: Teubner 1990) *ad loc.*

² L. Friedlaender, *M. Valerii epigrammaton libri mit erklärenden Anmerkungen von L. Friedlaender* (Leipzig 1886) II 101.

³ O. Crusius, "Alphius-Olphius (Martial IX 95)," *Philologus* 65 (1906) 159. Cf. H.C. Schnur, "On a Crux in Martial (9.95)," *CW* 48 (1955) 51.

⁴ W.A.C. Ker, *Martial Epigrams* (London 1920, Cambridge, Mass. 1978) 142.

⁵ J. Mussehl, "Martial IX 95," *Hermes* 58 (1923) 238.

⁶ Cf. N.E. Lemaire, *M. Valerii Martialis Epigrammata* (Paris 1825) 462; K. Barwick, "Zur Kompositionstechnik und Erklärung Martials," *Philologus* 87 (1932) 65; W. Heraeus, *M. Valerii Martialis Epigrammaton Libri* (Leipzig 1976) 223. "Cf. D.R. Shackleton Bailey: *Martial. Epigramms. Vol ii*, (Loeb series 1993), p. 314: "The point of the epigram is in doubt, but the best guess, as I now think, is Calderini's: *Olfius* = *cunnilingus* (*olfacio* = 'smell')".

Duxerat esuriens locupletem pauper anumque,
Uxorem pascit Gellius et futuit. (9.80)

This is clearly the same antithesis as the one to which Martial refers in the above epigram 9.95, since both of them point toward a man who, after he took a wife, became wealthy. Here the word *locupletem* may correspond to *Olphius Athenagoras*, who, since he is Greek, carries the Greek adjective ὄλβιος “wealthy”, sophisticatedly transliterated. It is worth noting that Martial evidently felt that the word *Olphius* would be unknown to his readers and required an explanation:

Nomen Athenagorae credis, Callistrate, verum,
Si scio, dispeream, qui sit Athenagoras.
Sed puta me verum, Callistrate, dicere nomen;
Non ego sed vester peccat Athenagoras. (9.95 b)

Under the circumstances, we should observe that *Olphius* may be interpreted as a Greek word, whose meaning is that of ὄλβιος, an adjective from ὄλβος⁷. To understand the wit lurking behind such transliteration we ought collate the meaning of *peccat* (9.95 b), which is of sexual sin⁸. Thus Martial satirizes the unscrupulous devices by which alone a poor man can achieve wealth in Rome⁹, unless he brags a Greek name. The real purpose of using this specific word may be explained by the evil meaning of words such as ὄλβος, κόρος, ὕβρις, and ἄτη in archaic Greek thought¹⁰.

I propose therefore to change the orthography *Olficus* in the Latin Dictionaries¹¹ and provide the entry *Olphius*, identifying it as a loanword from Greek and a ἄπαξ λεγόμενον in Martial.

⁷ Cf. *LSJ* (1940) s.v. and H. Frisk, *GEW* II (1973) s.v. ὄλβιος, ὄλβος.

⁸ *Hor Sat.* 1.2, 63; *Ov. H.* 16, 295; *Mart.* 1.34, 2.

⁹ See E.S. Ramage, *Urbanitas. Ancient Sophistication and Refinement* (Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press 1973). And also W.S. Anderson, “Lascivia vs. Ira: Martial and Juvenal”, *Essays in Roman Satire* (Princeton 1982) 379–381.

¹⁰ R. Schmiel, “The ὄλβος, κόρος, ὕβρις, ἄτη sequence”, *Traditio* 45 (1990), 343–346.

¹¹ Cf. F. Gaffiot (1934) s.v. *Olficus*; “*flacon d’odeurs*” nom d’homme,” and Ch. Lewis-Short (1984) s.v. *Olficus* “smelling,” in a play on the word *Alphicus*.

Some Supplements to the Revised *LSJ* Supplement

By Robert RENEHAN, Santa Barbara

The *Greek-English Lexicon* of Liddell-Scott Jones (ninth edition, 1940) is not a perfect work, an *opus omnibus numeris absolutum*. How could it be? A.E. Housman, in a familiar passage from his Cambridge Inaugural Address of 1911, a passage of which he was sufficiently fond to repeat it in his edition of Juvenal, famously remarked of lexica that “it is the common lot of such works of reference that they begin to be obsolete the day after they are published.” What *LSJ* is, however, is the most useful and the most widely consulted complete lexicon of ancient Greek presently available. The appearance in 1996 of a revised *Supplement* to it has further increased its utility. Nevertheless, until the day of the electronic *LSJ*, it may serve some small service for scholars to continue to note various omissions and oversights in it. Naturally, there is room for disagreement as to what should properly be included in a work of the compass of *LSJ* and I have accordingly often added explicit comments to explain why I believe a particular addition or correction belongs therein. I am aware that all such judgments must be subjective and that an editor of a lexicon does not enjoy a comparable luxury of space to explain editorial decisions. (A word on the *Diccionario Griego-Español*. This work in progress is in many respects admirable, all the more so in view of the fiscal constraints under which it labors. However, it is intended to be much more comprehensive than *LSJ* and many citations included in it (now or in future) rightly find no place in *LSJ*. Some of the entries in the present paper are, or doubtless will be, in the *DGE* (though all my materials have been collected independently of that work). Since *LSJ* is, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, the standard Greek lexicon of reference for most classicists, I have not deemed any overlaps with the *DGE* a reason for omitting certain entries, especially since my reasons for believing that they belong in *LSJ* will often not be apparent from their surroundings in the *DGE*.) Finally, I record my hope that it will appear from some of these entries that *LSJ* is not entirely adequate in its documentation of one of the most important areas of classical Greek, namely the Aristotelian corpus.

ἀγκάς “Adv. into or in the arms ...” Add Orph. *Lith.* 375 μητέρι ... υἶόν ... ἀγκὰς ἐχούση.

ἀγορεύω “... 3. proclaim ... ὁ νόμος ἄ. the law declares, Antipho 3.3.7, Lys. 9.9, Arist. *Rh.* 1354^a 22 ...” Add Arist. *EN* 1129^b14 οἱ ... νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων κτλ., where J. Burnet’s observation is worth repeating: “The verb ἀγορεύειν belongs to Attic legal style, and is never used in Aristotle except of οἱ νόμοι”.

ἀδήφαγος, ον “gluttonous, greedy ... b. t.t. for a category of horses at the games, Pherecr. 212 K.-A., Ar. *fr.* 758 ... 2. fig., eating up fuel, money, etc., ἄ. λύχνος Alc. Com. 21 ...” Add two passages from Max. Tyr.: 8(2).4 ... πῦρ, ἀγαλμα ἐφήμερον, ἀκόρεστον καὶ ἀδήφαγον (the allusion is to fire as an image or symbol of the deity among the Persians). 26(20).5 ... κατὰ τὴν Ὀμηρικὴν εἰκόνα, ἵππον ... ἀδήφαγον ... Here the adjective is applied to a horse, but the allusion is explicitly to the famous simile in *Il.* 6.506–11 = 15.263–68 and ἀδήφαγος is Maximus’ prose substitution for the Homeric phrase, ἀκοστήσας ἐπὶ φάτνῃ (6.506 = 15.263). It is not apparent that Maximus is employing a technical term in reference to the games. (Contrast *LSJ* above).

ἀθρέω “... II. later, of the mind, look upon, observe, θέλων ἄθρησον *view* kindly, Pi. *P.* 2.70; πολλὰ πυθέσθαι, πολλὰ δ’ ἄθρησαι S. *OT.* 1305 ...” For the use of this verb in philosophical Greek add Arist. *Cael.* 293^a29 τὸ πιστὸν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἀθροῦσιν ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἐκ τῶν λόγων. Id. *Met.* 998^b1 εἴ τις ἐθέλει τὴν φύσιν ἀθρεῖν κτλ.

ἀκριβολογέομαι “to be exact or precise in language, investigation, etc., abs. Pl. *R.* 340e, *Cra.* 415a: c.acc. rei, weigh accurately, Id. *R.* 403d; ταυτί πάνθ’ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀκριβολογοῦμαι D.18.21 ... ib. 240: later in Act. D.H. *Dem.* 26, Alex. Aphr. in *Metaph.* 479.15.” *LSJ* cites an example from the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (early 3rd cent. A. D.) and the 1996 *Suppl.* adds an occurrence from the Roman jurist Herennius Modestinus (3rd cent. A. D.), but no instance from Aristotle himself who uses it a number of times, e. g., *EN* 1139^b19 (ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστίν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν), *Cael.* 306^b27, *Pol.* 1258b 34, *Rh.* 1331^b18. (Curiously, despite the omission of any Aristotelian examples of the verb, *LSJ* include, in a separate entry, his use of the verbal adjective ἀκριβολογητέον.)

ἀλκή, ἡ Add the use of this noun in a periphrasis, Pi. *I.* 4.35^b ἴστε μάν / Αἴαντος ἀλκὴν (= Αἴαντα ἄλκιμον); see J.B. Bury ad. loc. for this highly poetic passage. Compare βίη, ἴς, μένος, σθένος in such periphrases. Note also E. *Ion* 204 τὰν πῦρ πνέουσαν ἐναίρει / τρισώματον ἀλκάν, of the Chimaera.

ἀλλοιῶ “change, alter ... II. Pass. ... become different, be changed ... ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι *undergo an alteration*, Pl. *Th.* 181d; rare in Poetry ...”

ἀλλοιώσις, *εως*, ἡ “difference, Pl. *R.* 454c; alteration, Arist. *Rh.* 226^a26, Aristox. *Harm.* p.74 M. ...”

Thus no example of ἀλλοιῶ is cited from Aristotle and only one of ἀλλοιώσις. This is misleading since verb and noun are both very common in Aristotle, in a technical philosophical sense, as well as in later philosophical writings. ἀλλοιώσις is one of the formal types of change (κίνησις), namely *qualitative* change in contrast to quantitative change (αὔξεισις and φθίσις) and local change (φορᾶ). Given its long and important history in philosophy, more documentation, especially from its beginnings, is a desideratum. See, e.g., Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* and Lampe’s *Patristic Greek Lexicon* s.vv. ἀλλοιῶ and ἀλλοιώσις for numerous examples.

ἄλπος, *ον* “without pain ...” Add the usage in Arist. *Cael.* 294^a12 τάχα γὰρ ἀλυποτέρας διανοίας τὸ μὴ θαυμάζειν πῶς ποτε κτλ., “...it is the part of a rather unfeeling, insensate intellect not to wonder how ever ...” This use of ἄλπος is clearly colloquial (Simplicius ad. loc. paraphrases by ‘ἀργοτέρας’) and similar in sense to the commoner adjective ἀναίσθητος, ‘insensate’ (‘without sense or feeling ... without perception or common sense, stupid ...’ *LSJ* s.v.). For this word in this sense see *LSJ* s.v. I.2 and Arist. *EN* 1114^a 10 τὸ ... ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ... κομιδῇ ἀναίσθητον (not in *LSJ*).

ἀνάγκη, ἡ “... III. = ἡ δικαστικὴ κλεψύδρα, Hsch.” Photius has the same entry, but Pollux 8.17 preserves an actual passage from Aristophanes, perhaps the only one known to the ancient grammarians, where this meaning is alleged to occur: ἐνιοι δ’ οἴονται καὶ ἀνάγκην σκεῦος εἶναι δικαστικόν, εἰπόντος Ἀριστοφάνους [= *fr.* 601.2 K.-A.] ‘οὐκ εἰ λαβὼν θύραζε τὰ ψηφίσματα / καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην ἐς κόρακας ἐντευθενί;’ (The *DGE* cites this passage s.v. III.2, defining it as “*limitación de tiempo de intervención ante un tribunal*”, but this less concrete meaning seems oddly conjoined with οὐκ εἰ λαβὼν.)

ἀνθέλω “draw or pull against, Th. 4.14 ... ἄ. τὴν ψυχὴν *draw it in a contrary direction*, Pl. *R.* 439^b8 ...” Add Arist. *De. An.* 433^b8, ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει ...

ἀνομία, ἡ *LSJ Suppl.*: “... 1. add ἐξάλειψο(ν) τὰς ἄ. μου καὶ τὰ παραπτώματα ἄ μου SEG 31.1562.5 (? Egypt, Chr., iv/v AD); cf. ἀνόμιον.” The *Suppl.*, s.v. ἀνόμιον, τό, gives “*transgression, wrong-doing, ἐξάλειψον τὸ ἀνόμιον αὐτῆς* Guarducci *EG* 4. p. 459 no. 2.12 (Nubia, Chr. v AD); cf. ἀνομία.” These entries are misleading, for they

fail to indicate that both passages are biblical echoes. See, e. g., LXX. *Ps.* 50.3 ἐξάλειψον τὸ ἀνόμημά μου, 11 πάσας τὰς ἀνομίας μου ἐξάλειψον (the obvious source). See also LXX. *Ps.* 108.14. ἐξάλειψω, ἀνομία, and παράπτωμα are all common biblical words (both LXX and *NT*); *LSJ* cite not one example of the first two.

ἀντίκειμαι “to be set over against, correspond with . . . II. to be opposite to . . . 2. to be opposed to, in various ways, *Arist. Cat.* 11^b17, *Metaph.* 1055^a38, al . . .” A curious sense of τὰ ἀντικείμενα in Aristotle has been overlooked by *LSJ*. See *De. An.* 402^b15, 415^a20. W.D. Ross at 402^b15 correctly observes “τὰ ἀντικείμενα refers here not, as it more often does, to opposites, but to objects which stand over against the mental activity which apprehends them.” R.D. Hicks notes at the same passage “Whatever the precise explanation, it is clear that ἀντικείμενον = the object of a mental operation, *the external thing to which we are attending* (emphasis added).” This usage is a particularly clear illustration of the flexibility of Aristotle’s Greek.

ἀντίτεχνος, ον “rival in an art or craft, *Ar. Ra.* 816, *Pl. R.* 493a etc. . . .” Add *Arist. Pol.* 1311^a17, where the word refers to political rivals of a tyrant.

ἀποσοβέω “scare away as one does birds . . . II. intr., to be off in a hurry, οὐκ ἀποσοβήσεις; i. e. *be off!* *Ar. Av.* 1032, 1258, cf. *Luc. Nav.* 4; ἀποσοβόμεν *let’s be off*, *Men.* 997.” For meaning II add Longus 3.7.

ἀπόσταξις, εως, ἡ “nose-bleeding, *Hp. Acut. (Sp.)* 29.” It is misleading to cite a single example of this word as if it were a *hapax legomenon*. There are a half-dozen occurrences of it in the Hippocratic corpus and it is clearly a common medical term. See., e. g., *Acut. (Sp.)* 23 ἄ. αἵματος ἐκ ῥινῶν; *Epid.* 580; *Prorrh.* 1.141 ἀπὸ ῥινῶν . . . μικρὰ ἀπόσταξις.

ἀπώλεια, ἡ “destruction . . . II. loss . . . 3. thing lost, LXX *Le.* 6.3 (5.22).” Longus 1.5.1 seems to have an example of meaning II.3: εἰς τοῦτο τὸ νυμφαῖον οἷς . . . συχνὰ φοιτῶσα δόξαν πολλάκις ἀπωλείας παρεῖχε (‘ . . . gave the appearance of a thing lost’).

ἄρσην, ὁ, ἡ “male . . . masculine . . .” *LSJ* s.v. 2 and 4 cite instances of this adjective used of plants = ‘robust’, ‘coarse’, vel sim. Add *Hp. Mul.* 1.75, where it is applied to λιβανωτός, ‘frankincense.’ *LSJ* s.v. λιβανωτός, I.1 state that “the best kind was λ. ἄρσην *Dsc.* 1.68, *Alciph.* 2.4”. These passages as well deserve to be listed s.v. ἄρσην.

ἀσινής, ἐς “unhurt, unharmed . . . II.1. Act., *doing no harm*, *Sapph.* 80, *Hdt.* 1.105, *X. Eq.* 5.1, *Hp. Fract.* 28 . . . *innocent*, ἡδοναί *Pl. Lg.* 670d . . .” Aristotle also uses the adjective, *EN* 1150^a4 ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ

ἡ φαυλότης κτλ. The frequency of the word in both Herodotus and the Hippocratic corpus (more occurrences in each than *LSJ* indicate) suggests that it was common in Ionic, though not confined to that dialect. Enoch Powell in his *Lexicon to Herodotus* notes that author's fondness for the phrase ἀποπέμπειν τινὰ ἄ. (2.181, 7.146, 9.5). Aeschylus is the only Attic poet for whom this adjective is attested.

ἀσκολιάζω "... II. *hop on one leg*, ἀσκολιάζειν ῥῆον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀρισ-
τεροῖς Arist. *IA* 705^b33 ..."

ἀσκολιάζω "= -ιάζω II, Pl. *Smp.* 190d, Phryn. *PS* p. 42B."

There is a three-fold confusion here. (1) In both the Plato and Aristotle passages cited the MSS have both verbs as variants (and the Greek lexicographers recognize both verbs in their definitions: contrast the scholia to Plato, loc. cit., with Hsch. s.v.). *LSJ* are silent on this. (2) Editors (e. g. Burnet and Dover) favor (probably correctly) ἀσκολιάζω in Plato, loc. cit., whereas the passage is cited in *LSJ* only s.v. ἀσκολίζω. (Editors of Aristotle also favor ἀσκολιάζω.) (3) *LSJ* adduce Phrynichus for the form ἀσκολίζω, and only for that form. Here is the actual entry: ἀσκολιάζειν καὶ ἀσκολίζειν· σημαίνει τὸ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ σκόλου πεπληγμένον ἐφ' ἓν σκέλος ἄλλεσθαι. (See De Borries' edition ad loc. for further references to the grammarians.)

ἄστυτος, ον "(στύω) *impotent*, paratrag. for ἄστυλος in Xenarch. 1." In Xenarch., loc. cit., K.-A. now print the v.l. ἀσύντατος, but ἄστυτος does occur as the title of a comedy by Eubulus, Ath. 69C: Εὐβουλος δ' ἐν Ἀστύτοις φησί κτλ (fr. 13 K.-A.).

See R.L. Hunter's discussion on p. 103 of his edition of the fragments of Eubulus.

ἀϋτή, ἡ "*breath* ... II. 9.609; τεῖρε δ' ἄ. Ἥφαιστοιο *the fiery breath* of Hephaistos, 21.366; ὄσσον πυρὸς ἵκετ' ἄ. Od.16.290 (hence abs. for *heat* 9.389): in pl. ... ἀϋτμαὶ Ἥφαιστου Q.S. 13.269 ... Opp. C. 1.467." Apart from Homeric occurrences *LSJ* cite only a couple of late passages from (Ps.-) Oppian and Quintus, both probably dating from the third century A. D. Add therefore several examples from the Hellenistic poets, Call. *Dian.* v. 117 ... φάεος δ' ἐνέτηκας ἀϋτμήν / ἀσβέστου, τό ῥα πατρὸς ἀποστάζουσι κεραυνοί; A.R. 1.734 ... μαλεροῖο πυρὸς ζείουσαν ἀϋτμήν.

ἀφίημι This verb is a common medical term used of diseases, fevers, and symptoms of various sorts (chills etc.) *leaving* a person. *LSJ* s.v. II. 2.a. ("of things, *get rid of*") cite, among a wide variety of occurrences with non-medical nouns, only Hp. *Prorrh.* 2.39, where νοσήματα is the *object* of the verb. For the distinct usage where the affliction is the *subject* they cite nothing. See Hp. *Epid.* 5.20 ὅτε δὲ

καὶ ἀφῆκε ῥίγος, ὑπολαβὼν ἦκεν ὁ πυρετός. 5.28 ὁ δὲ πυρετός ... οὐκ ἀφίει. *Morb.* 2.40 πυρετός αὐτὸν λαμβάνει καθ' ἡμέρη καὶ ἀφίει. 2.44 ὅταν δ' ὁ πυρετός ἀφῆ κτλ. For many more examples, with the personal object both expressed and unexpressed, see the *Index Hippocraticus* s.v. ἀφίημι (I, p. 115). Aristotle also preserves an example, *Ph.* 230^b4 ... οἱ ἀφιέμενοι μὴ ἐν κρίσιμοις ἡμέραις, οἱ δ' ἐν κρίσιμοις. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, p. 128^a55 renders ἀφιέμενοι 'liberati morbo' and Ross in his commentary ad loc. paraphrases 'people who recover from fevers not in the critical days'. (This passive of course corresponds to an active form with 'fever' vel. sim. as subject. Aristotle knew his medical terminology.)

ἀφίστημι "put away, remove, keep out of the way ... B. intr. in Pass., as also in aor. 2 ἀπέστην ... stand away or aloof from ..." Observe the absolute usage in Aristotle = 'take leave of a subject', vel sim. *EN* 1165^a35 οὐ μὴν διὰ γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον. *Met.* 1056^b28 οὐκ ὄρθῶς ἀπέστη ('left the subject' W.D. Ross ad loc.) Ἄναξαγόρας εἰπὼν ὅτι κτλ. *Top.* 107^b9 οὐκ ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ἐπισκεπτεόν τί κτλ. *Ph.* 191^b10 ὅπερ ἐκείνοι μὲν οὐ διελόντες ἀπέστησαν. (*LSJ* have a separate entry for the verbal adjective ἀποστατέον, but omit there too the Aristotelian passages.)

βαβαί "exclam. of surprise or amazement, bless me! E. *Cyc.* 156, *Ar. Av.* 272, etc. ... *Achae.* 28 ... *Alex.* 206: c. gen., βαβαί τοῦ λόγου ... *Pl. Phlb.* 23b, cf. *Jul. Caes.* 309^b etc." Plato, loc. cit., is the only classical prose passage cited by *LSJ*; this is misleading. There are some ten other examples of βαβαί in Plato, none of them followed by a genitive, but all used either absolutely or followed by an exclamatory clause introduced by ὡς (e.g. *R.* 361D, 459B) or οἶον (*Alc.* 1.118B, 119C).

βέβηλος, ον "allowable to be trodden, prob. of ground ... generally, permitted ... II. of persons, unhallowed, = ἀμύητος, *S. Fr.* 154, *Orph. Fr.* 245; impure, E. *Fr.* 648 ... uninitiated ... *Gal. UP* 12.6." The well-known conclusion of the Hippocratic *Lex* (c.5) deserves a citation: τὰ δὲ ἱερὰ ἐόντα πρῆγματα ἱεροῖσιν ἀνθρώποισι δείκνυται βεβήλοισι δὲ οὐ θέμις, πρὶν ἢ τελεσθῶσιν ὀργίοισιν ἐπιστήμης. Note the metaphorical use of the word with reference to the 'mysteries of science' (ὀργίοισιν ἐπιστήμης).

βλέπω "see, have the power of sight ... II. look ... freq. folld. by noun in acc., φόβον β. look terror, i. e. to look terrible ... also folld. by Adj., μέγα β. dub. In *Semon.* 19; φθονερά β. *Pi. N.* 4.39; γλίσχρον β. *Euphro* 10.16, cf. *Men. Epit.* 479, *Jul. Caes.* 309c." The less common construction with an adjective is found also in Aristophanes, *Lys.* 886 ἀγανώτερον βλέπειν.

βόσις, εως, ἢ “(βόσκω) *food, fodder*, ἰχθύσι II. 19.268; οἰωνοῖς καὶ θηροῖς Q.S. 1.329; β. καὶ τροφή Porph. *Antr.* 15.” Add Theoc. (?) 25.8 βόσκονται ... βόσιν.

βρυάζω “*swell, teem* ... metaph. *wax wanton* ...” Add Men. *Asp.* v. 48 ἐβρυάζον οἱ πλεῖστοι (‘most of our men were carousing’ tr. W.G. Arnott). See further Gomme-Sandbach ad loc.

γαλεάγρα, ἢ “*weasel-trap* or *weasel-cage* ... generally *cage for beasts* ... used for prisoners, Plu. *Phoc.* 33, *App. Pun.* 4.” For this last sense add D.L. 5.5 ἐν σιδηρᾷ περιήγετο γαλεάγρα (of Callisthenes, Aristotle’s nephew).

γλάγος, εος, τό “poet. for γάλα (q.v.), *milk*, II. 2.471, Pi. *Fr.* 106, Nic. *Al.* 385.” Add Mosch. 3.3.

γυμνάσιον, τό “I. in pl., *bodily exercises*, Pi. *Fr.* 129.4, Hdt. 9.33, Hp. *Art.* 58, Pl. *R.* 539d etc. ... II. *gymnastic school* ...” The *singular* occurs in meaning I also, of a specific bodily exercise, in Pl. *Lach.* 182A: καὶ ἅμα προσήκει μάλιστ’ ἐλευθέρῳ τοῦτό τε τὸ γυμνάσιον καὶ ἡ ἰππική. (The exercise in question is training in the use of military arms.)

δεχάς, ἀδος, ἢ “*receptacle*, coined by Pythag. to expl. δεκάς, Ph. 2.184, *Theol. Ar.* 59, *Ascl. in Metaph.* 38.31 etc.” Make this word δεχάς (A) and add a new word δεχάς (B) from Plu. *Agis* 19: ... καὶ τοὺς ὑπηρετάς ἐκέλευον ἄγειν [sc. Ἄγίδα] εἰς τὴν καλουμένην Δεχάδα. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν οἴκημα τῆς εἰρκτῆς ἐν ᾧ θανατοῦσι τοὺς καταδίκους ἀποπνίγοντες. This is obviously an independent coinage and distinct from the *LSJ* entry. There is a v.l. κεκάδαι here, of no apparent meaning. Xylander conjectured τὸν καλούμενον καιάδαν, which some editors have printed, but the καιάδας was a deep pit (βάραθρον), not a room (οἴκημα), and does not seem to be referred to here. Compare Paus. 4.18.4–7. Nor is it likely that state officials would have descended among the unburied corpses in the καιάδας – the stench must have been extreme at times – to carry out an execution. The ‘reception room’, ἢ δεχάς, was the place for that. *Mutatis mutandis*, one might say that the δεχάς was to the καιάδας as the ritual practice of πρόθεσις το ἐκφορά.

διακναίω “*grate to bits* ... *ruin utterly, destroy* ... *wear or waste away* ...” (Definitions as corrected in 1996 *Suppl.*) This verb is also used of the effect of loud noises or sounds, = ‘shatter’ vel sim. Arist. *Cael.* 290^b34 οἱ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντες ψόφοι διακναίουσι καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων τοὺς ὄγκους; ib. 291^a22.

διάπειρα, ἢ “*crucial experiment, trial, proof* ... Hdt. 2.28, 77 ... Id. 1.47; δ. βροτῶν ἔλεγχος Pi. O. 4.18.” The word is commoner than

this entry would suggest and is correct (Attic and other) prose. *LSJ* 1996 *Suppl.* partially remedy this by citing a passage from Aeschines and several from (spurious) speeches in the Demosthenic corpus. Plutarch also uses the word, *Dion* 22.3.

διαπτοέω “scare away ... strike with panic ...” The verb is found in *imesi* in [Mosch.] 4 (= *Megara*).122, τοῖα ... ὄνειρα διὰ φρένας ἐπτοίησαν.

διατελέω “bring quite to an end, accomplish ... II. abs., 1. mostly c. part., continue being or doing so and so ... 2. with no part. or Adj., continue, live, δ. μετ’ ἀλλήλων διὰ βίου Pl. *Smp.* 192c; δ. χαριέντως Id. *R.* 426a; ἐν ἀγρῷ Men. *Georg.* 4.” Add Arist. *HA* 505^b8 ἐν τοῖς ποτίμοις ὕδασι διατελεῖ (of water-snakes); see further Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, p. 190^a 40–47.

διεφθοσ, ον “well-boiled, opp. ὀπτός, Hp. *Aff.* 40 (Comp.), Antig. *Mir.* 82 ... ἀκροκόλια Pherecr. 108.14, Telecl. 48.” Add Arist. *HA* 548^a8.

διψάω “thirst ... 2. metaph., δ. τινός thirst after a thing, Pi. *N.* 3.6; ἐλευθερίας Pl. *R.* 562c.” Add a third example of the genitival construction, Arist. *Cael.* 291^b27 ... διὰ τὸ φιλοσοφίας διψῆν (from a famous passage).

δρέπανον, το To the usual meanings (‘sickle’, ‘pruning-knife’, ‘weapron with a curved blade’) add a new one, ‘elephant goad’. Arist. *HA* 510^a28 ... ὁ ἐλεφαντιστῆς ἐπιπηδήσας κατευθύνει τῷ δρεπάνῳ.

δωμάω “build, A.R. 2.531, *IG* 14.1868, *AP* 7.142 ... Pass., δ. ἐκ λίθων Antyll. ap. Orib. 9.13.6 ...” Add the oldest extant example of the passive (perhaps the oldest extant example in general), Call. *H. Dian.* 249 ... περὶ βρέτας εὐρὺ θέμιλον / δωμήθη. The 1996 *Suppl.* adds a new word, a compound of this verb, namely *περιδωμάω*, citing it as “poet. in *POxy.* 2812 *fr.* 1(a)ii 25.” Correct the attribution from ‘poet.’ to Nicander (?) in *SH* 562.1, where the editors remark “... *περιδωμάω* novum (*δωμάω* primum ap. A.R.) ...” This last assertion is not certain (see above).

δωροδόκος, ον “taking presents or bribes, corrupt, Pl. *R.* 390d, D. 18.61; Com. *δωροδόκοισιν ἐπ’ ἄνθεσιν ἴζων* Ar. *Eq.* 403.” As often, Aristotle is omitted; add *EN* 1163^b11.

εἶθαρ “Adv. at once, forthwith, Il.5.337, Theoc. 25.213, Antim. 16.5, A.R. 2.408, Nic. *Th.* 547.” One Homeric citation versus four instances from Hellenistic poetry, to which a fifth is added in the *Suppl.* from Callimachus. Actually, *εἶθαρ* occurs nine times in the *Iliad* and the passage cited is sometimes taken in a local sense (compare Il. 20.473). Add, e.g., *Il.* 11.579, 23.256 and Hes. *Th.* 688, *Id. fr.* 1.12 (uncertain

supplement). Gow's brief comment on εἶθαρ at [Theocr.] 25.213 is useful and puts things in some perspective.

εἶμι (*sum*) *LSJ* s.v., l. 20: "opt. εἶην, -ης . . ., -η, also εἶοις, εἶοι, Il. 9.284, 142, al. . . ." The first-person sg. form εἶοιμι occurs in Posidippus = *SH fr.* 705.16; for εἶοις and εἶοι add *Call. fr.* 162.3 and *fr.* 55.3.

εἶμι (*ibo*) "... VI.2 ἴτω *let it pass, well then*, *S. Ph.* 120, *E. Med.* 798." The 1996 *Suppl.* adds *E. Ba.* 365, *Heracl.* 455. This does not bring out sufficiently the meaning of ἴτω ("the Greek for a shrug of the shoulders", Dodds on *E. Ba.* 363-65). For its origin and force compare such fuller expressions as *S. OT* 1458 ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἡμῶν μοιρ', ὀποῖπερ εἶσ', ἴτω. *Pl. Ap.* 19A ὁμως τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὄπη τῷ θεῷ φίλον κτλ. *Call. Del.* 128 ἴτω περρωμένον ἡμαρ. There is a tone of resignation in ἴτω.

εἶς, μία, ἓν "... 6. Math., τὸ ἓν *unity*, opp. πλῆθος, *Pythag. Fr.* 5, etc.: pl., ἓνα *units*, *Arist. Metaph.* 1056^b21; ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶν ἓνα πλείω *Id. Ph.* 207^b7; τῶν προτέρων ἐνῶν *Dam. Pr.* 460. 7. *Philos.*, ἓν, τό, *unity*, the *One* ... *Heraclit.* 10, cf. *Emp.* 17.1 etc.: later indecl., ἓν εἶναι τοῦ ἓν παρουσία *Plot.* 6.6.14, cf. 5.5.5." Indecidable ἓν occurs already in *Aristotle, Met.* 1015^b36 τῶν ... καθ' αὐτὰ ἐν λεγομένων (cf. *ib.*, 1016^a12-13, 22, 25-26); *De An.* 430^a28 σύνθεσις τις ... νοημάτων ὅσπερ ἐν ὄντων, where *W.D. Ross* correctly refers to "the use of ἓν as an indeclinable *predicate* [emphasis mine], whatever the gender and the case of the subject may be".

ἕκαστος, η, ον "each ..." The 1996 *Suppl.* s.v. states "III.2, add 'b w. ellipsis of ἡμέρα, ἐφ' ἑκάστης *each day*, *Just. Nov.* 40 epilogus; sim. καθ' ἑκάστην *ib.* 43.1.1." The idiom καθ' ἑκάστην occurs both in non-legal Greek and earlier. See *Dio Cassius* 77 (78).15.6; *Aëtius medicus* 9.1 (cf. *Aretaeus*, p. 130, l.3 test. ed. *Hude*). Later occurrences can be found in *Photius Bibl.* P. 209A33 *Bekker* (= vol. IV, p. 10, ll. 33-34 *Henry*) and in *Greg. Cor.* p. 33, where it is cited, apparently erroneously, as an Attic usage.

ἑκάτερος, α, ον "each of two, each singly, opp. ἀμφοτέροι ... with Particles and Preps. ... ἐφ' ἑκάτερα *both ways*, *Thuc.* 5.73." Add a second example of this phrase, *Arist. PA* 682^b10: δύο γὰρ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα πτερὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσιν (= "for they have two wings *on each side* of the body", i. e. ἑκάτερα does not go with πτερὰ). Note that the paraphrase in *LSJ* ("both ways") is, strictly speaking, inconsistent with the distinction (correctly) made between ἑκάτερος and ἀμφοτέροι.

ἔκβολος, ον "thrown out or away, exposed, ἔκβολον οἶκων βρέφος *E. Ph.* 804 (lyr.); rejected, σφόνδυλοι *Supp. Epigr.* 2.569.22 (*Didyma*); ἔ. βροτῶν βίου *Luc. Trag.* 215 ..." Add. *Call. Cer.* ἔκβολα λύματα

δαυτός. D. Mastronarde at E., loc. cit., describes the word as a ‘Euripidean coinage’; it is true that Euripides is fond of the word, but the extant evidence does not allow us to assert that no one before him – or after, for that matter – had independently formed this normal compound (= prose ἐκβόλιμος). After all, Euripides employs the word ‘with virtuosity in four or five conceptually determined senses’ [Mastronarde, loc. cit.], whereas other authors use it more literally, a fact which militates against direct borrowing. One needs constant reminding how much Greek has not survived.

ἐκεῖθεν, ἐκεῖθι. *LSJ* omit any citations from perhaps the oldest extant prose author to use these words – Herodotus. See, for ἐκεῖθεν, 8.68 β (κεῖθεν apparently in 1.122) and, for ἐκεῖθι – which *LSJ* describe as “poet. for ἐκεῖ ... and in late Prose” – 1.182, 2.122 (κεῖθι is a v.l. in the latter passage but editors favor the longer form.) If *LSJ* have omitted the forms ἐκεῖθεν and ἐκεῖθι from Herodotus on the grounds that the Ionic forms are κεῖθεν, κεῖθι, they are inconsistent since s.v. ἐκεῖνος they state explicitly that “Hdt. prefers ἐκεῖνος [sc. to κεῖνος]” and s.v. ἐκεῖσε they cite that form, not κεῖσε, from him (7.239). H.W. Smyth long ago noted that “κεῖνος ... [is] preferred by the iambic writers to the longer forms, which find favor in Herodotus and Hippocrates” (*The Sounds and Inflections of the Greek Dialects. Ionic* (Oxford 1894), p. 41).

ἐξελαύνω “drive out ... expel ...” Add the comic expression in Antiph. fr. 293. 1ff. K.-A.: οἶνω ... τὸν οἶνον ἐξελαύνειν [= the English expression ‘hair of the dog’] / σάλπιγγι τὴν σάλπιγγα κτλ. For a fuller citation and discussion of this *modus dicendi* see my note on E. *HF* 40 in *CP* 80(1985):145.

ἐξέρχομαι “go or come out of ... I.1.1 of offspring, issue from the womb, τὰ μὲν τετελειωμένα, τὰ δὲ ἀτελῆ ἐ. Arist. *Pr.* 896^a18; ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς M. Ant. 9.3.” Of the two examples adduced one is from a later compilation of the Aristotelian school, not from Aristotle himself, the other from the second century A. D. Add Arist. *GA* 779^a10; *HA* 583^b14, 585^a25. (Some may regard the *HA* passages as later additions; the *GA* passage is secure.)

ἐπαπορέω “raise a new doubt or question, πότερον ... Plb. 6.3.6; δύο ταῦτα, εἰ ..., τί ... Ph. 2.216, cf. S.E. *P.* 1.225, Ph. Byz. *Mir.* 4.2 ...” Add. Plu. *Mor.* 864 B where the verb is followed by εἴτε ... εἴτε ...

ἐπεὶ “... II. with *Subj.*, ἄν being always added in Att. Prose, and ἄν or κε generally in Poetry: ἐπεὶ with ἄν becomes ἐπήν (so in Com., Ar. *Lys.* 1175, *Av.* 983), later ἐπάν (q.v.) ...” *LSJ* strangely adduce

only instances from comedy. Kühner-Gerth, II. p. 447 n. 1 cite Th. 5.47, 8.58; X. *Cyr.* 3.2.1, *An.* 2.4.3, *Hell.* 2.1.27; E. *HF* 1364 and ‘unter den Rednern nur Isocr. 5.38.’ (In some of these passages ἐπὶ ἄν or ἐπειδὴν – this latter the commonest Attic form – are vv. ll.)

ἐπιλήθω “... II. *Med.* ... forget ... 2. less freq., forget *willfully*, τῶν ἐντολέων μεμνημένος ἐπελανθάνετο Hdt. 3.147; ἐκὼν ἐπιλήθωμαι Id. 4.43, cf. 3.75, Aeschin. 1.158.” The 1996 *Supp.* adds another example of this interesting expression from Demades. Other occurrences can be found at Aeschin. 3.85 and Callisth. Olynth. ap. Σ Arist. *EN* 1124^b16 (ἐπελάθοντο ἐκόντες). ἐκὼν, almost invariably present in this idiom (compare μεμνημένος in Hdt. 3.147), shows that *LSJ*’s rendering of the verb ‘forget *willfully* [emphasis mine]’ is misleading. This sense requires the presence of ἐκὼν or an equivalent. ἐπιλήθωμαι *alone* can hardly have this meaning.

ἔχω “B. intrans. I.1 *hold oneself*, i. e. *keep*, so and so ... ἔχε ἡρέμα *keep* still, Pl. *Cra.* 399e, etc. ...” I miss the comparable usage with an *adjective*, especially in the common phrase ἔχ’ ἡσυχος: E. *Hipp.* 1313, *IA* 1133, *Med.* 550; Ar. *Nub.* 1244, *Plut.* 127. ἄφοβος ἔχε occurs in E. *Or.* 1273. The expression is colloquial, not poetic (as K.-G. call it, I, p. 92); it is found also in Hdt. (8.65). See further P.T. Stevens, *Colloquial Expressions in Euripides* (Wiesbaden 1976), pp. 34–35 (“... ‘wait a minute’, ‘take it easy’, often (always in Eur.) deprecating an interruption”).

ἑωρίζεται “μετεωρίζεται, ἀναπατεῖ, Hsch.” This verb occurs in Jo. Mal., *Chron.* 2. p. 32 (= Migne 97.101A) and 5. p. 95 (= Migne 97.180C). In this latter passage the infinitive τὸ ἑωρισθῆναι is used. The meaning is ‘stroll’, ‘walk’ vel sim. (‘take a walk’ Lampe s.v.).

ἡμιθνής, ἦτος, ὁ, ἦ “= ἡμιθανής, Ar. *Nu.* 504, Th. 2.52, Plb. 14.57, Gal. 10.1021; of fear, Aeschin. 3.159; ὑπὸς βαθὸς καὶ ἦ. Philostr. Jun. *VA* 2.36.” Add Call. *Cer.* 59 (pl.) of the effects of fear. This seems to be the only extant poetic occurrence of the word apart from its appearance in a trimeter of Aristophanes (loc. cit.). *LSJ*’s equation of this word with ἡμιθανής, while correct so far as the sense goes, is misleading. ἡμιθνής is the only form in use in classical authors. ἡμιθανής is first attested in biblical Greek, an epigram from Bithynia of the first century BC (added in the 1996 *Suppl.*), and Strabo; it is also found in Christian writers, perhaps under biblical influence. Later authors who employ ἡμιθνής may well be on occasion consciously Atticizing.

ἦνυστρον, τό “*fourth stomach of ruminating animals* ...” Add the comic poet Mnesimachus, 4.14. (W.G. Arnott on Alexis *fr.* 275.1–2 discusses this word in detail.)

ἥσων, ἥσσον The idiom *ἥσων αὐτοῦ εἶναι*, “to lack mastery over oneself,” vel. sim. is missing from *LSJ*. Its contrary is *κρείττων αὐτοῦ εἶναι* (*LSJ* s.v. *κρείσσω* III). See Pl. *Lg.* 626E ... εἰς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ὁ μὲν κρείττων αὐτοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἥττων ἐστί κτλ. Id. *Prt.* 358C οὐδὲ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο τι τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀμαθία, οὐδὲ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ σοφία; *R.* 430 E.

θρασύτης, ητος, ἦ “over-boldness, *Hr. Lex* 4, *Th.* 2.61, *Lys.* 3.45; *θ.* = τὸ σφόδρα θαρρεῖν, *Arist. Rh.* 1390^a31 ... pl., *Isoc.* 4.77; ἀνδρεία καὶ *θ.* D. *Prooem.* 45.” Surprisingly, no examples from Plato are cited; add, e.g., *Charm.* 155C, 156D, *La.* 197B, *Legg.* 649C.

θυμός, ὁ “...II.6 *mind, soul, as the seat of thought* ... ἐν *θ.* ἐβάλλοντο ἔπος II. 15.566; τοὺς λόγους θυμῷ βάλε A. *Pr.* 706; εἰς *θ.* βαλεῖν τι S. *OT* 975 ...” *LSJ* miss the idiom ἐς *θ.* βαλέσθαι τι (middle voice of βάλλω c. ἐς; contrast S., loc. cit.) in Herodotus 1.84, 7.51, 8.68 γ. Compare *LSJ* s.v. βάλλω A.II.6 and B.I.1.

θυρωρός, ὁ “door-keeper, porter...” This word seems to have acquired a special meaning = *παράνυμφος*. See *Hsch.* s.v. *θυρωρός*: ὁ παράνυμφος, ὁ τὴν θύραν τοῦ θαλάμου κλείων and the fuller account in *Pollux* 3.42, where the *θυρωρός* is called τις τῶν τοῦ νυμφίου φίλων. The sense seems to be something like our ‘best man’ and the word is perhaps so used in *Sappho fr.* 110 (a).1 *θυρώρω πόδες ἐπτορόγυιοι κτλ.* Compare *Synesius ep.* 3 (= *PG* 66.1325a), where *Lampe*, s.v. *θυρωρός*, explains “of best man, who guarded the nuptial chamber”. *Synesius*, incidentally, explicitly refers to *Sappho* here (ὡς ἂν εἶποι *Σαπφῶ*).

ἰδιοφυής, ἐς “of peculiar nature, *Placit.* 1.7.20; *σάλπιγγες* D.S.5.30; τὰ *ι.*, title of work by a writer called *Archelaus*, D.L.2.17.” *Pliny* in *HN* I, in his list of authorities used for book 28 cites another author who wrote such a work: *ex auctoribus*. ... *Orpheo qui ἰδιοφυῆ* (*Sillig: diophios* codd.) *scripsit* ...

ἴριος, η, ον “made from the iris [= *LSJ* s.v., meaning II.4], *μύρον* Pl. *Com.* 69.7, *Cephisod.* 3.2, *Alex.* 62.8, *Thphr. HP* 9.9.2, *Plb.* 30.26.2.” Add *Matro, Conviv.* v.106 *μύρον ἴρινον* [*ἴηρ*- codd.: corr. *Casaubon*]. For further particulars on the *μύρον ἴρινον* see *W.G. Arnott*, note to *Alex. fr.* 63 (62).8: “perfume manufactured from the root of the orris, *Iris florentina* ...” with the secondary literature cited there. *Theophrastus, HP.* 9.7.3, lists the iris among plants used for perfumes (εἰς τὰ ἀρώματα) and states that the only one of them found in Europe is the iris: ἐκ ... αὐτῆς Εὐρώπης οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔξω τῆς Ἰριδος.

καθάρσιος, ον “cleansing from guilt or defilement, purifying ... II. as Subst., 1. καθάρσιον (sc. ἱερόν), τό, purificatory offering, *Aesch.* 1.23 ... hence, *expiation* ... *Hdt.* 1.35 ...” Here belongs the idiom

seen in the phrase $\psi\omicron\nu\nu\epsilon\kappa$ καθαρσίου, ‘egg of purification’ in Luc. *D. Mort.* 1.1. For the sense compare Ov. *Ars.* 2.329–30, Juv. 6.518 (“... nisi se centum lustraverit ovis”) and see Rohde’s *Psyche*, Appendix V for eggs as a purifying substance.

καίτοι (*divisim LSJ*) “... III. with a participle, much like καίπερ, Simon. 5.9, Ar. *Ec.* 159, Pl. *R.* 511d, Plb. 22.8.13, Phld. *Ir.* p. 22W., Luc. *Alex.* 3: once in the Att. Oratt., Lys. 31.34; also καίτοι γε διαχλευάζων Pl. *Ax.* 364b.” Add some examples from Aristotle (and Ps.-Arist.): *HA* 541^a10 ... ἡ θήλεια ἕνα πόρον ἔχει, καίτοι κύστιν ἔχουσα. *Mete.* 369^a20 ... καίτοι πεφυκότος ἄνω τοῦ θερμοῦ φέρεσθαι παντός. So also in the spurious *De Mundo* 397^a28, 398^b26, 399^a3 and *Probl.* 929^a16. The genuine Aristotelian evidence is important, as it is further support against those who question the presence of this use in the classical period. See, e.g., J. Adam on Pl. *R.* 611 D and especially G.M. Bolling in *AJP* 33 (1902): 319–21. His views are summarized in *GP*², p. 559, and opposed by R.G. Ussher on Ar. *Ec.* vv. 158–59. To the lone example of καίτοι γε *c. part.* cited from [Pl.] *Ax.* (see above) add Longus 1.16 and 3.2.

κάνναθρον, τό “or better κάνναθρον, τό (κάννα) carriage furnished with wicker-work, X. *Ages.* 8.7, Plu. *Ages.* 19, cf. Hsch., Eust. 1344.44.” Plutarch, loc. cit., is explicitly referring to X., loc. cit. Add Didymus ap. Athen. 139F τῶν δὲ παρθένων αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ καννάθρων φέρονται πολυτελῶς κατεσκευασμένων κτλ. The extant sources support the view that the κάνναθρον was 1) an elegant conveyance for women 2) in use especially in Sparta.

καρβάτινος, ἡ, ον “made of hide, οἰκίαι Ph. *Bel.* 101.31: – esp. καρβάτιναι, αἱ, shoes of undressed leather, brogues, X. *An.* 4.5.14, Arist. *HA* 499^a30, Luc. *Alex.* 39.” Add Longus 2.3, of an old cowherd (προεσβύτης ... καρβατίνας ὑποδεδεμένος). It ought to have been remarked in *LSJ* that in Aristotle, loc. cit., the καρβάτιναι in question are not worn by humans, but by camels being used in warfare.

καρτερέω “to be steadfast, patient ... in later Prose meaning little more than wait and see, LXX. 2 *Ma.* 7.17; οὐ κ. μέχρι θαλάμων ἐλθεῖν S.E. *M.* 1.291.” Add Plu. *Alex.* 25 ... καὶ μηδὲ τῶν ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου καρτερούντων ἀλλὰ συντρεχόντων καὶ προσβοηθούντων κτλ. Id. *Dion* 51 ... οὐκ ἐκαρτέρησαν αἱ γυναῖκες οὐδ’ ἀνέμειναν εἰσελθεῖν αὐτόν. So also Arr. 4.8.9. These passages show that *LSJ* are correct in stating that the verb could mean “little more than wait”, but also that καρτερεῖν and (ἀνα)μένειν were not entirely synonymous. Something of the original meaning of the root καρτ- seems still to have been heard: = ‘bear to wait’, ‘endure waiting’, vel sim. The frequent presence

of a negative particle with καρτερεῖν when so used points in the same direction.

κατασκεδάννυμι and -ύω “scatter, pour upon or over . . . τὰς ἀμίδας D. 54.4 . . .” Add Ar. *fr.* 653 K.-A. (= *fr.* 41 Dem.) κατεσκέδασέ μου τὴν ἀμίδα κεχηνότος. Kassel-Austin ad loc. aptly cite Moer., p. 200. 33Bk. (= k 22 Hansen), κατεσκέδασε τὴν ἀμίδα Ἀττικοί, κατέχεεν Ἕλληνες. For useful comments on the force of this word see J. Burnet on Pl. *Ap.* 18C and for its constructions see N. Dunbar on Ar. *Av.* 534–38.

καταστρέφω “ . . . Pass. plpf. 3pl. -εστράφατο D.C. 39.5 . . .” This form is attested more than half a millenium earlier than Dio Cassius; see Hdt. 1.27: . . . οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ Ἕλληνες κατεστράφατο ἐς φόρου ἀπαγωγὴν. Note the construction with a prepositional phrase.

κατιθύς “Adv. straight ahead or down from, c. gen., Babr. 95.42, Q.S.7.136: – also κατιθύ Herod. 8.60, Man. 1.30.” Add the oldest extant occurrence, Hdt. 9.51 (in the form κατιθύ). There are also a number of examples in the Hippocratic corpus, e. g. *Loc. Hom.* 3, *Off.* 3. [Cf. *LSJ* s.v. ἰθύς II.2.] For further discussion of the word (sometimes written *divisim*) see Headlam-Knox on Herod., loc. cit.

κινόπετον, τό “venomous beast, esp. serpent, Call. *Jov.* 25, Nic. *Th.* 27, 195.” Add Artem. 1.8. G.R. McLennan, on Call., loc. cit., has useful comments on this word, noting in part “. . . κινόπετα were land animals (v. *Suda*), while κνώδαλα were properly sea animals, but the word was also used of land animals (cf. Apoll. Soph. 101, 15ff.). . .”

κνήμη, ἡ “part between knee and ankle, leg, shank . . . prov., ἀπώτερω ἢ γόνυ κνάμα ‘blood is thicker than water’, Theoc. 16.18.” The proverb is attested earlier than Theocritus; Aristotle already knew it, *EN* 1168^{b8} καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον . . . ‘γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον’. As Gow at Theoc., loc. cit., observes, the proverb usually is cited in Aristotle’s version.

κολλάω “glue, cement . . .” Add the metaphorical usage in Call. *Lav. Pall.* 83 ἐκόλλασαν . . . ἀνῖαι / γώνατα καὶ φωνὰν ἔσχεν ἀμαχανία. See A.W. Bulloch ad loc. He rightly observes that the usual verb in this metaphor is πήγνυμι and “C.’s change of verb revitalises the metaphor.” He also cites some passages from the LXX, especially *Job* 29.10 γλῶσσα αὐτῶν τῷ λάρυγγι αὐτῶν ἐκολλήθη. The verb is common in the *NT* as well, in various senses.

κούρητες, ων, οἱ “young men, esp. young warriors . . . II. as. pr. n. Κουρητες . . . divinities coupled with Nymphs and Satyrs . . . prov., Κουρήτων στόμα, of prophecy, Zen. 4.61.” The expression κουρήτων (*sic*) στόμα is now printed as *Trag. adesp. fr.* 581 K.-Sn.

κράτος, εος, τό “*strength, might* . . . I.2 personified, K. Βία τε A. *Pr.* 12; K. καὶ Δίκη Id. *Ch.* 244.” Κράτος and Βία (-η) are already personified beings in Hes. *Th.* 385; they are the offspring of a certain Pallas and Styx there.

κυρέω “also κύρω . . . I. folld. by a case, *hit, light upon*, 1.c.dat . . . μέγα δένδρον αἰθέρι κῦρον *reaching to* . . ., Call. *Cer.* 38, cf. A.R. 2.363, 4.945 . . .” The metaphorical use in Aeschylus, *fr.* 159. 1 belongs here: θυμός ποθ' ἀμός οὐρανῶ κυρῶν ἄνω / ἔραζε πίπτει κτλ. (The text of the beginning of v.1 is not entirely secure, but θυμός seems to be the subject; Porson conjectured πότμος.)

κύων See below s.v. λύκος.

κώδων, ωνος “ὁ (Att. ἢ S. *Aj.* 17, dub. in Ar. *Pax* 1078), *bell* . . .” The 1996 *Suppl.* adds another instance of the feminine gender from a sixth-century B. C. inscription from Tarentum. For this gender see also Arist. *Sens.* 446^b22. These passages may be relevant to Ar. *Pax.* 1078 where κώδων is often emended away (so, most recently, S.D. Olson in his 1998 Oxford text and commentary of the play). The passage is admittedly obscure, but ἡ κώδων there, with the uncommon gender, may well be authentic. What is the likelihood that the unexpected (but correct!) collocation ἡ κώδων got into the MSS by mere accident? [Note that when *LSJ* state “κώδων, ὁ (Att. ἢ . . .)” this is misleading on two scores: 1) the word κώδων in Attic, as in other dialects, is regularly masculine; the feminine gender is exceptional there. 2) The feminine gender is not confined to Attic; it occurs elsewhere. For a comparable fluctuation of gender see *LSJ* s.v. ἀύλων.]

κωλώτης, ου, ὁ “= ἀσκαλαβώτης [*spotted lizard*, ‘gecko’] Arist. *HA* 609^b19, Babr. 204, Hsch.” Add Plin. *HN* 9.87 and 29.90, two passages which demonstrate that the word was not uncommon; note especially 29.90: *hunc* [sc. *stelionem*] *Graeci coloten vocant et ascalaboten et galeoten*. Observe the Greek accusative terminations, which suggest that the words were still heard as Greek vocables by the Romans.

ληστήριον, . . . τό “*band of robbers*, X. *HG* 5.4.42, Aeschin. 1.191 . . . II. *robbery*, Luc. *Cont.* 11(pl).” For meaning II add Longus 1.31, 32. That the word is used of the act (‘robbery’, ‘piracy’) rather than the actors (‘robbers’, ‘pirates’) in Longus is particularly clear in the second passage (1.32): ἐνόμιζε τὴν ψυχὴν ἔτι παρὰ τοῖς λησταῖς μένειν, οἷα νέος καὶ ἄγροικος καὶ ἔτι ἀγνοῶν τὸ Ἔρωτος ληστήριον.

λιποθυμέω “*fall into a swoon, faint*, Hp. *Art.* 68, *Mul.* 2.134, Plu. *Them.* 10, Gal. 1.139.” Add Longus 2.30. Lampe quotes further examples from Christian authors. The synonym λιποψυχέω seems to

have been used in classical Attic (though by no means confined to that dialect).

λύκος, ὁ “wolf ... ἐκ λύκου στόματος, of getting a thing *praeter spem*, Zen. 3.48 ...” This saying survives in the literature, not merely in a paroemiographer’s collection, Longus 1.22: ... καὶ σωθεὶς ἐκ κυνός, φασίν, οὐ λύκου στόματος ... Context: A person was saved from real dogs; there is a play on the proverb. Note φασίν, *ut dicunt*, which proves that a familiar saying is present. Curiously, Longus preserves another saying shown to be current by a φασίν, this time involving dogs, 2.2: ... τότε δὲ ‘κύνες’, φασίν, ‘ἐκ δεσμών λυθέντες’ ἐσκίρτων, ἐσύριττον, ἦδον κτλ. Here it is Daphnis and Chloe who were leaping, piping, singing; they are the ‘dogs’ of the proverb. For this use of parenthetical φασί without a conjunction (ὡς, ὡσπερ, etc.) see my remarks in *HSCP* 75 (1975): 87–89 and my *Studies in Greek Texts* (Göttingen 1976), pp. 146–47.

μελίτωμα, ατος, τό “honey-cake, Batr. 39, Philet. ap. Ath. 14.646d, Archig. ap. Orib. 8.1.7.” Add Longus 3.9; 4.16, 26 (plural in all instances).

μεταπηδάω “leap from one place to another ... metaph., S.E.M. 9.97.” Add Max. Tyr. 18(12).6 ... ἀεὶ μεταβαίνει τὸ κακὸν ἀπ’ ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ μεταπηδᾷ κτλ.

μυδάω “to be damp, dripping ... II. to be damp, clammy from decay, σάρεξ μυδῶσα Hp. VC 15; of a corpse, S. Ant. 410.” Meaning II is correctly distinguished from meaning I since the verb is sometimes used with specific reference to *putrefaction* and not mere dampness. For a good illustration of this connotation of the word (compare also *LSJ* s.v. μύδησις II) see Longus 3.28, of a dead dolphin: ὁ γὰρ δελφίς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ὀδωδῶς ... καὶ μυδῶν, οὗ τῆ σηπεδόνι καθάπερ ἡγεμόνι χρώμενος ὀδοῦ κτλ.

νεόσμηκτος, ον “newly cleaned, θώρηκες II. 13.342; Euph. 132; κάλαμος AP 6.227 (Crin.); χαλκός Plu. Aem. 32.” Callimachus merits a mention, *fr.* 676.2 ... νεοσμήκτους ἀστρίας.

ξύω See below s.v. τρίβω.

ὁ, ἡ, τό *LSJ* seem to have overlooked the idiom, common in Lucian, whereby a participle is omitted after the article so that the article appears to govern an accusative. The participle to be understood will be one appropriate in sense to the noun in the accusative. See, e.g. Luc. *Bis Acc.* 9 ὁ τὴν σύριγγα (*sc.* ἔχων); *Cont.* (= *Charon*) 9 ἐς τὴν μεγάλην ἀκρόπολιν, τὴν τὸ τριπλοῦν τεῖχος (*sc.* ἔχουσαν); *Deor. Conc.* 9 ... ὁ Μῆδος, ὁ τὸν κἀνδυν καὶ τὴν τιάραν. A similar usage can be seen on some of the curse inscriptions from Epidaurus. See Schwyzer-

Debrunner, p. 88 who cite Κλεινάτας Θηβαῖος ὁ τοῦς φθειρας (8). See also K.-G. I. 318 n. 22.

ὁδός, οὐ, ἢ "... III. Metaph., *way or manner* ... 3. *method, system* ... ὁδῶ *methodically, systematically*, Pl. R. 533b, *Stoic.* 2.39 etc." As often, *LSJ* leap over Aristotle; he employs this usage, GC 324^b35, PA 644^b18, *Top.* 109^b14 and it is not apparent why '*Stoic.*' is included when he is excluded.

ὄμβριος, ον "*rainy, of rain, ὄ. ὕδωρ rain-water*, Xenoph. 30.4, *SIG* 56. 29 ... Hdt. 2.25, Hp. *Aēr.* 7 etc. ..." Add the substantival usage τὸ ὄμβριον = '*rain*', '*rain-water*' in Arist. *HA* 601^b 11.

ὁμώνυμος, ον "I. *having the same name*, Il. 17.720, Pi. I. 7(6). 24 etc. ... IV. in the Logic of Arist., τὰ ὁ. are *things having the same name but different natures and definitions, things denoted by equivocal or ambiguous words*, Cat. 1^a 1, cf. *EN* 1096^b 27." Be it noted that Aristotle also on occasion uses ὁμώνυμος in the ordinary sense of '*having the same name*', GC 328^b21 (see H.H. Joachim ad loc.), *Met.* 1034^a22 (see W.D. Ross ad loc.).

ὄνειροπολέω "*dream* ..." *LSJ* add an example (actually two) of the middle of this verb so used from Sextus Empiricus (*M.* 8.57). There is another instance of the middle voice in Longus 3.9: ... ταῦτα πάντα ποιεῖν Χλόην ὄνειροπολοῦμενος.

ὄφαρτυτής, οὔ, ὁ "*cook*, Hyr. *Fr.* 259; ὄφαρτυται καὶ μυροποιοί Phld. *Mus.* p. 86 K.; used derisively of a gourmand, *Timae.* 70." Add Longus 4.16 (pl.).

παλιγγενεσία, ἢ "*rebirth, regeneration, of the world* ... Ph. 1.528 ... renewal of a race, *Corp. Herm.* 3.3; of persons, *beginning of a new life* ... Ph. 1.150 ... *transmigration, reincarnation* of souls, Plu. 2.998c ... 2. in Stoic Philos., *rebirth* of the κόσμος, Chrysipp. *Stoic.* 2.191 ..." *LSJ* give these and other technical senses of the word (including the Christian senses '*resurrection*' and '*regeneration*' through baptism). For the most basic meaning, a '*rebirth*' of a person after death, see Longus 4.2: Χλόη ... καὶ Δάφνις ἐν μνήμη γενόμενοι τῶν καταλειφθέντων τερπνῶν ... τὴν ἡρινὴν ὥραν ἀνέμενον, ἐκ θανάτου παλιγγενεσίαν. The '*rebirth*' here is of course not literal; the anxious lovers indulge in hyperbole.

παρατείνω "*stretch out along, beside, or near, χεῖρες παρατεταμέναι* Hp. *Fract.* 13 ... *extend, deploy, τὴν φάλαγγα* X. *An.* 7.3.48 ..." What is probably the oldest extant occurrence has been omitted, Xenoph. *fr.* 1.3 ἄλλος δ' εὐῶδες μύρον ἐν φιάλῃ παρατείνει κτλ.

παρεκτείνω Add a new meaning, '*stretch out on the rack*', '*torture*', '*wear out*' (literally or metaphorically). See Σ to Ar. V. 681 ἀποκναίεις·

λυπεῖς, ὀδυνᾶς, ἀπολλύεις, ἀποκόπτεις, παρεκτείνεις, For the general sense compare *LSJ* s.vv. ἐκτείνω III, παρατείνω I. 2 and Gomme-Sandbach on *Men. Sam.* 421 παρατενεῖς.

περιδωμάω See above s.v. δωμάω.

περιτρέπω "I.1 *turn and bring round, divert* ... π. τινὰ εἰς μανίαν, εἰς χαράν, *Act. Ap.* 26.24, *J. AJ* 9.4.4 ..." *Act. Ap.*, loc. cit., reads Μαίην Παῦλε· τὰ πολλά σε γράμματα εἰς μανίαν περιτρέπει ('much learning doth make thee mad', *King James Version*). With this compare *Luc. Abd.* 30 (in a discussion of the τῆς μανίας μυρία εἶδη): ... διαβολὴ ἄκαιρος καὶ ὀργὴ ἄλογος ... κατ' ὀλίγον ἐς μανίαν περιέτρεψεν.

This shows that the phrase εἰς μανίαν περιτρέπειν was a familiar idiom (Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich, *Lexicon of the New Testament*² cite also *Vita Aesopi* I c.55.)

πλαταμών, ὠνος, ὁ "any broad flat body or space, esp. flat stone, h. *Merc.* 128, A.R. 1.365 ..." Add *Hr. Epid.* I, Case 2: Σιληνὸς ὄκει ἐπὶ τοῦ πλαταμώνος πλησίον τῶν Εὐαλκίδεω. ("... lived on Broadway ..." tr. W.H.S. Jones; "... lived on the flat ground ..." tr. J. Chadwick and W.M. Mann).

πλέω 1996 *Suppl.*: "... II 2, add 'b ὀφθαλμοὶ πλέοντες *swimming* eyes, as a morbid symptom, *Hr. Epid.* 7.17." What this means we are not told (the 1968 *Suppl.* added '(dub. sens.)'. Perhaps one can be more explicit. The Latin verb *natare* is also used of the eyes, OLD s.v. 4b: "(of the eyes) to be incapable of a steady gaze, *swim*." It cites, inter alia, Verg. G.4.496 (*conditque natantia lumina somnus*), *Id. A.* 5.856; *Ov. Met.* 5.71 (*iam moriens oculis sub nocte natantibus atra / circumspexit Athin*). Not adduced is *Lucr.* 3.480, *nant oculi* (of an intoxicated person). C. Bailey ad loc. appositely observes "*nant* ... It seems not quite to mean 'swimming' as we use it of giddiness, but to express the state just before sleep." That such is the general sense of πλέω in the Hippocratic passage cited above can be shown merely by quoting the whole clause: ὀφθαλμοὶ κεχρωσμένοι, πλέοντες ὥσπερ τῶν νυσταζόντων. Whether this use of *natare* is a borrowing from πλέω or an independent development is uncertain. In any event neither verb was likely felt to be a formal technical term of the medical vocabulary; compare already in Homer the rare compound δακρυπλώειν, *Od.* 19.122, of an intoxicated person. (See *Arist. Pr.* 953^b9-12.)

ποιός, α, ον "of what kind? ... I.3 with the Art., when the question implies a Noun which is defined by the Art. or the context ... in Prose, τὸ π.; *Pl. Sph.* 220e etc. ... τὸ π. δῆ; *Id. Tht.* 147d, *Phdr.* 279a ..." Add the expanded combination τὸ ποιὸν τι; it occurs thrice in *Pl. Phd.* 78B. The force of the τι is more easily grasped than translated.

πόλος, ὁ “1. *axis of the celestial sphere*, γῆν ἰλλομένην τὴν περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον Pl. *Ti.* 40c ... 3. *celestial sphere, vault of heaven, sky*, A. *Pr.* 429 (lyr.), E. *Fr.* 839.11 (anap.); ἄστρον π. Id. *Or.* 1685 (anap.) ...” For meaning 3, which seems to be the oldest meaning (at least the oldest attested) add Timotheos PMG 800.1 (Page); Cleanth. *fr.* 1 [= *Hymn. in Iovem*].16 οὐδὲ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαῖμον, / οὔτε κατ’ αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον, οὔτ’ ἐνὶ πόντῳ.

πολύς, πολλή, πολύ Add the temporal idiom πόλλ’ ἐπὶ πόλλοις = ‘*iterum atque iterum*’ (Van Leeuwen), ‘many on many a time’ (R. Neil). It occurs in Ar. *Eq.* 411–12 (... τοὺς κονδύλους, οὓς πολλά δὴ πὶ πολλοῖς ἦνεσχόμην), Id. *V.* 1046 (καίτοι σπένδων πόλλ’ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς ὄμνυσιν τὸν Διόνυσον), Ael. *VH* 4.18 πολλά ἐπὶ πολλοῖς ἐπιστείλαντος τοῦ Διονυσίου A similar collocation can be seen already in Pi. *O.* 6.79 ... ἐδώρησαν θεῶν κάρυκα λιταῖς θυσίαις / πολλά δὴ πολλαῖσιν Ἑρμᾶν.

πρόβατον, τό “used (among the Ionians and Dorians) of all four-footed *cattle* ... but in Att. Prose and Com. (never in Trag.) almost invariably of *sheep* ... generally, *animals for slaughter*, whether for sacrifices ... or for food ...” Add the striking phrase in Thuc. 2.51 ὥσπερ τὰ πρόβατα ἔθνησκον (during the plague). To appreciate the full force of this sentence one must remember that πρόβατα were *slaughtered*; so too the Athenian population by the plague.

προσλέγω “*say in addition*, Luc. *Pseudol.* 31:– Med. 1 aor. προσελεξάμην Hes. *Op.* 499, Dor. ποτ-, τὼς οὐδὲν ποτελέξαθ’ *addressed, accosted*, Theoc. 1.92, cf. A.R. 4.833.” Add A.R. 3.426; [Theoc.] 25.192 and, especially, Call. *H.* 3.80 τάδε προσελέξαο. The active also occurs in Call. *H.* 5.96 πρὸς τόδ’ ἔλεξεν ἔπος (*in tmesi*). Gow on [Theoc.] 25.192 is unaware of the Callimachean examples.

Πτώϊος, contr. Πτῶος, ον “a name of *Apollo* from Mt. Ptoön in Boeotia, *IG* 7.2712: τὰ Πτώϊα *the festival of Apollo* Πτώϊος, ib. 2170, al.” *LSJ* cite only inscriptional evidence for this word; it occurs in Hdt., 8.135 τοῦ Πτῶου Ἀπόλλωνος τὸ τέμενος.

σαίρω (B) “*sweep, clean*, σαίρειν τε δῶμα E. *Hec.* 363; σαίρειν στέγας Id. *Cyc.* 29, cf. *Hyps. Fr.* 1 ii 17 (lyr.) ... Id. *Ion* 121, cf. 115 (both lyr.) ...” Add Euph. 53.2 Powell σαίρεσκον Ἀθηναίης περὶ βῶμον. (On the frequency of this verb in Euripides see R. Seaford at *Cyc.* 29.)

σαλάμ This Semitic word occurs once in extant ancient Greek, namely *AP* 7.419.7 (Meleager), where the context guarantees the word and sense: ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν Σύρος ἐσσί, σάλαμ· εἰ δ’ οὖν σύ γε Φοῖνιξ, / ναίδιος· εἰ δ’ Ἕλλην, χαίρε· τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ φράσον. The modern Arabic ‘salaam’ and Hebrew ‘shalom’, both used similarly in greeting, will be

familiar to all. See Gow-Page, *Hellenistic Epigrams* ad loc. [4006]: “σαλάμ: *salaam*; here only in Greek literature. The experts recommend a variety of different spellings – σελόμ, σελώμ, σελάμ.”

σημείον, τό “*mark* by which a thing is known ... *sign, token* ...” Add the idiomatic phrase σημείου χάριν = ‘by way of a token’, ‘just for an indication’ vel sim. Aristotle employs it, *HA* 502^b23, 611^a31; *PA* 669^b29, 670^b12.

σπέλεθος “f.l. for πέλεθος [= ‘*dung*’, ‘*ordure*’] in Ar. *Ec.* 595.” The orthography σπ- is metrically guaranteed at Hegemon, *fr. epic.* 1.2 Brandt; add the passage to *LSJ*.

σφυράς, Att. σφυράς, άδος, ή “*ball of dung*, such as that of sheep or goats: hence in pl., σφυράδων άποκνίσματα scraps of *sheep’s* or *goats’ dung*, Ar. *Pax* 790.” The 1996 *Suppl.* adds a second comic instance, Eur. 15 K.-A. Add Arist. *HA* 586^b9: τὰ δὲ τῶν τετραπόδων ἔχει καὶ περιπτώματα ὅταν ἤδη τέλεια ἦ, καὶ ὕγρον καὶ σφυράδας κτλ. This passage shows that the word, while perhaps homely, is a neutral term, and not in itself vulgar, although, naturally, it can lend itself to such applications. Compare, e. g., English ‘*dung*’.

στατός, ή, όν “*placed, standing* ... I.3 στατός (sc. χιτών), = ὀρθοστάδιον or στάδιος χιτών ... Duris 70 J., Arr. *Epict.* 2.16.9; σ. θώραξ, = στάδιος, Sch. Ar. *Pax* 1227.” For this meaning add Plu. *Alc.* 32 στατοῦς καὶ ξυστίδας καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἐναγώνιον ἀμπεχομένους κόσμον ...

στρατιώτης, ου, ό “*soldier* ... II. *water-lettuce* (σ. ἔνυδρος Gal. 12.131), *Pistia Stratiotes*, Meno *Iatr.* 6.22, Dsc. 4.101 ... ib.102.” Philoponus, *Comm. in Arist. GC*, p. 191.29. Vitelli preserves an interesting use of this plant: φασὶ γοῦν διὰ τῶν καλουμένων ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ [= “in everyday speech”] στρατιωτῶν ποταμοῦ διηθούμενον τὸν κεκραμένον οἶνον διακρίνειν τοῦ ὕδατος τὸν οἶνον.

συφεός, ό “*hog-sty*, *Od.* 10.238, 14.13, 73, Parth. 12.2; συφεόνδε *to the sty*, *Od.* 10.320: – Ep. form συφείος, ib. 389.” Add Longus 3.4 ... φροντίς ἦν ... ὕῶν ἐν τοῖς συφείοις ἄκυλον καὶ βαλάνους [sc. ἐσθιόντων]. The word is an epic one and sounds such a tone here too. It occurs first at *Od.* 10.328 (of Odysseus’ men turned into swine by Circe); vv. 241–42 run thus: ... τοῖσι δὲ Κίρκη / πάρ ῥ’ ἄκυλον βάλανόν τ’ ἔβαλεν κτλ. The foods confirm the Homeric echo.

σχολάζω “... IV. of a place, *to be vacant, unoccupied*, Plu. *CG* 12, Jul. *Caes.* 316c: c. dat., *to be reserved for*, τὸ ἀπ’ οὐρανοῦ κορυφῆς μέχρι σελήνης θεοῖς καὶ ἄστροις ... σχολάζει Herm. ap. Stob. 1.49.68.” For the meaning ‘*to be reserved for*’ add Longus 4.4.1 ἐσχόλαξε ... τοῖς ἄνθεσιν ἠ πηγῇ. This meaning is also found in a passage of Eusebius, *Theoph. fr.* 3 (PG 24.620A); see Lampe, *Patristic Greek Lexicon* s.v.

τέλος, τό *LSJ* seem to have overlooked the (post-classical) idiom ἐκφέρειν τέλος = “*issue or promulgate an order or decree.*” See D.H. 7.45 οὐδὲν ὦμὸν οὐδ’ ὑπερήφανον ἐξήνεγκαν τέλος καθ’ ἡμῶν; Id. 8.54 ... τὴν βουλὴν τέλος μηθὲν ἐκφέρειν εἰς τὸν δῆμον. Plu. *Cor.* 6 ... τῆς βουλῆς [= the Senate] ... μηδὲν τέλος ἐκφερούσης; Id. *Them.* 12 ὁ Ξέρξης ... τέλος [del. Steph.] εὐθὺς ἐξέφερε πρὸς τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τῶν νεῶν. In this idiom ἐκφέρειν should probably be placed in *LSJ* s.v. II.3 and τέλος s.v. I.5.

τέμνω “*cut ... II. 4 divide ... γραμμὴ δίχα τετμημένη Pl. R. 509d ...*” Despite this single citation of τέμνω used of dissecting a line in *LSJ*, from Plato, the usage is standard. Add from Aristotle *Cael.* 272^a14; *Mete.* 363^b2, 376^a10; *EN* 1132^a25.

τέρας, τό “gen. Ep. αος (not in Hom. or Hes.), Ion. εος ... the forms τέρατ-ος, -ι, -α, -ων are Hellenistic, Moer. pp. 366, 369 P., Thom. Mag. p. 348 R. (τέρατα LXX. *Ex.* 4.21, al., τεράτων ib. *Ps.* 104 (105).27) ...” This is inaccurate; Plato already employs the form τέρατα at *Hipp. Mai.* 300 E and *Phlb.* 14 E. He also has the compounds τερατολόγος and τερατοσκόπος.

τραγικός, ἡ, ὄν “*of or like a goat, goatish, in this sense first in later authors, as Plu. Pyrrh. 11, Luc. D.Deor. 22.1; in a double sense, τὸ ψευδὲς τραχὺ καὶ τ. goatlike and tragic Pl. Cra. 408c. II. commonly, of or for tragedy, tragic ...*” There is another pun on the two senses, ‘of goats’ and ‘tragic’, in Longus 4.17: ... ὑπεκρίνετο τὴν τραγικὴν δυσωδίαν μυσάττεσθαι. That the foul smell of the goats also is ‘tragic’ for the young man in love with the goatherd here is shown by the verb ὑπεκρίνετο, deliberately chosen to suggest acting and the stage. Add the passage to *LSJ*.

τρίβω “*rub ...*” Add a new meaning, of masturbation, Ar. *V.* 739 ... πόρνην, ἥτις τὸ πέος τρίβει / καὶ τὴν ὄσφυν (cf. v. 1344 and, for compounds of τρίβω, J. Henderson, *The Maculate Muse*² (Oxford 1991), p. 176). That this meaning of the verb is not in and of itself vulgar (though clearly so used, of course, in Aristophanes) is suggested by a passage in Aristotle, *HA* 581^a29: συμβαίνει ... περὶ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον [σχ. πυβερτυ] τοῖς [τε] πειρομένοις τρίβεσθαι περὶ τὴν τοῦ σπέρματος πρόεσιν οὐ μόνον ἡδονὴν γίνεσθαι τοῦ σπέρματος ἐξιόντος ἀλλὰ καὶ λύπην. (Note the medio-passive usage.) The verb ξύω is used in a similar sense. Arist. *Pr.* 953^b37 καὶ ἔτι πρὶν δύνασθαι προίεσθαι σπέρμα, γίνεται τις ἡδονὴ ἔτι παισὶν οὖσιν, ὅταν ἐγγὺς ὄντες τοῦ ἡβᾶν ξύωνται τὰ αἰδοῖα δι’ ἀκολασίαν. Compare Id. *GA* 728^a14 and Democr. 127 D.-K. ξυόμενοι ἄνθρωποι ἡδονται καὶ σφιν γίνεται ἅπερ τοῖς ἀφροδισιάζουσιν. (*LSJ* s.v. ξύω do not cite the relevant *GA* passage

and introduce between the Democr. citation and the Aristotelian *Problemata* citation an irrelevant passage from the *HA* of Aristotle.)

τρύχιος, η, ον “of rags, ragged, J. *AJ* 5.1.16, Gal. *Thras.* 18, Alciphr. 1.36.” Add Max. Tyr. 13(7).5 ῥακία ἀσθενῆ καὶ τρύχινα.

ὑπέρ “B. with ACCUS. ... II. 1.a. of Measure, *above, exceeding, beyond* ... ὑ. ἡμᾶς *beyond* our powers, Pl. *Prm.* 128b. ...” This idiomatic usage of ὑπέρ is not confined to one passage in Plato. Add Arist. *GA* 723^a22 λίαν ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τὸ λεγόμενον, 747^b8 τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἐστὶ τὸ λεγόμενον. Other pronouns and nouns also occur with ὑπέρ in this sense, Arist. *EN* 1095^a25 ... τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν; Id. *Div. Somn.* 462^b25–26 ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡμετέραν εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν σύνεσιν κτλ. See also Isocr. 4.11 ... τῶν λόγων τοῖς ὑπὲρ τοὺς ιδιώτας ἔχουσι καὶ λίαν ἀπηκριβωμένοις.

ὑπηρετικός, ἡ, ὄν “*menial* ... 4. ὑ κέλῃς a cock-boat *attending on* a larger vessel X. *HG* 1.6.36; -κόν, τό (sc. πλοῖον), *dispatch-boat, tender*, D. 50.45, Decr. ap. eund. 18.106 ...” Add Plu. *Dion* 22, where the contrast is explicit: ... Δίωνα μὴ ναῦς ἔχοντα ... ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν εἰς ὑπηρετικὸν ἐμβάντα ...

φαῦλος, η, ον “*cheap, easy, slight, paltry* ... II. of persons ... 3. *careless, thoughtless, indifferent* ... esp. in Adv. ... φ. φέρειν to bear *lightly*, E. *IA* 850, Ar. *Av.* 961.” N. Dunbar on Ar., loc. cit., writes “φαύλως φέρειν, *treat lightly, not take seriously*, is cited only here and E. *IA* 850, but cf. A. *Pers.* 520.” This is inaccurate; the phrase occurs also at Ar. *fr.* 674 K.-A. (= *fr.* 653) φαύλως φέρει νῦν τὸ κακόν. Eustathius, who preserves the fragment (*in. Il.* p. 1367, 1), glosses thus: φαύλως τὸ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡσυχῆ.

φιτρός, ὁ “*block of wood, log*, φιτρῶν καὶ λάων II. 12.29, 21.314 ... A.R. 1.405, Call. *fr.* 177.2, 785 Pf. ... Q.S. 12.137 ... B. 5.142, Lyc. 913.” Every example cited in *LSJ* is from poetry, much of it of a learned sort. For a prose instance see [Arist.] *De Plantis* 819^b4 πάλιν εἰσὶ δένδρα ἅπερ ἔχουσιν ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας ῥίζης φιτρόν κτλ. Here φιτρόν means something like ‘stem’; the closest Greek equivalent would perhaps be στέλεχος.

φρεατία, ἡ “*tank, cistern*, X. *HG* 3.1.7, Plb. 10.28.2.” Add Max. Tyr. 8 (2).7 ... ἂν ... ὀπτέυσαις ἐκ τῆς κορυφῆς ὡσπερ εἰς φρεατίας ἔδαφος.

φρουρά, ἡ “*look-out, watch, guard* ... I.3 *prison, ward*, Pl. *Phd.* 62b, *Grg.* 525a.” This meaning of φρουρά is not confined to Plato; see Plu. *Thes.* 16, φρουρὰ μὲν ἦν ὁ λαβύρινθος.

χαλινός, ὁ “*bit* ... 2. metaph., of *anything which curbs, restrains, or compels* ... Pi. *P.* 4.25 ... E. *IT* 1043 ... A. *Pr.* 562 ... S. *Fr.* 869 ...”

Add the most famous metaphorical χαλινός of all, that which saved Theages for philosophy, Pl. *R.* 496B: ... εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐταίρου Θεάγου χαλινός οἷος κατασχεῖν. (The reference is to his delicate health which prevented him from entering politics.)

χρoιά "... Att. χρoιά and χρoά ... *skin ... colour ... complexion* ... III. In Music, *nuance* of a scale, Plu. 2.1143e." Aristotle has a curious use of this word, of *taste* (comparable, *mutatis mutandis*, to the metaphorical meaning III) in *Met.* 359^b11 παντοδαπὰς λαμβάνει μορφὰς καὶ χρoὰς χυμῶν ("kinds and *shades* of taste" tr. H.P.D. Lee, "kinds and *shades* of flavor" tr. E.W. Webster, emphases added).

χρoσός, ὁ "*gold* ..." Add the striking metaphorical usage, of the sun, in Simon. *fr. eleg.* 11.2 West: κάλλιστον μάρτυν ἔθεντο πόνων, / χρoσοῦ τιμήεντος ἐν αἰθέρι. The poet is praising the bravery of the Corinthians at the battle of Plataea. Note therefore the epithet τιμήεντος; this adjective is used of literal gold in the Homeric poems (*Il.* 18.475, *Od.* 8.393). The tone of the phrase may be intentionally epic.

Binding Theory and Valency Grammar in Latin¹

By HILKE ROS, Gent

0. Introduction

Binding theory has been an important topic in Generative Grammar since the '80s. The main concern of this paper is developing a binding theory for Latin in the light of the theory worked out for English in Chomsky (1981). Some research on the Latin situation has already been carried out, particularly by Alessandra Bertocchi. However, in Bertocchi (1989) she gave up all structural and syntactic explanations in favor of a more pragmatic approach and in fact returned to the rather vague formulations of traditional grammars. It is nevertheless my belief that the matter could be explained in structural terms and that a solution to this complicated question could be found in Valency Grammar. To prove this statement will be the main concern of the following paper.

The text is organized as follows: in the first section the binding theory will be introduced very briefly. In section 2 earlier proposals will be outlined and their inadequacies will be demonstrated. The importance of Valency Grammar will be pointed out in the third section. However, there remain some problems, which will be tackled in the fourth section. In section 5 we will reach some conclusions.

1. Binding theory

Binding theory handles the distribution of reflexives and pronouns and the way in which they refer to other elements in the sentence. Nominal Phrases (NPs) are divided into three categories: R-expressions (i.e. referring expressions, e.g. *John, the car, the man over there, ...*), pronominals (*he, him, she, ...*) and anaphors (*himself, herself, itself, each other*). To each category corresponds a binding principle²:

- 1) A An anaphor is bound in its governing category
- B A pronominal is free in its governing category
- C An R-expression is free

¹ The author is Research Assistant of the Fund for Scientific Research – Flanders (Belgium) (F.W.O. – Vlaanderen).

² See Chomsky (1981), p. 188.

To understand these principles further definitions are required³:

- 2) α is bound by β if and only if α and β are coindexed and β c-commands α
- 3) α is free if and only if it is not bound
- 4) β is a governing category for α if and only if β is the minimal category containing α , a governor of α , and a SUBJECT accessible to α

SUBJECT in definition (4) is a formalized manner to refer to AGR⁴ in a tensed clause or to the subject of an infinite clause. This means in informal terms that a category should contain a finite verb or/and a subject to be a governing category. Some examples may help to clarify these notions. The following sentences show how an anaphor must be bound in its governing category:

- 5) Steven_i talks about himself_i
- 6) *Himself_i talks about Steven_i
- 7) Peter_i thinks [Steven_j talks about himself_{j/*i}]

In (5) the anaphor *himself* is bound by *Steven* because the latter c-commands⁵ the former and the two NPs bear the same index. Example (6) is ungrammatical because *himself* cannot be c-commanded by *Steven* and consequently the anaphor is free, in contradiction with principle A of the binding theory. Sentence (7) shows that the anaphor can be bound by *Steven* but not by *Peter*, because it is out of the governing category (indicated by the brackets). *Talks* is a finite verb and by consequence the embedded sentence consists of a governing category in which the anaphor must be bound. The following examples show that a pronominal must be free in its governing category:

- 8) Steven_i talks about him_{j/*i}
- 9) Peter_i thinks [Steven_j talks about him_{i/*j}]

In (8) *him* cannot be coindexed with *Steven* since in that case the pronominal would not be free. Example (9) shows that *Peter* may bind *him* because the former is not part of the governing category of the

³ See Lasnik (1989), p. 19; Chomsky (1981), p. 211.

⁴ AGR is an abbreviation of *Agreement*, a set of features such as tense, number and gender.

⁵ *C-command* is defined as follows (Reinhart (1983), p. 18): Node A c-commands node B if the branching node most immediately dominating A also dominates B.

latter. Finally, it is clear that an R-expression may not be bound by any c-commanding NP, inside (ex. 10–11) or outside (ex. 12) the governing category:

- 10) Steven_i talks about Steven_{j/*i}
- 11) He_i talks about Steven_{j/*i}
- 12) Peter_i thinks Steven_j talks about Peter_{k/*i}

After this brief introduction to binding theory we can concentrate on the situation in Latin.

2. Binding theory in Latin: earlier proposals

2.1 S'-deletion

If we want to apply this theory to Latin, we don't have any problem in simple sentences. In (13) the anaphor *se* must be bound by the c-commanding NP *Allobroges*, while in (14) the pronominal *eum* must be free⁶:

- 13) Allobroges_i ... se_i ad Caesarem recipiunt (BG 1.11.5)
- 14) Considius_i equo admisso ad eum_j accurrit (BG 1.22.2)

However, problems arise when *se* is used as what traditional grammars call an "indirect reflexive". That is the case in AcI-constructions (*Accusativus cum Infinitivo*) as in the following example:

- 15) Ariovistus_i respondit ... sese_i ad eum venturum fuisse (BG 1.34.3)

This type of sentences is comparable with English constructions with verbs such as *believe*, *expect*, etc. Therefore, the problem is dealt with in Chomsky's binding theory. In definition (4) it is stated that a governing category should contain an accessible SUBJECT, i.e. AGR (a finite verb) or a subject. Consider the following examples:

- 16) Steven_i believes [himself_i to be a genius]
- 17) Steven_i expects [himself_i to win the race]

⁶ Most examples are from Caesar's *De Bello Gallico*, abbreviated as BG. Other abbreviations are: Cic. = Cicero, Caecil. = *In Caecilium*, Flac. = *Pro Flacco*, Inv. = *De Inventione*, Verr. = *In Verrem*

In these sentences the expressions between brackets can be compared with Latin AcI-constructions. However, they cannot constitute a governing category, because they don't contain an accessible SUBJECT: there is no AGR since the verb is infinite, neither is there an accessible subject since the subject of the AcI is the anaphor itself, which must be bound. Consequently the matrix sentence is the governing category and *himself* can be bound by *Steven*. In the same way *sese* is bound by *Ariovistus* outside the AcI in the Latin sentence.

This quite exceptional situation is explained in Generative Grammar by the notion S'-deletion (S-bar-deletion) or S'-pruning. It is believed that a small class of English verbs doesn't select S'-complements but S-complements. Consider the following examples:

- 18) Steven believes [_{S'} (that) [_S he is a genius]]
 19) Steven wants [_{S'} (for) [_S Bill to win the race]]
 20) Steven believes [_{S'} COMP [_S himself to be a genius]]
 21) Steven believes [_S himself to be a genius]]

We could assume that a sentence like (16) should be represented as in (20) with a COMP(lementizer) that is not lexically filled as it is optional in (18–19). Nevertheless, as the COMP in (20) cannot contain lexical material at all (contrary to examples (18–19)), it is believed that there is no COMP and that the S' is reduced to S, as represented in (21). This assumption has two advantages: it explains the binding of *himself* by *Steven* and the exceptional case marking of *himself* by *believes*. If we would assume a S'-complement after *believe*, the S' would be an opaque domain and binding and case marking would be made impossible by the S'-boundary. By the process of S'-deletion the opaque domain is made transparent and consequently the binding and the object case of *himself* are both logical.

The AcI-construction is quite rare in English, but very widespread of course in Latin. We could explain binding facts in Latin AcI-constructions by the process of S'-deletion, but more complex problems arise when the anaphor in an AcI is not the subject. Consider the following example:

- 22) Caesar_i Gallorum animos verbis confirmavit pollicitusque est [_{sibi}_i
eam rem curae futuram] (BG 1.33.1)

In this sentence the AcI does have an accessible SUBJECT: *eam rem*. By consequence the AcI should be the governing category. Nevertheless *sibi* is bound by *Caesar* outside the governing category in

the matrix sentence and this fact seems a violation of principle A of the binding theory. When we subject Latin AcI-constructions to a closer investigation, we conclude that they differ from English *believe*-constructions precisely with regard to binding theory. Consider the following contrasts:

- 23) Philip_i believes [Luke_j to despise himself_{j/*i}]
 24) Philippus_i putat [Lucium_j se_{i/j} contemnere]
 25) Philip_i believes [Luke_j to despise him_{i/k/*j}]
 26) Philippus_i putat [Lucium_j eum_{k/*i/*j} contemnere]

In English the AcI is the relevant binding domain, since *himself* in (23) must be bound by *Luke* inside the AcI. *Him* in (25) can refer to *Philip* because, in terms of binding theory, it is free inside the AcI. The situation is completely different in Latin. The matrix sentence is the relevant domain, since *se* in (24) can be bound outside the AcI and the pronominal in (26) must be free not only inside the AcI, but also in the matrix sentence.

It seems then that S'-deletion has other consequences in English than in Latin. As we said before, this process makes the subject of the AcI transparent: the subject can be case marked by the verb of the matrix sentence and be bound by a NP in the matrix sentence. The rest of the AcI however (i.e. all elements except the subject) remains opaque. There cannot exist binding relations or case marking relations between elements of the AcI (other than the subject) and elements in the matrix sentence. These observations hold at least for English. Example (23) proves that there cannot be a binding relation between *himself* and *Philip*. The situation seems different in Latin. Apparently, S'-deletion renders the whole AcI-construction transparent⁷. Sentences (24) en (26) show that *se* and *eum* are in a transparent position with respect to *Philippus*.

2.2 A parameterized binding theory

The preceding discussion made clear that Chomsky's binding theory should be modified in order to account for Latin binding facts. This need for adaptation was also observed in other languages and led to a parameterized binding theory in Yang (1983). In his article Yang maintains the basic concepts of Chomsky's theory, but differences

⁷ See Calboli (1995), pp. 73–4.

between individual languages are explained by means of a parameter that is differently set depending on the language in question. According to Yang this parametrical variation regards the notion SUBJECT.

First of all, Yang makes a distinction between unmarked and marked reflexives. Unmarked reflexives are reflexives that obey principle A of the English binding theory proposed by Chomsky. Consequently, the formulation of the Unmarked Reflexive-Binding Principle is hardly changed⁸. For marked reflexives (e.g. “indirect” reflexives in Latin) Yang proposes the following principle⁹:

27) Marked Reflexive-Binding Principle

A marked reflexive is bound in the c-domain of its c-commanding minimal SUBJECT.

(i) SUBJECT = AGR only;

(ii) AGR is parameterized for individual languages:

(a) INFL of a finite clause for Russian, Hindi, Norwegian, Gothic, Latin, etc.

(b) INFL of an indicative clause for Icelandic, Italian, etc.

(c) COMP for Dutch, etc.

According to Yang, the notion SUBJECT is thus subject to parametrical variation. This means for Latin that a clause must be finite to constitute a governing category. By consequence all Latin AcI-constructions are inappropriate as governing categories. In (27) the subject of an AcI is no longer considered as an accessible SUBJECT in Latin. In this way, the question whether the anaphor is the subject of the AcI or not (which is a relevant question in English), becomes superfluous. The only criterion is the finiteness of the clause: the governing category of an anaphor or a pronominal is the minimal finite clause.

Unfortunately, Yang’s proposal doesn’t explain all Latin facts. Many examples show that a Latin anaphor can be bound outside the minimal finite clause:

28) Caesar_i mandavit legatis suis [ut quae diceret Ariovistus ad se_i referrent] (BG 1.47.5)

29) cuncti_i ad me publice venerunt, [ut suarum_i fortunarum omnium causam defensionemque susciperem] (Cic., Caecil. 2)

30) Diviciacus_i multis cum lacrimis Caesarem complexus obsecrare coepit ne quid gravius in fratrem statueret: scire se_i illa esse vera,

⁸ See Yang (1983), p. 176.

⁹ See Yang (1983), p. 178.

nec quemquam ex eo plus quam se_i doloris capere, [propterea quod ... per se_i crevisset] (BG 1.20.2)

It is however significant that indirect reflexives always occur in infinite or subjunctive sentences, never in indicative sentences¹⁰. The importance of the opposition between indicative and subjunctive/infinite for binding theory is demonstrated by the alternation of *is* and *se* in the following sentences:

31) Caesar_i non solum publicas sed etiam privatas iniurias ultus est, [quod eius_i soceri ... avum ... Tigurini ... interfecerant] (BG 1.12.7)

32) decima legio_i ... ei gratias egit, [quod de se_i optimum iudicium fecisset] (BG 1.41.2)

In (31) the embedded indicative sentence is the governing category. Consequently, *eius* is free, even when it is coindexed with *Caesar*. In (32) on the contrary, the matrix sentence is the governing category since the anaphor *se* is bound by *legio*. The embedded sentence seems inappropriate as governing category because it is in the subjunctive mood.

Our conclusion could be that Yang put Latin in the wrong list. In Latin AGR is not INFL of a finite clause, but INFL of an indicative clause, as in Italian or Icelandic. In this way Yang's parameterized binding theory would account for all Latin facts. The problem is however that a model based on the opposition between indicative and subjunctive/infinite overgenerates. Many subjunctive sentences do constitute governing categories, as in the following example¹¹:

33) Gallis; magno ad pugnam erat impedimento, quod *pro*_i pluribus eorum scutis uno ictu pilorum transfixis et colligatis, [cum ferrum_i se_{i/*j} inflexisset], neque evellere neque sinistra impedita satis commode pugnare poterant (BG 1.25.3)

The clause introduced by *cum* is in the subjunctive mood. Following the (adapted) definitions of Yang, the subjunctive clause doesn't count as a governing category and the anaphor can be bound outside the *cum*-clause. This is of course wrong; it is clear that the *cum*-clause is

¹⁰ See Bertocchi & Casadio (1980), p. 30; Bertocchi (1986), pp. 75–6; Calboli (1995), p. 79; Benedicto (1991), p. 172.

¹¹ Assuming that Latin is a pro-drop language, empty subjects are presented as *pro*.

the governing category for *se*. It seems thus impossible to deal with such examples within a model based on the distinction between moods. There is still another descriptive problem, when we encounter matrix sentences in subjunctive mood. In that case, still following Yang's adapted definitions, there would be no governing category at all and the occurrence of an anaphor would be made impossible.

Although an adequate formulation of a Latin binding theory based on the distinction between moods encounters many problems, that doesn't mean the distinction is unimportant. In my view the opposition between indicative and subjunctive/infinitive is the surface representation of an opposition on a deeper syntactic level: the distinction made in Valency Grammar between complement and adjunct. But before we go into this matter, I will first comment some proposals made by Bertocchi.

2.3 *Sequence of time*

As said before, Alessandra Bertocchi devoted some articles to the topic, some of which in collaboration with Claudia Casadio. Bertocchi & Casadio (1980) and (1983) merely described the problems of Latin binding facts without providing a real explanation. In Bertocchi (1986) however a possible solution is offered.

The essential concept in Bertocchi's proposal is *sequence of time* (*consecutio temporum*). Traditionally this term refers to the fact that the temporal interpretation of an embedded clause depends on the temporal interpretation of the matrix sentence. In other cases the clause is interpreted relative to the moment of speech rather than in relation to the tense of the main verb. In such cases there is no sequence of time. Bertocchi comes to the conclusion that in subjunctive and infinitive contexts, i.e. the contexts where an indirect reflexive is possible, there is always sequence of time. Therefore she proposes to formalize the distinction between these two sorts of temporal interpretation. When a verb is interpreted relative to the moment of speech, she calls that phenomenon "TENSE". When a tense merely expresses a temporal relation to the main verb (in case of sequence of time), we are dealing with "tense". She then states that an embedded sentence should contain the feature [+TENSE] to be the relevant binding domain for an anaphor. When this feature is not present (e.g. the clause contains the feature [+tense], but not [+TENSE]), the binding domain must be extended to the matrix sentence.

The hypothesis explains most facts convincingly. It is adequate with AcI-constructions (34–35), *ut*-clauses (36–37), indirect questions (38) and clauses that are part of an *oratio obliqua* (39):

- 34) (Ariovistus_i respondit [sese_i ad eum *venturum fuisse*] (= 15)
 35) Caesar_i Gallorum animos verbis confirmavit pollicitusque est [sibi_i eam rem curae *futuram*] (= 22)
 36) Caesar_i mandavit legatis suis [ut quae diceret Ariovistus ad se_i *referrent*] (= 28)
 37) cuncti_i ad me publice venerunt, [ut suarum_i fortunarum omnium causam defensionemque *susciperem*] (= 29)
 38) Ariovistus_i conclamavit [quid ad se_i *venirent*] (BG 1.47.6)
 39) Diviciacus_i multis cum lacrimis Caesarem complexus obsecrare coepit ne quid gravius in fratrem *statueret*. *scire* se_i illa esse vera, nec quemquam ex eo plus quam se doloris *capere*, [propterea quod (...) per se_i *crevisset*] (= 30)

In all these sentences the tense of the italicized verb expresses a relation to the tense of the main verb. There is sequence of time, but there is no direct temporal relation with the moment of speech. Consequently, the embedded clauses between brackets contain the feature [+tense], but not [+TENSE]. This means that the binding domain must be expanded to a higher level to obtain the relevant governing category for the anaphor. In (34–38) this higher level is the matrix sentence, which naturally contains [+TENSE]. In (39) even the next level doesn't contain [+TENSE] since it is an AcI-construction. In this example too we have to extend the relevant domain to the matrix sentence.

Although Bertocchi's proposal solves certain problems, we run into difficulties again: the model still overgenerates. There are many sentences in which there is sequence of time but the binding domain may not be expanded to the matrix sentence. Consider the following examples:

- 40) interea *pro*_i ea legione [quam *pro*_i secum_i *habebat*] militibusque [qui ex provincia *convenerant*] ... murum ... fossamque perducit (BG 1.8.1)
 41) Gallis_i magno ad pugnam erat impedimento, quod *pro*_i pluribus eorum scutis uno ictu pilorum transfixis et colligatis, [cum ferrum_i se_{i/*} *inflexisset*], neque evellere neque sinistra impedita satis comode pugnare poterant (BG 1.25.3)
 42) genus_i hoc erat [quo se_{i/*} Germani_i *exercuerant*] (BG 1.48.5)

As in these sentences the tense of the italicized verbs are related to the tense of the main verb rather than to the moment of speech, there is sequence of time and by consequence the clauses between brackets contain the feature [+tense] but not [+TENSE]. Following Bertocchi's proposal the matrix sentence is the governing category and anaphors can be bound outside the brackets. This is clearly not the case. In (40) *secum* can be coreferential with *pro* in the matrix sentence by coincidence, but coreferentiality with an element in the matrix sentence is completely impossible in (41–42).

Therefore, this attempt also seems to fail to solve the complex Latin binding situation. Since syntactical explanations appeared to be impossible, Bertocchi took another path in Bertocchi (1989).

2.4 *Empathy*

Bertocchi (1989) handles the problem of antecedents of Latin reflexives. The author concludes that "it is ... difficult to formulate fixed mechanical rules for the binding of the reflexive to possible antecedents, since it appears that the selection of the referent is strongly determined by the choices of the speaker."¹² In the article syntactical explanations of the Latin facts are given up and some semantic and pragmatic proposals are considered. Finally, Bertocchi states that the term *empathy*, introduced by Kuno and Kaburaki, could help to describe the Latin situation. This term refers to the speaker's identification with a person who participates in the event that he describes in the sentence. According to Bertocchi, the Latin reflexive is used when the event is described from the subject's (or topic's) "camera angle". In this way the use of the indirect reflexive can be explained. The indirect reflexive is used when the speaker identifies himself in some respect with the main subject. In this case not only the main clause, but also the clauses dependent on it are all presented by the speaker from the point of view of the main subject. This explains the occurrence of *se* and *suus* in an embedded clause, while their referent is in the main clause.

With the term *empathy* Bertocchi in a way reformulates the statements in traditional grammars about indirect reflexive use. Compare for instance with Ernout & Thomas: "Le réfléchi est dit indirect, lorsque, dans une proposition subordonnée représentant la pensée ou

¹² See Bertocchi (1989), p. 456.

l'intention du sujet du verbe principal, il renvoie à ce dernier."¹³ Such reflections based on pragmatics are interesting but rather vague. Therefore it is my belief that the matter should be further investigated on the basis of syntactical criteria. Bertocchi admits that syntactic factors are involved in Latin reflexivization¹⁴. Latin reflexives must be syntactically bound, either in their own clause or in the matrix sentence. Discourse antecedents, which are possible in Icelandic, are not allowed in Latin. This fact convinces me that a structural explanation must be pursued. That doesn't mean that semantic or pragmatic approaches are worthless. Obviously there are semantic and pragmatic factors that influence the use and the interpretation of Latin reflexives. In my view, however, pragmatic and semantic influences precede syntax. Differences on pragmatic and semantic level cause differences in syntactic structure and that structure produces the sentence. Whether a form of *se* or of *is* is used, is only *indirectly* determined by semantic or pragmatic factors such as empathy, and the relation between pragmatics and linguistic forms is mediated by syntax. For this reason I believe we should solve the current problem by employing syntactical criteria. It appears that Valency Grammar offers us a valid criterion to formulate a structural binding theory for Latin.

3. Complements and adjuncts

When we compare the contexts in which an indirect reflexive can occur with the contexts in which it is not possible, the opposition between complement and adjunct comes to mind. Let us first consider this opposition introduced in Valency Grammar.

In Valency Grammar a distinction is made between indispensable *complements* and optional *adjuncts*¹⁵. Naturally the opposition between complement and adjunct exists also on a sentential level:

- 43) John says that Mary loves him
- 44) *John says
- 45) *John says and does that Mary loves him
- 46) Mary kissed John because she loves him
- 47) Mary kissed John

¹³ See Ernout & Thomas (1959), p. 182.

¹⁴ See Bertocchi (1989), pp. 456–7.

¹⁵ See Happ (1976), pp. 184–7, 402–3; Pinkster (1984), pp. 1–14.

48) Mary kissed John and did that because she loves him.

The omission test in (44) and (47) and the *do*-test in (45) and (48) prove that *that Mary loves him* in (43) is a complement, while *because she loves him* in (46) is an adjunct.

When we take a closer look at some Latin examples, we see how important valency is with respect to binding theory:

- 49) Ariovistus_i; respondit [sese_i; ad eum venturum fuisse] (= 15)
 50) Caesar_i; Gallorum animos verbis confirmavit pollicitusque est [sibi_i; eam rem curae futuram] (= 22)
 51) Caesar_i; mandavit legatis suis [ut quae diceret Ariovistus ad se_i; referrent] (= 28)
 52) Ariovistus_i; conclamavit [quid ad se_i; venirent] (= 38)
 53) Gallis; magno ad pugnam erat impedimento, quod *pro*_i; pluribus eorum scutis uno ictu pilorum transfixis et colligatis, [cum ferrum_i; se_i/_∗_i; inflexisset], neque evellere neque sinistra impedita satis comode pugnare poterant (= 41)

When we examine in which respect the clauses between brackets in (49–52) differ from the *cum*-clause in (53), we find that the former are complement clauses while the latter is an adjunct clause¹⁶. Apparently indirect reflexive occurs in complement clauses, but not in adjunct clauses. However, we also have to deal with sentences like the following:

- 54) Diviciacus_i; multis cum lacrimis Caesarem complexus obsecrare coepit ne quid gravius in fratrem statueret: scire se_i; illa esse vera, nec quemquam ex eo plus quam se_i; doloris capere, [propterea quod (...) per se_i; crevisset] (= 30)

In (54) the clause between brackets is not a complement clause but an adjunct clause. It is nevertheless dependent on the AcI-construction *quemquem capere*, which is a complement of the main verb¹⁷. Since

¹⁶ A similar conclusion is reached by Poirier (1989), pp. 346–7. He states that clauses have to be part of the same predicate as the main verb to contain an indirect reflexive.

¹⁷ It is questionable whether in long indirect speeches as these the AcI is still a complement. After all *ne quid gravius in fratrem statueret* is a complement to *obsecrare* and it is typical for complements that they are not numerous (contrary to adjuncts). The fact however that the infinitive is used and the subject is in objective case proves a strong dependency relationship with the main verb. Therefore, I assume that the AcI is a complement, although the relationship between *obsecrare* and the AcI is rather unclear.

the clause between brackets is part of the complement of the main verb, the reflexive can be bound by *Diviciacus* in the main sentence. As a matter of fact we have to emphasize that the italicized *se* is bound by *Diviciacus* and not by the *se*'s in the AcI. That would be impossible since the *propterea*-clause is not a complement to the AcI, but an adjunct. The coreferentiality between the three *se*'s is coincidental. This is made clear by the following example:

55) *Lucius_i dixit [Philippum_i Iuliam_k interfecturum fuisse [si Gaius_i veritatem de se_{i/1/*j/*k} pandisset]]*

In (55) the *si*-clause is not a complement but an adjunct to the AcI. This explains why *se* cannot be bound by *Philippum* or *Iuliam*. The *si*-clause is however part of the complement to *dixit*. Consequently, it can be bound by *Lucius*. Of course the interpretation as a direct reflexive is also possible.


It appears therefore, that the distinction between complements and adjuncts is important to determine the binding domain for Latin reflexives. The importance of this distinction was already noticed in Benedicto (1991), who states that a Latin reflexive must be bound in its *dynasty*. A dynasty is a chain of governors such that each governor governs the minimal domain containing the next governor.¹⁸ What is important in this matter, is the fact that a dynasty can be formed in case of a complement clause, but not in case of an adjunct clause. This explains why an indirect reflexive can occur in a complement clause but not in an adjunct clause. Since a Latin reflexive must be bound in its dynasty and a dynasty can only be formed with a complement clause, indirect reflexives are only found in complement clauses. Benedicto makes another interesting statement about relative clauses¹⁹. Since non-restrictive relative clauses are attached on a higher level in the phrase marker than restrictive clauses, a dynasty can be formed with the latter but not with the former. Consequently, indirect reflexives occur in restrictive relative clauses, but not in non-restrictive clauses. Consider the following examples:

56) *Verres_i Milesios navem poposcit [quae eum_i praesidii causa Myn- dum prosequeretur]* (Cic., Verr., 2.1.86)

¹⁸ See Benedicto (1991), p. 172.


¹⁹ See Benedicto (1991), pp. 174–7.

57)



58) Epaminondas_i [_{NP} ei [_{NP} qui sibi_i ex lege praetor successerat]] exercitum non tradidit (Cic., Inv., 1.55)

59)



In (56) the relative clause is non-restrictive. The phrase marker in (57) shows that *poposcit* doesn't govern the relative clause and by consequence a dynasty cannot be formed. This explains why *eum* is used and not *se*. In (58) on the other hand, the relative clause is restrictive and a daughter of the NP (see 59). A dynasty can be formed and an indirect reflexive can occur. It is important to emphasize that the restrictive clause with the indirect reflexive is not in subjunctive mood and the non-restrictive clause is not in indicative mood. That is what we would expect following the assumptions about the opposition between indicative and subjunctive/infinite in section 2.2. Apparently, binding is not determined by this opposition, but by the distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive sentences, which is an exponent of the Valency Grammar opposition between complements and adjuncts. Probably, the use of subjunctive/infinite on the one hand and of indicative on the other is a factor that points out whether we are dealing with respectively a complement or an adjunct. Nevertheless, examples as (56) and (58) show that the opposition between indicative and subjunctive/infinite does not completely coincide with the one between adjuncts and complements. Therefore,

we conclude that the contrast between complements and adjuncts is the determinant factor for a Latin binding theory.

4. Further complications

Unfortunately it appears that the opposition between complements and adjuncts is still not sufficient to determine the syntactic binding domain for Latin anaphors. Again some examples contradict the present hypothesis, viz adverbial *ut*-clauses and some other sentences. Consider the following examples:

- 60) *cuncti; ad me publice venerunt, [ut suarum; fortunarum omnium causam defensionemque susciperem]* (= 29)
 61) *decima legio; ... ei gratias egit, [quod de se; optimum iudicium fecisset]* (= 32)

The sentences contain an indirect reflexive, but they cannot be considered to be complement clauses, as the tests prove:

- 62) *cuncti ad me publice venerunt*
 63) *cuncti ad me publice venerunt et id fecerunt ut suarum fortunarum omnium causam defensionemque susciperem*
 64) *decima legio ei gratias egit*
 65) *decima legio ei gratias egit et id fecit quod de se optimum iudicium fecisset*

The clauses can be omitted and a paraphrase with *facere* doesn't produce an ill-formed sentence. Therefore, these clauses are not complements but adjuncts²⁰. Yet the existence of these counterexamples doesn't necessarily ruin our hypothesis. Our assumptions can be maintained if we assign a sort of intermediate position to sentences like (60–61). It is true that they are not complements but they appear to be less adjunct-like than other adjunct clauses. Especially final clauses seem to be more related to the events in the main sentence and in this way they have a more complement-like quality. This becomes clear when final clauses are contrasted with consecutive clauses:

- 66) *Ariovistus; ad Caesarem; legatos mittit, uti ex suis; legatis aliquem ad se; mitteret* (BG 1.47.1)

²⁰ The identification for sentence (61) in Benedicto (1991), p. 172, as a complement clause seems wrong to me and is contradicted by the tests.

67) *neminem adeo infatuare potuit ut ei nummum ullum crederet* (Cic., Flac. 47.3)

The first sentence is a final clause and contains an indirect reflexive. In the consecutive clause in (67) an indirect reflexive is impossible. About this contrast Milner states: “Ainsi les consécutives se distinguent des finales en ceci que les secondes présentent un processus comme entièrement dépendant de l’activité d’un terme – généralement le sujet – de la principale, alors que les premières peuvent à l’occasion être posées de manière autonome.”²¹ Then Milner compares the contrast between final and consecutive clauses with the one between restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses. In the previous section we identified the latter contrast with the opposition between complements and adjuncts. We cannot maintain that the distinction between final and consecutive clauses is a distinction between complements and adjuncts, but in an intuitive way final clauses are to be considered more complement-like than consecutive clauses while consecutive clauses are more autonomous and adjunct-like. This intuition is confirmed by syntactic evidence suggesting that final clauses are closer to complement clauses than we would expect. The negation for complement clauses as well as for final clauses is *ne*, while in consecutive clauses *ut non* is used. This difference with respect to negation could be taken to mean that final clauses have another status than consecutive clauses and that the former are more related to complement clauses.

What I would suggest, is that final clauses (and some other clauses with an indirect reflexive as (61)) take an intermediate position between complements and adjuncts. Of course this makes the picture of Valency Grammar more complex, since we would have three categories instead of two, viz complements, adjuncts and a category in between. It is not clear either how we could represent this in phrase markers. The reason for maintaining these highly theoretical and hypothetical assumptions is my strong belief in the importance of the complement/adjunct opposition for Latin binding theory. In my research on the first book of Caesar’s *De Bello Gallico* I found only 5 counterexamples (= 1.28%) to my hypothesis on a total of 391 forms of *is*, *se* and *suus*. This makes me believe that the complement/adjunct opposition is the essential syntactical criterion in order to develop a Latin binding theory. The occurrence of indirect reflexives in final

²¹ See Milner (1978), p. 81.

clauses however is too significant and systematical to be ignored. The hypothesis that final clauses take an intermediate position between complements and adjuncts is an attempt to incorporate these problematic cases into the binding theory. Clearly further research on this topic is necessary.

5. Conclusion

In this paper I investigated the possibilities to develop a binding theory for Latin. It was immediately clear that Chomsky's definitions needed to be modified to account for the indirect reflexive phenomenon in Latin. Previous attempts to solve the complex problem in Latin did not yield satisfactory answers. The S'-deletion process could only explain the AcI-cases and (even the adapted) parameterized binding theory as proposed by Yang didn't account for all facts. The proposal by Bertocchi (1986), based on the sequence of time concept, incorporated all possible indirect reflexive contexts, but was unfortunately found to be overgenerating. The pragmatic approach of Bertocchi (1989) introducing the notion *empathy* was considered interesting but rather vague and did not meet the need for a structural-syntactical explanation.

As it appeared that only complement clauses can contain an indirect reflexive, such a structural-syntactical explanation was thought to be available in the complement/adjunct opposition. However, final (and some other) clauses contradicted this hypothesis. Therefore, it was suggested that these clauses take an intermediate position between complements and adjuncts.

An interesting point in the previous discussion was the fact that it is apparently possible to solve problems in developing a theory rooted in Generative Grammar by appealing to Valency Grammar. This suggests that assimilation of both linguistic paradigms can lead to promising results in the future.

References

- Benedicto, E. 1991. "Latin Long-distance Anaphora", in: J. Koster & E. Reuland (Eds.), *Long-distance Anaphora*, Cambridge: 171-184.
- Bertocchi, A. 1986. "Anaphor and Tense in Latin", in: G. Calboli (Ed.), *Papers on grammar II*, Bologna: 63-86.
- Bertocchi, A. 1989. "The Role of Antecedents of Latin Anaphors", in: G. Calboli

- (Ed.), *Subordination and Other Topics in Latin. Proceedings of the Third Colloquium on Latin Linguistics, Bologna, 1-5 April 1985*, Amsterdam: 441-462.
- Bertocchi, A.; Casadio, C. 1980. "Conditions on Anaphora: an Analysis of Reflexive in Latin", in: G. Calboli (Ed.), *Papers on grammar I*, Bologna: 1-46.
- Bertocchi, A.; Casadio, C. 1983. "Anaphoric Relations, Pronouns and Latin Complementation", in: H. Pinkster (Ed.), *Latin Linguistics and Linguistic Theory. Proceedings of the 1st International Colloquium on Latin Linguistics, Amsterdam, April 1981*, Amsterdam: 27-39.
- Calboli, G. 1995. "Subjonctif et réfléchi dans la proposition déclarative: du latin au roman", in: D. Longrée (Ed.), *De Usu. Etudes de syntaxe latine offertes en hommage à Marius Lavency*, Louvain-la-Neuve: 71-81.
- Chomsky, N. 1981. *Lectures on Government and Binding*, Dordrecht.
- Ernout, A.; Thomas, F. 1959. *Syntaxe latine*, Paris.
- Everaert, M. 2000. "Types of anaphoric expressions: Reflexives and reciprocals", in: Z. Frajzyngier & T.S. Curl (Ed.), *Reciprocals. Forms and Functions*, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: 63-83.
- Frajzyngier, Z. 2000. "Domains of point of view and coreferentiality: System interaction approach to the study of reflexives", in: Z. Frajzyngier & T.S. Curl (Ed.), *Reflexives. Forms and Functions*, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: 125-152.
- Frajzyngier, Z.; Curl, T.S. 2000. *Reflexives. Forms and Functions*, Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
- Happ, H. 1976. *Grundfragen einer Dependenz-Grammatik des Lateinischen*, Göttingen.
- König, E. 2000. "Intensifiers and reflexives: A typological perspective", in: Frajzyngier & Curl (2000): 41-74.
- Lasnik, H. 1989. "A Selective History of Modern *Binding Theory*", in: H. Lasnik (Ed.), *Essays on Anaphora*, Dordrecht: 1-36.
- Milner, J.C. 1978. "Le système du réfléchi en latin", in: *Langages*, 50: 73-85.
- Pinkster, H. 1984. *Latijnse syntaxis en semantiek*, Amsterdam.
- Poirier, M. 1989. "Le fonctionnement du réfléchi latin, témoignage sur la pertinence linguistique de l'opposition sujet/prédicat?", in: *Cahiers de l'Institut de Linguistique, Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve*, 15/1-4: 345-354.
- Reinhart, T. 1983. *Anaphora and Semantic Interpretation*, London.
- Reinhart, T.; Reuland, E. 1993. "Reflexivity", in: *Linguistic Inquiry*, 24, 4: 657-720.
- Reuland, E. 2000. "The fine structure of grammar: Anaphoric relations", in: Z. Frajzyngier & T.S. Curl (Ed.), *Reflexives. Forms and Functions*, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: 1-30.
- Yang, D.-W. 1983. "The Extended *Binding Theory* of Anaphors", in: *Language Research*, 19: 169-92.

Atreus and Attarissiyas

By MARTIN L. WEST, Oxford

There are many Homeric names in -εύς, including those of some of the most prominent Achaean heroes (Achilleus, Odysseus) or their fathers (Peleus, Neleus, etc.). As has often been observed, names with this suffix do not occur in the historical period but are well attested in the Linear B texts. In Homer they are generally declined with genitive in -ῆος or -έος as metrically convenient, the first being the primary reflex of *-ῆΦος, the second showing Ionic vowel-shortening following the loss of ƒ.

Atreus and Tydeus, however, are peculiar in that although they appear very frequently (mostly in phrases referring to their sons), they never have -ῆ-, only -έ-. Thus, whereas besides Πηλέος υἱός or υἰέ (6×) we find also Πηλῆος υἱός three times and fifteen other occurrences of Πηλῆα, -ος, -ι, with Atreus we find only Ἄτρεός υἱός (11×) and one instance of the dative Ἄτρεϊ, never *Ἄτρηα, -ος, -ι. With Tydeus we have Τυδέος 31 times, Τυδέϊ twice, Τυδέα and Τυδῆ once each, but never Τυδῆα, -ος, -ι. The patronymics tell a similar story. From Neleus and Peleus we get Νηληΐος and Νηληϊάδης, Πηληΐος and Πηληϊάδης (besides Πηλείδης and Πηλείων), but no *Ἄτρηΐος, *Ἄτρηϊάδης, *Τυδῆΐος, *Τυδῆϊάδης, only Ἄτρεΐδης, Ἄτρείων, Τυδείδης.

These facts have long been noted, but not satisfactorily explained. One would think that the Atreidai and Diomedes had a long history in oral tradition (even if not necessarily in the same cycle of poems), and that formulae such as *Ἄτρηΐος υἱός, *Ἄτρηϊάδης Ἀγαμέμνων, *Τυδῆΐος υἱός, *Τυδῆϊάδης Διφομήδης, should have established themselves in the epic language long before the loss of ƒ made shorter alternatives possible. It is the absence of these longer forms, not the currency of the shorter ones, that requires explanation¹.

Atreus and Tydeus are relatively obscure figures. There are myths about them, but the myths may not be very old. They were celebrated

¹ This is the point not sufficiently regarded in discussions such as those of K. Witte, *Glotta* 3, 1912, 388–93 (= *Zur homerischen Sprache*, Darmstadt 1972, 77–82); Schwyzer I 576; P. Chantraine, *Gramm. hom.* I 105f.; P. Wathelet, *Les traits éoliens dans la langue de l'épopée grecque*, Rome 1970, 275f.

chiefly as fathers of their sons; in other words, much more in the genitive, or in patronymic forms, than in the nominative. It seems a possibility worth considering that their original names did not end in -εύς, and that this nominative was in their case a relatively late back-formation from the genitive -έος and/or the patronymic -είδης.

I shall not pursue Tydeus further, as his name is particularly obscure, an exception to the general rule that -εύς names are explicable from Greek². In the case of Atreus, the Greeks of the Classical period themselves understood the name as ἄτρεστος³, and many modern scholars have accepted that it is a *Kurzname* based either on ἄτρεστος or on some other name beginning ἄτρε(σ)-⁴. They have not failed to observe that this gives a semantic link with the names of Atreus' sons, Agamemnon and Menelaus, both of which express the notion of standing fast in battle⁵.

From the formal point of view, ἄτρεύς can indeed be explained on these lines. But if the Homeric facts suggest that the nominative form is a relatively late and secondary coinage after an ἄτρεός or ἄτρείδης or ἄτρείων that did not go back to *ἄτρηF- but to *ἄτρε(σ)-, we should look for a different original nominative⁶. From the genitive we

² Cf. L.R. Palmer, *Mycenaeans and Minoans*, London 1961, 147. It is of no significance that Tydeus is named on a black-figure amphora as TVΔVΣ, since -υς for -εύς appears on a whole series of mythical names on Attic vases (P. Kretschmer, *Die griechischen Vasenschriften ihrer Sprache nach untersucht*, Gütersloh 1894, 138f., 193f.). Note also the anomalous accusative Τυδῆ (not resolvable into -έα) at Δ 384, in a passage with material from the Theban epic cycle, and Τύδης in Antimachus fr. 6-7.

³ Eur. *Iph. Aul.* 321 μῶν τρέσας οὐκ ἀνακαλύψω βλέφαρον, ἄτρεώς γεγώς; Pl. *Crat.* 395b τοῖς δ' ἐπαίουσι περὶ ὀνομάτων ἰκανῶς δηλοῖ ὁ βούλεται ὁ ἄτρεύς· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀτειρὲς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄτρεστον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀτηρὸν πανταχῆ ὀρθῶς αὐτῶι τὸ ὄνομα κεῖται; Hermog. π. ἰδεῶν 341 R. καὶ ὁ Εὐφορίων (fr. 125 Powell) "ἀτρεά δῆμον Ἀθηνῶν" ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄτρεστον καὶ ἄφοβον.

⁴ Fick-Bechtel, *Die griechischen Personennamen*, 2. Aufl., Göttingen 1894, 425; J. Escher-Bürkli, *RE* II 2139 with references to other literature; L.R. Palmer, *The Greek Language*, London 1980, 36. Cf. the historical Arcadian name Atrestidas, and Atreas (< *ἄτρε(h)ίας?) cited by Pape-Benseler from an Ephesian coin in T.E. Mionnet, *Description des médailles antiques grecques et romaines*, Paris 1807-37, Supp. 6.121.

⁵ Palmer, *The Greek Language*, 35f.

⁶ I note in passing that O. Szemerényi, *Μνήμης χάριν* (Gedenkschrift für P. Kretschmer, 1956-7) II 178f. = *Scripta Minora*, Innsbruck 1987, III 1112f., derives Atreus' name from ἄ-τρεσ-, but in accordance with his theory of the -εύς names he reconstructs the original declension as *ἦ-tres-us, *ἦ-tres-wos,

might infer an original * 'Ατρης, gen. 'Ατρε(σ)ος, compounded simply from the negative prefix and the verbal root τρεσ-. However, I cannot cite a close parallel for such a formation. One might compare ἄ-ζυγ-⁷, but this has the zero grade of the root.

There is another possible solution, namely to suppose that the formula 'Ατρέος υἱός is itself secondary to 'Ατρείδης. In forming a patronymic in -ίδης, it was permissible to shorten the original name. Thus Simoeisios 'Ανθεμίδης (Δ 488) is the son not of * 'Ανθεμος but of 'Ανθεμίων (473); Idomeneus Δευκαλίδης (N 307 al.) is the son of Δευκαλίων (451f.); Kypselos 'Ηετίδης was the son of 'Ηετίων (orac. in Hdt. 5.92ε.2)⁸. Similarly, the 'Ατρε(η)-ίδαι might originally have been the sons of an 'Α-τρε(η)-ίων; in Homer this form is itself a patronymic, synonymous with 'Ατρείδης, but it could be a valid name in itself, like 'Α-σφαλ-ίων (δ 216). But -ίων is not the only suffix that comes into question. We might think, perhaps, of an * 'Ατρε(η)ίας (< earlier * 'Α-τρεσ-ίας), an older form of the historically attested 'Ατρέας⁹. On this hypothesis the father's name would have been forgotten at an early stage by the tradition, which maintained only the patronymics 'Ατρείδης and 'Ατρείων. Later, when there were forms like Πηλείδης meaning 'son of Peleus', these came to be understood as 'son of Atreus', and the formula 'Ατρέος υἱός was coined as a metrical variant, on the model Πηλείδης: Πηλέος υἱός, paving the way for occasional use of the nominative 'Ατρέύς¹⁰.

We can now reconsider from a new vantage-point the formerly much discussed question of the relationship, if any, between Atreus' name and that of At-ta-ri-iš-ši-ia-aš or At-ta-ar-ši-ia-aš, recorded in a Hittite document as that of a 'man of Ahhiya' who in the reign of Tudḫaliyas II (c.1390-70?) had invaded Hittite territory in western Anatolia with infantry and a hundred chariots and subsequently assisted the rebel vassal Madduwattas in an assault on Cyprus¹¹. Emil

etc. He claims the Pylian place-name *A-te-re-wi-ya* (PY Aa 779, al.) as clear evidence for 'ΑτρηF-; but it can equally well be read as 'ΑδρηFια (cf. the Boeotian 'Αδρεύς and 'Αδρηίς).

⁷ Cf. A. Debrunner, *Griechische Wortbildungslehre*, Heidelberg 1917, 32.

⁸ See Schwyzer 509 for further examples.

⁹ The -ίας suffix is attested for Mycenaean personal names at least in *te/ti-mi-ti-ya* Θεμιστίας; in myth cf. Πελίας, Τειρεσίας, Αινείας; Schwyzer 470.

¹⁰ It occurs only once in Homer, B 106, and nowhere else before the fifth century.

¹¹ 'Indictment of Madduwatta', KUB XIV 1 + KBo XIX 38; A. Götze, *Madduwattas*, Leipzig 1928 (from *Mitt. d. Vorderasiatisch-Aegypt. Gesellsch.*

Forrer, in a notorious article in which he proposed a series of identifications of names occurring in the Hittite records with names known from Greek sources, connected Attar(is)siyas with Atreus, while admitting that it was difficult simply to equate the two forms:

Ein Zweifel an der sachlichen Identität dieser beiden scheint mir nicht möglich; jedoch sind die griechische und die keilinschriftlichen Formen des Namens nicht ohne weiteres gleichzusetzen. Die Ähnlichkeit der beiden Namen aber ist eine zu auffallende, als daß ich sie für Zufall halten könnte¹².

Forrer's article provoked a strongly negative reaction from Hittitologists such as Albrecht Götze, Johannes Friedrich, and Ferdinand Sommer. Sommer pronounced the Attar(is)siyas-Atreus equation, from the phonological point of view, to be 'ein Ding der Unmöglichkeit', and declared that 'den Namen [Attarssiyas, as he interpreted it from the variant spellings] als kleinasiatisch zu betrachten, besteht nicht der geringste Grund'¹³. Even Paul Kretschmer, who accepted many of Forrer's equations, remained unpersuaded by Attar(is)siyas-Atreus¹⁴. However, it is now generally agreed that the Orientalists went too far in their wholesale rejection of Forrer's proposals. Everyone today admits, on historical and geographical rather than on linguistic grounds, that Ahhiya/ Ahhiyawa was a Mycenaean kingdom (wherever its borders are to be placed), that Wilusa/Wilusiya was in the Troad and inseparable from *Ἰλίου*, that Lazpas is Lesbos, Apasas Ephesus, and Millawanda Miletus¹⁵. Of the personal names, it is accepted that that of Alaksandus, ruler of Wilusa, is not Asiatic but a rendering of *Ἀλέξανδρος*, and that Tawagalawas or Tawakalawas, the name of an Ahhiyawan king's brother, is a rendering of *Ἐτεφοκλέης* (not the son of Oedipus, of course, but a homonym).

What, then, of Attar(is)siyas? As he was a 'man of Ahhiya', there is at least a fair chance that he too should have a Greek name. While

32, 1927), 41–50; F. Sommer, *Die Ahhijawā-Urkunden* (*Abh. Bayr. Ak. Wiss.* 6, 1932), 330f. This is the earliest reference to Ahhiya(wa) in Hittite texts.

¹² *Mitt. d. Deutschen Orient-Gesellsch.* 63, 1924, 21; cf. *Orientalische Literatur-Zeitung* 1924, 118; *Kleinasiatische Forschungen* 1, 1930, 263f.

¹³ *Die Ahhijawa-Urkunden*, 330. He referred to Götze, *Madduwattas*, 49, who had compared the Lydian names *Atraśās*, *Atraśtaś*. Cf. also H. von Kamptz, *Die homerischen Personennamen*, Göttingen 1982, 336f.

¹⁴ *Glotta* 15, 1927, 168; 18, 1930, 162 and 170.

¹⁵ On Hittite geography see now O.R. Gurney in H. Otten et al., *Hittite and Other Anatolian and Near Eastern Studies in Honour of Sedat Alp*, Ankara, 1992, 213–21; F. Starke, *Studia Troica* 7, 1997, 448–87, esp. 448–59; J.D. Hawkins, *Anat. St.* 48, 1998, 1–31.

it is implausible to equate it directly with Ἄτρεός, it has occurred to several scholars that a relationship is nevertheless possible. Kretschmer records that in April 1924, immediately on the appearance of Forrer's paper, he had written to him to say that *if* the two names were correctly equated (which, however, he regarded as 'sachlich nicht genügend begründet'), Ἄτρεός should be seen as a shortened form for *Ἄτρεσίᾱς or *Ἄτρεσίᾱς¹⁶. Even before that, P. Haupt had written that 'Hitt. Attarissiiias (< Attaristiiias < Atristiiias) may represent ἄτρεστος'¹⁷. O. Szemerényi¹⁸ interpreted it as Atarsiyas or Atresiyas, considering this to be a Hittite 'translation' of Ἄτρεός.

We have seen reason to suspect that behind the Homeric patronymic Ἄτρεΐδης lies a Mycenaean name such as *Atrehion or *Atrehias, with Atreh- from older *Atres-. The name of the early fourteenth-century Achaean freebooter commemorated in the Indictment of Madduwatta may very well be interpreted as Atresias or Atersias (or Atarsias < *A-trs-ias). There is no reason to connect this man with the father of the Atreidai celebrated in Greek tradition; but he probably had the same or a related name.

¹⁶ P. Kretschmer, *Glotta* 15, 1927, 168. For -τρεσ- he compared Hesych. ε 6581 ἔτρεσεν· ἐφόβησεν.

¹⁷ P. Haupt, *AJP* 45, 1924, 253.

¹⁸ Cf. above, n. 6.

Hypomnemata

Untersuchungen zur Antike und zu ihrem Nachleben

150: Adam Nicholas Bartley

Stories from the Mountains, Stories from the Sea

The Digressions and Similes of Oppian's
Halieutica and the *Cynegetica*

2003. XII, 342 Seiten, gebunden € 66,- D
ISBN 3-525-25249-8

This work is an examination of the extent and nature of influence from Greek and Roman epic upon the *Halieutica* of Oppian of Cilicia, a text on salt-water fishing in five books of epic verse, and the pseudo-Oppianic *Cynegetica*, a similar work devoted to hunting over four books. Passages that digress from technical instruction and the more developed similes have been chosen for analysis due to their thematic links with earlier Greek and Roman heroic and didactic epics. Recently developed approaches to study of the intertextual relationship between the Roman epic poets and their Greek predecessors have been adapted to the study of the *Halieutica* and the *Cynegetica*. This approach highlights differences between the response of these poets and of their Roman counterparts.

Der Band untersucht den Einfluss griechischer und römischer Epik auf die *Halieutica* des Oppian von Cilicien und die pseudo-oppianische *Cynegetica*.

149: Augustin Speyer

Kommunikationsstrukturen in Senecas Dramen

Eine pragmatisch-linguistische
Analyse mit statistischer Auswertung
als Grundlage neuer Ansätze zur
Interpretation

2003. 320 Seiten mit 21 Figuren
und 15 Tabellen, gebunden € 59,- D
ISBN 3-525-25248-X

Die Kommunikation der Figuren in Senecas Tragödien ist bemerkenswert subtil durchgestaltet, wie die Untersuchung des Dramencorpus nach zwei Parametern, Unterbrechungsfrequenz und Kohärenz zeigt. Ein Spiel mit diesen beiden Parametern erlaubt es Seneca z.B. Spannungsbögen und Konflikte in einer realitätsnahen Weise zu gestalten, wie es sonst keiner der attischen Tragiker in dieser Konsequenz getan hat. Die Ergebnisse aus dem dialogischen Bereich lassen sich auf den monologischen Bereich übertragen und zeugen dort von derselben Sorgfalt und Variabilität in der Ausarbeitung.

V&R
Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht

Aporemata

Kritische Studien zur Philologiegeschichte

Bei Subskription der Reihe ca. 5 % Ermäßigung.

Band 6: Glenn W. Most (Hg.)
Disciplining Classics –
Altertumswissenschaft als Beruf
2002. XI, 280 Seiten, kart. € 62,- D
ISBN 3-525-25905-0

Alle Beiträge gehen zurück auf das von Glenn W. Most im Sommer 1999 veranstaltete 5. Heidelberger Kolloquium zu historischen und methodologischen Fragen der Philologie. Dies ist der letzte Band der Reihe Aporemata.

Band 5: Glenn W. Most (Hg.)
Historicization – Historisierung
2001. XII, 385 Seiten, kart. € 66,- D
ISBN 3-525-25904-2

Die Beiträge des Bandes untersuchen die Rolle der Historisierung während der letzten Jahrhunderte in den Disziplinen Philologie, Religionswissenschaft, Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Kunstgeschichte, Geschichte, Archäologie und Anthropologie.

Band 4: Glenn W. Most (Hg.)
Commentaries – Kommentare
1999. XVI, 468 Seiten mit 8 Abbildungen, kart.
€ 74,- D
ISBN 3-525-25903-4

Die Kommentierung von Texten, blickweitend auch jene von Kunstwerken, und ihre weit zurückreichende Tradition, innerhalb derer sie eigenständige Entwicklungen und oftmals erstaunliche Wirkungen entfaltet hat, wird an Beispielen aus der lateinischen und griechischen Klassik, aber auch aus der Assyriologie, der Sinologie, der Judaistik und der Islamistik diskutiert.

Band 3:
Fragmentsammlungen philo-
sophischer Texte der Antike /
Le raccolte dei frammenti
di filosofi antichi

Atti del Seminario Internazionale Ascona, Centro Stefano Franscini 22-27 Settembre 1996. Herausgegeben von Walter Burkert, Laura Gemelli Marciano, Elisabetta Matelli, Lucia Orelli. 1998. XIII, 433 Seiten, kart.
€ 69,- D
ISBN 3-525-25902-6

Wissenschaftler, die mit Editionen und Interpretationen philosophischer Fragmente hervorgetreten sind und weiter daran arbeiten, zeigen in Diskussion und Darstellung für den Gesamtbereich der griechischen Antike in ihrer persönlichen Perspektive die Problemlage im allgemeinen und die Chancen des Fortschritts durch weitere Detailarbeit.

Band 2: Glenn W. Most (Hg.)
Editing Texts – Texte edieren
1998. XVI, 268 Seiten mit zwei Indices, kart.
€ 52,- D
ISBN 3-525-25901-8

Band 1: Glenn W. Most (Hg.)
Collecting Fragments –
Fragmente sammeln
1997. X, 338 Seiten, kart. € 52,- D
ISBN 3-525-25900-X

V&R
Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht

Neuerscheinungen zu Aischylos

Sabine Föllinger

Genosdependenzen: Studien zur Arbeit am Mythos bei Aischylos

Hypomnemata, Band 148.

2003. 372 Seiten, gebunden € 79,- D

ISBN 3-525-25247-1

Ausgehend von einer grundsätzlichen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Begriff „griechischer Mythos“ und der Frage nach seiner Literarizität untersucht Sabine Föllinger – bei Ausschluss des problematischen Prometheus – die Plots der aischyleischen Dramen unter dem Aspekt von Tradition und Innovation in der Mythenbehandlung. Ein Vergleich mit den vor- aischyleischen – epischen, lyrischen, auch bildlichen – Quellen führt zu dem Ergebnis, dass Aischylos mythische Erzählungen kreierte, die von Affirmation oder Ablehnung geprägte, Generationen übergreifende Dependenz in den Mittelpunkt stellen. Die Genosdependenzen werden als externe Determinanten für das stets in Beziehung zur Gemeinschaft (Polis) gesetzte individuelle Handeln dargestellt. Damit bilden die aischyleischen Mythen als rational zu betrachtende Erklärungsangebote für die Kausalität komplexer Zusammenhänge.

Eckard Lefèvre

Studien zu den Quellen und zum Verständnis des *Prometheus Desmotes*

Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Phil.-Hist. Klasse.

Dritte Folge, Band 252. 2003. 190 Seiten,
Leinen € 49,90 D

ISBN 3-525-82524-2

Unter Aischylos' Namen ist die Tragödie ‚Der Gefesselte Prometheus‘ (*Prometheus Desmotes*) überliefert. Aufgrund seiner ungewöhnlichen Struktur, der Sprache und des Weltbilds regen sich seit dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts Zweifel an der Echtheit des Stücks. Der Autor versucht, seine Unechtheit und Abhängigkeit von mehreren aischyleischen Tragödien (darunter dem ‚Gelösten Prometheus‘, *Prometheus Lyamēnos*) zu erweisen. Dagegen wird nicht die Ansicht führender Forscher geteilt, auch der ‚Gelöste Prometheus‘ und der ‚Feuerbringer Prometheus‘ (*Prometheus Pyrphoros*) seien unecht. Es wird gezeigt, dass das Stück um 425 v. Chr. unter dem Einfluss der Sophistik entstanden ist.

V&R
Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht

Platon Werke

Übersetzung und Kommentar

Herausgegeben von Ernst Heitsch
und Carl Werner Müller.

Bei Abnahme des Gesamtwerkes
ca. 5% Nachlass.

Gesamtplan der Ausgabe

- I
 - 1 Euthyphron (M. Forscher)
 - 2 Apologie (E. Heitsch)*
 - 3 Kriton (K. Döring)
 - 4 Phaidon (Th. Ebert)
- II
 - 1 Kratylos (P. Staudacher)
 - 2 Theaitetos (O. Primavesi)
 - 3 Sophistes (G. Patzig)
 - 4 Politikos (F. Ricken)
- III
 - 1 Parmenides (A. Graeser)
 - 2 Philebos (D. Frede)*
 - 3 Symposion ((K. Sier)
 - 4 Phaidros (E. Heitsch)*
- IV
 - 1 Alkibiades I (K. Döring)
 - 2 Alkibiades II (N.N.)
 - 3 Hipparchos (P. Rudolf)
 - 4 Erastai (W. Deuse)
- V
 - 1 Theages (K. Döring)
 - 2 Charmides (F. Buddensiek)
 - 3 Laches (J. Hardy)
 - 4 Lysis (M. Bordt)*
- VI
 - 1 Euthydemos (M. Erler)
 - 2 Protagoras (B. Manuwald)*
 - 3 Gorgias (J. Dalfen)
 - 4 Menon (J. Szaif)
- VII
 - 1 Hippias maior (C.W. Müller)
 - 2 Hippias minor (C.W. Müller)
 - 3 Ion (C.W. Müller)
 - 4 Menexenos (Ch. Eucken)
- VIII
 - 1 Kleitophon (N.N.)
 - 2 Politeia I-IV (P. Stemmer)
 - Politeia V-VII (A. Schmitt)
 - Politeia VIII-X (N. Blössner)
 - 3 Timaios (W. Bernard)
 - 4 Kritias (H.G. Nesselrath)
- IX
 - 1 Minos (J. Dalfen)
 - 2 Nomoi (K. Schöpsdau)
 - 3 Epinomis (K. Geus)
 - 4 Epistulae (K. Trampedach)

* Bereits erschienen

IX 2 Nomoi (Gesetze)

Buch IV-VII

Übersetzung und Kommentar
von Klaus Schöpsdau

NEU

2003. 656 Seiten, gebunden ca. € 106,- D ;
bei Abnahme des Gesamtwerkes
ca. 5% Nachlass
ISBN 3-525-30434-X

Die *Nomoi* („Gesetze“), in denen ein Gesetzeskodex für einen fiktiven Staat formuliert wird, können als das eigentliche politische Hauptwerk Platons gelten. Ziel des auf drei Bände angelegten Kommentars ist es, auf der Basis der seit E.B. Englands Kommentar (1921) geleisteten exegetischen Arbeit den Text sachlich und gedanklich eingehend zu erklären und ihn in den Kontext der antiken politischen Theorie und Praxis einzuordnen. Der zweite Band enthält die Bücher IV-VII, in denen Platon neben einer Beschreibung der territorialen Anlage der idealen Stadt, ihrer sozialen Struktur und ihrer Verfassungsorgane in einer großen Ansprache an die künftigen Bewohner die für das Leben in der Stadt maßgebenden ethischen Normen und Werte aufzeigt und ein detailliertes Curriculum für die Erziehung der Bürger entwirft.

V&R
Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht